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Abstract
Soft Power Politics
The Role of Political Foundations in Germany’s Foreign Policy towards 
Regime Change in Spain, Portugal and South Africa 1974 - 1994
A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations
Jens-Ulrich Poppen 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Summer 2006
This thesis explores new analytical ground in analysing and describing power in the 
pursuit of Germany’s postwar foreign policy, particularly during the Cold War era. 
With reference to Germany’s party foundations, the dissertation provides an 
introductory discussion of the prevailing narratives on power in the discourse over 
Germany’s postwar foreign policy, namely ‘forgetting power’, civilian power, tamed 
power and middle power.
It advances the critical argument that the realist ‘forgetting power’ narrative remains 
too narrowly focused on coercive and unilaterally realised power projection 
capabilities while appreciating multilateral forms of external action only as an 
expression of weakness. On the other hand, the largely constructivist approaches of 
civilian, tamed and middle power analysis put too exclusive an emphasis on 
multilateral frameworks of diplomatic action in the pursuit of the FRG’s foreign 
policy.
Instead, this research concludes that postwar Germany’s foreign policy cannot be 
fully understood without paying ample attention to the two-layered operational nature 
of the FRG’s diplomacy, which is based on the systemic relationship of 
transnationally operating nongovernmental actors and state institutions. Postwar 
Germany was therefore neither ‘forgetful of its power’ nor did it play out its power 
resources solely within multilateral organisations. In fact, it pursued state interests 
regularly through non-multilateral channels and by mobilising noncoercive power 
potentials.
The thesis utilises Joseph S. Nye’s concept of soft power as the ability to shape the 
preferences of actors through inducement and attraction rather than coercion and 
threat in order to highlight the specific configuration of the FRG’s postwar foreign 
policy displayed on a sub-state level. This model is then applied to analyse the 
democracy promotion activities of two German political foundations or Stiftungen, the 
Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (FEF) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF) 
during the regime change processes in Spain, Portugal and South Africa respectively.
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Introduction
In January 2003, the Office of the Public Prosecutor in the Turkish capital Ankara 
charged the resident representatives of five German political foundations or Stiftungen 
with the “creation of a secret alliance to launch activities directed against the Turkish 
Government and intended to promote separatism.”1 The Turkish High Court for State 
Security subsequently opened trial proceedings against the Stiftungen -  the Christian 
Democratic Konrad-Adenauer Foundation (KAF) closely affiliated with the German 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Social Democratic Friedrich-Ebert Foundation 
(FEF) linked with the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the liberal Friedrich-Naumann 
Foundation (FNF) close to the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Bavaria-based Hanns- 
Seidel Foundation (HSF) as the think tank affiliated with the Christian Social Union 
(CSU) and the party foundation of the German Green Party, the Heinrich-Boll 
Foundation (HBF) -  and their representatives, which found themselves threatened with 
a possible maximum sentence of up to 15 years imprisonment for trying to conspire 
against the national unity and the secular structures of the Turkish state.2 Ironically 
though, the prosecutor coined the allegations “legal espionage.” The accusations of 
external interference in domestic Turkish affairs had been triggered by the book of the 
nationalistic history professor Necip Hablemitoglu of the University of Ankara, ‘The 
Bergama Dossier and the German Foundations’, in which the Turkish academic accused 
the transnationally-operating organisations of having incited local farmers in the town of 
Bergama to protest against the commercial exploitation of natural gold deposits by an 
Australian company, which would cause environmental damages by using the toxic 
substance cyanide in the washing process.4 According to Habemitoglu’s hypothesis, the 
Stiftungen, acting on behalf of the German Government and being disguised agents of 
the country’s intelligence agency Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), followed the long­
1 Spiegel-Online, ’Deutschen Stiftungsmitgliedem drohen 15 Jahre Haft’, 2 January 2003.
2 Ibid.
3 BBC News Online, ‘German group rejects ,spy’ charges’, 26 December 2002, available from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/2606513.stm. cited on 12 March 2003.
4 Shortly after the publication o f the(/Sergama Dossier’, Hablemitoglu was assassinated by unknown 
gunmen in front o f his house in Ankara/see Evangelos Antonaros, ‘Ein unbequemer Mann’, Die Welt, 20 
December 2002.
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term goal of undermining the cultural, ethnic and religious unity of the Turkish state. 
Since Germany possessed the world’s largest gold reserves including Jewish gold inlays 
robbed from inmates in the Nazi-run concentration camps, the government in Berlin 
tried to prevent Turkey from exploiting its own resources thereby stabilising the 
international market and avoiding a free fall of gold prices through growing supply.5 
The academic’s analysis, which was subsequently used by the equally nationalistic state 
attorney Nuh Mete Yiiksel in his indictment to illustrate the Stiftungen’s intention to 
lastingly erode the fundaments of Turkish sovereignty, appeared to be “just as 
unbelievable as it was absurd”6 and was widely seen as an ‘academically’ supported 
attempt of anti-European forces in the highest echelons of government and the justice 
system to sabotage the country’s future accession to the European Union (EU) and to 
slow down any attempts of further European integration.
The episode, which ended with the acquittal of all accused, highlighted some 
characteristic aspects of the operational nature of Germany’s foreign policy and its 
multifaceted and multilayered set up. The country’s transnationally operating political 
foundations are a foreign policy instrument, which helps Germany’s parties to 
implement project-based programmes of political co-operation aimed at promoting 
democratic structures and the strengthening of a global ethos of good governance. They 
have become an integral part of the FRG’s foreign policy system since their coming into 
existence in the late 1950s and are neither mere tools for the Federal Republic’s official 
diplomacy nor are they foreign policy actors that operate without political affiliation in 
the anything-goes environment of an international relations vacuum. Their high degree 
of manoeuvrability in the international system comes as a result of their “ambivalent 
position within the FRG’s institutional structure” 7 and adds to the diversity of 
Germany’s foreign policy system. The tense reaction on the part of Ankara’s 
conservative establishment highlights the widespread sensitivities and often almost 
allergic reaction in certain political circles provoked by the appearance of the Stiftungen
5 GUnter Seufert, ’Im Auftrage Berlins’, Berliner Zeitung, 23 December 2002.
6 Harald Weiss, ’Das Ankaraner Staatssicherheitsgericht und die deutsche Aussenpolitik’, available from 
www.swr.de/nachrichten/kommentare/2002/12/27/456. cited on 16 March 2003.
7 Sebastian Bartsch, ‘Politische Stiftungen: Grenzganger zwischen Gesellschafts- und Staatenwelt’, in 
Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Karl Kaiser (eds.), Deutschlands neue Aufienpolitik - Institutionen und Ressourcen, 
vol.4, (R.Oldenbourg Verlag Munchen 1998), p. 193.
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on the political scene of their respective host country. The fear of outside meddling in 
the internal affairs of a sovereign polity leads many governments to either observe the 
activities of the German political foundations with the utmost level of suspicion or to 
ban the transnational organisations altogether from their state territory. This fear comes 
as a reaction to a form of German diplomatic power that largely eludes the control of 
foreign governments. Their decidedly low-key approach to international projects has 
frequently aroused the suspicion of foreign governments that the foundations were in 
fact influencing political developments in third countries through a “secret-service-style 
invisible hand”. 8 The Stiftungen provide political aid and infrastructural expertise 
through various channels on sub-governmental level and operate behind-the-scenes of 
the target country. They transcend borders and systems, stabilise and strengthen 
democratic forces in transitional societies and in countries undergoing phases of a 
consolidating “democratic deepening.” 9 The Foundations’ democracy promotion 
activities can be seen as an expression of post-war Germany’s pro-active foreign policy 
approach, which appeared to be everything but abstemious in the conduct of the FRG’s 
external relations and the shaping of its international milieu in spite of its semi­
sovereign status and its strong multilateral integration.
Therefore, the Stiftungen model seems to run counter to a number of common 
assumptions about the operational mode of (West) Germany’s foreign policy in the 
aftermath of the Second World War and calls for a conceptual rethink of long- 
established narratives that have sought to explain idea, configuration, historical 
transformation and structure of political power in the Federal Republic.10 This study 
seeks to address these existing imbalances arguing that postwar Germany’s foreign 
policy cannot be fully understood without paying ample attention to the two-layered 
operational nature of its diplomacy, which is based on the systemic relationship of 
transnationally operating nongovernmental actors (like the political foundations) and 
state institutions. It will further argue that the FRG pursued its state interests often 
through non-multilateral channels and by mobilising noncoercive power potentials.
8 Ibid, p. 194.
9 Georg Sorensen, Democracy and Democratisation: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World, 
(Westview Press, Boulder 1993), p.40.
10 See p.4 as well as Chapter 1.
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Literature
The widely held view in academia, journalism and on the political scene both in West 
Germany and abroad was that the FRG had become a fragmented entity on the 
international map and that its society defined itself exclusively through its economic 
success rather than through a people’s traditional arsenal of collective sentiments such 
as patriotism, national pride or military glory. This narrative adumbrated the FRG as the 
semi-sovereign torso of the former German Empire, a geographically ‘amputated’ state 
that remained permanently handicapped by the loss of one-third of its territory to the 
Soviet sphere of influence. Bonn’s satellite dependency on the United States hegemon 
and the surrender of crucial elements of its state sovereignty such as the right to produce 
and possess nuclear weapons were seen as further illustration of German weakness and 
its diplomatic vulnerability.11
Consequently, critics argued, West Germany sought compensation for its loss of 
great power status by carving out an operational niche as a medium-seize actor in 
international relations. Its post-war appearance as a middle power with a strong 
preference for multilateral means of resolving international conflict within European or 
transatlantic frameworks led a number of conservative academic commentators to 
remark often aghastly that the Federal Republic’s foreign policy was characterised by a 
“fear of power”, a “forgetfulness” or Machtvergessenheit displayed towards more 
assertive forms of international self-conduct, which in their view was the expression of 
an attitude that frowned upon the use of coercion to change other states behaviour. 
Reflecting on his country’s foreign policy before the historical watershed of 
reunification in 1989/90, realist IR scholar Hans-Peter Schwarz could barely conceal the 
acidity in his critique when he pointed out “over the past few decades, it was not exactly
1 9common practice to emphasise ‘German interests’. The ‘forgetting power’ theorists 
like Schwarz put forward a general critique of those societal and political forces, which 
in their opinion had declared the pursuit of classical power politics and any diplomacy
11 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Zentralmacht Europas -  Deutschlands Riickkehr a u f die Weltbuhne, (Siedler 
Verlag, Berlin 1994); Christian Hacke, ‘Nationales Interesse als Handlungsmaxime fur die Aussenpolitik 
Deutschlands’, in Karl Kaiser, Joachim Krause (eds.), Deutschlands neue Aufienpolitik -  Interessen und 
Strategies vol.3, (R.Oldenbourg Verlag Miinchen 1996), pp. 3 -  13.
12 Ibid, p. 17.
11
guided by national interests to be inadmissible. “The idea of ‘nation’ was demonised, 
European integration idealised” writes Christian Hacke, “at the same time, the notion of 
‘power’ was abolished and replaced by ‘responsibility’ and ‘peace politics’.”13
Realists accused West German foreign policy elites and the intellectual 
masterminds of the FRG’s post-war middlepowerdom of having swapped the 
rationality-based calculus of state interests for some diffuse attempt at diplomatic 
altruism with the process of European integration as the new catalyst for identity 
building. Deeply traumatised by the horrors of the Second World War and the genocide 
that came in its wake, West Germany’s 60-million strong population surrendered to a 
pacifist reflex, which excluded from the exercise of political power as the ability to 
“make or receive any change, or to resist it”14 not only any use of physical force but also 
any consideration given to self-advancement and self-interest. Realist scholars therefore 
deplored what they perceived to be West Germany’s schizophrenic predisposition 
towards expressing the national interest of others rather than its own with 
multilateralism being elevated to the level of diplomatic dogma at the expense of an 
autonomous foreign policy. In their eyes, the FRG’s “forgetfulness of power” amounted 
to a free fall from a near indomitable position in the international arena to the pitifully 
pusillanimous manoeuvring of an ‘emasculated’ foreign policy.
In contrast, a number of mostly constructivist analysts have rejected the acerbity 
with which realism had described West Germany’s Cold War appearance on the 
international stage and have instead highlighted the multilateral configuration of Bonn’s 
post-war power politics. They put forward the proposition that following a 
‘civilianising’ impulse, the FRG’s foreign policy merely adjusted to changes in the 
structure of the international system commonly described as global interdependence and 
as, what Richard Rosecrance has described as ‘trading states’15, had replaced the old 
confrontative patterns of foreign policy behaviour by co-operative strategies and
13 Christian Hacke, ‘Nationales Interesse als Handlungsmaxime fiir die Aussenpolitik Deutschlands’, 
op.cit., p.3; See also Egon Bahr, Deutsche Interessen -  Streitschrift zur Macht, Sicherheit und Aufienpolitik, 
(Karl Blessing Verlag, Miinchen 1998), p. 18.
14 Steven Lukes, ‘Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds’, Millenium: Journal o f  International Studies, 
vol.33, no.3, p.478.
15 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise o f  the Trading State -  Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, 
(Basic Books, New York 1985).
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approaches, which were more conducive to international economic relations than 
unilateral forms of coercion-based power politics.16 In their assessment, the FRG far 
from being oblivious of power had in fact pursued power politics with the necessary 
degree of assertiveness only that in an increasingly interdependent world and, crucially, 
with a radically altered normative system and post-Auschwitz national identity, German 
power now was being played out within multilateral frameworks and through 
international organisations. Three approaches within the constructivist camp have 
minted the debate on power in the pursuit of West Germany’s foreign policy. Certainly 
the most influential narrative appeared to be the civilian power hypothesis, which 
argued that instead of having experienced a depletion of political power, West Germany 
merely reconfigured its power projection capabilities thus moving away from a thinking 
in realist terms of deterrence and containment towards a multilaterally grounded 
diplomacy that sought to achieve international consensus on issues o f ‘high-politics’ and 
promoted institutionalised forms of conflict-resolution. 17 Civilian power theorists 
discern the FRG’s rejection of any militarised foreign policy as part of a civilisational 
process, which they see characterised by the partial transfer of sovereign rights and the 
taming of social violence domestically as well as internationally. Civilian powers are 
therefore anything but machtvergessen, instead they dexterously use the operational 
space that multilateral organisations provide for the pursuit of state interests.
The theme of an ‘institutionalisation of power’ is being taken up by Peter 
Katzenstein, who also demurs the realist assertion of West Germany’s forgetfulness of 
power, complements the civilian power approach and argues that rather than German 
power having sunken into oblivion it has been tamed through a process of thorough 
European integration. Katzenstein argues that this European institutional context had 
facilitated the emergence of a new national identity in West Germany, which favoured 
bargaining, negotiating and consensual approaches over threatening military postures. In 
his view, the FRG’s postwar aversion towards the use of force found its expression in 
Bonn’s dialogue-oriented multilateral diplomacy, which Katzenstein classifies as ‘soft’.
16 Gunther Hellmann, ‘Jenseits von “Normalisierung” und “Militarisierung”: Zur Standortdebatte ttber die 
neue deutsche Aufienpolitik’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, vol.47, 1997, no. 1-2, p.26.
17 See e.g. Hanns W. Maull, ’Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland -  Vierzehn Thesen fur eine neue 
deutsche Aufienpolitik’, Europa-Archiv, vol. 43, no. 10, 1992, pp. 269 -278.
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The final narrative depicts the FRG as a middle power, which after its defeat in the
Second World War learned to play the role of good international citizen in international 
1 8 *  •fora. This, middle power theorists would argue, was expressed in West Germany’s 
proneness to display certain patterns of foreign policy behaviour such as bridge- 
building, mediation, ‘honest broker’, two-track diplomacy and multilateral forms of 
dispute resolution. The middle power approach also contrasts starkly with the rather 
disparaging remarks made by realist scholars about the “German public’s provincial 
lack of understanding regarding the central position of power in international relations” 
and their scoffing at the “Federal Government’s general obsession with harmony, which 
is being exceeded only by the tendency to either create a new intergovernmental 
organisation or to inflate an already existing one for every new problem.”19
Both realist as well as constructivist analytical modi operandi remain 
unsatisfactory in their explanatory power. While Schwarz and Hacke assign 
extraproportional significance to a state’s ability and preparedness to pursue its interests 
through the use of military force and other forms of coercion, constructivists show only 
the multilateral dimension of soft power. The realist paradigm of a German 
‘forgetfulness of power’ leads to an analytical disequilibrium, which debars any softer 
forms of power from the discussion on West Germany’s foreign policy and dismisses 
the FRG’s multilateral predisposition and its underlying co-operative internationalism as 
an expression of weakness. On the other hand, the various constructivist narratives are 
projecting a similar degree of explanatory exclusiveness only that they replace the 
primacy of unilateral foreign relations management by a behavioural predisposition 
towards collective action. Civilian, tamed and middle power approaches provide 
important insights into the interconnectedness of identity, structural change in the 
international system and new forms of power. However, this thesis will argue that they 
too fall short of delivering the whole story of the FRG’s foreign policy pre-1989 as they 
equate the use of soft power with a state’s multilateral integration thus overlooking an 
important transnational dimension of West Germany’s foreign policy that allowed for a 
certain degree of autonomous action on a sub-state level and which facilitated the
18 See e.g. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, (Yale University Press, New Haven 1989).
19 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Zentralmacht Europas -  Deutschlands Ruckkehr a u f die Weltbiihne, op.cit.,
p.61.
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pursuit of state interests outside of multilateral frameworks. Insights into this ‘private’ 
foreign policy can be gleaned from an analysis of the informal diplomacy of Germany’s 
party foundations and particularly of their democracy promotion activities in transitional 
theatres. In fact, it is only through a conflation of governmental (‘public’) and non-state 
(‘private’) level that any scholarly examination can adequately dissect the multilayered 
facets and complex operational structure of West Germany’s foreign policy apparatus. 
This thesis argues that this conflation and its underlying complexity are expressed in the 
systemic relationship between the international activities of the Stiftungen and Bonn’s 
official diplomacy. Instead of abstaining from power politics being content with an 
effete foreign policy that simply dawdled along in the international realm, the FRG 
pursued its interests in a co-ordinated effort, in which state actors operated abreast 
nongovernmental organisations. While governmental foreign policy administered 
bilateral relations and dealt with questions of state security and economic relations on a 
multilateral level, sub-state actors like the political foundations employed soft power 
beyond the framework of international institutions and furthered state and party interests 
through transnational channels.
Typical instruments of their soft power interventionism are seminars, 
conferences, workshops, publications, skill and knowledge transfer from foreign, often 
German experts to elites in transition countries as well as the setting up of intermediary 
organisations often involved in think tank activities and political research. In addition, 
the political foundations provide material support for foreign partners although they are 
legally prevented from directly financing political parties abroad. In their international 
activities, Germany’s political foundations usually focus thematically on capacity and 
constitution-building as well as on party management and electoral assistance whereby 
they adapt their strategies regularly to the specific circumstances and dynamics of 
different regime change processes. Their sub-state level democracy promotion projects 
target elites as well as the general public, the former by organising platforms and for a 
for the exchange of concepts and ideas, the latter through programmes of civic 
education.
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Soft Power
West Germany’s informal Stiftungen diplomacy helps to illuminate and analytically 
explore the specific operational mode with which the FRG during the Cold War and 
beyond mobilised its ‘power of attraction’. All of the previously discussed constructivist 
narratives have pointed at the soft power phenomenon but have failed to say what 
exactly the concept entails and where it derives from. While for realists softer forms of 
power do not exist at all and scholarly references to soft power need to be seen as 
figments and attempts to deaden the phantom pain of lost sovereignty and real might, 
constructivists in their discussion of power in West Germany’s Cold War foreign policy 
have simply equated the ‘power of attraction’ with multilateral action. In trying to 
examine soft power-based foreign policy initiatives in the pursuit of state interests, this 
thesis will draw on the work of American academic Joseph S. Nye, who has set non- 
coercive forms of power against the traditional compendium of interstate power politics 
with its emphasis on physical force and economic pressure. He describes soft power as 
“the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others”20 
The concept of attracting others to one’s cause draws from the model of early childhood 
socialisation during which parents use their ability to shape their children’s beliefs and 
preferences through the attractiveness of their own ideas. “Parents of teenagers know 
that if they have structured their children’s beliefs and preferences, their power will be 
greater and will last longer than if they had relied only on active control.”21 Similarly, 
the “ability to affect what other countries want tends to be associated with intangible 
power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions.”
The seeds for what later became known as soft power were academically sown 
in the late 1970s when Joseph S. Nye and Robert Keohane described the international 
intertwining and interweaving state’s interests as global interdependence. In their 
seminal work, the two scholars argued that “the resources that produce power
20 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox o f  American Power: Why the w orld’s only superpower can't go it alone, 
(Oxford University Press 2001), p.9.
21 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature o f  American Power, (Basic Books, New York 
1991), pp.31-32.
22 Joseph S. Nye, ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Policy, Fall 90, issue 80, p.159.
23 Joseph S. Nye, Robert O. Keohane, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, (3rd ed. 
Longman, Boston 2001).
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capabilities have become more complex” and that power ought to be understood as 
control over outcomes as well as control over resources.24 According to Nye and 
Keohane, asymmetrical interdependencies had become sources of power for 
international actors and required a rethinking on the part of power theorists. The 
phenomenon of global interdependence and the post-modern reality of a world of 
shrinking boundaries transcended the narrow focus on military and economic might and 
led to an increasingly blurred distinction between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ thus 
rendering the separation into the realm of the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ 
questionable at best. In such an interdependent world, West Germany’s political 
foundations were an insightful example of how transnational actors of democracy 
promotion managed to carve out an operational sphere in “their quest for a niche in 
global politics” thus cashing in on the asymmetrical nature of political power.
Therefore, it seems justified to make the assertion that the FRG’s postwar 
adroitness in becoming a skilled negotiator within multilateral organisations was 
complemented by a nongovemmentally operated form of soft power politics, which 
engaged in reputation-building and sought to influence the process of structural 
transformation and institutional change in transition countries. In the light of the 
abovementioned, it seems untenable to maintain the realist depiction of West Germany 
as a ‘forgetting power’. Instead, this thesis will argue that the FRG did in fact pursue 
power politics guided by state interests but that the power at its disposal was softened 
through its reliance on co-option and the ability to convince others of the rightness of its 
ideas and policies. Furthermore, the study aims to show that contrary to both realist and 
constructivist beliefs (West) German foreign policy had indeed a non-multilateral 
dimension, in which nongovernmental actors through transnational channels were 
employing soft power. Given that soft power’s working is very difficult to prove 
empirically, I will argue that much is already gained by specifying precisely those 
channels through which soft power operates.
It is important to stress that although this thesis will occasionally contextualise (West) 
Germany’s foreign policy towards regime change in Portugal, Spain and South Africa
24 Ibid, p. 10.
25 Amir Taheri, ‘The Perils o f ‘Soft Power’, New York Post, 8 December 2003. On ‘niche diplomacy’ see 
Frank Bruni, ‘A Nation That Exports Oil, Herring and Peace’, Washington Post, 21 December 2002.
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by highlighting aspects of its European and hence multilateral dimension, it does not 
examine the process of the FRG’s European integration nor does it discuss the 
emergence and operationalisation of an European foreign policy. Therefore, the notion 
of Europe as a “normative power” and its “ideational impact” 26 on the Iberian 
transitions will not feature on this study’s research agenda. Surely, the European 
Community’s (EC) own soft power resulting from its normative framework of peace, 
democracy, the rule of law and human rights on the one hand and social solidarity, 
sustainable development and good governance on the other played a crucial role in the 
political transformation of Spain and Portugal with both countries eventually joining the 
EC m 1986. There is no doubt that the prospect of joining the economically successful 
supranational organisation and to have the new democracy legitimised through EC 
membership in the eyes of the public played a hugely important role for the ultimate 
course of the democratisation process in both countries. “In a country, used to national 
projects being framed in the rhetoric of dictatorship” write Carlos Closa and Paul M. 
Heywood, “the European ideal -  embracing the rule of law, participatory democracy, a 
market economy, constitutional order and so forth -  offered an alternative overarching
9 o
political project.” In Portugal, the political elites were won over by the same “complex 
system of material and symbolic incentives” that reinforced the Community’s soft 
power and Beate Kohler has therefore rightly pointed out that “closer links between 
Portugal and the EC are seen not only as providing foreign support for her domestic 
political arrangements but also as a means of increasing internal economic efficiency.”29 
However, the importance of the transnational diffusion of norms through 
European institutions and the ‘power of attraction’ exercised by the EC do not take 
away from the argument pursued in this thesis, which is that soft power does not need to 
operate multilaterally, that it can be operationalised on a transnational level and that
26 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal o f Common Market 
Studies, vol.40, no.2, p.238; Ian Manners, ‘’Normative Power Europe Reconsidered’, October 2004, 
CIDEL Workshop, Oslo 22 -  23 October 2004, available from
http://www.arena.uio.no/cidelAVorkshopOsloSecurity/Manners.pdfFrom civilian to military power: the 
European Union at a crossroads?, cited on 6 June 2002, pp. 4 -  5.
27 For a discussion o f the normative aspects see ibid, pp. 242 -  243.
28 Carlos Closa, Paul M. Heywood, Spain and the European Union, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan 
2004), p. 17.
29 Beate Kohler, Political Forces in Spain, Greece and Portugal, (Butterworth, London 1982), p.245.
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much is already gained by identifying the channels through which soft power operates 
given the difficulties to prove its effectiveness empirically.30 Without question, (West) 
Germany’s soft power was being amplified through its integrated position within 
Europe’s multilateral structures. The thesis, however, analyses only the German foreign 
policy decision-making and implementing process and does not seek to establish causal 
nexuses between external democracy promotion and the outcome of regime change 
processes. Therefore, the question of other forms of soft power and their importance 
needs to be addressed in a different study.
Thesis Structure
Chapter One sets out to develop the theoretical argument as sketched out above. In its 
first part, the chapter’s main thrust is to discuss the most important narratives in the 
literature on West Germany’s foreign policy and their dealing with concept and 
configuration of power. It highlights the tension between realism’s ‘forgetting power’ 
proposition and constructivism’s focus on a multilaterally integrated form of power in 
an interdependent world. While criticising both the Machtvergessenheit paradigm as 
well as the definition of (West) German power as soft, tamed or of medium proportions 
as being too exclusive and not allowing the necessary complexity of the FRG’s 
international relations to be fully taken into account, the argument calls for an 
emendation of existing narratives and approaches in FPA and calls for the reaching 
beyond the narrow confines of coercion while also carrying the discussion of German 
power outside of the multilateral sphere of collective action. The second part of the first 
chapter will examine in greater depth the concept of soft power as introduced to 
international relations theory by Joseph Nye. It will then connect Nye’s main hypothesis 
with a compendious introduction of Arnold Wolfers classical study of milieu and 
possession goals. Given that milieu goals aim at the stabilisation of a state’s 
extraterritorial environment and promote co-operative interstate relations, they lend 
themselves to the pursuit through soft power because influencing the process of 
structural transformation through the provision of ideas, policies and expertise will
30 For the transnational^ promoted internalisation of international norms see Thomas Risse, Stephen C. 
Ropp, Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The power o f  human rights -  international norms and domestic change, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999).
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ensure a high degree of systemic compatibility and thus a stable external environment. 
Soft power furthers milieu goals by helping the power wielder to appeal to others 
through his own democratic values while hard power can be seen as the traditional 
modus operandi to work towards the realisation of possession goals i.e. territorial gains 
or economic advantages. However, Wolfers rightly points out, milieu goals might be 
only a necessary step on the path to acquiring new possessions. Following the 
discussion of soft power, Chapter One will finally provide an overview of the system of 
West Germany’s political foundations as part of the FRG’s foreign policy apparatus. It 
will highlight the historical origins of these nonstate actors and their close affiliation 
with (West) Germany’s main political parties. Their legal and institutional status will be 
examined, their generous funding provided by the Federal Government will be put under 
the spotlight and strategic orientation, thematic priorities and operational modalities of 
their democracy promotion activities in host countries will be subjected to closer 
scrutiny.
Chapters Two to Five will test the argument of a sub-state level pursuit of 
national interests through the Stiftungen's informal and soft power-based diplomacy by 
analysing their involvement in different transition scenarios. Having fenced in the 
theoretical playground, the study will focus in its empirical part on the role of the 
Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (FEF) in post-Franco Spain and post-revolutionary Portugal 
between 1974 and 1982, as well as on the activities of the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation 
(KAF) in South Africa from the early 1980s to the country’s first democratic elections 
in 1994. The case studies will conduct a thorough investigation into forms of political 
co-operation between the foundations and their respective partner organisations. In 
Spain and Portugal, the thesis will trace the efforts of West Germany’s soft power 
diplomacy to hedge the institutional transformation of Spain’s Socialist Workers Party 
(PSOE) led by Felipe Gonzalez and the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS) headed by 
Lisbon lawyer Mario Soares from exiled political movements to serious political party 
contenders. In South Africa, the KAF’s support for the Inkatha movement (later Inkatha 
Freedom Party IFP) of Zulu leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi was aimed at strengthening a 
regionally-based organisation, which sought to become a countrywide political
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representation of the country’s disenfranchised black population while rejecting armed 
resistance and externally imposed economic sanctions.
In detail: The transition to and consolidation of democracy in Portugal is being 
discussed in two chapters. Chapter Two of the dissertation covers the first phase of 
democratic change from the Revolution of the Carnations in April 1974 onwards, during 
which West Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD)-led foreign policy sought to 
stabilise Portugal’s Socialist forces against a possible Communist onslaught. Chapter 
Three takes a closer look at FEF-directed capacity-building measures as part of the 
phase of democratic consolidation spanning the period between 1976 and 1981. Both 
chapters will alternate between the analysis of governmental diplomacy, foreign policy 
decisions made by the SPD as the majority party in the West German Government and 
the FEF’s transnational activities. Spain’s transition from Franco-style authoritarianism 
to liberal democracy will be submitted to a careful examination in Chapter Four. It 
shows how West Germany’s Social Democracy in its governmental role as well as 
through its party foundation provided the SPD’s partner organisation PSOE with 
financial, logistical and political aid. In highlighting the way in which West Germany’s 
Social Democrats sought to help Spain’s Socialists to develop PSOE’s organisational 
structures, build a non-Communist union organisation and play a leading role in the 
constitution-building process, the role of the FEF office in Madrid will take centre stage. 
Finally, Chapter Five shifts the analytical focus towards West German Conservatism 
and examines a case of transnational democracy promotion during the tenure of 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl. It will document the KAF’s cross-border activities, in 
particular its support for the Inkatha-mn think tank, the Inkatha-Institute and the 
Democracy Development Programme (DDP), after the foundation was being permitted 
to open an office in the apartheid state in 1982. Although the Cold War is commonly 
thought to have ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, it seems justified to 
continue the analysis of nonstate actor KAF’s democracy promotion projects in South 
Africa well into the first four years of the post-Cold War era as it will show strong 
elements of continuity in the soft power-based pursuit of Germany’s foreign policy. 
Finally, the concluding chapter undertakes to firmly connect the various strings of 
analysis and to sum up findings and observations about formation, genesis, modality and
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direction of the FRG’s soft power politics and the role of FEF and KAF within the 
context of the transitional processes in the Iberian Peninsula and South Africa.
Selection of Case Studies
The reasons for having chosen the Iberian and South African transition theatres to 
exemplify nature and workings of (West) German power in its international relations 
after the Second World War were manifold. Firstly, political developments in all three 
countries and the outcome of their respective transformation processes were of 
particular importance to German foreign policy makers given that the Iberian Peninsula 
was part of the FRG’s immediate European neighbourhood and South Africa’s supply 
chain for raw materials needed by West Germany’s industry was crucial for the viability 
of certain business sectors. From a security point of view, West Germany together with 
its NATO allies faced the sobering prospect of losing Portugal to the Soviet-dominated 
Communist world in a process often described as ‘Nato’s crumbling Southern flank’.
The risk of a serious destabilisation of Bonn’s regional milieu - in its ‘backyard’ as it 
were -  affected the Federal Republic’s national interest of regional security and 
economic stability much more than it was the case with other transitions e.g. in Latin 
America (Brazil, Chile). In South Africa, West Germany’s raw material dependency as 
well as its cultural links with the apartheid state’s white minority constituted a similar 
situation affecting the FRG’s national interest. Secondly, the democratisation processes 
in the Iberian Peninsula in their international dimension were often highly personalised 
and regularly driven by long-standing friendships between West German politicians and 
their Spanish and Portuguese counterparts. Willy Brandt’s relationships with both PSOE 
leader Gonzalez and PS-Chairman Soares are cases in point. It seemed therefore obvious 
to focus on these two transformation cases as the close political friendships helped to 
connect the dots in the relations between West Germany’s foreign policy actors and the 
Spanish and Portuguese recipients of political aid.
^  Finally, the involvement of FEF and KAF in Portugal, Spain and South Africa might /  
appear to be a geographically rather random choice of democracy promotion case 
studies but the foundations’ time of engagement in these three settings provides a 
continuous timeline commencing in the first half of the 1970s at the outset of what
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Samuel Huntington has described as the “third wave of democratisation”31 and ending in 
the mid-1990s with the colonial era finally buried in South Africa with the first 
democratic elections in 1994. Therefore, the choice of case studies seemed to be an 
analytically fecund approach to look into questions of continuity and change in the 
modality of (West) Germany’s foreign policy and its soft power-driven democracy 
promotion activities over a period of more than twenty years.
Placing the regime change processes in Lisbon, Madrid and Pretoria analytically 
next to each other also allows for a comparative perspective, which brings out the 
differences in operational strategies and thematic foci as applied by the political 
foundations within different transformation frameworks. The Portuguese ‘Revolution of 
the Carnations’ brought about fundamental change of political structures by means of a 
coup d’etat or ruptura pactada while the end of the Franco regime in Spain and the 
governmental changing of the guard in South Africa were characterised by established 
elites gradually surrendering power as part of a negotiated settlement process or reforma 
pactada. Therefore, the choice of case studies in this thesis supports its attempt to 
show that and how soft power needs to adapt to different types of regime transitions. At 
the same time, the combination of Iberian and South African democratisation processes 
makes an examination of the international activities of the two biggest political 
foundations -  FEF and KAF -  possible thereby forestalling criticism of a too narrowly 
construed analytical focus and political one-sidedness. It is important to mention that 
although West Germany’s soft power politics is being examined in the context of 
various regime change processes, the thesis does not aim at making a contribution to the 
ever-growing field of transformation literature. This is not to say that the empirical 
material produced in the country studies will not provide food for thought for other 
researchers to pursue new paths of inquiry, which might help them to shed more light on
31 Samuel P. Huntington, The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century, (University of 
Oklahoma Press 1991).
32 See Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, ‘The Paradigmatic Case o f Reforma Pactada -  Ruptura Pactada: Spain’ in 
Problems o f  Democratic Transitions and Consolidation -  Southern Europe, South America and Post- 
Communist Europe, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press 1996), pp. 87 -  115.
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the international dimension of regime change as an important aspect of any process of 
transition from authoritarian rule33.
Methodology
The study follows a qualitative methodology and derives its empirical evidence from a 
combination of primary and secondary sources. The primary source base consists of 
interviews, written correspondence, archives material and official publications made 
available by the political foundations as well as by Germany’s Lower House, the 
Bundestag. Scholarly books and articles fall into the second category of sources 
covering a broad range of thematic areas such as Germany’s post-war history, Cold War 
foreign policy analysis, regime change, transnationalism, global interdependence and 
soft power. The thirty interviewees can be grouped into five categories, namely 
foundation officials, government officials, party officials, journalists and diplomats. The 
material on FEF activities in Spain and Portugal, correspondence between SPD, PSOE 
and PS leaders and internal analyses of the SPD’s International Affairs Department were 
collected in the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie AdsD (Archive of Social Democracy) in 
Bonn. Generally, the lamentable scarcity of primary sources needs to be seen as a 
consequence of the foundations’ policy of blocking access to the original documentation 
of the foundations’ international activities. Therefore, the archived material used in this 
study had to be ‘dug out’ from a number of individual depositories in the AdsD. In the 
case of the KAF’s democracy promotion activities in South Africa, the Foundation’s 
Archive of Christian-Democratic Politics (Archiv fur Christlich-Demokratische Politik) 
in Sankt Augustin near Bonn could not be accessed, as documents relating to events that 
have taken place less than 30 years ago remain barred for research purposes. The thesis 
also provides additional archives material including political assessments by regional 
desks, annual reports, background notes, briefing papers and memoranda for the years 
1974 and 1975 by the West German Foreign Office or Auswdrtige Amt. The 30-year 
freeze on access to official ministerial documents had been lifted in 2005 for the 
abovementioned years and more material could be therefore recovered from the Political 
Archives of the German Foreign Office in Berlin (Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen
33 See Prospects for Further Research, p.317.
24
Amtes). German and Spanish secondary literature, archive documents and interviews 
have been translated into English by the author of this thesis whereby longer passages 
have been additionally marked as ‘translated by author’ in the footnotes.
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Chapter 1
Renouncing Power Politics? -  The FRG’s Foreign Policy, 
Machtvergessenheit and the Soft Dimension of Power
1,1, Introduction
The first chapter is divided into three parts. In its first part, it critically analyses the 
prevailing narratives in the literature on West Germany’s foreign policy by contrasting 
the realist Machtvergessenheit approach prominently advocated by Hans-Peter Schwarz 
and Christian Hacke with the largely constructivist theoretical frameworks of ‘civilian 
power’, ‘tamed power’ and ‘middle power’ represented by scholars such as Hanns W.
Maull, Peter Katzenstein and Kim Nossal (see 1.2.). It advances the argument that the 
realist narrative focuses two heavily on coercive power projection capabilities thus f  
overlooking important means and channels of influence in international relations based 
on persuasion and co-option. Although the approach acknowledges the importance of 
multilateralism in West German diplomacy, it sees such a ‘concerted’ form of external 
action and its underlying co-operative internationalism simply as an expression of 
weakness, which only illustrates the ‘powerless’ nature of West German foreign policy.
On the other hand, it is being argued that the constructivist approaches in their 
discussion of German postwar power also fail to fully grasp the nature and multifaceted 
make-up of the FRG’s foreign policy. Although they reject the realist argument of 
‘forgetting power’ and instead claim that the FRG was powerful indeed, used its power 
and was guided in its foreign policy behaviour by its national interests and in spite of 
their willingness to incorporate forms of noncoercive power into their analysis of the 
Federal Republic’s Cold War diplomacy, the literature review shows that the 
constructivist focus rests almost exclusively on multilateral frameworks of operation 
such as the European Community or NATO. Since constructivist narratives therefore 
provide important insights into the interconnectedness of postwar identity, structural 
changes on an international level and new forms of power but hardly go beyond the 
realm of multilateral action, the ambition in developing the thesis’s theoretical 
framework of enquiry is to show that (West) German foreign policy did not only have a
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power dimension, which rested resting largely on noncoercive instruments, but that 
these softer forms of power were often operationalised outside of multilateral channels.
In the second part, the chapter will therefore introduce the concept of soft power 
setting forth the essential propositions made by American academic Joseph S. Nye in his 
writings on the noncoercive ‘power of attraction’ (see 1.3). It will further highlight the 
relevance of what Arnold Wolfers has coined ‘milieu goals’ for the utilization of soft 
power i.e. the attempt to influence the dynamics and conditions of a state’s 
extraterritorial environment thus anticipating the operational context of Bonn’s 
persuasion-based democracy promotion activities in Spain, Portugal and South Africa 
on a theoretical level. The study identifies soft power as the FRG’s postwar mode of 
external action (which serves to repudiate the realist claim of a ‘forgetfulness of power’) 
while arguing that, contrary to constructivist belief, West German soft power was not 
only displayed within multilateral fora but through transnationally operating non­
governmental organisations on a sub-state level as well. The latter point serves as the 
basis for the analysis in the chapter’s third part, which will highlight the role of 
Germany’s political foundations {Stiftungen) as an important component of the FRG’s 
foreign policy system.
Apart from providing a brief historical overview of Stiftungen activities, the third 
section concerns itself with an examination of the foundation’s organisational structure, 
their institutional status and relationship with political parties, the sources of funding 
and their operational mode in the pursuit of international activities (see 1.4.). Having 
identified the political foundations as transnational organisations of democracy 
promotion dependent on soft power, the chapter will conclude that only through a 
conflation of both operational levels i.e. governmental diplomacy (‘public’) and 
transnational foreign policy (‘private’) can one arrive at a complete narrative that 
adequately depicts (West) Germany’s Cold War foreign policy tools, methods and 
strategies and that can provide an accurate picture of the nature and configuration of 
German power and power politics in the postwar era.
1.2. Discourses on power in the FRG’s foreign policy pre-1989
The FRG’s foreign policy with its preference for multilateral problem-solving
mechanisms, its rejection of the pursuit of an international agenda by military means, its
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appreciation of the concept of collective security and its active participation in 
international institutions in order to strengthen the global acceptance of international 
legal norms has been always met with a mixed response in academic circles. While 
mostly liberal commentators acknowledged that Bonn’s diplomacy had managed to “not 
only increase the security of its democracy and to enhance its prosperity but also to earn 
the recognition, respect and trust of the international community” through its 
Selbsteinbindung i.e. self-integration in intergovernmental structures and through its co­
operation with others, more sceptical observers ridiculed the Federal Republic’s “self- 
denial vis-a-vis the outside world” and deplored its “renunciation of national 
interests.”34 While one faction argued that ‘power politics’ had fallen victim to the 
legacy of Germany’s wartime past, the other faction insisted that power had remained a 
central concept in the FRG’s Cold War foreign policy only that changes in the external 
environment and a newly emerged post-Auschwitz national identity had altered the 
nature of power politics, re-configured its operational framework and enabled diplomats 
and politicians to explore new channels through which power was being projected. At 
the heart of the scholarly argument lies therefore the question of what exactly constitutes 
or qualifies for political power and to what extent the Federal Republic had either 
overcome, transcended or simply modified elements of power in the management of its 
external relations.
Four discourses are standing out in the debate over the FRG’s Cold War foreign 
policy suggesting different ways to think about power in the Federal Republic’s 
international relations. The first approach carries most of the classical hallmarks of 
realist analysis and puts forward the proposition that power and power politics had 
become somewhat scorned concepts among West Germany’s political decision-makers 
with the national interest being rejected as a guiding principle of the FRG’s post-war 
diplomacy. This narrative’s central theme is a qualitative change in the substance of 
external action, which is characterised by a principled aversion towards the use of force, 
an abstention from conflict situations in world politics and a ‘forgetfulness’ related to
34 See the diverging assessments o f August Pradetto and Karl Feldmeyer during the round table workshop 
‘Deutsche Aussenpolitik im Spannungsfeld von nationalen Interessen, moralischen Anspriichen und neuer 
amerikanischer Dominanz’ organised by the BMW-Herbert Quandt Foundation, October 15, 2003, 
available from www.politik.uni-bonn.de/main/dokus/quandt rtw2.pdf. cited on 12 February 2006, pp.5-12.
28
political power coined Machtvergessenheit. The second school of thought objects to this 
interpretation of West Germany’s foreign policy as being devoid of state interests and 
argues instead that the FRG did in fact possess a ‘power’ dimension, which however 
found its expression in new forms of global influence. This approach identifies the FRG 
as a ‘civilian power’, which pursues its foreign policy goals by pre-dominantly non­
military means and mostly within multilateral frameworks. The third discourse puts less 
emphasis on the impetus of promoting civilianised interaction between states but shares 
with the former the analytical focus on the institutionalisation of West Germany’s 
foreign policy describing its effect as a ‘taming’ of German power. Finally, the FRG’s 
classification as a middle power attempts to lay bare nexuses between status and type of 
states and their foreign policy behaviour. The following sub-sections will examine the 
four approaches more closely showing that the realist narrative remains analytically too 
one-sided in its fixation on the coercive dimension of power while the civilian, tamed 
and middle power approaches limit the power dimension of West German foreign policy 
to the country’s membership in multilateral organisations such as EC and NATO. The 
lopsided nature of the four narratives merits an integrated approach, which brings 
together the utilizable propositions of both realist and constructivist analyses while 
adding and integrating the study’s central argument of an often non-multilaterally 
operationalised soft power politics by West Germany’s foreign policy elites.
1.2.1. Forgetting Power
Realist FPA scholars have come to strongly influence explanatory models explaining 
nature and configuration of the Federal Republic’s external relations during the Cold 
War. Their leading voices have consistently deplored what they believe to be the FRG’s 
disregard for any unilateral and ‘selfishly’ interest-driven pursuit of its foreign policy 
agenda.
The lamentable German ‘Machtvergessenheit' and the inhibition to face the often- 
discomforting realities of world politics have led to provincialism in foreign affairs. 
German politicians and many scholars abhor terms such as power politics and the
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national interest and the concepts behind them. Instead, a peculiar extensive moralism, 
altruism, and self-denial characterise German foreign policy.35
According to realist interpretation, the Federal Republic never escaped the birth defect 
of its post-Second World War genesis as a remote-controlled model democracy 
supervised and monitored by the Western wartime alliance. It was only within the 
operational space prescribed by governments in Washington, London and Paris that 
German foreign policy makers were able to conduct their diplomatic business on the 
international stage and successive chancellors in Bonn presided over a state whose 
military micro-sovereignty and guilt-ridden national identity prevented the Germans 
from fully ‘normalising’ their international relations. Some writers on German foreign 
policy claimed that Europe had become a “substitute fatherland” for post-war Germans 
in the West, and in conservative academic circles, it became a fashionable habit to 
describe the West German foreign policy establishment as being essentially 
machtvergessen i.e. in denial of the importance of power politics. After the Hitler 
regime had justified genocide by way of referring to Germany’s national interest, post­
war society categorically rejected any ‘national’ sentiments and images in its public 
domain with post-war integration in multilateral structures becoming the new raison 
d’etat of the FRG’s diplomacy. Realists have therefore coined the phrase of West 
Germany as a “traumatised giant” in international affairs, who had surrendered its 
diplomatic autonomy partly because of external pressure and partly because it did not 
even trust itself.37
Hans-Peter Schwarz, one of Germany’s most prolific foreign policy analysts has 
pointed out “multilateral systems were in the utmost interest of German foreign policy 
makers since the Federal Republic needed to find its postwar niche from a position of 
weakness.”38 Within the German IR community, Schwarz articulated most eloquently
35 Christian Hacke, ‘Power and Morality -  The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau’, available from 
http://www.politik.uni-bonn.de/main/lesthal/files/hacke-afpil.pdf. cited on 9 March 2006, p.7.
36 Max Otte, A Rising Middle Power -  German Foreign Policy in Transition 1989-1999, (St. Martin’Press, 
New York 2000), p. 15.
37 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Zentralmacht Europas -  Deutschlands Riickkehr a u f die Weltbiihne, (Siedler 
Verlag, Berlin, 1994), p. 13.
38 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die gezahmten Deutschen -  Von der Machtbessessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit, 
(Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Dusseldorf 1985), p. 42.
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the realist conviction that Bonn’s dependency on the United States was simply an 
expression of political guardianship and a telling illustration of the fragmented state of 
Germany’s foreign policy. Its postwar democracy, he argued, was left with only a few 
options of positioning itself in the international arena as it remained territorially divided, 
morally discredited and operationally constrained. Although multilateralism enabled the 
German government to eventually regain some of its previous maneuverability in 
international affairs, its increasingly accentuated role and growing importance as one of 
Washington’s staunchest allies in the bipolar world of superpower confrontation could 
not conceal the fundamental change that had taken place in Germany’s external relations 
with a dramatically curtailed ability to engage in an unconstrained employment of hard 
coercive power for the realisation of state interests. In Schwarz’s opinion, the fact that 
any unilateral use of military force by Germany’s political leadership had become 
morally unthinkable and politically impossible demonstrated that the country’s foreign 
policy had experienced an almost seismic shift from its former great power status 
characterised by the restless pursuit of political power and military glory coined 
Machtbesessenheit towards becoming a medium-seized European polity whose global 
ambitions were reduced to playing the role of good international citizen within the 
transatlantic and European communities. “There has been a fundamental weakening of 
the Federal Republic compared to the great power status of the Reich based on the 
autonomy of decision-making” concludes Schwarz and points at the total absence of any 
foreign policy strategies that had not been coordinated with its Western alliance 
partners.39 The latter led him to believe that “multilateralism prevents autonomous 
foreign policy.”40
Academic advocates of the Machtvergessenheit approach stressed that the 
disappearance of autonomous external action and the “negative attitude vis-a-vis the 
very notion of power since the 1950s” was followed by an operational mode of West 
German diplomacy that was not only multi laterally grounded but also accompanied by 
strong moral considerations.41 The normalisation of relations between the Federal
39 Ibid, p.l 16.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid, p. 117.
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Republic and the member states of the Warsaw Pact towards the end of the 1960s, 
which came to be known as Ostpolitik derived its legitimacy therefore from the moral 
dimension of closer co-operation and national reconciliation between old enemies. 
According to Schwarz, the new priorities in German foreign policy seemed to be the 
preservation of good neighbourly relations and the promotion of tolerance and 
understanding between adversaries rather than the maximisation of wealth and the 
acquisition of territory through the use of economic coercion or military threats. Realists 
in the German IR community were under no illusion that the pursuit of national interests 
by conventional means such as gun boat diplomacy or economic bullying was no longer 
feasible and that the new democracy needed to find its niche as a non-militarist, 
internationalist and second-tier semi-sovereign actor in international organisations. 
“Power politics after Hitler remained a German taboo with war going through a process 
of criminalisation” complains Schwarz and he continues to argue “in the Federal 
Republic internationalist ideas concerning the principal question of power were as 
dominant as the thinking in military categories during the Bismarck and the Wilhelmine 
era.”42
In fact, it was this internationalist ethos in the FRG’s foreign policy with its 
potential to affect as much the interests of foreign societies as they affected West 
German interests, which in the eyes of its realist critics was merely the flip side of it’s 
Machtvergessenheit. Besides the rejection of power politics with its employment of hard 
power, particularly military force, Schwarz identifies additional components of what he 
calls the internationalist trait of West German foreign policy. They include the attempt 
to further deepen political co-operation in Western Europe, the categorical rejection of 
colonialism in all its variations, the support for disarmament processes, an unqualified 
support for development aid and Third World concerns, a preference for providing 
global solutions to solve ‘big’ problems, unconditioned and uncritical co-operation 
within international organisations as well as the promotion of global human rights 
policies.43 As far as conservative IR scholars were concerned, the pacifist configuration 
of West Germany’s foreign policy throughout the Cold War era had to be seen as an
42 Ibid, p.l 17.
43 Ibid, p. 123.
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attempt at political catharsis after the Nazi regime had presided over a genocidal 
overstretch of power politics with disastrous consequences for global peace. Germany’s 
post-1945 internationalism became the new diplomatic doctrine and any thinking in 
categories of power, coercion, threat and national interest, which had previously 
dominated foreign policy planning, was replaced by a non-belligerent, cosmopolitan and 
tolerant foreign policy attitude, which sometimes seemed to take the form of political 
altruism. The new catch word that summed up Bonn’s new foreign policy parameters 
was Friedenspolitik or peace politics which, according to Schwarz, led to the 
marginalisation of military power, downgraded the criteria of Germany’s national 
interest and focused on strategies of conflict resolution as the centrepiece of post-war 
foreign policy concepts. Friedenspolitik and Machtvergessenheit not only 
‘revolutionised’ Germany’s foreign policy and its elite-driven discourse but it also 
changed the public’s perception of the legitimacy of a foreign policy driven by national 
interests. Realists pointed out that the trauma of collective guilt was deeply ingrained in 
Germany’s national psyche and the country’s new political culture of humility and good 
international citizenship was characterised by an almost introverted and often reluctant 
approach to independent action in international affairs. In Schwarz’s concept of power, 
which was uni-dimensionally defined as the coercion-based ability of states to impose 
their will on rival governments, ^vas clearly no place for internationalism and 
Friedenspolitik.44 West German ‘forgetfulness’ or ‘obliviousness’ in its employment of 
power during the Cold War resulted in several behavioural characteristics displayed in 
the FRG’s foreign policy. He argues that besides its willingness to adopt the role of 
moderator, mediator and bridge-builder, Bonn’s diplomacy favoured multilateral 
solutions particularly within the transatlantic alliance, which it “understood as a 
permanent framework for orientation”, and engaged in foreign policy decision-making 
accompanied by strong moral over-tones.”45
Fellow realist Gregor Schollgen describes the ‘Bonn Republic’ as a medium- 
seize state, which occupies a peripheral position in the international system until the fall
44 Ibid, p.70.
45 Ibid, p.24.
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of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany’s East and West in 1989/90.46 He 
agrees with his colleagues’ general verdict that the Federal Republic in its post-war 
history had developed a paralysing “fear of power.” This fear syndrome led to a “factual 
withdrawal from world politics after 1945 in order to disrupt any attempt to continue 
Germany’s great power politics.”47 The erstwhile great power had become a political 
dwarf in international affairs condemned through the atrophy if not total disappearance 
of any Machtwillen or ‘will to power’ and had become content to watch former rivals 
engaging in the game of international high politics from the sidelines.48 Schollgen 
strikes up a familiar tone by highlighting Germany’s multilateral commitments, which 
were a direct consequence of the generational experience of war by successive 
chancellors and an expression of the country’s multinational interwoveness, which had 
come to replace the old dashing attitude in German foreign policy.49 However, he does 
not disguise the fact that the international environment of superpower confrontation and 
substantially diminished German power projection capabilities greatly contributed to the 
economic recovery and industrial success story of the FRG with West Germany 
“prospering in the lee of the East-West conflict.”50
Other authors of the Machtvergessenheit School interpret the FRG’s preference 
for multilateral action simply as a “pretext for national abstention”51 In their view, the 
institutionalisation and multilateralisation of Germany’s post-war diplomacy kept the 
FRG in a state of incompleteness and fragmentation.52 While ‘complete’ states and 
‘complete’ foreign policies required a conscious decision to use military force in 
international affairs, West Germany’s “deep-seated aversion to power politics” disabled 
its foreign affairs apparatus and prevented it from effectively pursuing the FRG’s 
national interests. Thus realists like Schwarz postulate that without soldiers, missiles and
46 Gregor Schollgen, Angst vor der Macht -  Die Deutschen und ihre Aussenpolitik, (Verlag Ullstein, Berlin 
1993), p.27.
47 Ibid, p.47.
48 Ibid, p.55. See also ‘Deutschlands neue Lage -  Die USA, die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die 
Zukunft des westlichen Biindnisses’, Europa-Archiv, no.5, 1992, p. 130.
49 Gregor Schollgen, ’Die Zukunft der deutschen Aussenpolitik liegt in Europa’, Das Parlament -  Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 11, 2004, p. 13.
50 Gregor Schollgen, ‘National Interest and International Responsibility: Germany’s Role in World 
Affairs’, in Amulf Baring (ed.), Germany’s New Position in Europe, (Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), p.40.
51 Franz-Josef Meiers, ‘Germany: The Reluctant Power’ Survival, vol.37, no.3, autumn 1995, p.83.
52 Ibid, p.84.
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bombs, there cannot be any power projection capability, and that the satisfactory 
realisation of one’s national interests, goals and preferences depended on one’s own 
ultimate willingness to embrace the idea of ‘warriordom’ in international affairs. 
Furthermore, realist scholars decried the post-national raison d’etat of the FRG, which 
in their view subordinated Bonn’s foreign policy goals to the sacrosanct political 
doctrine of Western integration and described the latter as standing in stark contrast to 
the FRG’s most obvious national interest, namely that of reunification. In their view, 
Adenauer’s Politik der Starke i.e. the politics of strength, which rejected suggestions of 
achieving German reunification by accepting a position of neutrality between East and 
West and through the FRG’s disassociation from the Western postwar alliance was the 
expression of a central contradiction in German foreign policy planning. Politik der 
Starke sought to convince Soviet leaders that their long-term goal of installing 
Communist puppet regimes in Western Europe including the FRG was impossible to 
realise and that once Soviet rulers had realised the futility of their ambitions, the West 
German government was able to negotiate reunification in an atmosphere of detente.53 
Adenauer’s uncompromising insistence on Western integration, maintained the critics, 
had tied the political fate of 50 million Germans in the Western part of the country 
inextricably to the ultimate triumph of capitalism and Westem-style democracy while 
sacrificing national unity on the altar of great power politics and ideological principles. 
The “strengthening of the FRG’s Western integration was prioritised over any other 
foreign policy goals. Since 1949, it in fact enjoyed priority over the goal of national 
reunification.”54
Therefore, the fragmentation and partition of German state territory as a 
consequence of the Second World War was followed by the fragmentation of the FRG’s 
raison d’etat and, as a result, caused the unravelling of its definition of the ‘national 
interest’.55 When Hans-Peter Schwarz pointedly asked “what does ‘national interest’
53 Christoph Bluth, Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear Strategy, (Clarendon Press, Oxford), p.21.
54 Hans-Peter Schwarz, ‘Die Politik der Westbindung oder die Staatsraison der Bundesrepublik’, Zeitschrift 
fu r  Politik’ vol.22, no.4, 1975, p.308.
55 Christian Hacke, ‘Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwischen Ost und West: Von der Tyrannei 
der Wahl zur glucklichen Krise’, in Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funke, Hans-Peter Schwarz (eds.), 
Deutschland zwischen Krieg und Frieden -  Beitrage zur Politik und Kultur im 20. Jahrhundert, (Festschrift 
ftir Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Droste Verlag 1991), p.222.
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consist of when a nation is divided” and subsequently stressed the obvious fact that 
“West Germans were thus for a long time tempted to define what was in the ‘national 
interest’ solely in terms of the western portion of their divided country”, he simply 
highlighted the change of political reference points and external constraints that had 
occurred in the immediate postwar era.56 Inevitably, Adenauer’s Politik der Starke and 
its emphasis on Western integration triggered a “conflict of foreign policy priorities” 
with periodic frictions between the goals of alliance and security policy, on the one hand 
and national unity and detente, on the other.57 The approach to treat the policy of 
Western integration as part of the national interest required arguably a rethink on the 
part of West Germany’s political elites as to how permanent the FRG’s very existence 
was likely to be. The ‘Hallstein Doctrine’, which sought to establish the government in 
Bonn as the only legitimate representation of Germans and their interests on the 
international stage and which threatened any country that recognised the Communist 
regime in East Berlin with the breaking-off of diplomatic relations did not allow for a 
definition of the national interest that incorporated both eastern and western part of the 
divided country. In this context, Jonathan Bach has remarked, “West Germany became
C O
the ‘real’ Germany, morally whole though territorially truncated.”
Machtvergessenheit theorists regularly stressed the power of external 
preferences in the formation and articulation of Germany’s national interest sometimes 
leading them to accept the dichotomy of national interest and multilateralism 
unquestioned. “Germany has always been reluctant to conduct foreign policy making by 
means of a domestically driven definition of the ‘national interest’”, writes Christian 
Tuschhoff, “instead, it engaged in processes of multilateral negotiations that allowed it 
to co-determine common solutions.”59 The view that the FRG lacked the determination
56Hans-Peter Schwarz, ‘Germany’s National and European Interests’, in Amulf Baring (ed.), Germany's 
New Position in Europe -  Problems and Perspectives, op.cit., p. 108.
57 Helga Haftendom, ‘AuBenpolitische Prioritaten und Handlungsspielraum -  Ein Paradigma zur Analyse 
der AuBenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, vo l.21 ,1989, p.35.
58 Jonathan P.G.Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration -  German Foreign Policy and National 
Identity after 1989, (St. Martin’s Press, New York 1999), p.72.
59 Christian Tuschhoff, ‘Explaining the Multilateral Reflex -  German Foreign Policy 1949-2002’, Working 
Paper 12/2005, BMW Centre for German and European Studies, Georgetown University, available from 
http://cges.georgetown.edu/docs/Docs Working Papers Page/Tuschhoff Working Paper.pdf. cited on 12 
January 2006, p.4.
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to formulate its foreign policy preferences and to articulate its own interests clearly and 
without ambiguity within and outside of multilateral fora was widely held not only in 
academic circles. The former CSU-Minister for International Development and 
Economic Co-operation, Carl-Dieter Spranger, remembered, “unfortunately, Germany’s 
ability and willingness to define its ‘national interests’, let alone to pursue those 
interests actively was as poorly developed in the 1980s and 1990s as it is today. Its 
foreign policy was dominated by ideational and humanitarian goals and purposes while 
other countries such as Britain, France, Russia and the United States pursued 
overarching national interests through their development aid policies.”60 Its diplomacy 
in international organisations is being described as the routinely displayed behavioural 
pattern to “hide behind foreign partners” with the intention to evade its international 
responsibilities as one of Europe’s leading powers.61 In the age of bipolarity, West 
Germany found itself pursuing a restless diplomatic campaign to repair its tarnished 
reputation, improve its image and to reassure its neighbours and partners of the moral 
sincerity of its ambitions and intentions. In the eyes of the traditionalists, West 
Germany’s ‘ignorance of power’ was expressed in its quest for rehabilitation, its low 
diplomatic profile, its co-operative attitude and, most importantly, in the transfer of 
sovereign rights and national prerogatives to multilateral bodies.62 The surrender of 
autonomy and the blurring of its diplomatic contours were driven by the negative 
connotation that ‘power’ had in the perception of the majority of Germans.
According to Machtvergessenheits proponents, the result was a “relatively 
passive attitude in foreign policy, the absence of any systematic attempt to engage in a 
discussion about one’s own interests and an extremely cautious approach to enforce the 
latter.”63 Historian Michael Sturmer has pointed out that in the international post-war 
geometry of power, the “organising principle” i.e. raison d’etat with which West 
Germany defined and determined its interests always came from the outside.64 The
60 Personal correspondence with Carl-Dieter Spranger, 31 March 2006.
61 Karl Kaiser, ‘Das Vereinigte Deutschland in der Intemationalen Politik’, in Karl Kaiser, Hanns W. Maull 
(eds.), Deutschlands Neue Aufienpolitik, vol.2, (R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munchen 1995), p.8.
62 Ibid, p.9.
63 Ibid.
64 Michael Sturmer, ‘Deutsche Interessen’, in Karl Kaiser, Hanns W. Maull (eds.), Deutschlands Neue 
Aufienpolitik, op.cit., p.52.
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guiding principle for West German foreign policy and its underlying state interests was 
the congruence of the FRG’s goals and preferences with European interests and 
transatlantic priorities. In its diplomatic behaviour, West German politicians wanted to 
remain ‘predictable’ in the eyes of their international counterparts and this predictability 
was to be guaranteed through Bonn’s co-operative attitude, the ‘multilateralisation’ of 
its international actions and its unceasing emphasis on dialogue. Therefore, StUrmer 
argues, the exact nature, content and direction of what the FRG actually wanted to 
achieve and secure fo r itself was often unclear.65
1.2.2. Civilian Power
The second discourse dealing with the problem of power in the context of the FRG’s 
foreign policy is based on a largely constructivist narrative and positions itself in clear 
opposition to the ‘forgetfulness of power’ approach introduced by Schwarz and other 
mostly realist writers. This discourse, which has been primarily advanced by German IR 
scholar Hanns Maull, defines the FRG as a ‘civilian power i.e. a type of actor “whose 
foreign policy role concept and role behaviour is linked with objectives, values, 
principals and with forms of influence and instruments of power, which seek to further 
the civilianisation of international relations.”66 The emergence of civilian powers was 
made possible by structural changes in the post-war world of international relations such 
as an increasing degree of economic interdependence and political interconnectedness.
According to Maull, global interdependence facilitated the emergence of new 
operational modes for Western foreign policies prioritising co-operative forms of 
international interaction, a heavy emphasis on non-military instruments in the pursuit of 
political and economic agendas as well as a partial transfer of sovereign rights from the
A 7nation-state to supranational institutions. He argues that a process of global social 
change furthers a tendency in societies around the world to tame organised social 
violence, formulate and enforce universal legal norms, institutionalise conflict-solving
65 Ibid, p.59.
66 Hanns W. Maull, ‘DFG-Projekt 'Zivilmachte -  Schlussbericht und Ergebnisse', (Department o f Foreign 
Policy and International Relations, University of Trier, 1997), available from http://www.politik.uni- 
trier.de/pubs/forsch/civil.pdf. cited on 4 March 2006, p.22.
67 Hanns W. Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, Foreign Affairs, winter 1990/91, 
vol.69, issue 5, p.92.
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mechanisms and to work towards the eradication of economic disparities guided by the
/ Q
principle of solidarity. His approach calls for a “New Thinking” in Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA) and rejects the idea that international relations require an analytical 
prism different from domestic politics. It puts forward the proposition that the post­
national (ist) state system is increasingly shaped by civilian powers and geared towards 
the promotion of international order through universally accepted legal norms.69 In 
Maull’s view, the process of civilianising the realm of international politics ultimately 
heads towards the creation of a world society complete with authority structures and a 
global judicial system based on international law. In the medium to short-term, however, 
it facilitates the “internalisation of socially accepted norms (politics through legitimacy) 
replacing the forced implementation of rules (politics through power) in analogy to the 
domestication of the societal use of force.”70 Maull stresses the fundamental changes in 
the international system since the end of the Second World War, which he deems 
significant enough to call into question the traditional assumptions and conventional 
political vocabulary of the realist school. In his analysis, the permeability of national 
boundaries, the economic and social interdependencies between countries, private 
sectors, societal groups and political elites as well as the unprecedented scope of global 
environmental and transnational challenges were all features of totally altered structures 
and dynamics in the international system that rendered the realist definition of power, 
national interest, sovereignty, autonomy or anarchy obsolescent.
Maull argued that many members of the international community had already 
began to move away from a ‘militarised’ foreign policy of the realist kind with is 
terminological paraphernalia of the balance of power, containment and deterrence 
towards what he calls a civilianised diplomacy, which projected the notion of 
citizenship, institutionalised channels of conflict resolution and participatory forms of 
political decision-making onto the level of the international system. Nothing less but a 
“new world order” needed to be created based on the principle of broad international
68 Hanns W. Maull, ’Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland -  Vierzehn Thesen fur eine neue deutsche 
Aufienpolitik’, op.cit., p.270.
69 Ibid.
70 Sebastian Hamisch, ’Deutsche Aussenpolitik nach der Wende: Zivilmacht am Ende?’, Beitrag fur den 
21. DVPW-Kongress in Halle, available from
http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/resources/conferences/hamisch.pdf. cited on 25 January 2006.
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consensus and preventing unilateral impulses in the foreign policies of member states as 
well as any attempts to establish unipolar hegemony by one of them.71 As the result of a 
postwar “learning process”, West Germany’s democracy had internalised such “New 
Thinking” in foreign affairs with its voluntary abstention from the “development of 
autonomous power projection capabilities”72 and its decision to end the “vain search for 
autonomy, dominance and status.”73 Its new identity and role concept as a civilian 
power rested on three core principles, namely a morally charged pacifism (‘never 
again’), the FRG’s integration into Western multilateral organisations (‘never alone’) as 
well as a pronounced preference for political solutions.74 Although Maull concedes that 
what he described as a “revolutionary change” in West German foreign policy thinking 
was as much a product of operational necessity in the absence of sufficient material 
resources as it was based on a voluntary act of will and a conscious decision by political 
leaders, he nevertheless places strong emphasis on the element of choice.
He remains sometimes unclear though in his attempt to determine the exact 
nature and scope of anti-militarist sentiment in West German society and as part of his 
civilian power concept.75 While at one point he described the dominant mentality in 
West Germany’s ‘civilian power society’ as that of a “widespread, instinctive
*7 f\pacificism” , which required controversies and collisions of interest to be solved 
through dialogue, negotiations and reasoning rather than by employing B-52 bombers, 
nuclear warheads or biological agents, other remarks run counter to the pacifism thesis. 
“Civilian powers are by no means pacifist” he writes in 1999 and adds that his concept 
has been often misunderstood because of the frequent confusion of strictly non-military 
foreign policy instruments with the ‘civilian’ element in the operational design of
71 Hanns W. Maull, ’Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, op.cit., p.272.
72 Hanns W. Maull, Germany and the Use o f Force: Still a Civilian Power?, Paper prepared for the 
Workshop on ‘Force, Order and Global Governance: An Assessment o f U.S., German and Japanese 
Approaches’, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 25 August 1999, p.5.
73 Ibid, p.3.
74 Ibid, pp.4-7.
75 This lack o f consistency or change of hearts in Maull’s work on the question o f military force and 
pacifist attitudes has been noticed by Christian W. Burckhardt, Why is there a public debate about the idea 
o f aPOivilian Power Europe, El Working Paper 2004 - 02, October 2004, London School of Economics 
and Political Science, pp. 11-12.
76 Ibid, p.4.
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civilian powers.77 In allowing for the residual employment of military power by civilian 
powers, Maull rejects the competing discourse, which sees any violation of the principle 
of non-violent self-conduct in international affairs by civilian powers as a titular 
contradiction in terms.78 It seems that he finally settles for the possibility of civilian 
powers resorting to military action in cases of individual and collective self-defence as 
well as in the pursuit of collective security against an international aggressor.79
The term ‘civilian power’ refers to three categories of analysis and description: 
Firstly, it introduces the ideal type of an actor, which is prepared to actively shape 
international structures but consciously maintains a profile distinct from traditional great 
powers. Secondly, it refers to a role concept, which introduces certain values and a 
specific diplomatic style to the practice of foreign policy and thirdly, civilian powers are 
being seen as the embodiment of particular foreign policy strategies adopted in the 
pursuit of political goals and the implementation of diplomatic agendas.80 In stark
77 Hanns W. Maull, DFG-Projekt 'Zivilmachte -  Schlussbericht undErgebnisse, op.cit., p.26;
78 Richard Rosecrance, ‘The European Union: A new Type o f International Actor’ in Jan Zielonka (ed.) 
Paradoxes o f  European Foreign Policy, (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, Brill, 1998), pp. 15-25; Ole 
Waever, ‘The EU as a security actor - reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign 
security orders’, in M.Kelstrup, M.C.Williams (eds.), International Relations theory and the politics o f  
European integration: power, security and community, (London, Routledge 2000), pp.250-294; Karen E. 
Smith, ‘Still ‘civilian’ power EU?’, European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 2005/01, available from 
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European civilian power as a force in world politics that promotes institutionalised forms o f conflict 
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Interdependence’, in H.Kohnstamm, W. Hager (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems 
before the European Community, (London, Macmillan 1973), pp. 1-21.
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contrast to Schwarz’s ‘forgetfulness of power’ approach, Maull’s ‘civilian power’ 
model, with which he examined both pre- and post-reunification foreign policy does not 
deny the relevance of the FRG’s national interest for the formulation and execution of 
its foreign policy. It rather understands state interests as being essentially conditioned 
and shaped by norms, values and ideas, which provide the ethical and normative 
framework for their pursuit. The civilianisation of world politics requires a particular 
form of self-awareness of actors, which in turn expresses itself in a non-utilitarian
o  1
diplomatic practice. In the foreign policy of civilian powers, norms and values 
coincide with the national interest, and as its norms and values claim universal validity 
they also coincide with the national interest of other states. Put differently, ‘civilian 
power’ diplomacy carries the signs of a certain missionary zeal as expressed in Maull’s 
frank assessment that “civilian powers have never renounced the possibility of them 
meddling in the internal affairs of other states” because they act on the realisation that 
“if one wants to make civilianisation processes succeed on a global scale, one needs to 
create the conditions for civilised state interaction.”
It follows from such a global role sought by civilian powers in general and the 
pre-1989 FRG in particular, that far from being oblivious of its own power projection 
capabilities, the West German state demonstrated a clear willingness to shape the 
structures of the international system only that influence and diplomatic initiatives were 
now being played out multilaterally. “Civilian powers reject unilateral and autonomous 
action,” writes Maull and instead he contrasts traditional concepts of leadership based 
on hegemony, domination and military superiority with the operational mode of
O l
multilateralism as being key to the foreign policy of civilian powers. In this sense, the 
FRG was ‘powerful’ indeed while acting in the national interest. However, for civilian 
power theorists national interest never meant only one’s own advantage and power as 
the will and capacity to shape structures in the external environment and to bring about 
global change remained meaningless if not linked to multilateral integration and 
collective action. The ‘never alone’ factor was expressed in numerous phrases such as
81 Ibid, p.21.
82 Ibid, p.24.
83 Knut Kirste, Hanns W. Maull, Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie, op.cit., p.25.
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civilian powers’ preparedness to take “collective action against international 
aggressors”, their “pursuit of national interests through international co-operation”, their 
foreign policy being subjected to increasing “institutionalisation through partial transfer 
of sovereignty” or the repeated use of terms such as ‘partnership’ and ‘co-operation’.
While realists’ accepted only unilateral practice based on hard i.e. coercive 
potential as evidence of real power, civilian power constructivists rejected the 
“traditional play of geopolitics” and the uni-dimensional definition of power by pointing 
at the multilateral integration of West Germany’s foreign policy institutions. “The term 
‘power’ no longer means what it used to: “hard” power, the ability to command others, 
is increasingly being replaced by “soft” (persuasive) power.”84 The transformation in the 
structural reality of the post-war international system was accompanied by a 
transformation of the basic ‘ingredients’ of power introducing a softer dimension to the 
previously hard forms of interaction in world politics. In a world dominated by civilian 
powers, political, social and economic interaction between members of the global 
community often revolves around supranational institutions and is governed and 
ultimately decided by the rule of international law. The military dimension in world 
politics became stunted if one leaves out the nuclear option as a strategic ‘game’ of 
mutual deterrence lacking the practical utility of conventional weaponry. “The 
Bundeswehr from this perspective” writes Maull, “could not plausibly be seen as a 
traditional military instrument” instead arguing that “its real purpose was to underpin a 
delicate, highly complex and dynamic strategy of war-avoidance through nuclear
O f
deterrence.” Measured by these criteria, the FRG’s foreign policy behaviour can be 
justifiably described as that of a civilian power and its self-conduct in the international 
realm as certainly more ‘civilised’ than that of its Nazi or Wilhelmine predecessors.
However, with its doctrine of a perceived “New Thinking” in international 
affairs -  a doctrine that pictures West Germany’s foreign policy as essentially deriving 
its moral legitimacy from the “voluntary” act of “abstaining from autonomous power
84 Hanns W. Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers, Foreign Affairs, vol.69, no.5, winter 
1990/91, p.106.
85 Hanns W. Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?’, Paper prepared for the 
Workshop on Force, Order and Global Governance, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, July 1-2, 
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2005, p.7.
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projection capabilities” and from its dismissal of dominance, status and autonomy as 
important driving forces for governmental action -  and its insistence on a process of 
continuously progressing structural change characterised by the taming of social 
violence in domestic as well as in international politics, the ‘civilian power’ approach 
detects a qualitative transformation of the territorially constituted structures of the 
Westphalian state system. It argues that this transformation needed to be seen as the 
manifestation of a fundamental change in the substance of foreign policy behaviour 
rather than as mere change in the form of external interaction, the latter being a 
consequence and expression of changes in the state’s operational environment.86 There 
are several problems with the conceptual pillars of such an approach. Firstly, Maull’s 
claim of a renunciation of autonomy by West German foreign policy makers appears to 
be questionable. Surely, the bipolar structural reality of the Cold War undoubtedly 
constrained the operational freedom of the FRG and other middle and great powers with 
its “shackles of ideological competition.” 87 However, if one defines autonomy 
classically as the “right of a state to self-government, law-making and self- 
administration” (Oxford English Dictionary88), it has never been renounced by post-war 
German elites nor eliminated by outside powers.
Maull acknowledges the validity and usefulness of power as an analytical 
category stating that he could not “imagine any politics, in which power would not play 
a role” and insisting, “the crucial question is in what form and context power is being 
brought to bear.”89 Contrary to the realist mocking of West Germany’s alleged post-war 
illness of Machtvergessenheit, he insists in more recent publications tha^^Jje FRG’s 
foreign policy tradition was anything but machtvergessen (otherwise it would not have 
been so successful)44 and describes West German diplomacy as pursuing “highly discreet 
and ‘intelligent’ power politics to achieve its interests and goals.” 90 However, his
86 For the hypothesis o f a qualitative transformation in international relations see Hanns W. Maull, 
‘Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, op.cit., p.269.
87 Wilfried von Bredow, Thomas Jager, Neue deutsche Aussenpolitik -  Nationale lnteressen in 
internationalen Beziehungen, (Leske & Budrich, Opladen 1993), p.24.
88 Available at http://www.oed.com. cited on 22 January 2006.
89 Personal correspondence with Hanns W. Maull, 18 August 2005.
90 Hanns W. Maull, ‘Deutsche Machtpolitik ohne Macht’, in WeltTrends, vol.43, no.12, summer 2004,
p.61.
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insistence on the causal nexus between global interdependence and the proclaimed 
fundamental erosion of a nation-state’s autonomy in the external realm appears to 
subsequently shift the focus too strongly towards multilateral structures as the only 
remaining residual framework within which political power can be exercised by nation­
state governments. Likewise, civilian power theorist Henning Tewes reflecting on the 
numerous cases of regime change and democratic transitions in Eastern and Central 
Europe after the demise of the Soviet Union sees the ultimate connection between the 
foreign policies of civilian powers and multilateral modes of operation. He asks “How 
does a civilian power behave towards a set of nascent market democracies right on its 
borders?” and Jhat_predicts that “it would attempt to stretch civilian power to these 
countries, that is would attempt to incorporate them into the network of interdependence 
in order to stabilise their democracies and to support their prosperity.” 91 And he 
concludes: “Hence, civilianisation occurs through stabilisation, which in turn occurs in 
multilateral frameworks.” 92 This near-exclusive concern with the multilateral 
configuration of the foreign policy of civilian powers and the approach’s strong 
emphasis on receding autonomous spaces within them appears to be not necessarily in 
accord with the FRG’s diplomatic reality and the activities of the political foundations. 
While multilateralism played a crucial role in West Germany’s external relations 
management it was clearly not the only level on which influence in the international 
realm was brought to bear and the civilian power approach fails to pay sufficient 
attention to the transnational and sub-state dimension of soft power.
1.2.3. Tamed Power
The constructivist argument of a constituent influence of norms, ideas and values on 
foreign policy strategies and state interests in the context of West Germany’s Cold War 
diplomacy is being further elaborated upon by a group of scholars, whose central 
propositions should be arguably read and interpreted in connection with the core 
argument of Maull’s civilian power theory. They too view the “institutionalisation of 
power” as the most distinctive feature of West Germany’s post-war foreign policy and 
describe Bonn’s declared preference for concerted action within multilateral fora and for
diplomacy through “institutionally mediated systems” as the consequence and product 
of an “internationalised state identity” with strong European traits.93 According to their 
interpretation, power in the FRG’s foreign policy had not been forgotten, ignored or 
rejected but “tamed” through multilateral arrangements particularly through the process 
of an institutional ‘Europeanisation’ of its external relations. Peter Katzenstein for 
example writes, “The institutionalisation of power is the most distinctive aspect of the 
relationship between Europe and Germany. The institutionalisation of power matters 
because it takes the hard edges off power relations.”94 His constructivist interpretation, 
which highlights historically induced changes in Germany’s national identity leading to 
a re-configuration of power in West Germany’s diplomacy and the selection of new 
channels and instruments through which it is being exercised shares a common 
analytical angle with the institutional preoccupation of neoliberalism. But while 
neoliberalism stresses the importance of institutions as means to reduce transaction 
costs, to strengthen predictability and certainty in an otherwise unpredictable and 
anarchic international environment and to improve efficiency in bargaining and 
negotiating situations between states, Katzenstein and his fellow ‘tamed power’ theorists 
evoke the norm-setting qualities of international institutions. They argue that the 
significance of an institutionalisation of state power and state action needed to be seen 
in the normative ferment that these institutions provide and which begets actor identities 
and international structures “in which the reputation of actors acquires meaning and 
value.”95 Katzenstein himself clarifies that
This is not to argue that German policy reflected idealist motives in the 1980s and 
1990s. It did not. It reflected German interests. But those interests pursued through 
power and bargaining were fundamentally shaped by the institutional context of Europe 
and the Europeanisation of the identity of the German state that had taken place in the 
preceding decades.96
93 Peter Katzenstein (ed.), Tamed Power -  Germany in Europe (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and 
London 1997), pp. 4-5.
94 Ibid, p.3.
95 Ibid, p. 13.
96 Ibid, pp. 14-15.
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Katzenstein’s version of West German foreign policy incorporates many of the basic 
characteristics of a civilian power with its strong focus on multilateralism and its thesis 
that state interests needed to be seen as a product rather than a producer of a polity’s 
normative structures. He refrains from labelling Germany’s discomfort vis-a-vis the 
mobilisation of military resources ‘pacifism’ instead describing the antimilitarist 
component of Germany’s post-war identity as a “widespread aversion to the use of 
force” which had become “an institutionalised norm” in the country’s quest for 
international rectification and the purging of its political soul after years of 
totalitarianism. What is new about the ‘tamed power’ paradigm compared to the civilian 
power discourse is that it introduces the idea of ‘soft power’ into the discussion linking 
‘softer’ forms of external action with multilateral diplomacy.
Between 1958 and 1989, Germany projected its power softly, revealing a form 
preference for normative and institutional over material interests, an ingrained support 
for multilateralism, and a greater inclination than its large European partners to delegate 
sovereignty to supranational institutions.97
Seen through a constructivist lens, Germany’s totalitarian past triggered the emergence 
of a new postwar identity, the new identity facilitated new normative choices, new 
norms produced new interests and these interests were pursued within new institutions 
(which in turn shaped West German interests). ‘Tamed power’ theorists argue that 
unlike previous operational modes adopted by German foreign affairs elites, the postwar 
modality of the FRG’s multi laterally packaged foreign policy was soft. Several 
references are being made to this softer dimension. “The German approach to power and 
the practices that sustain and reformulate it, emphasises its ‘soft’ elements,”98 writes 
Katzenstein and claims, “institutionalised power is ‘soft’ compared to other types of 
power.”99 The ‘taming’ of German power led to the grinding down of its hard power 
profile, the latter presumably referring to the unilateral use of military force although 
‘tamed power’ constructivists never provide a precise definition of what in their view
97 Jeffrey J. Anderson, ‘Hard interests, Soft Power and Germany’s Changing Role in Europe’, in Peter 
Katzenstein (ed.), Tamed Power -  Germany in Europe, op.cit., p.80.
98 Ibid, p.3.
99 Ibid, p.4.
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qualifies as soft and hard power. Like Maull, they think of unilateral forms of West 
German foreign policy and diplomatic action on Bonn’s own initiative as inconceivable.
“What is distinctive about Germany” it is being concluded, “is that its political leaders 
exercise power only in multilateral...systems -  in the EU, the Atlantic Community, and 
broader international fora -  that soften sovereign power.”100
1.2.4. Middle Power
Finally, in a further attempt to develop a conceptual framework for the employment of 
power in West Germany’s foreign policy proponents of the idea of ‘middlepowerdom’ 
seek to identify distinct behavioural patterns in West Germany’s foreign policy based on 
status categories. As early as 1970, Waldemar Besson had highlighted the strategic 
choicQwhich the Federal Republic was confronted with namely either to oppose the f  
political consequences of bipolarity or to define its role within these bipolar structures 
carving out its diplomatic niche. He points out that the first option was “driven by 
stronger national ambitions” whereas the latter approach required “an understanding of 
the Federal Republic as a middle power”, which despite its lower ranking status “was 
not willing to renounce its say in world politics.” 101 The FRG’s de-facto limited 
sovereignty, constraints on its operational freedom caused by a multitude of multilateral 
commitments as well as the impact, which postwar identity and reduced material power 
projection capabilities had on West Germany’s state behaviour both externally and 
internally led a number of FPA scholars to categorise the Federal Republic as the 
prototype of a medium-seized actor in international relations.102
In Besson’s assessment, the FRG’s material capabilities in the realm of military 
strength were obviously of a more limited nature than those of its partners in the
100 Ibid.
101 Waldemar Besson, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublih Deutschland - Erfahrungen und Mafistabe, 
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(Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1993), p. 164.
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Western alliance or in comparison with the Soviet Union. “Its status as a middle power” 
writes Besson, “illustrates the difference to nuclear great powers” but he is quick to 
stress that even without the coercive, threatening or deterrent potential of atomic 
weapons, the FRG’s industrial potency and geopolitical position entitled her to stake “an 
independent claim to join in the game of world politics.” 103 Middlepowerdom in 
Germany’s specific postwar configuration meant to perform a permanent balancing act 
between reliance on multilateral structures to ensure one’s own survival in the 
uncertainty of an era of superpower confrontation and the determination to develop a 
distinct national profile equally driven by self-interest and characterised by competitive 
aspirations to succeed in an internationally competitive environment. Besson called this 
the “dialectic of security and national ambition”, which was to illustrate the material 
dependency of the FRG as a middle power at the same time highlighting Bonn’s 
alternative power resources some of them equally effective to produce desired outcomes 
in an interdependent world. In the view of many observers, West German foreign policy 
managed to successfully operate in such an environment characterised by a “fatal 
dualism of bi-polarity and interdependence.”104
In stark contrast to Schwarz’s Machtvergessenheit approach, the middle power 
paradigm makes out a distinct profile and an assertive yet conciliatory approach to 
bilateral and multilateral interaction adopted by FRG foreign policy decision-makers. 
Far from displaying the neurotic behavioural tendencies of a political dwarf, West 
Germany played its role as a “self-confident middle power relying on its economic 
power and competitiveness, geopolitical position and proven loyalty and reliability as an 
alliance partner” in the frontline of world politics.105 However, the reference to self- 
confidence and the assertion that the FRG as a middle power and its political elites were 
determined “to have their say” in international diplomacy was not meant to be 
interpreted as a megalomaniac pursuit of foreign affairs synonymous with a denial of the 
limitations on the operational space available. It rather helped to reduce the discrepancy
103 Waldemar Besson, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, op.cit., p.458.
104 Klaus Ritter, ’Zum Handlungsspielraum der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Ost-West-Verhaltnis’, 
Europa-Archiv, \ ol.39, 1984, p.540.
105 Helga Hafitendom, Sicherheit und Entspannung -  Zur Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
1953 -1982, (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 1983) p.56-57.
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between ‘claim to fame’ rhetoric based on high-flying foreign policy goals and the de- 
facto power resources at the FRG’s disposal thus bringing in line expectations and 
reality. Therefore, West Germany’s realistic yet self-confident approach turned out to be 
conducive to a “moderation in the implementation and pursuit of one’s own interests 
and to the renunciation of any hegemonic ambitions.”106 In the immediate aftermath of 
the Second World War, the fragmentation of Germany’s territory and the allied 
occupation condemned the erstwhile great power to the passive existence of a state, 
which had been largely stripped 
government had regained most of its sovereign rights, it quickly became a trusted 
partner in alliance circles through its predictable, intelligent and diplomatic 
maneuvering within multilateral organisations. It thereby “achieved an increase of 
influence and legitimacy that elevated it to the status of a middle power, centrally 
involved in the Atlantic alliance and the European political order.” 107 Some FPA 
scholars have classified the FRG as a middle power not only because of the limitations 
of its quantifiable material power projection capabilities or because of its ability to carve 
out an operational niche between Washington and Moscow e.g. through its Ostpolitik in
1 HRthe later years of the 1960s. It has been given the label of being a middle power also 
because its domestic political culture and specific post-war identity facilitated certain 
behavioural patterns, which distinguished it from great power foreign policy. “Foreign 
policy agents” write Louis Belanger and Gordon Mace, “are at the same time agents of 
domestic political culture by reproducing and orienting typical external behaviour of 
middle powers.”109 Middle powers’ relationship to ‘power’ in international relations was 
crucially shaped by their domestic political structures and state and societal identity 
influenced the role conception of middle powers in general and the Federal Republic in 
particular.110
Located within the broader context of middle power research as an attempt to 
explore the interface of state type and foreign policy behaviour, the middle power
106 Ibid.
107 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, (Yale University Press, New Haven 1989), p .l.
108 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, (Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 145.
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narrative in the debate over power and state interests in West Germany’s foreign policy 
derives its theoretical underpinning from two explanatory approaches. Firstly, the 
quantitative-material and positional approach to middle power research emphasises the 
centrality of the quantifiability of political power and the importance of a state’s 
material resources for its classification as great, middle or minor power. Following a 
realist paradigm which claims that the ability of a state to exert influence “is
proportional to its underlying power, which is defined in terms of its access to
exogenously varying material resources”, the quantitative approach stresses GNP as a 
primary indicator for the categorisation of states followed by the^ei^e of the armed /
forces, level of military expenditure and the quantitative dimension of military
equipment.111 Walther Besson’s reference to the possession of nuclear weapons as a 
defining material condition drawing the line between middle and great power status 
needs to be seen as an example for such a quantitative-positional interpretation. It 
represents a largely realist analysis linking state power to coercive potential and hard 
assets and analytically marries a polity’s military capacity with its economic capabilities 
framed by its geopolitical location. Equally, references to the FRG’s economic strength 
and geopolitical position point at a realist appreciation of political power, of which the 
FRG had enough to play its role as a middle power with self-confidence, but not enough 
to count itself among the group of Cold War great powers.
Secondly, the behavioural explanatory approach to middle power research seeks 
to identify middle powers primarily through their foreign policy behaviour. It introduces 
the concept of middlepowermanship as a role-based and context-dependent status 
category, which displays a number of key behavioural aspects such as multilateralism 
and good international citizenship. Middle power behaviouralists underline the order- 
maintaining roles medium-seized states play on the international stage and within 
regional security arrangements, and they highlight the idealistic impulse, which often 
characterises the diplomatic performance of states positioned on the medium level of the 
international system. The FRG’s “increase in influence and legitimacy” as a trusted 
alliance partner reflects the aforementioned behavioural aspect of regularly acting 
within multilateral frameworks. Furthermore, like the aforementioned civilian power
111 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, op.cit., p.79.
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and tamed power narratives the behavioural approach to middle power foreign policy
displays a clearly constructivist handwriting allowing for the epistemological integration
of the aspect of cultural identity and a conceptual evaluation of the values embedded in
the political culture of middle powers. Rather than trying to globally compete in a
myriad of different issue areas thus greatly overstretching their power resources, middle
powers play out their expertise derived from specialised interests, employ their issue-
112specific skills and their “reputational qualifications” in certain operational niches. In 
that way, second-tier powers can exercise international leadership by playing out their 
comparative advantage vis-a-vis great powers and small states.
Unlike analysts favouring the use of quantitative criteria to determine small, 
middle and greatpowerdom, behaviouralists make the distinction between second and 
third-tier states on the basis of the degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the hegemon or leader 
although “their freedom of action cannot be confused with the manifestation of 
structural leadership expected from major powers.”113 The relationship between leader 
and follower, between great and middle power is not based on coercion but on the 
entrepreneurial and technical superiority of the latter in specific issue areas and 
regarding certain operational spaces. As one Canadian scholar remarked about the only 
marginal significance of military assets for middle power strategic thinking and global 
action: “We have our wheat and our diplomacy and certain skilled and bilingual soldiers 
to offer but military power in the abstract has really mattered little to our role as a 
middle power.”114 Middle power behaviouralists identify three important roles for niche 
actors to play out their issue-specific skills and to impact on the course, dynamic and 
content of international relations. Firstly, instead of overstretching their unevenly 
distributed resources, middle powers focus on the initiation of political processes and 
dialogues as catalysts, engage in two-track diplomacy by promoting coalition-building, 
agenda-setting and policy planning as facilitators and supervise the technical, logistical 
and organisational dimension of institution-building and dispute resolution in their
112 Louis Belanger, Gordon Mace, ‘Middle Powers and Regionalism in the Americas’, Andrew F. Cooper 
(ed.), Niche Diplomacy, op.cit., p. 164
113 Ibid..\65.
114 John W. Holmes, ‘Most safely in the middle’, International Journal, 39, spring 1984, pp.379-380.
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function as managers.115 Secondly, like their fellow constructivist peers in the area of 
civilian power research, behaviouralist middle power theorists stress the crucial meaning 
of collective action. In pursuit of their consensus-building and coalition-forming 
diplomacy, middle powers act in concert within multilateral frameworks thereby 
expressing their preference for conflict management through international 
institutions.116 Thirdly, niche diplomacy also allows for the role of regional hegemon, 
which enables middle powers to adopt a leadership position below the level of the 
global system thus stabilising the regional order and regulating regional spheres of 
influence.117 Like civilian power theorists, scholars of the medium-level category of 
state types emphasise the crucial importance of constructive internationalism, which 
provides governments with important legitimacy in the eyes of civil society actors at 
home. Middle powers’ behavioural predisposition for conciliatory and mediating 
diplomatic roles follows their interest in the promotion of an international order and the 
stabilisation of a global framework within which middle powers are able to pursue 
domestic values, preferences and principles.118 Niche politics by middle powers 
explores operational spaces, which are conducive to noncoercive forms of external 
action, and which are explained by David R. Black: “Middle-sized states are generally 
unable and less inclined to try to impose their views on other governments, as a 
conseqiHn®e^dieyafetviE4tl|Krffliiddleip’6Wer concept for the analysis of West Germany’s 
foreign policy and the role of its political foundations? Waldemar Besson provides the 
most convincing description of the FRG’s overall priorities when he talks about the 
“dialectic of security and national ambition’ as expressed in Bonn’s seesawing between 
multilateralism and the quest for a self-interested driven foreign policy agenda while 
Haftendom and Hanrieder have shifted their focus already stronger towards the
1,5 Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and 
Canada in a Changing World Order^ (Vancouver UBC Press 1993), pp.25-26.
116 Kim Richard Nossal, Richard Stubbs, ‘Mahathir’s Malaysia’, in Andrew F. Cooper et.al. (eds.), Niche 
Diplomacy, op.cit., p.151. See also Michael K. Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, Or Satellite? 
Competing Perspectives in the Study o f Canadian Foreign Policy, (York University Centre for 
International and Strategic Studies, 1989), pp. 3-8 for the behavioural aspects in Canadian 
middlepowerdom.
117 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran -  Middle Powers in a Penetrated 
Regional System , (London & New York, Routledge 1997), p.20.
1,8/&/</, p. 103.
119 Ibid, p . l l l .
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operational frameworks of “Atlantic alliance and the European political order”,120 which 
inevitably limits the attention given to foreign policy action outside of multilateral 
organisations. The more recent constructivist literature on middle power (Higgott, 
Cooper, Nossal) diplomacy has developed an interesting catalogue of behavioural 
patterns based on persuasion such as mediation, consensus- and bridge-building to 
exercise leadership in regional contexts and operational niches. However, behavioural 
middle power theorists link these forms of niche diplomacy regularly to multilateral 
action and therefore soft power, once again, remains largely confined to West 
Germany’s participation in intergovernmental organisations thus overlooking an 
important non-multilateral component of FRG foreign policy.
1.2.5. A Second Dimension of Power Politics - Preliminary Conclusions
The previous section has looked at four narratives -  one realist, two constructivist and
one combining both material-positional and identity-based behavioural criteria to arrive 
at the construction of status categories explaining state behaviour -  which have thus far 
dominated the discourse in FPA over nature, configuration and employment of power in 
the FRG’s foreign policy during the Cold War. It became clear that inherent in the 
realist narrative of West Germany as forgetting power was the uni-dimensional notion 
of power as the coercion-based potential to make other states behave in a way, which 
they would otherwise not consider to be an option for action in their foreign policy. This 
realist approach asserts that only if a state possesses the capabilities to force a rival into 
compliance or cause him to change his behaviour can this state be seen as powerful. 
Realist writers on power in West Germany’s foreign policy regard multilateral 
diplomacy as a sign of weakness and not a sign of strength. In their view, only coercive 
potential (played out unilaterally) qualifies for power. The realist narrative holds that 
Germany’s national psyche struggled to come to terms with the magnitude of crime 
perpetrated by the Nazi’s totalitarian regime against Europe’s Jewry and that the 
singularity of Auschwitz silenced any attempt to revive great power politics after the 
war. The very idea of power remained associated with physical coercion and equated 
with an aggressive self-conduct in international affairs, which should never again be
120 See p.40.
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allowed to challenge the political order in Europe or elsewhere. Therefore, the FRG’s 
foreign policy elites supported by the general public distanced themselves from key 
concepts in international diplomacy such as the national interest and renounced power 
politics as the immoral and egoistic pursuit of material gains.
On the other hand, the remaining three narratives of civilian power, tamed power 
and middle power all dismiss the ‘forgetting power’ narrative’s claim of a West German 
absenteeism in the field of interest-driven and assertive diplomacy and argue instead, 
that the FRG had indeed a power dimension, pursued power politics and followed its 
national interest, but that it did so exclusively as a member of international organisations 
using multilateral fora instead of unilateral action. In their interpretation, power and 
power politics still existed as an operational option for West German politicians, it was 
however being pursued through different channels, by different means, in different fora 
and expressed itself in different configurations. The three narratives answering power in 
the affirmative affix a different operational mode to the pursuit of power politics in the 
interdependent post-war world highlighting that the FRG did not coerce other members 
of the international community anymore but persuaded, convinced, attracted and co­
opted other governments to its cause and ideas i.e. it displayed a willingness to co­
operate internationally. Although all four narratives stress the importance of 
multilateralism in the pursuit of West German diplomacy in the Cold War era, they 
differ in their assessment of the true nature of these multilateral commitments. While the 
‘forgetting power’ school sees co-operative internationalism as a “pretext for national 
abstention”, civilian power, tamed power and middle power theorists conclude that 
multilateral frameworks were the only operational option available, in which national 
interests could be successfully pursued. In the eyes of the latter, international and 
supranational organisations provided platforms, on which the FRG played out softer 
forms of power while for realists, who complained about the FRG’s obliviousness vis-a- 
vis the concept of power, there did not exist any softer dimension to a truly interest- 
driven foreign policy. This thesis rejects the ‘forgetfulness of power’ approach with its 
uni-dimensional analysis of power based on coercion, quantifiability and material 
resourcefulness of nation-states. In contrast, it agrees with the (largely) constructivist 
argument that power has certainly not ceased to exist in (West) Germany’s external
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relations management but that it had taken different forms, which can be labelled ‘soft 
power’.
However, civilian, tamed and middle power narratives appear to be too narrowly 
construed in their exclusive focus on multilateral frameworks. In their interdependence- 
soft-power model, there does not seem to be any space for single-state initiatives nor 
room for any meaningful transnational activities by private or non-governmental 
diplomatic actors. Changing external conditions as well as a changed post-war identity 
and value system led the FRG to pursue its interests within the confines of multilateral 
organisations and only within such a radius of action. Therefore, the question at the end 
of the first chapter’s literature review appears to be the following: Does an additional 
aspect in the history of power in West Germany’s foreign policy remain, which has not 
been given the necessary attention? And if so, how one can think about such a second 
dimension of West Germany’s ‘soft power’ besides its tested multilateral diplomacy? 
Have there been any forms of non-multilateral and semi-autonomous diplomacy with 
which FRG state interests have been pursued, and how was this ‘private’ diplomacy 
operationalised? I argue that the equation of soft power with multilateralism misses 
important aspects of the FRG’s foreign policy and does not tell us either what the 
structural underpinnings of soft power are. Put differently, while realists dismiss soft 
power as irrelevant, the existing non-realist literature discusses power in the FRG’s 
foreign policy by applying an exclusively multilateral prism and remains silent on what 
soft power as a concept entails.
In the following section, I will take up the issue of soft power, to which civilian, 
tamed and middle power narratives have assigned equal significance as the ‘new’ 
operational mode in the pursuit of the FRG’s post-war foreign policy. Since the 
argument asserts firstly that the FRG’s foreign policy had remained interest-driven and 
‘powerful’ but that secondly, in contrast to previous historical periods, German interests 
after the Second World War were being pursued through non-coercive i.e. softer forms 
of power and thirdly, that this soft power did not necessarily require multilateral 
channels for its operationalisation, the second part of this chapter needs to a) take a 
closer look at the content and conceptual design of soft power and b) subsequently to 
introduce the system of Germany’s political foundations or Stiftungen as an example for
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the type of transnationally operating organisation that backs my claim that parts of the 
FRG’s foreign policy system were being involved in non-multilateral diplomacy based 
on soft power and driven by state interests.
1.3. Soft Power
American IR scholar Joseph S. Nye’s reflections on soft power stand out among the 
growing IR literature on noncoercive forms of interaction between states. Nye divides 
power into two basal categories characterised by different behavioural patterns. Hard 
power is being brought to bear either through means of military or economic coercion 
such as armed attack or the issuing of threats to impose sanctions (‘sticks’) or through 
the provision of inducements (‘carrots’), which Nye largely reduces to financial 
rewards. Soft power on the other hand is defined as “the ability to get what you want
171through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” While hard power rests on 
command structures and control, soft power seeks to co-opt. Nye’s approach appears to 
be largely in agreement with those scholars of power analysis who recognise the 
situationally specific nature of power. He emphasises the importance of knowing the 
preferences of potential influencees as a pre-requisite for the successful measurement of 
power “in terms of the changed behaviour of others.”122 Knowing about the crucial 
significance of contextual variables, Nye metaphorically urges analysts of power “to 
understand what game you are playing and how the value of the cards may be changing 
before you judge who is holding the high cards.”123
He rejects the notion of fungibility by asking, “which resources provide the best 
basis for power behaviour in a particular context?”124 According to Nye, hard power is 
generated by the sophistication of one’s armoury or it facilitates the magical effects on 
human behaviour, which often money can have. Soft power on the other hand “is based 
on our political ideals and our policies.”125 Such an ability to set the political agenda, to 
shape the preferences of others and to successfully sell one’s own political philosophy,
121 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (Public Affairs, New York 2004), 
p.x.
122 Ibid, p.2
123 Ibid, p.4.
124 Ibid, p.3.
125 Joseph S. Nye, ‘Soft Power can fight terrorism’, Alameda Times, 4 April 2004.
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socio-economic concepts and cultural achievements on the international marketplace of 
values and ideas has been occasionally described as the second face ofpower. Nye likes 
the effects of “an attractive ideology, culture and institutions” to the outcome of 
seductive processes and argues, that an evolutionary process has transformed the 
international political landscape and radically changed the sources of power in present 
day’s politics.126 “Today” he writes, “the foundations of power have been moving away 
from the emphasis on military force and conquest.”127 Various developmental stages of 
European and American societies had brought about a succession of different power 
resources critical for the strength of a state or political entity in international relations. 
The agrarian economies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries came to rely on 
population as a crucial power resource for taxation and military recruitment. The 
technological innovations of the industrial age enabled states with efficient 
administrative structures combined with the unparalleled firepower of new weaponry 
and new means of transportation to triumph over the sheer numerical strength of the 
enemy’s armed forces. All this, says Nye, came to an end with the advent of the 
information age and the phenomenon of globalisation. A state’s war-winning ability as 
a decisive indicator for powerfulness has been largely replaced by other factors. “In 
assessing power in the information age” writes Nye and co-author William A. Owens, 
“the importance of technology, education and institutional flexibility has risen, whereas 
that of geography, population and raw materials has fallen.”128
He explains the changing nature of power and the growing importance of the 
power of attraction by highlighting four paradigm shifts. First, the destructive power of 
nuclear weapons had claimed a price too high to pay for by human society. Therefore, as 
a means of deterrence nuclear weapons served their purpose during the Cold War but 
the lack of actual battlefield quality contributed to their increasingly diminished
1 *50strategic significance. Secondly, the rise of nationalism in Europe’s overseas
126 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, op.cit., pp.5-6.
127 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox o f  American Power: Why the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone, 
(Oxford University Press, New York 2002), p.5.
128 Joseph S. Nye Jr., William A. Owens, ‘America’s Information Edge’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 
1996, vol. 75, no. 2, p.22.
129 See Mary Kaldor, ‘American power: from ‘compellence’ to cosmopolitanism’, International Affairs vol. 
79, no. 1, 2003, p. 5 where she argues that the end of the Cold War has presented the United States with the
58
territories put an end to imperialistic expansion and colonial rule and ended an era of
divide-and-rule by conquest and military superiority. A third shift away from the
dominant role military capabilities played in international politics occurred within the
societies of the great powers. After the unprecedented destruction caused by two world
wars, any traces of a formerly dominant warrior ethic disappeared from Western
societies only to be replaced by the primacy of civic interaction among societies. The
lack of will to fight became a trait of the post-industrial age. Finally, in an economically
interdependent world the use of military force regularly collided with global business
interests of great and middle powers. Nye does not deny the role that hard power
resources and especially military capabilities still play in today’s world. He is also
keenly aware of the fact that the information age with its Internet revolution, the free
global movement of capital and the activities of transnational actors transcending
geographic boundaries “has yet to transform most of the world.”130 He acknowledges
the still violent face of world affairs with its civil wars, ethnic hatred and the menace of
international terrorism all of which defy peaceful ways of human interaction and all of
which are immune to the soft power “that is associated with ideas, cultures and 
1 1policies” . Therefore, he emphatically warns international relations scholars “to ignore 
the role of force and the centrality of security would be like ignoring oxygen.”132
However, Nye urges his own country to adopt a broader analytical focus in order 
to understand the complexity of variants and manifestations of power in a globalised 
international environment. Winning additional international allies by positively shaping 
the opinion of foreign audiences and elites and by manipulating political agendas in 
foreign countries, he argues, would substantially reduce operational costs normally 
generated by a “stick” approach to foreign policy. Instead, it would enable the United 
States to maintain its global hegemony through an inexpensive “carrot” strategy.
need for the development of a new institutional framework in order to successfully adjust to changed 
contextual circumstances. One of the crucial changes was the “decline of military power; that is to say the 
declining ability o f states to use military force for ‘compellance’ because o f a “growing destructiveness.” 
According to Kaldor, the globalisation age is characterised by the fact that “superior military technology 
rarely confers a decisive advantage in conflicts between armed opponents.”
130 Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox o f American Power, op.cit., p.7.
131 Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘The Information Revolution and American Soft Power’, Asia-Pacific Review , vol.9, 
no.l, 2002, p.67.
132 Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox o f  American Power, op.cit., p.7.
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“Nearly five centuries ago” asserts Nye, “Niccolo Machiavelli advised princes in Italy 
that it was more important to be feared than to be loved” not without expressing his 
belief that “in today’s world, it is best to be both.”133 But love requires the many Davids 
to perceive Goliath’s action as being legitimate whereas fear requires only a determined 
and sufficiently reckless use of superior power by the hegemon. Therefore, soft power 
will be rapidly undermined and eventually rendered inadequate if the foreign policy of a 
dominant actor appears to be unjust, unjustified and ignorant in the eyes of the outside 
world. “Our attractiveness as a shining city on the hill can be undercut by policies that 
others see as illegitimate” warns Nye and urges decision-makers to bear in mind that 
“since legitimacy rests in the eyes of the beholders, it is not sufficient to simply assert 
the superiority of our civic culture.”134
The importance of soft power in the context of this study derives not least from 
its relevance for the realisation of milieu goals.135 Evaluating the multitude of foreign 
policy goals on which nation-states base the pursuit of their external relations, political 
scientist Arnold Wolfers in an early collection of essays directed the attention of his 
fellow colleagues towards the important distinction between possession goals and milieu 
goals. While competing “with others for a share in values of limited supply”, states 
would strive for the preservation or enhancement of their own ‘belongings’. The defence 
of a state’s possessions -  territorial gains, political privileges or economic advantages -  
prioritises issues of national security and appears to be guided by a narrowly defined 
national self-interest.136 In contrast, through the pursuit of milieu goals states aim to 
actively influence the dynamics and conditions of their extraterritorial environment. 
States that pursue milieu goals seek to shape the operational framework within which 
they interact with other states. Their aim is to promote peaceful and co-operative 
bilateral relations, to strengthen multilateral institutions or to contribute towards socio­
economic stability in developing countries. By stressing the importance of what Stanley
133 Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘The velvet hegemon: how soft power can help defeat terrorism’, Foreign Policy, 
May/June 2003, p.75.
134 Joseph S. Nye, ‘Lonely at the Top’, Washington Post, 18 April 2004; Soft Power: The Means to Success 
in World Politics, op.cit., p.26.
135 Ibid, p. 17.
136 Arnold Wolfers (ed.), The Goals o f  Foreign Policy, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International 
Politics, (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press 1962), p.72.
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Hoffmann has described as the “international milieu that will provide a modicum of 
order i.e. reduce the inevitable loads of violence and chaos that an anarchic international 
system carries”, Wolfers does not deny the possibility that milieu goals often turn out to 
be only a processual step in a much more broadly conceptualised strategy of realising
•  117possession goals. Although he does not see anything contradictory or impossible in a 
state engaging in acts of political altruism “if its people or its rulers so desire”, he does 
not have any illusions either about the centrality of the milieu-goal pursuing 
benefactor’s self-interest.138 “Acts of national foreign policy expressing a generous and 
sympathetic impulse” writes Wolfers, “Usually will be found to have served the national 
security interest or economic interest of the donor as well.”139
His interest in the motivational predisposition of the donor is explained by his 
belief that to enquire about intentions, interests and preferences of the actor promoting 
milieu goals is an indispensable scholarly prerequisite if one wants to avoid navigating 
in complete analytical darkness because of the high level of ensuing abstraction. If a 
nation is helping others through economic aid to raise their standard of living, it may 
make a great deal of difference for the chances that such aid will be continued or 
extended whether the nation extending the aid considers economic improvement abroad 
as being desirable in itself, or promotes it merely for the sake of cementing its alliance 
with the assisted country or of drawing that country over to its own side. Wolfers 
recognises the difficulty of pinpointing the reciprocal elements inherent in cases of 
milieu goal driven foreign policy and notes the challenge for any attempt to determine 
the motivation of actors. He does not view the goal of creating a peaceful external 
environment and to better the living standards of others through charitable commitments 
as something that would not permit the benefactor to keep his personal interest in mind.
137 Stanley Hoffmann, ‘In Defence o f Mother Teresa: Morality in Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 
March/April 1996, available from http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19960301faresponse4194/stanlev- 
hoffmann/in-defense-of-mother-teresa-moralitv-in-foreign-policv.htm. cited on 4 March 2004.
138 Wolfers separates the possibility o f altruistic behaviour from the actual occurrence and likelihood of 
occurrence o f political altruism underlying the pursuit o f milieu goals. “Whether such altruistic acts are 
likely to occur, or whether, if a government claimed credit for them, its motives would be found to have 
been as pure as one were asked to believe, is another question.” Arnold Wolfers, Discord and 
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Charitable behaviour in many instances goes hand in hand with the expectation of “high 
dividends to the donor and yet be a moral credit to him.”140
In his approach, Nye connects the two ends of soft power and milieu goals. He 
deems noncoercive influence to be the most effective way to realise a foreign policy 
agenda that transcends strict national security concerns and pursues the goal of creating 
a stable external environment. In his view, appealing to other countries through one’s 
own democratic values and through the power of one’s own cultural achievements 
promises to be the most successful strategy to convince their governments to adopt 
similar positions and to introduce comparable policies. Realising that “it is easier to 
attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic”, Nye stresses the 
crucial role of soft power for democratisation, human rights advocacy and the promotion 
of market economies on a global scale.141 He describes the operational framework for 
foreign policy as a “three-dimensional chess game in which one can win only by playing 
vertically as well as horizontally.142 On the top board, conventional strategic thinking 
focuses on military issues and the categorisation of international relations is one of 
unipolarity versus multipolarity, hegemony versus a balance of power. The middle 
board is dominated by economic relations between states and characterised by a more 
even distribution of power resources. Finally, transnational relations are being played 
out on the bottom board and issues such as terrorism, international crime, climate 
change or democracy promotion is holding centre stage. And it is the bottom board with 
its transnational channels of interaction between states and societies where soft power 
can contribute towards the realisation of milieu goals i.e. create a more peaceful and 
stable external environment. Global interdependence has significantly altered the nature 
of political influence and the issues on the bottom board are “now intruding into the 
world of grand strategy.143 The transnational level of world affairs responds favourably 
to the use of noncoercive forms of influence and enables states to effectively target 
foreign elites as well as the broader public and civil society organisations in other 
countries on a sub-governmental level.
140 Ibid, p.75.
141 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, op.cit., p. 17.
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How is all of the above relevant for this study’s main argument of the existence 
of a power and state interest driven West German foreign policy located on a sub-state 
level and supplementing governmental diplomacy pursued through bilateral and 
multilateral channels? The aforementioned realist and constructivist narratives of nature 
and configuration of power in West Germany’s foreign policy have largely failed to take 
the bottom board of international relations as described by Nye in his analysis of soft 
power sufficiently into account. It is on this operational level that the democracy 
promotion activities of Germany’s political foundations are being played out thus 
constituting an important non-multilateral dimension of the FRG’s foreign policy. The 
‘three-dimensional chess board’ accommodates state as well as sub-state actors and 
actions and provides an analytical tool that helps to illustrate the FRG’s two-level 
foreign policy system with its multilateral (and often coercion-based) initiatives on the 
top and middle board and diplomatic soft power based on ideas, concepts and values on 
the bottom board. The final section of this chapter will take a closer look at the 
Stiftungen model of democracy promotion in order to make the use of soft power 
outside of multilateral frameworks clearer.
1.4. Operationalising Soft Power -The Stiftungen’s Informal Diplomacy
Germany’s Stiftungen or political foundations have been a highly visible component in
the international dimension of regime change being described as a foreign policy tool 
“unique for almost 20 years.” 144 The idea of promoting political pluralism in 
authoritarian societies around the globe provided the Western part of post-war Germany 
with the invaluable opportunity to regain ground in the international arena and to spruce 
up its blemished reputation inconspicuously without facing the risk of being 
immediately blinded by the spotlight of international public attention which had been 
extraordinarily aware of the country’s external relations after the disastrous era of Nazi 
rule. At a time when memories of the fascist era were still fresh and when many West 
German ambassadors had started their careers in the days of the Third Reich, “aid for 
democracy-building was thought to be more acceptable abroad if it came in the name of
144 Stefan Mair, ‘The Role o f the German Stiftungen in the Process of Democratisation’, ECDPM Working 
Paper no 32, available from www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/pubs/wp32 gb.htm. cited on 14 March 2004.
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political parties rather than from the German government.” 145 The Stiftungen model 
caused observers to describe it as the representation of “a long-standing German 
practice, dating back to Bismarck, of funding so-called middle organisations to engage 
in what elsewhere would be considered government business at home and abroad.”146 
The FEF as the oldest of Germany’s political foundations had been established as early 
as 1925 and was banned from the political scene by the Nazis in 1933 thus sharing the 
fate of many other democratic organisations after the Machtergreifung. It immediately 
resumed its activities after 1945 first in domestic politics and in the area of civic 
education and subsequently in the international realm. FNF, KAF and HSF were 
established in 1958, 1964 and 1967 respectively and more recently, the HBF affiliated 
with the German Green Party and the RLF close to the leftwing PDS further broadened 
the spectrum of political foundations in 1996 and 1999 respectively.147 The young 
democracy’s historical experience with citizen participation and democratic nation 
building soon developed into a permanent feature in its foreign policy. “Being a new 
democracy itself, the Federal Republic approaches democracy as something which can 
be taught and learnt.”148 West Germany’s democratic society was still in its infancy but 
the democratic learning process of the post-war generation created a specific foreign 
policy environment that had political leaders genuinely believe that liberal democracy 
was an attractive political model not only for their own country but for other countries 
as well where rulers still rejected any notion of human rights, civil liberties and the rule 
of law. Therefore, the origins of German democracy promotion efforts with the 
Stiftungen as their organisational transmission belt appear to be inseparably intertwined 
with the country’s contemporary political history. They highlight the founding ethos of a
145 Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, ‘International Political Finance: The Konrad Adenauer Foundation and 
Latin America’, in Laurence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions o f  Democratization: Europe 
and the Americas, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) p.233.
146 Ann L. Phillips, Power and Influence after the Cold War: Germany in East-Central Europe, (Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 2000), p. 128.
147 Norbert Lepszy, ‘Politische Stiftungen’, in Uwe Andersen, Woyke Wichard (eds.), Handwdrterbuch des 
politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (5. Auflage, Opladen, Leske + Budrich 2003), p. 103.
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society in which “every democrat is seen as a step away from the memory of 
dictatorship towards the hope of a totally secure and maturing democracy.”149
The international activities of West Germany’s party foundations also proved to 
be a useful strategic vehicle to activate transnational channels of cross-border interaction 
and to exert influence in the target society through soft power. The Stiftungen proved to 
be adequate foreign policy responses to the phenomenon of the ‘societalisation’ of 
Germany’s external relations. Walter L. Buhl remarks: “In the processes of 
multilateralisation, transnationalisation and the ‘societalisation’ of foreign policy, 
external and internal issues merge together beyond recognition.” 150 Being almost 
entirely funded by taxpayer’s money151, the political foundations take over a broad 
range of diplomatic responsibilities while operating with a much smaller bureaucratic 
apparatus, less personnel and a greater freedom of political manoeuvrability than the 
Foreign Service.
1.4.1 Legal and Institutional Status
The political status of Germany’s party foundations and the nature of their relationship 
with the Federal Government does not allow for a simplistic institutional analysis. 
Instead it requires locating the Stiftungen in the organisational grey zone between a 
semi-state and a non-governmental actor. The following observation made by American 
political analyst Peter D. Bell in his study of the Ford Foundation’s transnational 
activities some thirty years ago remains applicable in the context of Germany’s political 
aid system:
The importance of foundations as transnational actors does not result from their 
dominance in policy areas deemed important by governments. The relationship between 
foundations and governments is subtler. Under varying circumstances foundations 
support activities, which might have been financed by government and thus themselves, 
bear the risk of failure or reaction. Foundations inform and evaluate governmental 
policies, serve as resource bases for ideas and talent and even legitimate or undermine 
governmental programs and actions by supporting them or failing to do so. Foundations 
also influence, if only by assisting, other transnational and national actors which, in turn
149 Ibid.
150 Walter L. Biihl, ,Gesellschaftliche Grundlagen der Deutschen Aussenpolitik’, in: Karl Kaiser, Hanns W. 
Maull (eds.), Dehtschlands neue Aussenpolitik, vol.l: Grundlagen, (R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Miinchen 
1994), p. 182.
151 See 1.3.2.
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affect domestic and world politics. In short, consideration of foundations as 
transnational actors does not impair our view of the importance of governments. Instead, 
it gives us a richer picture of the complexity of world politics.152
Each of the foundations is closely affiliated with a particular political party and they are 
defined as private organisations under civil law, which provide services in the public 
interest. Being officially non-state actors, they emphasise their de-jure as well as de- 
facto independence from the world of governmental politics thereby “carrying out their 
tasks independently, responsibly and with intellectual open-mindedness” and with an 
awareness of the “required distance to political parties.”153 The political foundations are 
not subject to the body of law governing political party activities in the Federal Republic 
(Parteiengesetz) nor does constitutional law regulate their operations abroad or their 
domestic activities.154 In order to avoid a conflict of interests between parties and 
foundations, to maintain the political independence of Stiftungen staff and, given the 
enduring chorus of numerous critics, to shield the agencies against recurring accusations 
of political patronage and nepotism, the foundations do not select and appoint leading 
party functionaries for service on their managing boards or filling with them the 
positions of chairman, spokesperson, managing director and treasurer.155 Nevertheless, 
separation of party posts and leading positions within Stiftungen management does not 
extend to elected members of the Bundestag, former or actual members of the cabinet or 
junior party officials.156 The Stiftungen are de-facto members of one of the existing 
political ‘families’ and thus integral part of the broader party machinery. The close 
interconnectedness of parties and foundations is reflected in the number of cabinet
152 Peter D. Bell, ‘The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor’, International Organizations, vol. XXV, 
1971, no. 3, p. 478. Another scholar concludes: “The foundations’ foreign policy and governmental foreign 
policy complement one another to a large extent. This does however not rule out attempts on the part o f the 
foundations, very much to the regret o f the Foreign Ministry, to occasionally correct or even undermine 
official foreign policy”. Sebastian Bartsch, ‘Politische Stiftungen: Grenzganger zwischen Gesellschafts- 
und Staatenwelt’, in: Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Karl Kaiser (eds.), Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik, Bd. 4: 
Institutionen und Resourcen, (R. Oldenbourg Verlag Miinchen 1998), p. 195.
153 Gemeinsame Erklarung zur staatlichen Finanzierung der Politischen Stiftungen, Zweiter Abschnitt: 
Status der Politischen Stiftungen, available from www.KAF.de/stiftung/erklaerung.html. cited on 8 August 
2004, p. 3; The constitutional basis for the foundations’ activities can be found in Art.5, Art.9,1 and Art 
12,1 Basic Law (Grundgesetz).
154 Art.21 Basic Law (Grundgesetz).
155 Ibid, p.4.
156 Norbert Lepszy, ‘Politische Stiftungen’, op.cit., p. 104.
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ministers and other leading politicians who are alumni of their respective party 
foundation. Therefore, the Stiftungen serve as a recruitment ground for the political class 
and various dependencies and cross-institutional linkages are part of the network 
connecting parties and foundations.157
In fact, foundation officials stress the crucial importance of their organisations’ 
political integration into wider party structures. The global promotion of pluralist 
concepts of democracy could only be pursued with the necessary credibility by making 
the value system as represented by individual political parties at home the ideological 
bedrock of the Stiftungen’s international activities. KAF Latin America analyst Werner 
Bohler writes: “ Any attempt to disseminate democracy must be based on specific 
values. It is the political parties themselves that decide about values, contents and
1 SRprogrammes.” Their value orientation differentiated them from other democracy 
promotion agencies such as the International Institute for Democracy (IDEA) or the 
World Movement for Democracy (WMD), which only introduced the technical and 
procedural components of modem democratic systems in a non-partisan spirit without 
making basal value and preference-based choices. “Democracy can only be promoted 
through values because it is legitimised as a system through elections, in which rival 
parties compete with each other,” writes Bohler and stresses “this requires a politically 
educated electorate, which cannot be neutral and impartial but needs to make value 
judgments.”159 Despite their party political affiliation, they are significantly more than 
just a mere appendix of their respective ‘mother parties’ and keenly aware of their 
position within the FRG’s political spectrum.
The FRG’s Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) ruled in 
1986 that political foundations needed to maintain a minimum degree of independence 
from their affiliated parties. Stiftungen are neither allowed to co-operate with political
157 Former Minister o f State in the Ministry for International Development Wighardt Hardtl remembered 
that a total o f six ministers in the cabinet o f Chancellor Helmut Kohl had received scholarships from the 
Konrad-Adenauer Foundation. Interview Wighardt Hardtl.
158 Werner Bohler, ‘Die Rolle der politischen Stiftungen in der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik’, KAF 
Auslandsinformationen, no. 6, 2005, available from http://www.inwent.org/E-t-Z/content/archiv-ger/07- 
2005/trib artl.html. cited on 23 February 2006.
159 Werner B6hler, ‘Es kommt auf Werte an\  E  + Z -  Zeitschrift fu r  Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit, 
July 2005, available from http://www.inwent.org/E-t-Z/content/archiv-ger/07-20Q5/trib artl.html. cited on 
23 February 2006.
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parties e.g. on election campaigns nor can they directly enter into the process of 
competing for political power.160 It therefore seems to be justified to describe the 
multifaceted relationship between political foundations and political parties as the 
simultaneous existence of two phenomena, namely proximity and independence.161 
Neither are they umbilically linked nor remain foundations completely autonomous and /  
unaffected by external influence. They are non-governmental actors yet always two of 
them are closely connected with the government through their affiliation with respective 
political ‘mother parties’ and the interweavement of party and foundation personnel.
“The political and institutional independence of political foundations is also always 
useful for official foreign policy as an exculpation, for example when certain 
controversial facts and activities are reaching the German public or when they anger 
politicians in host countries” says Ulrich Karpen, a constitutional lawyer and university 
professor who has advised parties and governments in South Africa, Guatemala, 
Afghanistan and Chile in their constitution-building process as an expert in KAF 
democracy promotion projects. “In those cases” he adds, “official diplomacy can always 
point at the Stiftung and blame the foundation for those developments or incidents, 
which do not go down well with public opinion.”162
Both proximity and independence characterising the relationship between the 
institutions of governmental foreign policy and the informal and non-governmental 
operations of Germany’s political foundations often clearly reveal their instrumental 
character. The foundations’ position within the German foreign policy system 
occupying the interface between the FRG’s public management of its external affairs 
and the realm of (civil society) goes regularly beyond a mere co-existence of 
governmental and sub-state diplomacy.163 One analyst of Stiftungen activities in Africa 
describes the division of labour and responsibility between foundations, which he labels
160 BverfGE 73,1 (14 July 1986), available from http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/dfr/bv073001 .html#Rn 155. 
cited on 7 September 2003.
161 Gerd Langguth, ‘Politische Stiftungen und politische Bildung in Deutschland’, Aus Politik uned 
Zeitgeschichte B43, p. 42.
162 Personal interview with Ulrich Karpen, Hamburg, 10 February 2006.
163 The difficulties to pin down the exact nature o f role, mission and systemic integration of the political 
foundations within the FRG’s foreign policy system are evident in Nicole Renvert, ‘Mission Possible? Die 
Rolle der deutschen parteinahen Stiftungen in den USA’, DAAD/AICGS Working Paper, available from 
http://www.aicgs.org/documents/Renvert%20FINAL%20eng.pdf. cited on 26 February 2006, p.3.
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‘clandestine diplomats’ and official diplomacy by asserting that “in a sense the 
foundations are, on the one hand, an arm of German foreign policy, but on the other are 
supposed to be ‘autonomous’ with the upshot that they operate (with implicit approval 
of the Ministry) in an area, which the official policy wants to avoid.”164 Their combined 
presence in foreign countries mirrors the pluralist nature of Germany’s post-war 
democracy and their promotion of German society’s political values and preferences 
abroad makes them ideal sub-state transmitters of German interests. “In this way” writes 
the former KAF bureau chief in Johannesburg, Michael Lange about the general 
strategic goals of his organisation as a German foreign policy actor, “it is actively 
assuming a share of responsibility for shaping international relations, while conveying 
modem German political culture to the rest of the world.”165
1.4.2. Funding
Although Germany’s political foundations are being ‘privately’ organised i.e. non­
governmental agents of democracy promotion, they provide ‘public’ services in the 
domestic and international realm and are predominantly publicly funded receiving their 
funds from four different ministries.166 The Ministry for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (BMZ) provides the lion’s share of funding with roughly 90 percent of the
164 Gero Erdmann, ‘Hesitant Bedfellows: The German Stiftungen and Party Aid in Africa. - An Attempt at 
an Assessment’, CSGR Working Paper no 184/05, December 2005, available from 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/workingpaDers/2005/wpl8405.pdf. 27 February 2006, 
p.4.
165 Michael Lange, ‘Opening Remarks’ at the KAF Seminar ‘Democratic Transformation o f Education’, 27 
- 28 September 2000, Stellenbosch, available from
http://www.KAF.org.za/Publications/SeminarReports/democratictransformationofeducation/lange.pdf. 
cited on 27 February 2006.
166 During 1999, the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation for example received 96.3% of its budget from the 
Federal Government or the German Lander while fees for conferences and other cover charges generate 
only 2.9% o f the Foundation’s financial resources. Private donations and bond revenues account for 0.8%. 
Rolf Halfmann, ‘Principles governing the funding of political Foundations’, Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, 
February 2000, available from www.KAF.de/publikationen/2000/staat/finanz stift e.html. cited on 4 April 
2002, p .l. See also Ann L. Phillips, Power and Influence after the Cold War, op.cit., p. 129. Phillips 
mentions the Ministry for Education as well as the Interior Ministry as sources for funding o f domestic 
activities. She also presents funding figures, which show an increase from DM 25 million in 1967 to DM 
650 million in 1994. This is followed by a decrease to DM 600 million in 1996 due to the budgetary 
constraints in the public sector. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky speaks of a total amount of DM 290 million in 
1988 for overseas programs, a sum which is being split into DM 170 million spent on foreign projects and 
DM 20 million on inland activities related to the Foundation’s international project agenda. According to 
Pinto-Duschinsky, the Foundations received a total o f DM 2,895.16 million between 1962 and 1988 from 
the Ministry for International Development (Bundesministerium fu r  wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit 
BMZ), Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, ‘Foreign political aid’, op.cit., pp.35-36.
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expenditures while the Foreign Ministry (Auswartiges Amt) provides the remaining 10 
percent of the foundation’s budgets for international activities. 167 The political 
foundations are required to apply for funding for each of their democracy promotion 
projects to the BMZ while Ambassadors and the Foreign Ministry reserve a right to veto 
specific projects for diplomatic reasons.168 The foundations receive additional grants, 
which in the case of the KAF amount to approximately 30 percent of its annual budget 
covering expenses for conferences, seminars, research, consulting, publications and 
human resources.169 The exact amount of public funding is b§ing determined by the ^  
parliamentary budget select committee and depends on the relative strength of the 
foundation-affiliated political parties in the German Lower House or Bundestag. It can 
be put at around one third each for KAF and FEF (32.5%) as well as circa 10 percent for 
FNF, HSF, and HBS respectively.170 In order to be eligible for state funding and despite 
their relatively independent position in the political system, a political foundation must 
be officially recognised by a political party in parliament.171 In recent years, the annual 
budgets of Germany’s Stiftungen have by far outstripped the financial resources 
available to the other political foundations in Europe. In 2004, the combined total 
budget of Germany’s party-affiliated democracy promotion agencies has reached an 
impressive €358 million while the remaining organisations received only €42 million in 
funds.172
Having been confronted with accusations of financial mismanagement and a lack 
of accountability, the foundations responded to the criticism of numerous commentators 
by adopting a joint declaration in which they argued that by financially supporting the 
Stiftungen as organisations, which would promote “societal and democratic educational
167 Sebastian Bartsch, ’Politische Stiftungen: GrenzgSnger zwischen Gesellschafts- und Staatenwelt’, 
op.cit., p. 187.
168 Embassies do not use their veto against Stiftungen projects very often and only in those instances where 
there are concerns that a proposed project is likely to violate norms of international law or partner 
organisations are undemocratic . Ibid, p. 187.
169 Rolf Halfmann, ‘Principles governing the funding o f political foundations’, op.cit., p .l.
170 Stefan Mair, ‘The Role of the German ‘Stiftungen’ in the Process o f Democratisation’, op.cit., p.3.
171 Ibid.
172 Jos van Wersch, Jeroen de Zeeuw, ‘Mapping European Democracy Assistance -  Tracing the Activities 
and Financial Flows of Political Foundations’, Working Paper 36, Conflict Research Programme, 
Netherland Institute for International Relations, November 2005, available from 
http://www.cdi.anu.edu.au/featured articles/featured-
articles dowloads/CDI.News FEB MAR 06 FA 2.pdf. cited on 25 April 2006, pp. 11-12.
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services, information and political consulting”, the federal government promoted citizen 
education as a necessary prerequisite for political pluralism.173 The foundations see 
themselves as “an important part of the Federal Republic’s political culture” in so far as 
they actively promote the general political maxim of liberal democratic societies that 
“political discourse and political decision-making require information and ethical- 
political orientation” which ought to be provided by “non-state actors in the area of 
education policy.”174
1.4.3. Modus Operandi
The party foundations are trying to identify societal spaces in order to facilitate political 
dialogue. They work towards far reaching changes in political attitudes and seek to 
initiate or facilitate democratisation processes. By identifying politically compatible 
partner organisations in authoritarian settings the foundations would steer these “Trojan 
horses” in the target country towards a strengthening of civil society,175 something the 
former Acting Chairman of the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation (KAF) Gerd Langguth 
called “legal interference in the internal affairs of other countries.”176 They work behind 
the scenes of a target country’s political process and provide financial support for both 
political projects organised by democratic parties as well as for civil society 
organisations like human rights groups, trade unions or independent media 
organisations. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky writes:
They shape political outcomes, which were negotiated during periods of transition from 
authoritarian rule to democratic orders demonstrating their usefulness as “a successful
173 Gemeinsame Erklarung zur staatlichen Finanzierung der politischen Stiftungen, op.cit., p.4. One author 
summarises the often polarised debate about the foundations’ institutional, democratic and financial 
legitimacy as follows: “The Foundations as generators o f democratic vitality, as powerhouses or pillars of 
West German democracy - this is one view. The Foundations being the product o f hidden channels for 
financial transactions of public funds und state-sponsored letter box institutions for their affiliated parties -  
that’s the other view.”, Henning von Vieregge, Gesellschaftspolitische Stiftungen in der Bundesrepublik, 
(Deutscher Instituts Verlag, K6ln, 1980), p.44. See also ’Die gesetzlosen F iinf, Der Spiegel, 52, 1994; 
Hans Apel, Die deformierte Demokratie: Parteienherschaft in Deutschland, (Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 
Stuttgart, 1991), pp.130-139.
174 ’Gemeinsame Erklarung’, op.cit., p.2.
175 See Jens-Ulrich Poppen, Transnational Actors, Political Aid and the Transition from Authoritarian 
Rule: The Role o f Germany’s Political Foundations within South Africa’s Process of Democratisation, 
1984-1994, unpublished Masters thesis, Faculty of Arts, University o f the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 
2000, p.53.
176 Personal Interview (phone) with Gerd Langguth, 26 July 2006.
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instrument in generating networks of contacts [...] powerful instruments not only for 
promoting democracy, but also for furthering Germany’s interests and contacts.177
However, being questioned on the link between governmental foreign policy and the 
foundation’s international operations, Stiftungen management insists that it is “really the 
absolute exception that political foundations act as merely biddable tools of nation-state
17fiforeign policy.” Their ability to access different sectors of civil society gives them a 
distinct advantage over the traditional Foreign Service and they are able to respond 
flexibly and with immediacy to the particular needs of their partner organisations.179 
Often, politicians value this freedom of movement. “The foundations are often not 
bound by the same diplomatic considerations that restrict the activities of the official 
representations” points out Germany’s late President Johannes Rau in a speech 
commemorating the 40th anniversary of the KAF’s international programme and he 
reminds his country’s foreign policy community that political foundations “can often co­
operate with those groups, with which the German state and its official diplomacy needs
1 finto maintain a distance.” The process of democracy promotion begins with the 
identification of a partner organisation, which should ideally operate within the target
1 Q 1
country. The foundations represent Germany’s multiparty democracy and since they 
operate collectively in their host society they are seen as credible agents for the
1 R9promotion of democratic pluralism. In their international operations, KAF, which is
177 Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, ‘Foreign political aid: the German political Foundations and their US 
counterparts’, International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 1, January 1991, p.60.
178 Personal interview with Uwe Optenhogel, Berlin, 7 March 2002.
m Ibid.
180 Johannes Rau, ‘Demokratie weltweit fftrdem -  ein Auftrag an uns alle’, Ansprache aus Anlass des 
vierzigjahrigen Jubilaums der intemationalen Arbeit der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, available from 
http://www.KAF.de/publikationen/2003/l272 dokument.html. cited on 21 March 2006.
181 The case o f the international dimension o f regime change in South Africa illustrates the fact that 
Germany’s Stiftungen sometimes need to co-operate with political parties and organisations in exile. 
During the apartheid era, the FEF supported the illegally operating liberation movement ANC as its main 
partner organisation (besides the trade union organisation COSATU as the representative o f the labour 
movement). In the eyes o f the FEF strategists, the moral and political credibility of the ANC prevailed over 
the organisation’s disadvantage of having only limited means to influence the political development within 
the South African political system. The liberal FNF, like the FEF, was not allowed to open an office in 
South Africa until 1991/92 and instead launched its operations from the Zimbabwean capital Harare.
182 According to the ‘Principles o f co-operation in the area o f international development agreed upon 
between the Federal Government and the political foundations’, Stiftungen cannot operate in host countries 
and launch democracy promotion projects without having identified a suitable partner organisation with the
72
closely affiliated with the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), enters into 
transitional alliances with conservative organisations in the host country. The Friedrich- 
Ebert Foundation (FEF) with its institutional links to the German Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) works closely together with a variety of union and labour movements as 
well as with centre-left political parties. Being committed to the ideals and values of 
political liberalism with its emphasis on individual rights, private property, democratic 
constitutionalism and a free market economy, the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation (FNF) 
promotes entrepreneurial initiatives, human rights groups, legal support groups and 
liberal think tanks.183 On the right of the democratic spectrum, the CDU’s Bavarian 
sister party Christian Social Union (CSU) participates in international democracy 
promotion efforts with its own party Foundation, the Hanns-Seidel Foundation (HSF). 
Identifying mainly smaller centre-right parties as partners for their international projects, 
the HSF positions itself as a regionally-based provider of expertise on federalism, local 
government, administrative modernisation, market economy and national security.184 
The HSF successfully defined its operational niche vis-a-vis its conservative sister 
organisation KAF in a division of labour which covers “both partners and issues” and 
which “has evolved in the field as a natural outgrowth of different priorities and the
1 RSpolitical partnership of their affiliated parties at home.” Finally, the Green party’s 
Heinrich-Boll Foundation (HBF) focuses particularly on environmental issues in 
developing countries, whereas the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) promotes 
Socialist policies via the Rosa-Luxemburg Foundation (RLF). All of Germany’s 
political Foundations need to act with a high degree of cultural sensitivity as they co­
operate with civil society and political actors from a broad range of cultural, ethnic,
ability of having a future impact on political structures abroad, quoted in Norbert Lepszy, ‘Politische 
Stiftungen’, op.cit., p. 104.
183 The FNF described its political co-operation during South Africa’s transition to democracy: “The 
existing relationship of trust between the Foundation and its partners creates a situation in which the 
Foundation is in a position to contribute with some firm liberal solutions to the political work in South 
Africa. With its resources and instruments, through political education and the promotion of democratic 
institutions and structures, the Foundation can help the transition to majority government lose its 
threatening character.” FNF Annual Report 1993, p.93.
184 Gerhard Michels, ‘Die Hanns-Seidel Stiftung in Sudkorea -  Arbeiten in einem Schwellenland’, 
available from http://www.koreaverband.de/publikationen/archive/2-99/2-99-art. 1 l.pdf. cited on 2 March 
2006.
185 Ann L. Phillips, Power and Influence after the Cold War, op.cit., p. 132.
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religious and ideological backgrounds encompassing Ibero-American Catholicism, 
African one-party systems or Islamic societies.186
How are the international operations of democracy promotion by Germany’s 
party foundations put into practice? How do these aid agencies strengthen democratic 
forces abroad through their “power of attraction” (Nye) being “mediators in a de-limited 
world”? 187 James M. Scott lists four key activities of think tanks and political 
Foundations as cornerstones of their agenda for democracy promotion. Financial support 
is being given to a broad range of civil society organisations including political parties, 
trade unions, human rights groups, local government initiatives, media organisations and 
private research institutes. The funding of research and analysis enables practitioners 
including state as well as non-state actors to develop the conceptual basis for 
democratisation projects and may focus on “the foreign policies of countries trying to 
promote democracy, the policies of countries engaging in democratisation and/or the 
efforts of democracy activists.”188 Also, foundations and think tanks establish useful 
channels for network activities by facilitating the exchange of political information 
between and organisational interaction among democracy campaigners, foreign policy 
makers, civil society representatives and pressure groups.
In a different approach, Dutch scholars Jos van Wersch and Joeroen de Zeeuw
have categorised the thematic foci of political foundations by grouping activities in the
1 80three areas of civil society, political parties and remaining projects. Support for civil 
society organisations includes trade unions, business associations and human rights 
groups. Trying to strengthen pluralist structures in emerging democracies, party 
assistance seeks to provide foreign party leaders with organisational skills, supports 
youth organisations or co-operates with foreign parties during election campaigns. The 
final category consists of broad range of issue areas such as election support, capacity
186 Personal interview with Uwe Optenhogel, Berlin, 7 March 2006.
187 Enst Hillebrand, Uwe Optenhogel, ’Mediatoren in einer entgrenzten Welt: Zur aussenpolitischen Rolle 
der politischen Stiftungen’, available from www.demglob.de/arthillopten.html. cited on 8 January 2002.
188 James M. Scott, ‘Transnationalizing Democracy Promotion: The Role o f Western Political Foundations 
and Think Tanks’, Democratization, vol. 6, autumn 1999, No. 3, p .155.
189 Jos van Wersch, Jeroen de Zeeuw, ‘Mapping European Democracy Assistance’, op.cit., pp. 13-14.
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building, institution building or the promotion of good governance.190 Active democracy
building appears to be the most direct form of what has been called the ‘new
interventionism’ and sees aid agencies such as the German political Foundations at the
forefront of institution building in transitional settings. These soft power actors of
democracy promotion enjoy a great freedom of movement and political manoeuvrability
to help other countries to “make the transition to modernity, to successful, participatory
systems within the context of their own individual histories, cultures and traditions.”191
Summarised in the words of Gerhard Raichle, the FNF’s former director of external
affairs: “I did what my superior colleague has not prevented me from doing.”192
In particular, transnational actors provide transitional elites with the necessary
political skills to formulate their partisan interests through capacity-building 
101measures. The Stiftungen influence future decision-makers and their perspective on 
crucial policy areas by transferring urgently needed political-administrative know-how 
to spiritually akin partner organisations.194 The political foundations describe their soft 
power-based democracy promotion activities, as being demand-driven i.e. political 
actors in predominantly developing countries would approach the political aid agencies 
in the first place in order to equip themselves with expertise on specific issues. 
However, the principle of reciprocity applies to their soft power relations with the 
Stiftungen and although political actors in newly emerging democracies will have the 
utmost interest to benefit from external experience and know-how, the political 
foundations as part of Germany’s foreign policy system will often have a strong interest 
themselves to make an impact on the political agenda of transitional states. Although 
they are providing foreign elites and organisations with the necessary tools to further the 
cause of democracy in their countries seemingly without much self-interest, they are
190 Ibid. In 2003/04, the entirety o f Europe’s political foundations spent 72% on support for political 
parties, 17% on civil society actors and only 11% on remaining thematic areas. In comparison, the German 
KAF spent 30% o f its international budget on civil society projects, only 20% for the support o f political 
parties and 50% on projects in the category ‘other’.
191 Carl Gershman, The Political Foundations in the Western Democracies: What Role and What Future? A 
presentation by the President of the National Endowment for Democracy at the French Senate, Paris, 
6.6.1996, in: available from www.iran.org/news/960606 Gershman Paris.html. cited on 9 December 2002.
192 Personal interview with Gerhard Raichle, Berlin, 6 December 1999.
193 Personal interview with Uwe Optenhdgel, Berlin, 7 March 2002.
194 Ibid.
75
indeed working towards the creation of an international environment, which is 
conducive to the realisation of milieu goals. FEF international affairs expert Dieter 
Optenhogel explains:
Although we are talking more about a demand-driven than supply-orientated 
programme of democracy promotion, I don’t think that this necessarily translates into 
less influence. We will not become active in target countries as agencies of intervention 
with an only short-term perspective but we are always acting with the awareness that 
these long-term processes, which are supported by us, will eventually generate Social 
Democratic ideas.195
Therefore, the pay-off of democracy promotion activities might not be immediate and 
tangible but the creation of an international environment shaped by “Social Democratic” 
ideas means that soft power has helped political forces in the driving-seat with which 
the German Government can do business with -  economically as well as politically. The 
foundation’s strategic planning of these long-term processes experienced significant 
changes over the past thirty years. The idea of a centralised and systematic approach to 
the management of democracy promotion operations in foreign settings was largely 
unknown in foundation headquarters and a lot of responsibility for the preparation and 
implementation of transition projects rested therefore with the Stiftungen offices in the 
target countries. 196 During the Spanish transition for example, FEF resident 
representative Dieter Koniecki did not produce any written planning material for project 
management and the foundation “was used only as an instrument for political 
intervention integrated into a macro strategy which was dominated by the transition’s
1 07European dimension and the Kissinger-Schmidt connection.” The absence of any 
strategic planning was not necessarily a disadvantage. The party foundations became
10R“an invaluable source for top politicians and their strategic planning.” Also, FEF 
analyst Gunther Esters stresses the inevitable lack of flexibility, which the introduction 
of a concept of strategic planning would have caused:
195 Ibid  (translation by author).
196 Personal interview with Gunther Esters, Bonn, 18 April 2002.
197 Personal interview with Uwe OptenhSgel, Berlin, 7 March 2002.
198 Ibid.
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In economics, one calls the rather inflexible model of management planning and 
organisational structure a ‘fit model’. In this model, the different components fit 
together at one particular moment in time. The remaining question is if these 
components are indeed the right elements. As a general rule one can say that the faster 
societal conditions change the more likely it is that the components do not fit anymore. 
What would have happened for example during the transition in Portugal, if we had 
geared the different parts of our strategy towards the specific political situation of 1974 
given that things changed rapidly? Therefore, we were rather in favour of a ‘three-joint- 
system’, which operated with a greater degree of flexibility. The FEF rejected the idea 
of a fit-planning model.199
Having arrived in the age of globalisation, the importance of strategic planning has 
changed for the Stiftungen not least because they have to meet additional requirements 
of transparency and are being subjected to public scrutiny as organisations, which are 
largely funded by the taxpayer. Today, political foundations need to account for the way 
they spend public funds on democracy promotion projects by keeping a record of their 
project management which is based on the concept of an ‘objectives-oriented project 
planning’ (zielorientierte Projektplanung). The concept is based on an evaluation of the 
needs of partner organisations and target groups and defines the key elements of any 
democracy promotion project in co-operation with the different planning units 
involved.200 Objective-oriented project planning consists of various elements such as 
problem analysis, situation analysis, objectives analysis and goal formulation, the 
creation of a project planning matrix, the identification of indicators and operation 
planning.
1.5. Conclusions
Although multilateralism arguably limits autonomous decision-making, acting in 
concert and coordinating policies, strategies and tactics with alliance partners does not 
diminish the crucial importance of state interests, power resources and regional or global 
ambitions driven by considerations of self-advancement and collective gains. Timothy 
Garton Ash has once called this form of collective action “attritional multilateralism” 
through which “German diplomacy has excelled at the patient, discreet pursuit of
199 Personal interview with Gunther Esters, Bonn, 18 April 2002 (translation by author).
200 Ibid.
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national”201 and Christoph Bertram has remarked that “of all Western countries, post- 
war'dermany has been most conscious of the need to be part of a team in international 
affairs” because it had realised that “to be lonely meant to be either ineffectual or
• 9 0 9isolated.” And despite the traumatic experience of systematic abuse of political power 
during the Nazi era, West German foreign policy makers had neither particularly desired 
inefficiency nor isolation or a lack of influence and power after the war. “Making 
Germany influential by making her part of a group of influential states was the objective 
of successive German governments” writes Bertram.203 Furthermore, it does also not 
follow from Bonn’s multilateral commitments that single state initiatives, bilateral 
action or ‘private’ foreign policy agendas and institutions did not play a role in the 
pursuit of West Germany’s diplomatic agenda.
Needless to say that the prominence of multilateralism in academic studies 
dealing with the FRG’s foreign policy has more than some justification and pointless to 
question the credentials of Bonn’s foreign policy elites as being committed team players 
within NATO and EC. However, the argument pursued in this thesis is that other 
diplomatic initiatives were being played out parallel to the country’s multilateral 
commitments, single-state initiatives which were launched through the aforementioned 
informal diplomatic channels of the Stiftungen and located within bilateral and 
transnational frameworks thus pointing at a different configuration of power with a 
different selection of foreign policy instruments. The dualism of ‘private’ and ‘public’ 
foreign policy and the simultaneous activities of diplomatic institutions of government 
and transnationally operating semi- or non-state actors arguably require a more 
comprehensive analytical approach. Rather than the FRG’s national interests such as 
security or the maximisation of wealth, it was the modality of West Germany’s foreign 
policy i.e. the way the Federal Republic operationalised its diplomacy that was shaped 
by changes in its external environment. Despite agreeing with Maull on the ‘civilian 
power’ hypothesis of a change in substance and nature of post-war international 
relations, German academic Beate Kohler-Koch concedes that “the increase in
201 Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Germany’s Choice, Foreign Affairs, Vol.73, July/August, p.71.
202 Christoph Bertram, ‘The Power and the Past: Germany’s New International Loneliness’, in: Amulf 
Baring (ed.), Germany's New Position in Europe, op.cit., p.93.
203 Ibid.
international co-operation is not necessarily an indication for a qualitative 
transformation in international politics” but can be “interpreted with equal plausibility as 
the successful adjustment of national power politics within a changing framework for 
international action.”204 The interpretative approach followed in this study argues that in 
the Federal Republic precisely such an adjustment process in reaction to the “main 
tendencies in international politics” had taken place in order to “increase its influence 
through international co-operation”.205
British scholars Simon Bulmer and William I. Patterson have summed up the 
nature of the change in the configuration of power in Germany’s post-war foreign policy. 
“Power and influence do not derive only from their explicit use in a purposive manner 
through governmental diplomacy” the authors write in a 1996 publication on Germany’s 
role in Europe, “they may also derive from Germany’s policy credentials, from 
reputation. German power may also be facilitated by the actions of private actors.206 
Rather than indulging in diplomatic asceticism without any clear idea or guidance as to 
how to define its national interest and far from using the country’s totalitarian past as a 
“pretext for national abstention”, Germany’s foreign policy experienced a thorough 
change in its operational modality shifting away from predominantly coercion-based 
and unilaterally deployed instruments of global interaction towards a two-track 
approach to diplomacy characterised by multilateral integration of its ‘public’ dimension 
and the more autonomous activities o f ‘private’ or ‘semi-private’ actors. Such a change 
was quite different from an alleged “abstinence in world politics” 207 One scholar has 
described the multifaceted and multilayered nature of such an approach by 
acknowledging that
One can pursue national interests, preferences and values with different methods, 
multilateral ones and with an emphasis on the rule of international law, whenever there
204 Beate Kohler-Koch, ‘Deutsche Einigung im Spannungsfeld intemationaler Umbriiche’, in: Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift, No.32, 1991, Vol.4, p.606.
205 Werner Link, ‘Die AuBenpolitik und intemationale Einordnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in: 
Werner Weidenfeld, Hartmut Zimmermann (eds.), Deutschland-Handbuch -  Eine doppelte Bilanz 1949- 
1989, (Bundeszentrale fiir politische Bildung, Munchen 1989), p.584.
206 Simon Bulmer, William E. Paterson, ‘Germany in the European Union: gentle giant or emergent leader’, 
International Affairs, vol. 72, no.l, January 1996, p.29.
207 Josef Joffe, ’Deutsche Aussenpolitik -  postmodern’, Intemationale Politik, no.l, 1995, p.44.
79
is an opportunity for it, or by employing soft power (normally one of the less expensive 
resources) or by falling back on other means of power politics (usually the more 
expensive alternative).20
West Germany’s Cold war foreign policy was therefore characterised also by a tum- 
away from the unilateral use of hard power i.e. military force and, to an extent, coercive 
economic tools of statecraft towards softer forms of power and influence. Bonn’s 
remaining hard power capabilities were increasingly integrated into structures of 
collective decision-making whereas its soft power capabilities helped the FRG to meet 
the post-war challenges of global interdependence. It was thus the notion, content and 
configuration of power in international relations that had undergone change but not the 
country’s political class’s willingness, preparedness and determination to engage in 
power politics. Machtvergessenheit would have required a behavioural predisposition 
with abstention following denial and for a country as resourceful as West Germany, 
neither abstention nor denial was an option. “Countries that have reached a critical mass 
of power cannot abstain from shaping the international system” writes Edwina Campbell, 
“and their attempt to abstain will often have consequences more profound than their 
willingness to employ the power and influence they wield209. Obviously, the unilateral 
use of military force for purposes other than securing the physical survival of the state 
was not an option anymore in the country’s foreign policy after the collapse of the Nazi 
Regime. The necessity to fill the ensuing operational vacuum and to respond to 
structural changes in the external environment caused by the deepening of global 
interdependence was acknowledged by exploring what Walter L. Buhl has called the
<ni  a
“social dimension of political power”. Better equipped for the task of carving out 
operational niches in an interdependent international system, non-state or semi-state 
actors like political foundations became useful vehicles to mobilise new power 
resources based on positive sanctions and characterised by their potential to influence
208 Wilfried von Bredow, ‘Machtpolitikresistenztestanordnungsproblem’, in: WeltTrends, vol.43, no.12, 
summer 2004, p.22 (translation by author).
209 Edwina Campbell, ‘Berlin -  Look to the World’, in: WeltTrends, Vol.43, No.12, Summer 2004, p.33.
210 Walter L. Buhl, Transnationale Politik -  Internationale Beziehungen zwischen Hegemonie und 
Interdependenz, (Stuttgart Klett, Verlag 1978), p. 180.
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the perception, preferences, agendas and conceptual approaches of other actors in the 
international community.
The FRG’s ‘private’ foreign policy enjoyed a degree of autonomy in its 
decision-making, agenda setting and implementation of policies, which governmental 
diplomacy was not always able to muster. It introduced a notion of political power to 
West Germany’s management of international relations that had been transformed from 
being a coercive strategy of limiting the choices for rivals, competitors and enemies into 
a non-coercive operational mode of promoting domestic social concepts and societal 
values abroad thus creating comparable structural conditions in third countries. Instead 
of forcing others into behavioural changes or trying to impose an external political 
agenda on weaker states, the FRG’s post-war variant of ‘power politics’ sought to 
enhance the international compatibility of public policies, technical expertise or pluralist 
structures. This employment of soft power resources with its emphasis on inter­
governmental co-operation and its targeting of conceptual and structural deficiencies, 
needs and challenges in third countries helped the FRG to stabilise its operational 
environment and enabled the government in Bonn to play a constructive order- 
maintaining role within regional contexts. As it constantly sought to identify and carve 
out operational niches within the international network of economic, social and political 
interdependencies, West Germany’s foreign policy displayed the role-based and 
context-dependent configuration of its power projection capabilities that behavioural 
middlepower research has centred its analysis on. According to Brian Hocking, middle 
powers act on the realisation that “tangible power differentials can be compensated for 
both by tangible resources (“soft power”) and by the processes through which these
power resources are converted into actual influence” in order to establish themselves as
2 11
niche players and to secure their influence in asymmetrical power relationships. In the 
case of West Germany, this meant turning to the vehicles of its informal or ‘private’ 
diplomacy as conducted by party foundations to further state interests.
The multilateral dimension of its ‘public’ diplomacy based on the ethical maxim 
of good international citizenship represented therefore only one aspect of the FRG’s 
foreign policy system. While its engagement in NATO and EC addressed mostly
211 Brian Hocking, .Finding your Niche’, in: Andrew Cooper (ed.), Niche Diplomacy, op.cit., p. 135.
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questions of what has been conventionally described as ‘high politics’, the other 
‘private’ side of its international appearance concerned the transfer of issue-specific 
expertise and the attracting of others to its political ideas through the FRG’s 
‘reputational qualifications’. Postwar German power politics and the promotion of its 
national interest were not played out any longer through the mobilisation of the army or 
exclusively through its economy’s coercive potential nor through reference to the 
geopolitical factors of territory or population. During the Cold War, Bonn’s influence 
was based primarily on its entrepreneurial and technical superiority as well as on its 
socio-economic competency. Self-awareness, role identity and changing external 
environment caused West Germany’s foreign policy elites to realise their potential to 
influence processes of opinion-forming, decision-making or institution-building in other 
countries thereby exploring new forms of demonstrating Machtbewusstsein while 
acknowledging the paramount importance of state interests. In a speech to the German 
Foreign Policy Association in 1995, former FRG President Roman Herzog has called 
such an operational ‘philosophy’ of shaping and stabilising the regional dimension of a 
nation-state’s operational environment an example of “security policy through soft 
power”, and he reminded his audience that the “secret of success” of West Germany’s 
foreign policy during the Cold War could only be fully understood by examining the 
‘power of attraction’, which the Federal Republic’s model of socio-economic 
partnership and political pluralism exhibited. According to Herzog, these ‘soft’ power 
projection capabilities were put into practice “not only through professional diplomacy” 
but equally “through political foundations, companies and private sector interest groups
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as well as via cultural and scientific institutions.”
Niche diplomacy with regional contexts often conducted through the ‘informal’ 
employment of soft power had become the hallmark of West Germany’s 
middlepowerdom. Self-awareness, domestic and foreign role expectations, societal 
norms and questions of national identity were as crucial for West German preference 
formation as was the FRG’s material and structural position in the international system. 
Its status as a middle power was therefore as much based on necessity, as it was the
212 Roman Herzog, ’Die Grundkoordinaten deutscher AuBenpolitik’, in: Intemationale Politik, No.4, 1995, 
p.5.
2,3 Ibid.
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result of a conscious decision to ‘cash in’ on its issue-specific expertise within regional 
niches played out parallel and in addition to its multilateral commitments. In short, soft 
power politics emerged in a historical situation, in which perception of one’s own status 
was married with changes in the structures of international politics and a realisation of 
the constraints imposed by the country’s material position. Holbraad’s quantitative 
approach on the other hand with its exclusive focus on the availability of material 
resources as a kind of analytical panacea does not answer the question why it is that 
some states claim and are being awarded great power status - Britain and France’s 
foreign policies being a case in point - while other states such as Germany and Japan 
although clearly commanding superior economic weight in terms of e.g. GNP have 
either not been granted a similar status or have rejected the label as great power 
themselves.
In 2002, German FPA scholar Sebastian Bartsch wrote regarding the changing 
perception and configuration of power in West Germany’s foreign policy as reflected in 
the activities of the country’s political foundations:
The fact that the multitude of publicly financed international projects launched and 
administered by the Stiftungen have developed into an important though hardly visible 
and often unreported element of Germany’s international influence can hardly be 
reconciled with widespread opinion about the Germans as being machtvergessen or even 
‘afraid of power’. The Stiftungen's integration into the institutional framework of the 
FRG’s foreign policy system bears testimony to the country’s willingness to actively 
shape international relations and to the fact that power and power politics were not 
forgotten but needed to adjust to changing political goals and a changing international 
environment at the same time drawing lessons from the country’s historical 
experience.214
The first chapter has aimed at paving the way for the subsequent examination of the 
Stiftungen model and its employment of soft power previously described by Bartsch in 
the context of the FRG’s ‘private’ diplomacy. Its provided a critique of the realist 
narrative of Machtvergessenheit and presented its argument of a continuation of German 
power politics ‘by other means’ in contrast to the interpretative notion of the FRG as a 
“reluctant power”. Its central argument was that it was not the motivation of German
2,4 Sebastian Bartsch, ’Politische Stiftungen: Grenzganger zwischen Gesellschafts- und Staatenwelt’, 
available from http://www.weltpolitik.net/print/1452.html. cited on 12 January 2006 (translation by author).
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elites to pursue a foreign policy agenda of self-advancement, one-sided wealth and 
utility maximisation and political dominance that had disappeared after the Second 
World War, but that it was the configuration of power in the management of West 
Germany’s international affairs and the selection of its diplomatic instruments that had 
changed. The argument at no point suggested that hard power elements would not play a 
role in the FRG’s foreign policy (and if one classifies financial incentives and material 
rewards i.e. the area of political financial aid as hard power because of the coercive 
flipside of such actor relations namely the possibility of withholding these incentives in 
cases of non-compliance with certain pre-conditions, even the work of the political 
foundations on the Iberian Peninsula and elsewhere would have had a strong hard power 
dimension). Rather, it put forward the proposition in order to effectively secure its 
national interest through regionally oriented niche diplomacy as a middle power, the 
FRG in its ‘private’ diplomacy mobilised its soft power resources. These ‘private’ actors 
did not only possess greater access to elites in target societies, unrivalled expertise, 
skills and experience in the management of socio-economic issues and more autonomy 
in their setting and implementation of political agendas. They were also proof that the 
conclusion drawn by some analysts about Bonn’s foreign policy establishment relying 
on “proxies to articulate West German foreign policy” such as the European Political 
Co-operation (EPC) was inaccurate. It was precisely through the conflation of ‘public’ 
and ‘private’, governmental, semi- and non-governmental, transnational and multilateral 
agency that structures in the external realm were shaped and state interests promoted.
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Chapter 2
Pursuing Soft Power Politics I: The Friedrich-Ebert 
Foundation in Portugal 1974-1975
A tense situation has emerged today with the 
Prime Minister and most o f the government 
besieged in the Santo Bento Parliamentary 
Building by Construction Worker Union 
demanding 45% pay rise...obviously a 
major attack on the government...the 
government has been surrounded all night 
without food and much sleep, only the 
Communists knowing what was up in 
advance had supplied themselves with roast 
chicken and so forth [....]to the fury o f the 
rest they sat in a special room eating while 
everyone else had to do without.215
2.1. Introduction
The previous chapter has introduced the central argument of an important yet often 
overlooked transnational dimension of West Germany’s foreign policy that was both 
interest driven, geared towards influencing political processes in other countries and 
operationalised outside of multilateral frameworks. It has rejected the realist narrative of 
a German postwar ‘forgetfulness of power’ while criticising constructivist approaches 
for their seeming inability to transcend the multilateral dimension of the FRG’s 
international relations and to give due attention to noncoercive foreign policy initiatives 
launched by sub-state actors within the broader framework of national diplomacy. The 
following case study seeks to support this argument as well as the proposition sketched 
out in the First chapter that only through a conflation of governmental and 
nongovernmental foreign policy actors and action can any analysis of West Germany’s 
external relations management fully capture the multi-level structural reality of the 
FRG’s foreign policy with its pursuit of soft power diplomacy within and outside of 
multilateral frameworks. The focus of the Portuguese case study will be squarely on the 
democracy-supporting role of the Social Democratic Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (FEF)
215 Mrs. Caspari, spouse of West Germany’s Ambassador to Portugal, Prof. Fritz Caspari, Personal 
interview with Fritz Caspari, London, 18 June 2002,
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and its political co-operation with the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS) embedded in the 
broader institutional context of West Germany’s foreign policy apparatus. Since the 
historical dynamics changed from direct confrontation and an ensuing power struggle 
between Communist forces and newly emerged democratic parties to the phase of 
democratic consolidation, the Portuguese process of political transformation is being 
divided into two parts. Events that unfolded until the end of 1975 are being dealt with in 
this chapter while the Chapter Three covers the period from 1976 to 1981. The case 
study will highlight the Cold War context, in which the FRG’s state interests during the 
Portuguese transition were being played out. It will show the crucial importance, which 
the West German Government as well as its majority party SPD and its affiliated 
transnational arm FEF attached to the containment of Communism and the 
determination, with which it tried to prevent the occupation of key power positions by 
the Portuguese Communist Party (see 2.2.). The organising of political counterpressure 
through the provision of political support for Socialist leader Mario Soares’s PS sought 
to push back the ideological frontline and was part of the foreign policy goal of 
facilitating political pluralism. It will be shown that by seeking to enfeeble PCP cadres 
and to prevent the ruling Armed Forces Movement (MFA) from further radicalisation 
towards the extreme left, West Germany’s governmental foreign policy institutions in 
co-operation with the majority party’s political foundation FEF aimed at maintaining the 
stability of Western security architecture and at preserving the integrity of the NATO 
alliance.
The chapter will then look at the interplay between state and sub-state actors and 
the way, in which Chancellery and SPD in conjunction with FEF helped to facililitate 
the transformation of political infrastructure through the exercise of soft power, the 
latter being expressed in the transfer of concepts, expertise and ideas (see 2.4.). Besides 
highlighting the role of key political personalities such as SPD-Chairman Willy Brandt 
(see 2.6.1.), the chapter will broach the issue of political aid in the area of party 
management, campaigning and civic education as part of a ‘soft’ and non-multilateral 
approach to shape the preferences of future elites in transition countries (see 2.7.3. -  
2.7.4.). Instead of congealing into the passive role of an international bystander forgetful 
of its power, the chapter argues that the FRG through government action and political
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foundation sought to actively intervene in its operational environment by means 
predicated on attraction and co-operation and performed in a more autonomous fashion 
than realist and constructivist narratives are willing to concede.
2,2, Stabilising the Operational Environment - Containing Communism
Five days after the demise of the Portuguese Estado Novo, German Social Democratic
parliamentarian Alwin Briick published his assessment of the immediate post-coup 
situation:
Every democrat must feel deep satisfaction and great joy about what happened over the 
past few days in Portugal. The importance of Portugal’s political development goes far 
beyond its domestic context. Something important happened for Europe and Africa, for 
NATO and the world. For a democratic Portugal, the door of the European Communities 
remains wide open [...] A democratic Portugal would strengthen the moral integrity of 
NATO just as fascist Portugal together with Greece had weakened it. Portugal’s colonial 
policies have discredited the alliance in the entire Third World.216
In Briick’s view, the Cold War context would provide the strategic framework for 
Western military interests, tactical calculations and ideological aspirations as well as for 
expansionist and potentially destabilising political intervention by the Soviet Union. 
Although there seemed to be a real opportunity to create sustainable democratic 
structures in the Iberian country almost fifty years after the end of the Portuguese First 
Republic in 1926, Western leaders quickly realised the imminent danger of a 
Communist power grab during the transition. “In future, Portugal will steer a course to 
the left within democratic boundaries -  at least until the next general elections scheduled 
to take place in a year from now” predicted the West German magazine Vorwarts thus 
warning of the possible radicalisation of Portugal’s post-revolutionary politics 217 The 
rapid emergence of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) as a political actor “which 
had courted and infiltrated the MFA from the very first days of the revolution”218 would 
soon pose the most serious threat to the survival of democratic structures. Since Portugal
2.6 Alwin Briick, ’Ein Erfolg fiir die Demokratie -  Das Ende der faschistischen Diktatur in Portugal’, SPD- 
Pressedienst, 29 April 1974, pp.5-6 (translation by author).
2.7 Herman Demi, Vorwarts 23 May 1974, p.9.
218 Stewart Lloyd-Jones, Portugal’s history since 1974, CPHRC Working Papers, series 2, number 1 
(November 2001), available from http://www.cphrc.org.uk/essavs/portugal-since-1974.pdf. cited on 2 
February 2002, p.5.
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was a NATO member state, any political regime in Lisbon guided by Communist 
ideology threatened to undermine alliance stability and to cause a creeping erosion of 
transatlantic defence capabilities often described as “Nato’s crumbling Southern
9 1  Qflank.” “The revolutionary process in Portugal” writes an observer of Portugal’s 
transition, “was seen as posing a serious threat to the alliance’s political cohesion and its 
military communication”220 and the British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan bleakly 
assessed the situation:
The southern flank is in the worst case scenario and many countries may go Communist 
by the end of the 70’s -  Spain, Portugal, Italy and conceivably Greece and Turkey. The 
causes are different. The virus isn’t travelling north at the moment. It is not a trend, but 
there are increased opportunities.221
Also, the EC’s ‘open-door policy’ with future Portuguese membership in the 
organisation was inseparably tied to the transition’s democratic outcome. The question 
of unhindered Portuguese access to Europe’s lucrative common market was of the 
utmost importance for the country’s private sector and a successful Communist power 
grab would have meant Portugal’s almost indefinite political and economic isolation. 
West Germany’s SPD-led coalition government shared the fear of a Communist take­
over. Former SPD minister and head of the Federal Chancellery Horst Ehmke recalls the 
position of his party vis-a-vis the newly arisen political challenge in NATO’s South 
European outpost: “After the revolution in Portugal, the SPD leadership formed the 
working group ‘South West Europe’. The declared goal of West Germany’s social 
democracy was to work towards the fragmentation of Communist forces.“222 Ehmke 
and other SPD leaders took an unambiguous stance towards any attempts by the Soviet 
Union to intervene in the transitional process through support for the PCP. Ehmke 
recalls:
219 David Rees, ‘Southern Europe, NATO’s Crumbling Flank’, Conflict Studies, August 1975,
No. 60, p.85.
220 Rainer Eisfeld, Elite Pluralism and Social Movements, available from 
http://www.qsilver.queensu.ca/~-leuprech/ipsa-pluralism/pdf/ElitePluralism.pdf. cited on 12 January 2002.
221 Digital National Security Archive (herafter DNSA/KT), 01774, Memorandum o f Conversation, The 
White House, 5 September 1975.
222 Personal interview with Horst Ehmke, Bonn, 17 April 2002.
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We made it clear to the Russians that it would be the end of detente if they would help 
PCP Chairman Cunhal to seize power positions. We told them in no uncertain terms that 
they had had their Prague Spring and now they should let us have our Lisbon Spring.223
The emerging rivalry between the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS) with its cosmopolitan 
leader Mario Soares and the PCP resurfacing after decades of clandestine struggle 
against the Salazar and Caetano regimes carried all the symptoms of the ideological in­
fighting between Communist and Socialist forces throughout the 1920s in Europe. 
Having been traditionally described by its Communist opponents as ‘social fascists’ who 
served as ‘useful idiots’ for their Capitalist masters, West European Socialists and 
Social Democrats did not take the threat lightly.
Only subsequent developments would reveal that within the MFA, as within the 
Portuguese polity at large, the forces for radical change were mounting an all-out 
challenge to the pro-Socialist moderates -  a logical consequence, perhaps, of the 
dynamics of revolution in which voices of moderation become all too vulnerable to 
charges of counterrevolutionary collusion.224
Deeply traumatised by their own historical experiences in the Weimar Republic and by 
their forced merger with the Moscow-backed German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, West Germany’s Social Democrats 
remained deeply suspicious of any cross-party co-operation between PS and PCP 
dismissing the notion of a ‘popular front’. Although SPD politicians were prepared to 
acknowledge the high level of societal acceptance and the political importance of 
Communist parties in France and Italy, they remained deeply sceptical. Reviewing the 
principal relationship between Socialists and Communists during the second half of the 
1970s, SPD foreign policy expert Ehmke wrote:
Socialists have sufficient experience with Communists to be able to unemotionally 
assess the internal development of Communist parties in Italy, Spain and France. At the 
present stage, nobody knows if this development will tactically exhaust itself or if it is 
going to lead to a genuine opening of West European Communist parties for liberal
223 Ibid  (translation by author).
224 Joan Barth Urban, ‘Contemporary Soviet Perspectives on Revolution in the West’, Orbis, vol. XIX, 
winter 1976, no. 4, p .1387.
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ideas. Democratic Socialists will not believe in a proclaimed change only because there 
is a proclamation.225
While Ehmke stressed that Social Democrats “have a foreign policy-related interest in 
the independence of Communist parties from Moscow”226 such independence had not 
become reality in Portugal’s transition. Alvaro Cunhal’s PCP benefited from a well- 
functioning party apparatus, a dense network of political contacts particularly with the 
USSR and strong links with the country’s labour union movement. It impressed FEF 
Managing Director Gunther Grunwald with its readiness to dominate the political scene 
after decades of clandestinity and exile:
One notices how brilliantly the Communists are organised. The structure of their cells 
and local branches is, according to observers of the situation, “exemplary” and 
“enviably good”. No other party in the country is equally capable of organising a 
demonstration on such short notice. Their ingenious public relations work is an obvious 
asset of Communist cadres.”
The PCP was also guided by the Machiavellian personality of its leader, who made no 
secret of his ideological agenda:
The allies of the proletariat for the Socialist revolution are not the same as those for the 
democratic and national revolution. In the first case, the proletariat carries out the 
fundamental attack on the monopolies and latifundiarios allied with the part of the 
bourgeoisie...interested in the antimonopolistic fight. The Socialist revolution is 
directed against the bourgeoisie in its totality and for this reason some of the allies of the 
proletariat during the first stage (sectors of the urban middle-class, sectors of the rural 
peasantry, and some elements of the petit bourgeoisie) cease to be allies during the 
Socialist revolution.228
Given Cunhal’s hard-line stance, insouciance towards the PCP was dangerous and 
Portugal’s democratic parties had every reason to reject the idea of political co­
225 Horst Ehmke, Der demokratische Sozialismus als geistige und politische Kraft: Entspannungspolitik 
und ideologische Auseinandersetzung, (Gesprachskreis Wissenschaft und Politik, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 
Bonn Bad-Godesberg 1976), p.22 (translation by author).
226 Ibid
227 PolArch/AA B26, 110.244, Report Dr.Grunwald, 13 March 1975 (translation by author).
228 Alvaro Cunhal, Radicalismo Pequeno Burges da Facada Socialista, (Lisbon, Edicoes Avante, 2nd 
edition, 1974), p.82, quoted in Kenneth Maxwell, ‘The Communists and the Portuguese Revolution’, 
Dissent, spring 1980, p.202. See also Arnold Hottinger, ‘The Rise o f Portugal’s Communists’, Problems o f  
Communism, July-August 1975, vol. XXIV, pp.4-8.
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operation with Communist forces. The challenge for governments in Western Europe 
was to create a situation in which a democratically elected government would secure the 
country’s membership in NATO and lead Portugal gradually into the European 
Community.
Initially, there seemed to exist diverging foreign policy approaches and different 
operational foci on both sides of the Atlantic. “A radical line wanted to isolate the 
Portuguese revolution -  the “vaccine theory” -  while a bolder position was committed 
to support democratisation against both the Soviet party and a majority of the praetorian
9 9 0party.” According to high-ranking West German officials, leading members of the 
U.S. administration favoured the build-up of a credible threat scenario vis-a-vis 
Portugal’s Communists and their Soviet backers and seriously considered a military 
intervention -  a “Chilean solution - in order to prevent another coup d’etat.230 American 
policy planners, military strategists and not least the Secretary of State himself were 
convinced that strength could only be demonstrated and Lisbon’s political apostasy 
could only be prevented through the use of coercive means. “I think the Communists 
will try to move quickly” Kissinger said in October 1974, “because they’ve learned
9*> i
from Chile that if they move too slowly we will do something”. Eberhard Dingels, the 
former Head of the SPD’s international relations department and a close adviser to party 
Chairman Willy Brandt recalls a meeting between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
and Brandt during which both men discussed the democratic prospects of the Portuguese 
transition. “Kissinger was extremely sceptical, and he was even more sceptical 
regarding the general abilities of the Europeans to provide political solutions.” 232 
According to Dingels, the Secretary of State expressed his firm belief that only hard
229 Carlos Gaspar, ‘International dimensions of the Portuguese transition’, Instituto Portuguese de Relacoes 
Internacionais, available from http://www.ipri.pt/prog invest/tema.php?idt=5. cited on 23 February 2006. 
The formulation “praetorian party” refers to those members o f the MFA, who held strong sympathies for 
the PCP and the long-term installation of a Communist regime in Lisbon.
23nportugal als Lehrbeispiel der Demokratisierung; 25 Jahre nach der Nelkenrevolution’, Neue Zurcher 
Zeitung, 24 April 1999.
231 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts 1966 -  1977, 01228, Secretary’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, 9 
October 1974.
232 Personal interview with Hans Eberhard Dingels, Bonn, 18 April 2002.
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power could prevent Portugal from drifting into the hands of the Soviet Union and 
concluded, “We have to land the marines.’’23| ^  f
According to German sources, the SPD’s rank and file as well as government 
officials in Bonn sought to ensure the commensurability of means and remained aloof 
towards overtly confrontational policies. SPD foreign policy expert Ehmke remembers:
“We were concerned that the Americans would initiate a Western version of Prague in 
1968. The greatest mistake we could make was to imitate Russian authoritarianism as 
exercised during the Prague Spring.”234 Kissinger’s scepticism became apparent when in 
October 1974 the U.S. Secretary of State denounced the then Portuguese Foreign 
Minister and PS leader Mario Soares as a “loser”235 and “the classical Kerensky type” of 
the Portuguese transition, “always understanding things three weeks too late”. 236 
Kissinger abrasively brushed off Soares’s reply that he had no intention to become a 
Portuguese Kerensky by reminding his Portuguese counterpart that neither Kerensky 
had such an intention.237 Although the U.S. Secretary of State admitted his lack of 
knowledge on issues relating to Portugal, he made no secret of his deep mistrust vis-a- 
vis the democratic forces in the transition country:
I don’t know anything about Portugal, but I have the impression that my view, which 
was based on pure dogmatism, was better than the reports I was getting from Portugal. I 
think the only effective organised political force in Portugal is the Communists. I know 
Soares and he reminds me of my colleagues at Harvard; he talks a lot and can do 
nothing.238
233 Ibid. Horst Ehmke confirms the hawkish attitude o f American officials, “important representatives who 
actively contemplated an intervention in Portugal.”
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Ehmke and Dingel’s recollection is being disputed by the U.S. Ambassador in 
Portugal at the time and former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) Frank C. Carlucci, who “knew of no plans for a military intervention.”239 Instead, 
the diplomat insisted that he “did not believe that Communism could endure in Portugal 
due to a) geography b) economic ties c) the influence of NATO d) the conservative 
nature of the Portuguese people and e) the influence of the Church. Consequently” he 
added, “I consistently urged support for the democratic parties and the electoral 
process.” 240 Others support Carlucci’s recollection. The former Head of the State 
Department’s Iberian Desk, U.S. Ambassador Edward Rowell speculates that Ehmke 
and Bahr “have not understood Kissinger who was -  and is -  notorious for saying 
outrageous things in order to provoke a reaction.” 241 Asked if the American 
administration had at any point seriously contemplated a military intervention, Rowell 
stresses that he never heard of “any suggestion of that nature, nor did any of my many 
friends and associates at the Pentagon.”242
Instead, it was understood in Washington as much as in European capitals that a 
multifaceted approach on the level of civil society as well as on bi- and multilateral level 
needed to be adopted, which would strengthen Portugal’s democratic parties, stabilise its 
economy, help to reintegrate returning settlers from Lisbon’s African territories and 
support those members of the MFA that “were committed to a democratic outcome” in 
order to “strengthen the armed forces’ affinity within the NATO alliance”.243 Some 
observers believe that it was due to Carlucci’s tempering influence and his far-sighted 
strategy of support for democratic parties in Portugal that from early 1975 onwards, 
American foreign policy towards the Portuguese transition shifted replacing its initially 
confrontative stance with a more pro-active approach. Carlos Gaspar sees this policy 
shift as the expression of Washington’s acceptance of West German leadership in the 
democratisation process. “By then (i.e. August 1975), the United States had already 
changed to follow the West German strategy of democratic engagement, at least for the
239 Personal correspondence with Frank C.Carlucci, 21 April 2005.
240 Ibid.
241 Personal correspondence with Edward Rowell, 3 April 2006.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
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time being. This was the first time the American party in a Cold War crisis had been led 
by a German strategy.”244
Carlucci himself stressed the excellent co-operation between him and West 
German Ambassador Fritz Caspari with whom he was “in daily touch”, but also pointed 
out that both diplomats found themselves relatively isolated as far as their strategy of 
constructive engagement was concerned. “We saw the situation in very much the same 
way, although most of our colleagues did not agree.”245 Given Kissinger’s gloomy 
assessment of the situation, which he “later brought with him during visits to the Federal 
Republic in conversations with Schmidt and Genscher”, and his condescending attitude 
towards Europe’s transitional ‘optimists’, Washington’s Ambassador in the FRG, 
Martin J. Hillenbrand described U.S. foreign policy at the time of the Portuguese 
Revolution and throughout the ‘hot’ transition phase as having “missed the boat”.246 The 
senior diplomat recalls:
The Germans and some of our other European allies deserved much credit for 
conducting a purposeful and effective policy with respect to Portugal in the years 
immediately after 1974. They obviously had better intelligence and political judgement 
about trends in the country than we did. 47
Hillenbrand’s colleague Edward Rowell, admitted that “the U.S. had no comparable 
tools in its bags, which meant that without the activities of the German Stiftungen, the 
effort to help Portugal’s democratic parties would have been very weak and 
unsatisfactory”. 248 Portugal expert Kenneth Maxwell agrees with Hillenbrandt’s 
assessment and pointed out that “the US took away major lessons from that experience 
and the various "democracy building" institutes were a result in many ways of the fact 
the US felt the Germans had tools for overt intervention in Portugal they did not at that 
time have.”249 In any case, Washington’s Social Democratic allies in Europe eschewed
244 Carlos Gaspar, ‘International dimensions of the Portuguese transition’, op.cit.
245 Personal correspondence with Frank C.Carlucci, 21 April 2005.
246 Martin J. Hillenbrand, Fragments o f Our Time -  Memoirs o f  a Diplomat, (The University of Georgia 
Press, Athens 1998), p.341.
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military action and favoured the support for Portugal’s democratic actors in order to 
play out what Joseph Nye had called the “power of attraction that is associated with 
ideas, cultures and policies.” The democratisation of post-revolutionary Portugal was 
identified as a strategic milieu goal on West Germany’s diplomatic agenda and foreign 
policy planners in Bonn decided to work towards the realisation of such a milieu goal by 
actively influencing the dynamics and conditions of their extraterritorial environment. 
Both governmental and nongovernmental diplomatic actors in the FRG’s foreign policy 
system realised that characteristic for Spain and Portugal’s transitional challenges was 
the need for “both countries to come to terms with the historical burden of past 
dictatorships and the lack of experience in dealing with democratic institutions and 
playing by democratic rules.”251 This required the use of soft power -  the transfer of 
ideas, concepts and expertise - for the creation of a political environment, which was not 
least conducive to Social Democratic ideas. Far from abstaining or rejecting its regional 
responsibility and renouncing the pursuit of state interests as the Machtvergessenheit 
realists claim, West Germany’s foreign policy on state and sub-state level mobilised 
their autonomous power projection capabilities to shape the emerging political 
structures of Portugal’s new democracy.
West German politicians shared Kissinger’s scepticism only to a certain extent. 
Contrary to the interventionist concept of hard coercive power, the West German 
Government presided over by Brandt’s successor Helmut Schmidt thought the situation 
in the South European state to be ideologically in flux and politically manageable. “One 
cannot form a final assessment of the matter. The Communists are well organised, but 
economically they have to rely entirely on Soviet aid. I don’t think that the Soviet Union 
will be prepared to provide long-term economic assistance to Portugal on any significant 
scale”252. Helmut Schmidt recalls:
Since the end of Salazar’s dictatorship and during the final stages of the Caetano years, 
the Portuguese revolution had been domestically drifting strongly towards Communism.
250 Joseph S. Nye, ‘The Information Revolution and American Soft Power’, op.cit., p.67.
251 PolArch/AA B26, 110.245, Southern Europe Desk (Referat 203), Report ‘Situation auf der iberischen 
Halbinsel’, 27 November 1975.
252 Conversation with Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger on/'thb 29 May 1974 in Brussels in Helmut 
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A number of officers who represented Portugal in the different political bodies of 
NATO expressed surprisingly naive, partly vulgar Marxist opinions and views. That was 
the case especially with Prime Minister Goncalves and President Costa Gomes. 
Therefore, I could perfectly understand that Ford and Kissinger gave the regime in 
Lisbon the cold shoulder; but we still maintained our hopes for a democratic 
development although East European attempts to prop up Communist cadres in the 
government were quite obvious.25
In July 1975, foreign affairs analyst John C. Campbell in an astute analysis of political 
instability in the Mediterranean region made out the case for the employment of soft 
power in order to strengthen democratic parties in the Portuguese transition. He urged 
West European foreign policy makers to exercise international leadership because they 
would be in many respects “better situated than the United States.” 254 Campbell 
dismissed any interventionist strategy by America and Europe thus rejecting the idea of 
a hard power based operational mode of action. “Force is ruled out,” he writes, because 
the West does not “have a Brezhnev Doctrine.” Instead, he expressed his conviction 
that although the international community’s arsenal of tools and strategies for 
democracy promotion on the Iberian Peninsula was admittedly limited, soft power 
would be a key approach for the diplomatic efforts of external actors. Campbell writes:
The problem is not one for spectacular coups or even primarily for conventional 
diplomacy. It is one of attitudes and influence. To have influence, outsiders must first of 
all have channels of communication to the government, the political parties, and the 
people of Portugal. They should not rebuff the government because it contains 
Communists. They should not prejudge the domestic issues under debate or challenge 
measures of social reform. But they quite properly could and should strengthen 
economic ties and provide financial aid.25
He suggested that West European countries should provide non-material and material 
support as well as knowledge and expertise to democratic forces in transitional Portugal. 
Knowing that “democratic European countries have a spectrum of political parties
253 Ibid (translation by author), p.208. The West German magazine Spiegel concluded that the differences 
in opinion concerning Portugal and the discrepancy between European and American interests were a result 
o f the “American involvement in South East Asia for many years.” Der Spiegel, 26 May 1975.
254 John C. Campbell, ‘The Mediterranean Crisis’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 53, no.4, July 1975, p.616.
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which are counterparts of those which have come onto the political scene in Portugal”, 
he advised left-of-centre parties in Europe to strengthen Mario Soares and his PS 
through “moral and financial support.”257
2.3. The Identification o f Political Partners - FEF, PS and PPD
Expressing his “confidence in individuals and structures”, West Germany’s Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt turned to the experts of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (FEF) for 
advice. Former FEF managing director Gunther Grunwald remembers being 
approached by Schmidt who asked him “if it would be possible to change the course of 
events and to influence the political development in Portugal by getting the Foundation 
actively involved.”259 Being kept informed about the situation on the ground through 
“regular reports from our guys in Lisbon”, Grunwald indicated his organisation’s 
preparedness to help.260 Although Schmidt expressed his confusion about the “multitude 
of political groups and parties which labelled themselves Socialist or Social
9 6 1Democratic” , the identification of a politically compatible partner organisation 
preceded Portugal’s transition. Through its support for the Lisbon lawyer Mario Soares 
and his Socialist Party (PS), West Germany’s SPD and its transnationally operating soft 
power tool FEF had been far-sightedly preparing the ground for the emergence of a 
successful democratic party in post-authoritarian Portugal. In retrospect, Willy Brandt 
asked:
What would have happened after the foreseeable fall of the Portuguese dictatorship if 
the international solidarity of democratic Socialists had been formed in advance i.e. 
before 25 April 1974? And what would have happened if it had not been in place after 
25 April 1974, refrained but tangible, when political and moral support was needed?262
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Political co-operation between the two parties reached back several years. In the 1970s, 
the SPD leadership began to take a more proactive approach towards the long-term 
promotion of democracy in Portugal by establishing permanent channels of contact with 
several exiled opposition groups and individuals. The FEF being an SPD-affiliated 
organisation appeared to be the natural choice for transitionally implemented democracy 
promotion projects especially since the SPD did not possess the logistical, 
organisational and operational know-how and resources to maintain behind-the-scenes 
channels of political communication. Gerhard Fischer, Portugal expert and first FEF 
resident representative in Lisbon remembers:
In order to identify a partner for political co-operation, we asked ourselves who could 
share in the enmity towards the regime in Lisbon the answer to which we found abroad. 
Normally, one finds politically complementary partners among exiled opposition groups 
the members of which often know each other because of their common escape from 
persecution. In the Portuguese case, we could count on a significant number of these 
dissidents.263
The FEF began to organise political seminars and invited Portuguese dissidents from 
several European countries. In facilitating these meetings, it intended to provide a forum 
for exiled opposition figures and to enable the dissident community to freely exchange 
information and to engage in political discourse without having to worry about material 
constraints. The FEF’s role was also to deliver political messages and to maintain 
channels of communication:
FEF officials would occasionally travel to Portugal on a tourist visa to meet up with 
‘friends’ of exiled Socialists. Every now and then we were told a name and we would 
then visit that person. This was usually followed by an invitation to a seminar in West 
Germany and we later picked them up behind the border.264
FEF officers would also covertly stay in the country for several weeks to maintain 
contact with the clandestine domestic opposition. Furthermore, the Foundation provided 
scholarships for selected Portuguese students to spend time at West German 
universities. It was hoped that these FEF-sponsored future elites would use the skills,
263 Personal interview with Gerhard Fischer, Bonn, 25 April 2002 (translation by the author).
264 Personal interview with Gerhard Fischer, Bonn, 25 April 2002 (translation by the author).
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ideas and concepts that they had become familiar with through their studies abroad, in 
the democratic reconstruction of their country. Before the Revolution of the 
Carnations in Portugal, approximately 100 students were given scholarships by the FEF. 
All of them were to become members of the PS at a later stage causing FEF Portugal 
expert Gerhard Fischer to say that “this form of political aid turned out to be quite 
fruitful in future.”266 One of the intellectuals benefiting from the FEF scholarship 
programme was Mario Soares, who at the time was still a member of the Portuguese 
Socialist Action (PSA), an umbrella organisation for Portugal’s Socialist opposition 
based in Geneva.267 His friendship with Willy Brandt, which dated back to 1965, was 
crucial as it opened Soares the resources and contacts of West Germany’s powerful 
SPD. Through the FEF’s democracy promotion activities, he got into contact with other 
opposition activists thus enabling him to solidify his future political base and to 
coordinate tactics, strategies and concepts.268 On th e i9  April 1973 at an FEF-sponsored 
seminar in the West German town of Bad Munstereiffel, the PSA was renamed the 
Portuguese Socialist Party (PS) with twenty-six founding members.269 Mario Soares was 
elected to the post of Secretary-General with 20 ‘yes’ against 7 ‘no’ votes.270
The new party leader visited his SPD friends in Bonn two days before rebellious 
military officers finally ended Portugal’s dictatorship. Arriving on 23 April 1974, Soares
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provided his West German friends with a first-hand account of the political situation 
back home. In conversation with SPD frontbencher Holger Bomer, Soares almost 
prophetically highlighted the possibility of fundamental change in Portugal given the 
“deepening political, economic and colonial-military crisis”.271 According to Soares, 
opposition forces and civil society actors were looking at a range of possible options to 
work towards regime change including terrorist action, civil unrest, military uprising or 
through institutional reform of state-run organisations like the trade unions. However, he 
assured his German hosts that the PS leadership rejected violent means, was committed 
to a peaceful and if necessary negotiated transition and maintained “good relations with 
young army officers” and “liaison persons inside the ministries.”272 The crucial question 
for West German politicians was, which position the PS and other opposition parties 
would adopt regarding Portugal’s membership in NATO after a possible regime change. 
Any radicalisation of Portugal’s political leadership, the forging of closer ties with the 
Soviet Union and Lisbon’s possible withdrawal from Western security structures would 
have meant a serious de-stabilisation of the FRG’s operational environment. The 
Foreign Office therefore voiced its strict opposition to any Communist infiltration of 
security-sensitive areas:
We need to have an open dialogue with the Portuguese about the necessity to restrict the 
exchange of information on certain questions of Western security in case of a 
Communist presence in government. No Communist in the area of security! We need to 
make clear time and again that in the long-run the involvement of Communist cabinet 
members is incompatible with Portugal’s NATO membership 273
Soares insisted that he and his fellow dissidents were united in their support of 
Portugal’s NATO membership “as long as there was no alternative security system in 
place in Western Europe” and as long as the East-West confrontation persisted.274
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Clearly relieved, SPD international affairs analyst Veronika Isenberg concluded, “It 
emerges as a result of the talks that the PS leadership adopts a pro-Western position.”275 
Initially, the newly founded political organisation appeared to be a classical 
cadre party “without significant roots in Portuguese society.”276 The PS served as a 
reservoir for a wide range of ideological beliefs, which led to a number of structural 
deficiencies. “We lacked almost everything to effectively impact on national political 
life. We did not have enough active party members in cities and villages, no battle- 
hardened party organisation with functioning structures, no effective information 
channels and almost no money.” 277 After 25 April 1974, the PS expanded its 
membership rapidly incorporating ultra-leftists, Social Democrats, Catholics, 
freemasons and Marxists thus drawing criticism of turning into a ‘vacuum cleaner party’ 
without a clear-cut political profile. The diversity of viewpoints, mentalities and 
ideological agendas created not only a pluralist and lively framework for discourse but 
at the same time undermined party unity in the ensuing power struggle with other 
political actors. Soares remembers:
Nobody really knew the troops, which had joined us. They were very heterogeneous. 
One did not speak the same language in Faro and Brago, the training was extremely 
poor and the party line was frequently ignored. It was difficult to unite all these political 
wings because the party meant something else to every one of them.279
In December 1974, the first PS party conference adopted a manifesto, in which the 
political principles of Portugal’s Socialists were outlined. The programme openly 
embraced Marxism as its guiding ideology thus proving to remain a far cry from the 
SPD’s political philosophy. The strong left-wing tendencies of the programme were 
probably due to the PS’s heterogeneity of membership and to the influence of left-wing 
PS firebrand Manuel Serra. The programme expressed the party’s rejection of “all those 
movements which call themselves Social Democratic or even Socialist but which only
276 Mario Soares, Portugal- Welcher Wegzum Sozialismus?, op.cit., p.65.
277 Ibid.
278 Ibid, pp. 66-67.
279 Ibid, p.67 (translation by author).
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serve the interests of imperialism thus preserving the structures of capitalism.”280 It 
called for plebiscitary forms of democracy, union activism, worker’s councils, and 
producer co-cooperatives as well as for the self-administration of organised labour.281 It 
committed the party to fighting capitalist orders and bourgeois rule.282
Despite the PS manifesto’s unashamed leftwing radicalism and boisterously 
doctrinaire stance towards ‘neo-capitalism’ and despite its hostility towards all those 
social orders which, according to the authors of the programme, “appear to be 
democracies only in form and which call themselves consumer societies, but which in 
fact increase the inequality among human beings”283, West German Social Democracy 
had no reason to be overly worried about the internal maturing process of its Portuguese 
partner as the PS leadership remained controlled by the conservative wing within the 
party. Among the 40 members on the PS’s executive board were only four or five 
proponents of the Serra-wing and only Serra himself got elected into the executive party 
secretariat as a representative of the left wing.284 The almost flamboyant Marxist 
radicalism of the manifesto never seriously undermined co-operation between FEF and 
the PS leadership, and the transitional process, which according to FEF strategists was 
to “eventually generate Social Democratic ideas” (Optenhogel) was never put at risk by 
radical rhetoric.
In his study on the international dimension of regime change in Portugal, 
German political scientist Rainer Eisfeld interprets the adoption of the party manifesto 
as a tactical manoeuvre and as the attempt to present the party as an ideological 
alternative to its main political competitor on the moderate left, the Partido Popular 
Democratico (PPD).285 The latter organisation was founded in May 1974 by three
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former ‘liberal’ members of Portugal’s Salazarist state party ANP, Francisco Sa 
Cameiro, Joaquim Magalhaes Mota and Francisco Pinto Balsemao with a clearly 
expressed orientation towards the establishment of Capitalist economic structures and 
the constitutional protection of private economic activities and private property. 
Although the PPD has been described as a formation of “liberals who do not dare to 
appear under a liberal label because everyone who does not pretend to be politically left 
puts himself at risk of being suspected a fascist”286, the PPD claimed to be a Social 
Democratic party and started to canvass for support by the SPD ever since its inaugural 
party conference of November 1974. Observing the catwalk of post-revolutionary 
political actors in Portugal, the SPD-owned Vorwarts commented about the PPD’s 
positioning within the kaleidoscope of ideological positions:
It characterises the current political climate in Portugal, that the first centrist party 
established last Saturday labels itself leftist. The ‘Party of the Left Centre’ -  this will be 
probably the name under which it will campaign in future -  brings together a number of 
young technocrats and liberal professors who worked under Caetano after the death of 
Salazar but broke with him when his relapse into the openly fascist policies of 
repression became apparent288
In October 1974, the PPD co-founder Francisco Pinto Balsemao approached the West 
German Ambassador in Lisbon Fritz Caspari and asked the diplomat to arrange a 
meeting with Willy Brandt or any other leading member of the SPD. Although Caspari 
speculated that the SPD leadership might be interested in exploring possible forms of 
future co-operation with the PPD, contacts between the two parties did not develop into 
any significant partnership in the long-run after talks between the head of the SPD’s 
international relation department Hans-Eberhard Dingels, Willy Brandt and Minister of 
State in the Auswdrtige Amt Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski had failed to produce any result
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that could serve as a basis for co-operation. However, Dingels was told to stay in touch 
with the PPD leadership.289
In the run up to Portugal’s first democratic elections on 25 April 1975, the PPD 
leader Rui Machete visited the German capital to establish contacts with officials of the 
FEF and to convince them to provide the PPD with political aid. Although PPD 
emissaries held talks with the British Labour Party as well as with Danish, Dutch and 
Swedish Social Democrats, West Germany received particular attention as it was “the 
country with the richest parties and the greatest willigness to help.”290 The Portuguese 
politician requested ‘technical support’ for the establishment of a trade union 
organisation, the training of political cadres and for educational programmes promoting 
producer co-operatives.291 Referring to the SPD-affiHated Institute for International 
Dialogue (IID), which had previously granted assistance to his party, Machete inquired 
if West Germany’s Social Democrats were prepared to send once again “Mr. Sahrholz 
to Lisbon to provide support as a consultant for party organisation and political 
campaigning to Lisbon.292 The PPD’s campaign office can only benefit from his 
experience.”293 Machete made no secret of his expectation to see his party entering the 
new government after the elections in April 1975 “if the elections, against all odds, are 
going to take place under normal conditions.” Once in the cabinet, it was crucial for the 
PPD to obtain “direct political aid from the Federal Republic and to let the militaries 
know that even for them there are political limits in the exercise of power.”294 Machete 
stressed the importance of a strong PPD in the international realm and suggested that the 
Portuguese Ambassador Emani Lopes as an active supporter of the party should serve as
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291 Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (hereafter AsdD), Helmut Schmidt Collection (hereafter HSC), 
BN/7340, notes of a conversation with Prof. Rui Machete, 10 April 1975.
292 PPD international affairs expert Brito Correia remembered that his party and the affiliated FundafSo 
Oliveira Martins had received “political aid from FEF and an Institute” and it seems plausible to assume 
that this Institute was in fact the IID. See personal correspondence with Luis Brito Correia, 11 July 2006.
293 Ibid. SPD functionary Richard Sahrholz of the SPD-affiliated Institute for International Dialogue (IID) 
visited Portugal in the run-up to the April 1975 elections to monitor the PPD’s campaign activities and to 
provide the party with electoral assistance. He held conversations with several PPD leaders such as Alfredo 
de Sousa, Luis Brito Correia, Manuel Castello Branco, Mario Pinto, Rebello de Sousa and Jorge Correia de 
Cunha.
294 AsdD, HSC, BN/7340, notes o f a conversation with Prof. Rui Machete, 10 April 1975.
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a cross-party liaison person who would maintain lines of communication between PPD 
and SPD headquarters. Machete informed his German hosts about an upcoming visit 
of two members of the PPD - the international relations expert Luis Brito Correia and 
for legal affairs, Prof. Paulo Pitta e Cunha -  to West Germany and mentioned the 
interest of the two envoys to meet “important SPD politicians.”296 The PPD leader also 
announced his intention to set up a party office in West Germany and to request the help 
of the IID for this project297
Earlier, SPD Chairman Willy Brandt on his first visit to Lisbon after the 
overthrow of the Salazarist regime was welcomed by a 100-strong delegation of PPD 
supporters who displayed placards conveying the political message of a partnership 
between SPD and PPD. On several occasions, Brandt needed to answer sceptics who 
questioned the SPD’s commitment to its partnership with Soares’s PS given the latter’s 
radical Marxist stance. Possibly in reaction to the radical tendencies of the PS 
manifesto, Brandt rejected the notion of an exclusive partnership between SPD and PS 
and spoke publicly about the possibility of also admitting the PPD into the Socialist 
International (SI).299 Brandt’s foreign policy adviser Hans-Eberhard Dingels hoped that 
“eventually informative contacts between the SPD and the PPD could turn out to be 
helpful.” 300 Because of Brandt’s critical attitude towards the PS’s programmatic 
radicalism and his rejection of an exclusive relationship between the two parties, the PS
295 Ibid. See also personal correspondence with Luis Brito Correia, 11 July 2006
296 Ibid. Correia and Pitta e Cunha held talks with representatives of SPD and FEF in Bonn to press the 
Germans further on the point o f a possible PPD membership in the Socialist International (SI) and future 
co-operation with the FRG’s Social Democrats. Their German contacts told them that the SI recognised 
only one party per country with the exception o f political splinter groups. However, since M&rio Soares 
“would not allow the PPD to become Portugal’s second SI member”, the talks between the Germans and 
the Portuguese envoys remained without success.
297 Ibid.
298 See Rudolf Wagner, ’Klare Absage an die Volksfront’, Vorwarts, 24 October 1974.
299 Ibid.
300 AsdD, Bruno Friedrich Collection (hereafter BFC), BN/1537, Notes concerning the visit o f SPD 
Chairman Brandt to Portugal by Hans-Eberhard Dingels, 22 October 1974. Dingels acknowledged that 
among the members o f the PPD there are “without any doubts Social Democrats” but he also had no 
illusions about the conservative and liberal elements o f the party structure and concluded that “an 
institutionalised connection between SPD and PPD is not on the agenda.” Ibid.
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leader reacted irritably. “It seemed” noted Dingels, “as if the farewell for Brandt by 
Soares turned out to be a touch less cordial”.301
FEF analyst Hans Ulrich Biinger was asked by Brandt to become the liaison 
officer for FEF and SPD in charge of maintaining contacts with Portugal’s political 
parties. He recalls, “The PPD was constantly seeking contacts with FEF and SPD” but 
stresses that those contacts “were limited to mere conversations and suggestions.”302 
Machete’s PPD did not possess the PS’s long-standing relationship with West 
Germany’s Social Democrats and it also lacked any pre-revolutionary democratic 
credentials. Although the PPD’s commitment to market economic principles and 
entrepreneurial initiative contrasted starkly with the quasi-revolutionary Marxist rhetoric 
expressed in the PS manifesto, the party was never able to replace the SPD-PS axis with 
an alternative model of transnational co-operation.303 The PPD leadership was told time 
and again that West Germany’s SPD could only grant support to members of the 
Socialist International to the point where several high-ranking PPD politicians 
complained about the obvious lack of interest by the SPD to establish and maintain a 
real political partnership.304 Nevertheless, PPD politician Luis Brito Correia remembers 
that West Germany’s SPD provided some political support for his party “although not 
officially and directly but through the FEF in order to avoid problems with PS leader 
Soares.”305
2.4. The Conflation o f State and Sub-State Diplomacy in the FRG’s 
Foreign Policy
West Germany’s foreign policy system is best described as a dense network of different 
institutional units or as a conglomerate of external affairs players simultaneously 
engaging in agenda setting, conceptualising, political communication and decision­
301 Ibid.
302 Personal correspondence with Hans Ulrich Biinger, 15 January 2002.
303 Certain circles within the SPD would have certainly appreciated a closer co-operation between PPD and 
West Germany’s Social Democrats. SPD heavyweight Hans Matthofer admitted in an interview with the 
German public broadcaster ZDF in March 1976 that personal animosities between individuals posed a 
bigger problem for political partnership than/Jdifferences in manifesto or ideology.” With regard to the 
PPD’s claim to be a social democratic party he assured his interviewer that.,I do not want to question their 
right to call themselves Social Democrats.” ZDF Bonner Perspektiven, 28 March 1976.
304 PolArch/AA B26, 110.244, Report Richard Sahrholz ‘Elections in Portugal, 25 April 1975’.
305 Personal correspondence with Luis Brito Correia, 11 July 2006.
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making. It lends itself to the description of being a multilayered diplomatic apparatus, in 
which different operational levels permanently interact with the external environment as 
well as with each other. At the same time, the different units of the system process and 
forward insights gained, information acquired and analyses developed. At the helm of 
the system, state-to-state interaction is being managed by traditional governmental 
institutions of national diplomacy, namely the Federal Chancellery, the Auswdrtige Amt 
and increasingly internationally active ministerial departments in the Federal Ministry 
for Economic Co-operation and International Development (Bundesministerium fur  
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung BMZ) as well as in the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (BWI). This ‘public’ institutional texture is being supplemented by 
‘private’ i.e. transnationally operating sub-state actors such as Germany’s political 
parties and their affiliated foundations. It is the latter category, which regularly 
harnesses the Federal Republic’s soft power resources while official diplomacy either 
maintains largely symbolic bilateral relations or acts within much more effective 
multilateral frameworks. Within the system, governmental and non-governmental actors 
co-operate and co-ordinate their activities in often subtle, sometimes unintended but 
always multifaceted ways.
In Portugal, the FRG’s governmental foreign policy establishment believed 
deficits in the area of political infrastructure with political pluralism being in a 
dangerously embryonic state, a crippled legal system, a largely silenced and otherwise 
Communist-dominated trade union movement as well as politically marginalised media 
organisations to be the main obstacles for Portugal’s successful democratisation. The 
FEF with its soft power capabilities appeared to be the most promising tool to remove 
those obstacles. The nature of the transitional framework and the aforementioned 
structural deficits required soft power-based outside intervention on a transnational 
level. While the Federal Government contemplated and co-ordinated more coercive 
steps towards the new regime in Lisbon within established multilateral parameters, the 
FEF with its close affiliation to West Germany’s ruling Social Democrats was to 
provide knowledge, expertise and information for the strengthening of democratic 
forces.
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According to the FEF’s political maxim that the “essential elements of 
democracy need to be developed within civil society ”306, the FEF as a transnational 
actor was uniquely positioned to operate within Portugal’s transition theatre. “Religious 
organisations and political foundations are often able to flexibly react to requests 
coming from civil society, something which bilateral co-operation usually is obliged to 
take into account.”307 The FEF served as a central agency for political communication as 
well as a political Trojan horse for the exercise of soft power and provided Portugal’s 
democrats with practical solutions for a sustainable build-up of democratic structures, 
tried and tested in a German setting. Although often described as a nongovernmental 
organisation, the FEF was anything but a mere tool in the hands of ministers, permanent 
secretaries or party leaders and maintained clear links with the institutions of West 
Germany’s public diplomacy. It’s preference formation and agenda-setting was guided 
not only by partisan considerations to help improve the position of like-minded political 
forces but also to work towards the maximisation of wealth and to ensure the FRG’s 
security by creating an operational environment that closely resembled West Germany’s 
own politico-structural reality. Therefore, the sometimes seemingly elusive shibboleth 
of the ‘national interest’ did play a not insignificant role in the international soft power 
driven activities of the FRG’s sub-state diplomacy. Ernst Hillebrandt and Uwe 
Optenhogel have correctly remarked “not only those political and social interest groups 
behind the foundations benefited from this foreign policy instrument but German society 
as a whole.”308
The conflation of governmental and transnational diplomacy is clearly expressed 
in a situational report on the West German involvement in the Iberian country, which 
remarked “there are multiple connections with Portugal via SPD and FEF, in particular 
with the PS, which have also practical implications. The government of the Federal 
Republic supports this moral and material assistance (campaign assistance, assistance in
306 Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, Das miihsame Gescha.fl der Demokratieforderung: Konzepte und 
Erfahrungen aus der Internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, (Bonn, 
1999), p.8.
307 Ibid, p. 10.
308 Ernst Hillebrandt, Uwe Openhogel, ‘Mediatoren in einer entgrenzten Welt -  Zur auBenpolitischen Rolle 
der politischen Stiftungen’, Politik undGesellscha.fi Online, no.2, 2001, available from 
http://www.FEF.de/ipg/ipg2 2001 /arthillebrand.htm. cited on 8 January 2002, p.7.
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the build-up of party structures, the reinforcing of anticommunism etc.)”.309 The same
report also highlights the CDU’s Portuguese contacts, in particular to the conservative
CDS. It points out that “here too material aid has been given the exact amount of which
remains unknown.” 310 Public and private diplomacy dealt with the transitional
challenges posed by the Portuguese post-revolutionary period through a clear separation
of political responsibilities and operational strategies. Threatening postures and the
public mobilisation of the coercive instruments of hard economic power such as
sanctions, boycotts or the withholding of financial aid remained largely in the
multilaterally controlled toolbox of governmental institutions.
On the other hand, democracy promotion based on institution building and the
strengthening of political pluralism belonged to the domain of the political foundations
with their employment of soft power and their greater degree of autonomy i.e. the
attempt to influence the transformation of political infrastructure in transition countries
by ‘conceptually’ co-opting foreign elites. This was acknowledged by the Auswartige
Amt, which pointed out that besides the exchange of high-ranking political visitors on
governmental level, the “focus of our foreign policy towards Portugal remains the
1 1
support for democratic forces through political parties and foundations.” The latter 
worked towards the consolidation of political pluralism in Portugal thus trying to shape 
societal and systemic structures through transnational intervention while the FRG’s 
public diplomacy represented by various ministerial bureaucracies and attributed to the 
Federal Government as a unified actor defined its “vital interest” as “securing Portugal’s
i p
membership in NATO.” Both operational components of West Germany’s post-war 
power politics -  public and private, governmental and non-governmental -  concerned 
themselves with questions of national security although with two different aspects of it. 
While SPD and FEF (as well as the other parties and their respective political 
foundations) sought to stabilise West Germany’s operational environment by creating 
the necessary structural preconditions for liberal democracy and strong private sectors in 
the Iberian Peninsula, the Schmidt-Genscher government worked towards the
309 PolArch/AA B26, 110.244, Report ,Portugal-Hilfe\ no date.
310 Ibid.
311 PolArch/AA B 2 6 ,110.242, Briefing P aper‘Die Portugal-Politik der Bundesregierung’, 18 March 1975.
312 Ibid.
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preservation of alliance structures thus stabilising the institutional framework of 
Western security architecture. Although both official diplomacy and the international 
Stiftungen activities were integral parts of the FRG’s foreign policy system working 
simultaneously towards West German state interests on different operational levels, their 
co-ordination proved sometimes difficult. Chancellor Schmidt told his cabinet in March 
1975 that “it would be important to differentiate between activities of the government 
and initiatives taken by political foundations” and urged his fellow ministerial 
colleagues to “maintain an overview of what the political foundation are actually 
doing.”313
As has been mentioned earlier, the SPD and its international relations 
department also pursued informal diplomacy on a transnational level. This involvement 
coincides with Sebastian Bartsch’s observation that the FRG’s
political parties are themselves societal actors of foreign policy through their strongly 
developed external relations, which they maintain in co-operation with their political 
foundations. In this sense, they are [...] important institutions facilitating public 
participation in Germany’s foreign policy.31
Individual contacts of prominent party officials often trumped institutional links, which 
was expressed in the extraordinarily prominent role SPD Chairman Willy Brandt played 
in strengthening the SPD’s foreign policy profile. In Portugal especially his close 
personal contacts turned out to be invaluable for the political partnership between SPD 
and PS. The winner of the Nobel Peace Prize would later use his international reputation 
in his job as chairman of the Socialist International (SI) from 1976 onwards for the 
benefit of Socialist parties during the transition processes in the Iberian Peninsula. 
Furthermore, the SPD party apparatus maintained working relations with the Federal 
Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt), a connection between sub-state actor and state 
executive, which appears to be “naturally closer than the one maintained by opposition
313 PolArch/AA B 2 6 ,110.242, Briefing Paper, Cabinet Meeting, 26 March 1975.
314 Sebastian Bartsch, ’Aussenpolitischer Einfluss und Aussenbeziehungen der Parteien’, in Wolf-Dieter 
Eberwein, Karl Kaiser (eds.), Deutschlands Neue Aussenpolitik -  Institutionen und Ressourcen, vol. 4, 
(R.Oldenbourg Verlag Munchen, 1998), p. 172 (translation by author).
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parties.”315 Although during the 1970s, the West German Government did contain a 
liberal element through the participation of the smaller Free Democratic Party (FDP) led 
by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Bonn’s political aid programme for 
Portuguese democracy was heavily dominated by the SPD’s cross-border party co­
operation on a transnational level. The three institutional levels, which form the basis 
for (West) Germany’s foreign policy system -  political parties, political foundations and 
governmental diplomacy -  with their two-layered operational dimensions - state and 
sub-state, ‘public’ and ‘private’, multilateral and transnational -  were informally 
combined in the so-called Circle of the Six (Sechserkreis), a committee which 
incorporated SPD officials, cabinet ministers and representatives of SI and FEF. SPD 
foreign affairs expert Horst Ehmke remembers:
This committee was the initial power centre for the coordination and decision-making 
within West Germany’s foreign policy. The Sechserkreis also illustrated the complex 
structures underlying the interaction between semi-govemmental actors, government, 
Chancellery and SI.3 6
The Sechserkreis met on a more or less regular basis in the parliamentary building 
“depending on demand and able to decide on an ad-hoc basis if necessary.”317 It then 
“entered into deliberation about the possible ways to become politically involved in
315 Ibid, p .168. Hans Matthfifer whose activities in the area of democratisation on the Iberian Peninsula date 
back to the 1960s embodied both governmental as well as transnational components o f Germany’s foreign 
policy system being a SPD minister and member of the government as well as a member of the SPD’s 
executive board. Asked whether he would “coordinate” his activities as a party functionary with the federal 
government he insisted that “the SPD acts independently” retaining its own responsibility for external 
affairs. At the same time though, Matthbfer expressed his conviction that the party leadership “would not 
do anything, which might contradict the goals o f the Federal Government.” ZDF Bonner Perspektiven, 28 
March 1976. As part o f the bureaucratic structures of the Federal Chancellery, the department for external 
relations (Abteilung fur Auswdrtige Angelegenheiten) needs to be mentioned at this point. Although its 
leading personnel is normally recruited from the diplomatic cadre at the German Foreign Office, these civil 
servants and career diplomats are often chosen for their political sympathies
316 Personal interview with Horst Ehmke, Bonn, 17 April 2002 (translation by the author). Among others, 
the head o f the SPD’s internal relations department Hans Eberhard Dingels Minister in the Auswartiges 
Amt Hans Jiirgen Wischnewski, Minister for Telecommunication and Technology Horst Ehmke, the mayor 
o f Bremen and member of the executive board Hans Koschnik, the SPD foreign policy expert and architect 
o f Brandt’s Ostpolitik Egon Bahr as well as the Managing Director o f the FEF Gunther Grunwald were 
regular participants in the Sechserkreis meetings.
317 Personal interview with GUnther Grunwald, Bonn, 11 December 2002.
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Portugal’s transition.” 318 The activities of the Sechserkreis were supplemented by 
regular briefings between FEF and SPD on the level of the executive board.”319
2,5, Governmental Diplomacy after 25 April 1974
After the almost bloodless overthrow of Portugal’s authoritarian regime in April 1974, 
the SPD/FDP coalition government under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was confronted 
with a foreign policy dilemma, which only the ideologically bipolar nature of the 
international Cold War environment could create. Parts of Portugal’s newly 
‘inaugurated’ ruling elite, the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), displayed either strong 
sympathies for the PCP or continued to toy more generally with the idea of political 
reform along Marxist lines. On the one hand, the officers had freed the country from the 
agonising dictatorship of the Salazarist regime thus leading society into a formerly 
unknown realm of political freedom. On the other hand, the left-leaning ideological 
background of many leading figures within the movement led to fears in Western 
capitals of an imminent political shift towards the extreme left, a fraternisation with the 
Soviet Union and an ultimate “socio-revolutionary leftwing dictatorship, possibly 
supported by the PCP, and secured by the armed forces.”320 The consequential political 
reaction in Bonn was summarised by Manfred Schuler, then Minister in the Chancellor’s 
Office: “Our assessment of the situation in Portugal left us with the belief that wherever 
there were Communists positioned at crucial points within the power structure, they had 
to be pushed out.”321 Schmidt’s own political evaluation of the Communist threat in 
Portugal and of a possible fragmentation of Western security architecture shared in the 
widespread pessimism of many European but particularly American analysts.322
318 Ibid.
3,9 Ibid.
320 PolArch/AA B26, Report ‘Situation in Portugal’, Southern Europe Desk (Referat 203), 13 February 
1975. In conversation with the Minister o f State in the Portuguese Foreign Office, Jorge Campinos, SPD 
international relations officer Dingels was told that several observers in Lisbon believed the Soviet Union 
to even accept a failed Communist coup d’etat, which would then be used as a pretext by rightwing 
elements to establish their own authoritarian regime. Such a scenario would enable Moscow to discredit the 
Western alliance by pointing at the political turmoil in Southern Europe’s “Portuguese Chile”. See 
PolArch/AA B26, 110.244, Notes (Hans-Eberhard Dingels), 3 February 1975.
321 Personal interview with Manfred Schiiler, Berlin, 20 June 2002.
322 Horst Ehmke admitted that the West German Government “thought a Portuguese drift towards a 
Communist system and a political positioning in great proximity to the Soviet Union to be extremely 
likely.” Personal interview with Horst Ehmke, Bonn, 17 April 2002. SPD chairman Willy Brandt admitted
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However, the Chancellor and his administration were still convinced that the situation 
provided sufficient space for a more pro-active political manoeuvring. Horst Ehmke 
remembers:
The crucial experience for Schmidt was a conversation with Kissinger, in which the 
latter articulated his harsh and deeply rooted anti-Communist stance and in which he 
expressed his pessimism regarding the Portuguese case. In reaction to the Secretary of 
State’s remarks, Schmidt expressed the determination of the Europeans to put 
themselves in charge of the Portuguese transition process.323
And his cabinet colleague Egon Bahr recalls the American secretary of state’s attitude:
For Kissinger, the situation seemed utterly hopeless. He already expected Portugal’s 
NATO membership to vanish. We, on the other hand, were always conscious of the 
necessity not to give in because there was a chance for West Germany’s Social 
Democracy to contribute to an ultimately positive outcome.324
In Kissinger’s view, the “political parties in Portugal” were “not able to exert any 
influence” and in talks with the West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
he confessed that “I don’t think they will survive. We cannot kid ourselves. The 
prospects are that we will have a dictatorial regime in Lisbon.”325 West Germany’s 
career diplomats in the Auswartige Amt shared Bahr and Ehmke’s description of the 
U.S. position at the outset of Portugal’s transition. “Right from the beginning, the 
American attitude towards the Portugal problem was a nuance more pessimistic than 
ours. Apparently, Kissinger has personally re-directed Washington’s policies in Lisbon 
a few times.“ In contrast to more conservative elements in the U.S. Administration, 
West German foreign policy makers warned “we cannot allow Communist provocations
in 1976: “We agreed with what the Americans said: It would not be good if there are certain NATO 
member states in which Communists are part o f the government. On the other hand, the Portuguese case 
has shown that it would have been wrong to remove Portugal from NATO just because there were 
Communist temporarily in government.” Westfalische Rundschau, 28 April 1976.
323 Personal interview with Horst Ehmke, Bonn, 17 April 2002 (translation by author).
324 Personal interview with Egon Bahr, Berlin, 21 June 2002.
325 DNSA/KT, 01707, Memorandum o f Conversation, The White House, 27 July 1975.
326 PolArch/AA B26, 110.244, Southern Europe Desk (Referat 203), Report ‘Situation in Portugal’, 13 
February 175; See also West German Ambassador Bemdt von Staden’s remarks to Kissinger that after 
assessing the situation in Portugal “we are slightly more optimistic”, DNSA/KT, 01591, Memorandum of 
Conversation, Department of State, 23 April 1975.
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to push us into a confrontation with Portugal’s ruling officers. Any measures leading to 
Portugal’s greater isolation will only play into the hands of the Communists.”327
In April 1975, the Auswdrtige Amt formulated its catalogue of politico-economic 
policies to facilitate the emergence and ensure the subsequent survival of democratic 
structures in Portugal. It placed great emphasis on financial incentives and economic 
rewards suggesting the pay-out of a DM 40 million emergency loan to the Portuguese 
Government, which “for public relation-related reasons should be increased to DM 100 
million soon”. It also envisaged increased economic activities of the FRG military 
including Bundeswehr purchases of ammunition from Portuguese manufacturers worth 
another DM 40 million. Within multilateral fora as the traditional operational 
environment for the FRG’s governmental diplomacy, the government promised to lobby 
decision-making bodies of the European Community to have them lift existing trade 
restrictions and reduce tariffs on agricultural products, textiles and paper. 329 The 
Schmidt Government was prepared to accept the role of international advocate for 
Portuguese interests and expressed its determination to convince EC institutions to 
provide Lisbon with urgently needed financial support, in particular with loans by the 
European Development Bank.330
2.5.1. Financial Support
During the following months, Schmidt relied heavily on SPD Chairman Willy Brandt’s 
personal contacts with PS leader Mario Soares because of “Brandt’s role in the operative 
domain until 1974.”331 Changes in the coalition government in Bonn after Brandt’s 
resignation over a case of East German espionage may have also contributed to a more 
visible role for the former Chancellor, who began to establish the party apparatus as his 
new foreign policy bastion. Schmidt and his foreign policy entourage quickly identified 
three main tasks: The strengthening of Portugal’s fragile institutional structures, the 
promotion of political pluralism and constitution building and the provision of economic
327 PolArch/AA B 2 6 ,110.244, Report ’Situation in Portugal’, 30 April 1975.
328 PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, Briefing Paper ‘Die Portugal-Politik der Bundesregierung’, 18 March 1975; 
Also PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, Briefing Paper 9 April 1975.
329 Ibid.
330 Ibid.
331 Personal interview with Manfred Schuler, Berlin, 20 June 2002.
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aid 332 “jhg  ro|e 0f political parties in this context was absolutely decisive.”333 Leaders 
of West Germany’s parliamentary parties including representatives of their respective 
foundations discussed the Portuguese situation at a meeting with the President of the 
Federal Republic (Bundesprasident), SPD politician Gustav Heinemann whereby the 
“debate was not about the ‘I f  but dealt exclusively with the ‘How’ of political aid.”334 
A second meeting followed between Schmidt and the party chairmen. As a 
result, it was agreed to allocate a certain amount of money to all of West Germany’s 
political parties, which would then be responsible for the implementation of political 
programmes first in Portugal, from 1975 onwards in Spain and later in Turkey too. 
According to Manfred Schuler, the Chancellery had to convince the Federal Financial 
Auditing Authority (Bundesrechnungshof) that it was not intended to channel the money 
around the legally required control mechanisms or to avoid transparency, but that the 
matter of financial aid for Portugal’s democrats had to be solved “discreetly due to its 
political sensitivity.”335 Being a “politically farsighted man”,336 the president of the 
auditing authority promised support and accepted the argument of the special nature of 
the planned operation. The financial allocations were made out of a reserve fund of the 
Federal Intelligence Agency BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst). Since West Germany’s 
Finance Minister Hans Apel immediately rejected the idea of allocating money for the 
democratic build-up in Portugal from his ministerial budget, party chairmen and 
foundation officials decided to approach the BND in order to access its secret financial 
reserves.337 According to Schuler, the agency agreed provided the operation would not 
become a secret service project and the money would be paid back at a later stage. The 
Portuguese partner organisations made it clear that high visibility and noisy publicity of 
Bonn’s democracy promotion projects were not in their interest because of feared public 
debates in the target country about the role of foreign influence. The accusation of being
332 Ibid.
333 Ibid
334 TUirl
337 The Germany correspondent of the London-based Times newspaper Roger Boynes reported in 2000,
that “a few German officials, including a senior intelligence agent worked out ways to help Social
Democrats in Portugal.” ‘Secret Service funds may have bolstered Bonn party war chests’, Times, 2 
February 2000.
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dominated by outside powers could be easily used as a political weapon against political 
opponents during the transition.
In the absence of officially published figures, analysts have to rely on the 
documentary evidence produced more or less coincidentally in the wake of the slush 
fund scandal surrounding former Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s time in office, which 
concussed Christian Democracy in 1999. According to internal documents of the 
Chancellery, the FRG’s political parties represented in the Bundestag received a total of 
DM 47 million as well as US$ 2.5 million for their international democracy promotion 
activities in Spain, Portugal and Turkey between 1974 and 1982.339 Both CDU and SPD 
received around DM 12 million and the smaller FDP slightly less.340 Listed under 
budgetary item number 0404 covering financial allocations for special operations of the 
intelligence service and being labelled ‘top secret’, only four people, namely the 
President of the Federal Auditing Authority and three members of parliament as the so- 
called ‘correspondent group’ were allowed to monitor the money transfers made out of 
the secret fund.341 The parliamentary ‘correspondents’ were shown receipts of payments 
issued by their respective party treasurers, who collected the money in cash, a modality 
of payment at their own request.342 The Chief of Staff in the Chancellor’s Office 
Manfred Schuler even remembered: “We paid them the money in used US $20 notes 
instead of giving out initially requested new Deutsche Mark bank notes.”343
338 Regarding the financial aid obtained by the PS, Rainer Eisfeld rejects the notion of an altruistic nature of 
political support for Soares by declaring that “as early as 1974, the PS did not only receive massive support 
from abroad, but was also confronted with equally massive expectations directly linked to this aid.” 
Sozialistischer Pluralismus in Europa, op.cit., p. 131.
339 Hans Leyendecker, ’Geheimfonds der Regierung Schmidt enthielt 52 Millionen Mark -  Unterlagen 
weisen hQhere Summe aus als bisher bekannt’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 3 February 2000.
340 Ibid
341 Ibid
342 Hans Leyendecker, ’Geheime Zahlungen aus dem Geheimdienst-Etat - Deutsche Parteien verteilten 
BND-Geld ohne jede Kontrolle an Partner in Spanien und Portugal’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 1 February 
2000. The former Director of the KAF’s Department for International Co-operation, Josef Thesing, made 
the rather incredible claim that his Foundation had not received any o f the money out o f the secret fund and 
was not even informed about the existence of these financial resources. Associated Press Worldstream, 7 
February 2000. Also contradicting the existing evidence that party treasuries had in fact received money 
from the secret fund, former SPD treasurer Inge Wettig-Danielmeier insisted that “this was an operation of 
the German and other governments, which supported Spain and Portugal. We as a party did not have 
anything to do with it.” in Tina Stadlmayer ‘BND-Geld fur Portugal und Spanien’, taz, 2 February 2000.
343 Personal interview with Manfred Schuler, Berlin, 20 June 2002.
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In 2000, German investigative reporter Hans Leyendecker, whose work on the 
diffuse nature of the financing of democracy promotion activities in the Iberian 
Peninsula helped to shed light on the financial dimension of the FRG’s political aid 
received information from an unidentified FEF informant that the political foundation 
received between DM 3 million and DM 5 million from the secret fund in ten successive 
transactions.344 During the 1980s and 1990s, SPD and CDU faced allegations of illegal 
party financing when investigators suspected both parties of having channelled the 
money via foreign bank accounts back into their respective treasuries instead of 
spending the funds completely on support for democratic partner organisations in Spain 
and Portugal.345 The public prosecutor’s office in the West German capital Bonn 
believe^)that the FEF had transferred vast sums of money, which it had received 
through the secret BND fund to the Tel Aviv-based Fritz-Naphtalie Foundation (FNAF). 
In 1984, investigators recovered documents during a raid of FEF offices in Bonn that 
showed the transfer of approximately DM 22 million between 1975 and 1981 into a 
Swiss-registered account of the FNAF.346 The true nature of these money transfers, 
however, could not be conclusively determined as most potential witnesses had died and 
others involved chose to remain silent.347
In addition, funding for the support of Socialist forces in Portugal came allegedly 
from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and was channelled via Socialist 
parties in Western Europe. Former adviser to U.S. Ambassador Frank Carlucci, Howard 
Wiarda, even recalls from his own investigations that “the CIA may have done the 
overall coordination for this entire project (Western democracy promotion efforts in
344 Hans Leyendecker, ’Bares ohne Belege’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 25 September 2000. Claude Montagny’s 
claimed that SPD and FEF spent DM 13.5 million for the support o f the PS between April 1974 and May 
1975, ’La fondation Friedrich Ebert: Efficace demarcheur de la social democratic allemande’, in La Social- 
Democratie au present, Paris, ES, 1979, p. 120.
345 SPD officials got worried when they remembered an episode in 1980 involving the party’s former 
treasurer Alfred Nau, in which Nau wanted to deliver a briefcase with DM 6 million in cash to then 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. He insisted the money was the result o f donations but refused to identify the 
donors. Another SPD ex-treasurer, Fritz Halstenberg, said that he was not prepared to “exclude the 
possibility” that Nau’s ‘donations’ did not in fact originate from the Iberia fund.
346 The Foundation was established by Israel’s Labour Party in 1970 with the support o f West Germany’s 
Social Democrats
347 Hans Leyendecker, ’Schweigen ist Geld’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 1 February 2000.
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Portugal, the author)”.348 Although the latter assertion remains without substantiation, 
there is in fact evidence to suggest that Europe’s powerful and well-connected Social 
Democrats and Socialist parties, unions and affiliated organisations, including the West 
German SPD, had received money from the U.S. American intelligence community. “In 
the spring of 1975” writes Gregory Treverton “the CIA began passing money, several 
million dollars a month to the party (the PS, the author) through its fellow Socialist 
parties in Western Europe, before it began receiving support directly from those fellow 
partries.”349 These financial channels must have been the “specific project” that the 
member of the U.S. Secretary of State’s staff, U.S. diplomat Wells Stabler, mentioned in 
December 1974 to help Soares’s party, which he believed to be in “bad shape.”350 The 
staffer informed Kissinger that “Carlucci now is endeavouring to work out something, 
there is something strange in the atmosphere, they are talking about it, a specific project, 
trying to get started”.351 When Kissinger responded that “I thought you were going to 
say he was going to use the CIA. We wouldn’t go to that extreme”, he is being told that 
“we have to go for it, though, on a specific project, using some of the US$ 10 million 
funds”.352 Despite Kissinger initial rejection of the CIA-administered “aid project”, 
Stabler assured him that Carlucci was “already in touch with Soares and the Embassy 
has been in touch with the Portuguese who are responsible for this.”353
However, a couple of months later Kissinger made remarks, which suggest that 
either the CIA had after all not provided the allegedly large amounts of money for 
democracy promotion in Portugal or that the Secretary of State was not informed about 
the true extent of the operation “Now what happened in Portugal might well have 
happened even with a massive CIA campaign, but we acted like children” he lamented 
and decried the fact that “we gave something like US$10,000 to some German party
348 Personal correspondence with Howard Wiarda, 22 June 2006.
349 Gregory F. Treverton, Covert Action -  the CIA and the Limits o f  American Intervention in the Postwar 
World, (I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. Publishers, London 1987), p.216.
350 DNSA/KT, 01228, Secretary’s StafFMeeting, Department of State, 9 December 1974.
351 Ibid.
352 Ibid
353 Ibid.
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which they were going to pass onto the Portuguese. It was peanuts. Brandt came and 
finally asked for some help.”354
2.5.2. The West German Embassy
At the time of the coup d’etat, a new Ambassador was appointed to head West 
Germany’s diplomatic mission in Lisbon. Everyone did not welcome the appointment:
The Embassy does not have an easy position in the new era. Instead of being an expert 
of the lusobrasilian world, the new Ambassador is an informed person in the Anglo- 
Saxon world and does not speak a word of Portuguese unlike the Ambassador of the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR); the press attache who was called back to Bonn 
shortly after the 25 April and who is needed in his job especially now in order to stand 
up to the countries of the Eastern Bloc has not been replaced yet. Instead of reacting to 
the slightest developments and signals, the Embassy is engaged in tactical manoeuvres 
disguised by blinds. 55
The new Ambassador, Prof. Fritz Caspari, was not an experienced career diplomat but 
served as Deputy Director of the President’s Office (Bundesprasidialamf) before taking 
up his new post. He visited Portugal for the first time on a preliminary fact-finding tour 
on 23 April 1974 one day before the revolution in Lisbon.356 The more experienced 
background of his diplomatic staff may have compensated for his lack of knowledge of 
Portugal’s regional, political and cultural history. The deputy head of mission Heibach 
could use his personal contacts to a number of MFA officers who he had befriended 
during his posting as Consul General to Mozambique and his successor, the diplomat 
Keil had lived and studied in Coimbra and therefore knew parts of the new bureaucratic 
elite.357
The Embassy served as the medium-level communication channel between the 
West German Government and EC member states in Portugal whereby political 
developments in the country were discussed in a circle of EC Ambassadors on a 
monthly basis. The Embassy also served as a reference point for political foundations, 
particularly the FEF. SPD Chairman Brandt had handpicked the Attache for Social
354 DNSA/KT 01486, Secretary’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, 29 January 1975.
355 Curt Meyer-Clason, Portugiesische Tagebucher (1969-76), (Bergisch Gladbach, 1987), p.3 (translation 
by author).
356 Personal interview with Fritz Caspari, London, 18 June 2002.
357 Ibid.
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Affairs Hans Ulrich Biinger in order for him to act as a political analyst and observer for 
FEF and SPD in Lisbon and as a go-between responsible for political communication
• l r owith Portugal’s democratic parties. Every two weeks, Biinger held talks with PS 
foreign policy expert Jorge Campinos, in which the FEF officer turned diplomat was 
provided with background information on the latest political developments.359 He also 
maintained channels of communication with parts of the strongly Communist-infiltrated 
trade union movement through members of its umbrella organisation Intersindical in the 
Ministry for Labour Affairs. At the same time, it was Biinger’s responsibility to 
monitor and support Socialist efforts to create labour organisations free from the 
influence of PCP activists such as the Forca democratica do trabalno?6X
In a case of institutional cross-linkage between transnational party foreign policy 
and governmental diplomacy, SPD international relations expert Hans-Eberhard Dingels 
briefed Ambassador Caspari on the transitional situation in Lisbon not without 
mentioning the importance of the PS for Portugal’s future democratic development. He 
pointed out that because of the SPD’s long-standing relationship with Mario Soares the 
Portuguese moderate left had developed a positive attitude towards the country’s 
membership in NATO and its political connectedness with Western Europe.362 Dingels 
urged Caspari to “remain in close contact” with the SPD international relations 
department in order to ensure a concerted and coordinated effort of democracy 
promotion and assured the incoming Ambassador that “democratic forces in Portugal 
will have a chance to stop the Communist influence and to prevent a falling back into 
past times in the long-run only if the democracies in the European Community and the 
West as a whole are going to assist them.”363 Caspari himself commented occasionally 
on FEF projects or provided reference letters for funding applications to the BMZ.364
358 Personal correspondence with Hans-Ulrich Biinger, 15 January 2002.
359 PolArch/AA B26, 110.240, Report West German Embassy ‘Partido Socialista’, 26 August 1975.
360 PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, Telex (Caspari/Biinger), ‘Kontakte mit portugiesischen Gewerkschaften’, 7 
February 1975.
361 Ibid.
362 AdsD, BFC, BN/1535, Letter Hans-Eberhard Dingels to Fritz Caspari, 9 July 1974. Dingels told Caspari 
that “it is the intention o f all o f  us to strengthen democracy by supporting our political friends in Portugal to 
the best o f our abilities.”
363 Ibid.
364 Personal interview with Fritz Caspari, London, 18 June 2002.
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Although personally a liberal conservative, Caspari supported Social Democratic efforts 
in democracy promotion in Portugal stating, “it is remarkable that almost nobody here 
knows what Social Democracy actually means. This appears to be a promising area to 
be targeted by an information campaign, in which the SPD can play a crucial role.”365 
However, he was particularly concerned that West German aid projects were 
administered in a strictly behind-the-scenes fashion and with “great sensitivity.” Despite 
his lack of knowledge about Portugal, Caspari soon realised that “the Portuguese were 
very concerned about their independence and that they outrightly rejected any form of 
patronising intervention with a headmaster attitude from abroad.”366 He therefore urged 
FEF personnel in Lisbon to “keep a distinctly low public profile, a guideline they have 
followed throughout.”367 At the same time, he made no secret of his intention to “help 
the country develop in a direction which is in accordance with the interests and positions 
of the West” and he was fully aware that “the contacts between our three parliamentary 
parties and Portuguese parties are of the utmost importance.”368 During Portugal’s ‘hot 
summer’ of 1975, the diplomatic mission prepared itself for the possibility that 
democratic politicians might seek political refuge on the Embassy compound. Even 
prominent political figures in the country were concerned about their personal safety 
taking security precautions, among them Mario Soares who constantly changed his 
whereabouts.369
365 Pol Arch/AA B26, 110.240, Report ‘Politische Parteien in Portugal -  Angriff auf Sozialdemokratie’, 17 
September 1975.
366 g p p  forejgn affairs expert Dingels echoed Caspari’s thoughts when he stressed that although Germany’s 
Social Democrats would work towards the “broadening of Portugal’s democratic potential” providing the 
PS with “organisational support”, the SPD would not be a “headmaster o f its partner organisations.” AdsD, 
WBC, Bn/127, Notes Hans-Eberhard Dingels, 17 October 1974.
367 Ibid.
368 Telegram Caspari to Auwdrtiges Amt, 10 October 1974, Willy Brandt Archive, SPD Chairman, Folder 
127. In March 1975, the extreme leftwing newspaper Berliner Extradienst quoted Caspari as saying that 
“we should help the country (i.e. Portugal) to develop in a political direction compatible with the interests 
o f the West. Therefore, financial allocations on the part o f the Socialist International should be discreetly 
increased. Relations of the SPD Chairman to Portugal’s democratic parties are o f the utmost importance not 
least in order to spare the free world the uncertainties o f a Portuguese “Santiago” as the CIA’s deputy 
director Vernon Walters has put it during his stay in Lisbon in August.” Cited in Berliner Extradienst, 
No.22, 14 March 1975.
369 During the summer o f 1975, Hans Ulrich Biinger stayed in close contact with Soares during the latter’s 
campaign tours and was always informed about his ever-changing whereabouts. Caspari also recalls an 
episode involving the PPD co-founder Francisco Pinto Balsemao who he met walking up and down in front 
o f the fence of the embassy compound. After being asked by Caspari about his reasons to do so he replied
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In July 1975, the Embassy warned the West German Foreign Office that the 
prospects for the development of political pluralism in Portugal were increasingly 
clouded by a creeping radicalisation of certain elements within the MFA. “The trend” 
writes FEF liaison officer Bunger “goes towards a leftist single-party system”.370 He 
pointed out that despite repeated assurances given by the country’s military leadership 
to honour the importance of political parties for the functioning and viability of 
democratic structures, it “remained more and more unclear, which real ways of 
influence would be left available for parties44 given the MFA’s attempts to install a 
country-wide 'popular’ decision-making system with a pronounced egalitarian ethos 
based on its revolutionary credentials.371 The Auswartige Am f s own assessment 
reflected Bunger’s warning and added to it the expression of a growing unease among 
West German diplomats about the ideological affiliations of leading military officers in 
Portugal. “The political attitudes of large parts of the officer corps will remain obscured 
as long as all non-Socialist alternatives relevant to the future of the country are being 
excluded from public discourse,” wrote the Foreign Office’s Iberia analysts concluding 
that “an escalation into civil war seems possible.”372 However, Bunger himself insisted 
that it would be still premature to declare the survival of democracy in Portugal failed 
stressing the growing awareness on the part of several MFA leaders of the dire 
economic situation the transitional country had been manoeuvred into. “Part of that 
awareness is the realisation that in the long-term, Portugal can arguably expect 
substantial aid and support only from Western democracies.”
2.5.3. Foreign Office Minister Wischnewski in Lisbon, June 1974
In June 1974, Foreign Office Minister Hans-Jiirgen Wischnewski travelled to Lisbon in
order to assess the political situation, to evaluate the prospects for a possible Portuguese 
long-term commitment to the process of European integration and to obtain clarification
that he intended to find the best place to jump over the fence to seek asylum in the embassy in a case of 
emergency. Personal interview with Fritz Caspari, London, 20 June 2002.
370 PolArch/AA B26 110.243, Embassy Lisbon, Report ,’Situation in Portugal’, (Caspari/Bunger), 18 July 
1975.
371 Ibid.
372 PolArch/AA B26, 110.243, Assessment Auswartiges Amt, Southern Europe Desk (Referat 203), 15 
August 1975.
373 Ibid.
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regarding the attitude of the MFA vis-a-vis Portugal’s NATO membership. 
Wischnewski held talks with Prime Minister Adelino Palma Carlos, Foreign Minister 
Mario Soares and other members of the new government. Back in Bonn, the Social 
Democrat stressed the fact that political developments in transitional Portugal were 
taking place in a “stormy” but otherwise “planned” way, and he emphasised that despite 
the de-facto control of political power by the MFA general elections for a constituent 
assembly as well as the drafting of a new democratic constitution and elections for a 
general assembly had been scheduled to take place before the end of June 1975. 
Wischnewski assured his government that it could do business with the transitional 
country and that Portugal was far from being lost for the Western community of 
states.374 Like other strategists in West Germany’s foreign policy circles, he realistically 
assessed the operational environment in Portugal as being conducive for a successful 
employment of soft power in order to shape the international milieu. In other words, a 
stable democracy in Portugal in which a Social Democratic or Socialist party would play 
a leading role would become a reliable political and trading partner in international 
affairs. The employment of soft power i.e. the transfer of policy templates, socio­
economic concepts, expertise on party management and the strengthening of 
institutional research capacities at this early stage of the Portuguese transition would 
nevertheless in the long-run be rewarded paying, in the words of Arnold Wolfers, “high 
dividends to the donor and yet be a moral credit to him.”
The minister who had urged NATO’s leadership three weeks before the 
Revolution of the Carnations to reassess its relationship with Portugal because “colonial 
policies and NATO’s aims cannot be reconciled” and who had openly stated that 
“Portuguese colonialism discredits the transatlantic alliance especially in the countries 
of the Third World”,376 appeared now relieved to report to his government that “in 
future, Portugal will remain fully integrated in NATO” and that the new Portuguese 
government had accepted the need for a Western defence alliance as long as the Warsaw
374 Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski, ‘Gute Gesprache in Lissabon’, SPD-Pressedienst, 28 June 1974.
375 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, op.cit., p.75.
376 Hans-JUrgen Wischnewski, ’Keine Waffen mehr fiir Portugal’, SPD-Pressedienst, 4 April 1974.
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Pact was in existence. 377 Furthermore, Wischnewski highlighted the European 
dimension of Portugal’s transitional process. He expressed the West German 
government’s hopes that the political development in the Iberian country, which was 
largely controlled by its left-wing military rulers would eventually help to facilitate 
“economic and social progress” in order to develop Portugal’s relationship with the 
EC. The Auswartige Amt envoy made no secret of the fact that risky political 
experiments, ideological kamikaze enterprises and economic reform radicalism would 
alienate European allies and would shut the door on bitterly needed material 
assistance.379 Portugal’s Foreign Minister Mario Soares had already assured the Western 
community of states that his country would meet his obligations resulting from its 
NATO membership. During a first phase of European integration, he proposed an 
association agreement with the EC stating “this is a very complex problem with 
extraordinarily far reaching economic and social consequences which needs to be 
considered and evaluated by a newly formed government in a very careful manner.”380 
The concept of a multiple-step integration process and a preparatory associative 
membership was supported by the West German GovemmenS^81
In fact, the European dimension of Portugal’s transition was to become one of 
the cornerstones for Socialist politics in Lisbon. It provided both a multilateral economic 
and political framework, which helped to reinforce the country’s cultural identity as part 
of the European family of states and a potentially useful financial connection which 
could help the country overcome its chronic budget deficit, its massive foreign debts and 
further inflationary turmoil. The Schmidt Government quickly realised the importance 
of offering a ‘European package’ as an incentive for further mobilisation of democratic 
resources and as a means to appeal to the Portuguese electorate. Although Portugal’s 
point of departure did not appear to be greatly favourable to a speedy acquis
377 Hans-Jiirgen Wischnewski, ’Gute Gesprache in Lissabon’, op.cit.
378 Ibid.
379 The policy o f threatening the Portuguese rulers with a withholding o f financial support and economic 
assistance remained unchanged throughout the transition, see e.g. PolArch/AA B26, Southern Europe Desk 
(Referat 203), Report ’Situation in Portugal’, 26 August 1975, in which Auswartiges Amt diplomats stated 
that “we have always made it clear to the Portuguese that they could expect Western assistance only in case 
o f a pluralist and democratic development.”
380 Basil P. Mathiopolous, ‘Ich bin optimistisch, Interview with Mario Soares’, Vorwarts, 9 M ay1974.
381 Hans-Jiirgen Wischnewski, ’Gute Gesprache in Lissabon’,op.cit.
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communitaire -  an inflation rate of up to 30 percent, widespread unemployment and a 
payment deficit totalling US $ 500 million as well as potential political problems 
associated with the return of thousands of Portuguese settlers from Africa -  the 
enthusiasm for the European project in Lisbon left observers of its transition to concede 
that such high levels of public support for European integration was “probably unique in 
the Western parts of the continent.”382
2.6. Sub-State Diplomacy 1 -  SPD and Soft Power after 25 April 1974
Parallel to the government’s ‘public’ diplomacy, West Germany’s interests in the
creation of non-Communist operational environment in Portugal complete with market 
economic structures and political pluralism was furthered on a sub-state level through 
the foreign policy initiatives of the SPD. Former Chancellor Willy Brandt largely drove 
the party’s foreign policy decision-making process and its democracy promotion 
activities in Portugal. Horst Ehmke ascertains that
The West German involvement in Portugal was a project initially initiated by Brandt, 
who co-ordinated political measures as well as any further steps with the British, who at 
that time had the closest contacts with the Portuguese. In all our efforts, Brandt was the
T O T
driving force not least because Schmidt did not have any personal contacts.
Although Schmidt later realised the usefulness of a division of labour between him and 
Brandt, he did not suppress his irritation about the frequent foreign policy activities of 
the SPD leader for a long time. Schmidt was concerned that Brandt would neglect his 
responsibilities on the domestic front while sharpening his profile as a mediator between 
the developed and developing world. This disquiet found its expression in the words of a 
local party activist that Brandt “sees himself more as Portuguese Foreign Minister than 
as SPD Chairman.”384
382 Egon C. Heinrich, ’Athen und Lissabon vor der EG-Tiir’, SPD-Pressedienst, 10 September 1974.
383 Personal interview with Horst Ehmke, Bonn, 17 April 2002 (translation by author). The argument that 
after his resignation Brandt concentrated his foreign policy activities on ’’relatively peripheral matters” and 
that the “party’s foreign policy was closer to Schmidt’s conceptions” must be consequently dismissed given 
his crucial role in West Germany’s transnational intervention in Portugal and Spain. See George C. 
Kyrtsos, The Attitudes and Policies o f  European Socialists regarding Spain, Portugal and Greece since 
1967, p. 194, here quoting Paul Friedrich, ‘The SPD and the Politics of Europe: From Willy Brandt to 
Helmut Schmidt’, Journal o f  CM Studies, June 1975, p.433.
384 Der Spiegel, 31 May 1976.
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2.6.1. Brandt’s Crucial Role
According to SPD politicians Horst Ehmke, Hans-Eberhard Dingels and Egon Bahr, it 
was elder statesman Brandt who convinced Kissinger to trust the political judgement of 
its European allies concerning a democratic outcome of the power struggle between 
PCP, parts of the MFA spearheaded by its Revolutionary Council and the newly formed 
democratic forces in Portugal.385
For the Americans, there was no difference between Communists in the West and those 
in the satellite countries of the Eastern Bloc. In the eyes of Brandt, the opposite was 
true. He regarded the Euro Communists as lost brothers who were on their way back 
home. Therefore, he was convinced that the chances were good to prevent the 
supposedly inevitable from happening.386
Brandt, who fled Germany after the Nazi’s power grab in 1933 and who himself 
experienced the hardship of a life in exile after having sought political refuge in Norway 
could impress his foreign counterparts with his outstanding personal reputation and his 
impeccable democratic credentials “representing the ‘other’ Germany to the outside 
world.”387 He was able to draw from his vast foreign policy experience having been not 
only head of the West German Government but also Foreign Minister himself. Since 
1976, he could also employ the (although only rudimentarily developed) organisational 
apparatus of the Socialist International (SI) for the sake of democracy promotion in the 
Iberian Peninsula. The SI was a global association of Socialist and Social Democratic 
parties, which Brandt energetically freed from its shadowy existence and successfully
385 “Brandt had a conversation with Henry Kissinger and from then onwards, the topic o f a possible 
American intervention did not resurface.” Ibid. Confronted with Kissinger’s belligerent attitude and his 
nervously issued threat to land American ground troops in the case o f a further deterioration o f political 
circumstances in Portugal, Brandt responded: “You can forget about that, we Europeans will sort this out!.” 
Personal interview with Hans-Eberhard Dingels, Bonn, 18 April 2002.
386 According to Bahr, Kissinger later admitted in a letter to Brandt (“normally the guy never admits 
anything”) that Brandt’s analysis o f the Portuguese situation was more accurate than his own. Bahr’s 
statement also reveals Kissinger’s lack of information about the political dynamics in Lisbon, something 
that may illustrate the invaluable intelligence and precise political analysis provided by the FEF. “The 
fragmented nature of political information Kissinger possessed caused Brandt to believe that the Americans 
would give up too early.” Personal interview Egon Bahr, Berlin, 21 June 2002 (translation by author). In 
February 1976, Kissinger expressed his appreciation of the SPD’s role during Portugal’s phase o f political 
instability. For years, Willy Brandt and his party had put up resistance against tendencies, which were not 
taken as seriously in the West as it would have been appropriate. The U.S. Secretary o f State also 
acknowledged Brandt’s achievements for the stability o f the NATO alliance in the face o f a possible 
Communist infiltration after the Portuguese revolution. Suddeutsche Zeitung, 2 February 1976.
387 Personal interview with Horst Ehmke, Bonn, 17 April 2002.
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revitalised as acting President.388 He concluded that if “Portugal could be successfully 
secured for the West it would be advantageous for the SI, for the SPD and for West 
Germany.”389
A few days after the overthrow of the Caetano Regime, the SPD issued an 
official statement assuring Portugal’s democrats that it would assist the country in 
returning to “the community of free and democratic nations and peoples so that Portugal 
after gaining internal and external stability can play its role as an equal partner in 
Europe.”390 Activating his almost decade-long friendship with Portugal’s new Foreign 
Minister Mario Soares, Brandt rightly interpreted the alarming signs and signals coming 
from the Tejo as “worrying” after “political friends appealed to me forcefully, and 
experience as well as intellect alarmed me.” 391 Brandt feared that when the PCP 
leadership would “seize power to destroy the just recently established young 
democracy” an international crisis could do lasting harm to the international balance of 
power and would negatively impact on the long-awaited democratisation process in 
neighbouring Spain.392 Obviously, any further polarisation of the political situation in 
Madrid was a real danger for the stability of the FRG’s regional milieu in Europe’s 
southern comer and any radicalisation of political positions within Spain’s gradually 
emerging transitional process that would involve either the continuation of Franco’s 
dictatorship or a fundamental shift towards the extreme left were clearly going against 
Bonn’s national interest.
Soares did not waste any time and provided his West German comrades with his 
personal assessment of the transitional situation. On 3 May 1974 he met with West 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Willy Brandt, SPD foreign affairs expert 
Wischnewski and other SPD grandees for talks about the emerging political situation in 
Portugal. His visit was undertaken with approval of the newly ruling military junta and
388 See also George C. Kyrtsos, The Attitudes and Policies o f  European Socialists regarding Spain, 
Portugal and Greece since 1967, op.cit, p. 195.
389 Personal interview with Egon Bahr, Berlin, 21 June 2002.
390 Socialist International, Circular No. 3, May 1974, quoted ibid.
391 Willy Brandt, Erinnerungen, op.cit., pp. 348-349. Brandt told reporters later that Spanish enthusiasm for 
the democratic transition would have been substantially diminished if the Portuguese experiment had gone 
wrong, Westfalische Rundschau, 28 April 1976.
392 Ibid.
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served the purpose of evaluating the general preparedness of West European 
governments to politically and financially support the new cabinet in Lisbon. In Bonn, 
Soares made clear to the assembled SPD rank and file that he insisted on Communist 
participation in the interim government not least because he was not prepared to 
individually take the blame for governmental failures in the absence of any democratic 
legitimacy usually bestowed upon political actors through elections. In particular, he 
described the yet outstanding decolonisation process as being a minefield for any 
political leadership and underlined his determination to let the PCP shoulder its share of 
responsibility inside government rather than as external critics.393
Being under no illusion about the organisational advantage of Cunhal’s 
Communist propaganda machine, Soares concluded that his strategic response had to 
rely on support by West European Social Democratic and Socialist parties if he wanted 
to transform the PS into a competitive political force without too much delay. In 
addition, Soares intended to open communication channels with the Soviet Union in 
order to prevent the PCP from monopolising bilateral relations through talks with the 
Soviet Ambassador in Bonn.394 In his talks with his West German hosts and U.S. 
Ambassador Martin J. Hillenbrand in Bonn, Soares emphasised the Portuguese 
commitment to NATO. He argued again that as long as the Warsaw Pact would shape 
Cold War security structures, the existence of a Western defence alliance appeared to be 
both justified and necessary. Furthermore, he stressed West Germany’s extraordinary 
importance for Portugal’s political future and described the Federal Republic as a 
political heavyweight in Europe while praising its well established connections with 
Portugal’s Socialist movement.
2.6.2. SPD Foreign Policy Spokesman Bruno Friedrich in Portugal, August 1974
In August 1974, SPD foreign affairs spokesman Bruno Friedrich travelled to Lisbon to
hold talks with the PS leadership. Friedrich’s visit served mainly the purpose of testing 
the grounds for future transitional aid and co-operation between the two parties. The 
SPD politician was to sound out the operational space, which SPD and its political
393 AdsD, BFC, BN/1537, Report Veronika Isenberg, May 1974.
™ Ibid.
395 Ibid.
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Foundation FEF with its soft power capabilities would be able to fill. During his 
conversations with PS officials, the SPD envoy pointed out that an indispensable 
precondition for West Germany’s political support was the Socialist’s consequent 
rejection of any tactical people’s front alliance with Cunhal’s PCP. Friedrich learned 
that Soares and his political friends desperately needed office space, printing devices, a 
member address filing system and the organisational know-how to effectively 
communicate between the party’s central office and its local and regional branches.396 
Earlier, SPD foreign affairs expert Dingels had asked Friedrich to raise three issues 
during his talks with Portuguese Socialists. The first issue was the build-up of effective 
party structures. Dingels wrote: “In my opinion our Portuguese friends are currently in 
no position to cope with the sort of modem political techniques that we use in
TQ7Germany.” The PS’s Social Democratic identity was a second issue to be discussed. 
Dingels had to find the right balance between his intention to abstain from any 
patronising interference in the internal affairs of the Portuguese partner and his 
determination to prevent any uncontrollable drift of PS cadres towards the extreme left. 
He was convinced that “especially in the Romanesque form of democratic Socialism the 
borderline of what has been labelled revolutionary Socialism but what is in fact 
Communism is constantly in flux.” 398 The final issue on Friedrich’s agenda was 
Portugal’s future role in Europe, development policies and the country’s overseas 
territories.399 The SPD politician optimistically concluded, “The Socialists have a clear 
chance to be far ahead of the Communists. If this happens it is likely that the party is 
going to follow politically into the SPD’s footsteps.”400
In numerous talks with Mario Soares, the Minister for Justice Salgado Zenha, PS 
Secretary-General Tito de Morais and two Ministers of State in the Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of Labour, Friedrich sensed a strong Portuguese interest to
396 Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 30 August 1974. See also Thomas Schroers, Die Aussenpolitik der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, op.cit., p.ISO.
397 Ibid
398 Ibid
399 AdsD, BFC, BN/1535, Letter Hans-Eberhard Dingels to Bruno Friedrich, 24 July 1974.
400 AdsD, BFC, BN/1536, Report Bruno Friedrich on his visit to Portugal 29 July -  2 August 1974. Dingels 
was assured by the Portuguese Minister in the Foreign Office Jorge Campinos that the organisational 
strengths of the Communists was undisputable but that the party had no significant support base in the 
country, AdsD, BFC, BN/1537, Notes Hans-Eberhard Dingels.
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learn and benefit from political concepts tried-and-tested in Germany. Zenha expressed 
his interest to send a high-ranking delegation of jurists to West Germany and 
immediately accepted an invitation by the SPD’s legal expert Hans-Jochen Vogel. The 
Socialist politicians suggested institutional long-term co-operation in the area of 
teachers’ training and pedagogic research, and they invited a qualified media advisor 
from Germany to Portugal.401 His Portuguese hosts left Friedrich in no doubt about their 
interest to obtain both material support as well as non-material assistance and to benefit 
from West Germany’s knowledge and expertise acquired through the FRG’s own 
experience with transitional challenges. The FRG’s Foreign Office supported the 
approach to introduce Lisbon’s political elite to the practical reality of West German 
governmental bureaucracy emphasising that “these visits are so important because right 
now there is a general lack of orientation within Portugal’s ministries and it seems as if 
these inter-ministerial exchanges are currently much more effective than official 
visits.”402 Promoting their political ideals and policies, Germany’s Social Democrats in 
co-operation with the FEF therefore used their “power of attraction” to influence 
Socialist decision-makers in Portugal by shaping the latter’s preferences. Examining the 
organisational state of the PS’s headquarters, Friedrich observed “the absence of any 
visible form of structured political work.”403 Admitting that there was “a lot of good will 
but no experience” and bewailing the fact that the positive phenomenon of a strong 
increase in party membership appeared to be neutralised by a lack of internal 
coordination, the SPD foreign policy expert demanded a change of approach to political 
work on local level. The party was in dire need for a central office building, which it 
was offered to purchase for DM 800.000 causing Soares, Zenha and Morais to enquire 
for a loan of DM 1-2 million provided by the SPD. The money would enable the PS 
leadership to not only purchase a new party building but also to provide regional PS 
offices with urgently needed equipment and to improve the technical preparation of 
election campaigns.404
401 Ibid.
402 PolArch/AA B26, Report (Drahterlass), 27 January 1975.
403 AdsD, BFC, BN/1536, Report Bruno Friedrich on his visit to Portugal 29 July -  2 August 1974, op.cit.
404 Ibid.
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On a final note, Mario Soares asked his German guest to deliver an invitation to 
Willy Brandt whose presence in Lisbon would be greatly appreciated. Soares suggested 
a preliminary schedule for the visit, which was supposed to include talks with Prime 
Minister Goncalves and himself. Part of the suggested itinerary was a massive PS 
election campaign event in the city of Porto. Friedrich commented positively on the idea 
because it could provide the SPD with an opportunity to “exert great influence on the 
development of the PS, strengthen Socialist self-esteem and to contribute towards the 
sidelining of the Communists. The visit could also counter liberal and conservative 
attempts to occupy Social Democratic positions.”405 In the absence of a functioning 
network of local party branches in the country, Friedrich urged his own party to 
concentrate on the establishment of regional PS offices rather than to promote the set-up 
of local branches in countless communities. He noted that the dominance of the public 
realm by PCP activists was exaggerated by the mass media, which, in his opinion 
focused too much on the display of party symbols and the masquerade of colourful 
public appearances. Months later, Friedrich summarised Portugal’s most serious post- 
authoritarian problems and mentioned the “decolonisation process, the transformation of 
the political system from a dictatorship to a democracy and the economic crisis as well 
as the reform of social structures.”406 He proposed a third way between a capitalist 
economy and a Socialist order, which would guarantee “democratic control of the 
economy while maintaining parliamentary democracy at the same time.”407
2.6.3. Willy Brandt’s Portugal Visit, October 1974
In October 1974, Brandt travelled to Portugal for a three-day visit. His tour of the 
country was aimed at strengthening Soares’s domestic position, to assess the state of 
Portugal’s transition and to assure the international and Portuguese public of the 
proactive nature of the co-operation between PS and SPD.408 The Auswartige Amt 
supported the SPD Chairman’s initiative as a “useful contribution to the consolidation of
405 Ibid.
406 Bruno Friedrich, ’Portugal’s schwieriger Weg’, SPD-Pressedienst, 12 March 1975.
407 Suddeutsche Zeitung, 30 August 1974.
408 Willy Brandt, ’Das portugiesische Volk kann sich auf uns verlassen’, op.cit., p. 182. In his study of 
Socialist attitudes towards Portugal, George Kyrtsos distinguishes between the “radicalised masses” for 
which Soares’ ideological attraction could not be enhanced, and the moderate segment of the electorate 
which viewed the SPD as the “standard bearer of European Social Democracy”.
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democratic forces in Portugal” and pointed out that the risk of a “better organised and 
materially superior Communist Party, which continues to gain weight within the 
governmental coalition and within the armed forces”, persisted.409Announcing that he 
was by no means a teacher who intended to “impose his wisdom” on Portugal’s 
Socialists, Brandt accompanied Soares to a PS meeting in the Northern city of Porto 
where both party leaders spoke in front of five thousand assembled Socialist supporters 
in the Crystal Palace.410 Brandt avoided any rhetorical commitment to an exclusive 
political partnership with the PS possibly deterred by the political radicalism shown by 
certain PS activists 411 He also reiterated his firm rejection of any form of political co­
operation between PCP and PS. In his memoirs, he recalls how he had noted during his 
visit how “the carnations, which became the symbol of the revolution had withered”, 
and in Porto, he uncompromisingly warned the Portuguese public not to enter into any 
short-lived pact with the enemy for the sake of creating a dangerously fragile and 
naturally short-lived ideological unity on the political left.412 In obvious reaction to 
Brandt’s campaign support for the PS, the PCP’s news magazine Avance launched an 
embittered attack against the SPD leader accusing him of “having interfered with 
internal matters of the Communist Party and in the Portuguese election process”.413
409 PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, Ausw&rtiges Amt, Political Affairs Department (Pol. Abteilung 2), 14 
October 1974.
410 Die Welt, 19 October 1974. Dingels noted that the visit was being “perceived by large parts o f the 
population as a sign of the connectedness between Portugal and democratic Europe.” See also See Rudolf 
Wagner, ’Klare Absage an die Volksfront’, Vorwarts, 24 October 1974
411 Soares on the other hand was only too keen to stress the close relationship with his West German 
friends. In an interview with the German magazine Quick, he made much play with his “very good contacts 
to politically influential forces in the Federal Republic” and stressed the fact that he maintained “a friendly 
relationship in great solidarity with the SPD. Numerous times, I had the pleasure to consult with former 
Chancellor Brandt and several ministers. Within the framework o f the Socialist International, we maintain 
contacts with SPD and Friedrich-Ebert Foundation.” Interview Mario Soares, Quick 17 October 1974; As 
late as August 1975, the Auswartiges Amt warned West German politicians to “tie the interests o f the 
Western world too closely with any of the political players on the transitional stage in Lisbon”, see 
PolArch/AA B26, Southern Europe Desk (Referat 203), Report ‘Situation in Portugal’, 26 August 1975.
4,2 Soares’ foreign policy adviser Campinos had told Dingels that the PS together with the country’s new 
President Costa Gomes seriously considered to invite a moderate conservative party to enter the cabinet in 
order to broaden the government’s focus and support base towards the centre-right o f the political 
spectrum. AdsD, BFC, BN/1537, Notes Hans-Eberhard Dingels, 2 October 1974.
413 Herman Demi, ’Chile ist weit’, Vorwarts, 19 December 1974. A month later, Brandt reflected on his 
visit to Portugal in a letter to a personal friend: “Democracy in Portugal stands a chance. Nevertheless, it is 
imperative that Europe contributes to the economic stabilisation and improvement of the situation.” AdsD, 
WBC, BN/132, Letter Willy Brandt to Robert Brunn, 11 November 1974. Brandt repeated his assessment 
in a statement to the German United Nations Association in which he demanded “solidarity” with Portugal
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2,7. Sub-State Diplomacy 2-  The Friedrich-Ebert Foundation in Portugal 
after 25 April 1974
In retrospect, SPD Chairman Willy Brandt responded to critics of West Germany’s 
democracy promotion activities and the involvement of the FEF during the transitional 
processes on the Iberian Peninsula:
It had been occasionally criticised that parties and foundations of the Federal Republic 
have supported certain groups with a similar political orientation by providing them 
with rather modest forms of aid. This has always made me angry. I have always thought 
of material support as something desirable and laudable. I am still proud today that the 
SPD helped Spanish democracy to get back on its feet not only with sweet talk. Apart 
from that, our century -  until long after the Second World War - has truly not suffered 
from an inflationary supply of European solidarity.414
West Germany’s solidarity with Portugal’s embattled democrats, which contained a 
significant degree of self-interest to create a politically and economically level playing 
field by fighting Communist parties and their proxies, was shown not only through the 
support granted by the SPD’s leadership but also demonstrated through the parallel 
activities of the FEF. The Foundation’s involvement in the Portuguese democratisation 
process was proof of an important non-multilateral dimension of West German 
diplomacy, for which state interests were just as germane and central as for other power 
configurations and operational modes. The different layers of Bonn’s foreign policy 
system, which, as has been previously argued, can be broadly grouped in a ‘public’ set 
of actors and a ‘private’ realm, in which non-governmental external affairs players 
pursue German interests on a transnational level. Although state and sub-state level 
display a certain degree of interconnectedness and co-ordination, they are not 
hierarchically structured and lack a clear-cut institutional chain of command. However, 
both sets of foreign policy actors let their decision-making be governed by traditional 
considerations of state security and maximisation of national wealth. Within transitional 
settings, these goals and their realisation required the creation of compatible political 
and economic structures in the target country i.e. parliamentary democracy, political 
pluralism, a codified legal framework as well as market economic principles governing
and its people to “establish a democratic order. These efforts cannot leave us indifferent.” AdsD, WBC, 
BN/22, Telegram Willy Brandt to West German United Nations Association, 8 November 1974.
4,4 Willy Brandt, Erinnerungen, op.cit., p.348 (translation by author).
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private sector activities. This in turn made it necessary for West German foreign policy 
to a) help eliminate all those political actors that opposed such politico-economic 
structures and to b) prop up those parties in support of the creation of a liberal 
democracy. While West Germany’s diplomacy on a governmental level wielded 
multilaterally packaged coercive power by threatening punitive action through sanctions 
in case of a Communist take-over in Lisbon, SPD and FEF sought to convince, attract 
and impress through soft power and a co-operative approach, which aimed at moulding 
the structural reality of the new democracy.
2.7.1. The Embassy Connection
From June 1975, FEF analyst Hans Ulrich Bunger embarked on his mission to “stay in 
close contact with political parties and societal actors.”415 He was personally chosen by 
Willy Brandt and ‘disguised’ as an Attache for Social Affairs at the West German 
Embassy in Lisbon. Although as a diplomat he needed “to go the conventional route i.e. 
my reports were signed by the ambassador and were then sent back to the Auswartige 
Am f \  Brandt as well as Chancellor Helmut Schmidt “were personally interested in any 
political information I could get hold of and they used them as the basis for their own 
decision-making.” 416 In Lisbon, Bunger gathered intelligence, provided analysis, 
identified and activated sources and supervised the work of West German foreign 
correspondents. He also maintained contact with PS leaders Mario Soares and Francisco 
Salgado Zenha, Francisco Sa Cameiro and Rui Machete of the PPD-PSD, Freitas do 
Amaral and Avelino Amaro da Costa of the conservative CDS as well as with MFA 
strongmen Ramalho Eanes and Melo Antunes 417
The FEF opened its first official bureau in Lisbon only as late as 1977. Until 
then, the Foundation concentrated on the gathering of information in order to provide
415 Personal correspondence with Hans-Ulrich Bunger, 15 January 2002.
416 Ibid.
417 Concerning the MFA, Bunger recalls that “of course we tried to find out who in the circle of officers 
would be rather open-minded regarding our political position.” Ibid. In 1976, influential West German 
unionist Eugen Loderer noted that “both attaches for social affairs at our embassies in Madrid and Lisbon 
gave me the impression to be very well informed. They have developed a thorough understanding of the 
political terrain in these transitional settings.” AdsD, WBC, BN/45, Letter Eugen Loderer to Willy Brandt, 
8 March 1976.
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SPD and government with adequate situational reports and political analyses including 
opinion polls and behind-the-scenes talks with import political players.
It goes without saying that in the heavily beleaguered Portugal, the Friedrich-Ebert 
Foundation has co-operated with its partners and friends in the Portuguese labour 
movement in a very intensive and close way through training programmes and other 
measures of co-operative assistance. We could make a significant contribution to the 
support of all those befriended groups in Portugal that wanted to lead their country back 
into the community of democratic countries in Europe despite the intensive efforts of 
others to achieve the contrary.418
According to a SPD news magazine, the FEF’s political investment in Portugal 
amounted to DM 882,000 (approximately £280,000) between April and December 1974. 
The money was used to fund programmes of political education and to provide technical 
support for the development of democratic structures and organisations.419 FEF 
managing director Gunther Grunwald describes the transitional phase as being a period 
of “strategic planning of a different sort, which means that we thoroughly analysed the 
wishes and needs of our political friends particularly those of Mario Soares.”420 The 
abovementioned support was supplemented by invitations for political activists from 
Portugal to study at West German universities and by providing support for countrywide 
political training projects for PS cadres.421 “Our approach was a strengthening of 
political centre-left forces rather than a revaluation of the right against the extreme 
left.”422 The funding of FEF activities remained a sensitive issue, as was the question of 
transitional financial aid for democratic parties from abroad. In January 1975, the West 
German Embassy in Lisbon warned political parties and their affiliated foundations of a 
lack of transparency and illegal funding practices in their support for Portuguese 
activists. It stressed that
Portuguese parties will be fully held accountable for their campaign expenditures. 
Neither they nor their candidates are permitted to accept financial contributions neither
418 FEF Annual Report 1975, p.76 (translation by author).
419 Sozialdemokrat-Magazin, 1975, no.l, p.21.
420 Personal interview with Gunther Grunwald, Bonn, 11 December 2002.
421 Personal correspondence with Hans Ulrich Bunger, 15 January 2002.
422 Personal interview with Michael Dauderstddt, Bonn, 21 April 2002.
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from foreign companies or private individuals nor from domestic commercial entities. 
No political party or coalition of parties is permitted to spend more than DM 8000 
(approximately £ 2500)!423
2.7.2. Auswartige Amt, FEF and the U.S. Administration
In order to maintain a necessary level of co-ordination, the West German Government 
was “very interested to maintain our exchange of information with the Americans” 
throughout the transition.424 The FEF possessing up-to-date political analyses of the 
Portuguese situation and being provided with crucial information by top-level sources 
within the Portuguese political establishment served as a reference point for the co­
operation between West Germany’s foreign policy makers and American diplomats. In 
an internal memorandum to the Chancellery labelled confidential, the FEF suggested 
three ways to provide U.S. diplomats with information. FEF reports could be given to 
the Americans either directly by foundation officials, they could be forwarded through 
the Auswartige Amt or delivered through the Chancellor’s office.425 The document 
suggests the handover of FEF background analyses to the U.S. Ambassador’s personal 
assistant by staff of the Chancellor’s office and that as soon as this procedure had 
developed a certain routine, a driver could deliver the reports in an envelope.426 Two 
weeks earlier, another confidential document confirmed, “the exchange of information 
with the Americans can be described as routine although the different ways to establish
4 9 7and maintain contacts are used with varying degrees of intensity.” The author of the 
document emphasises that the head of the SPD’s international relations department 
Hans-Eberhard Dingels “maintains good contacts with the U.S. Embassy which
49fttherefore receives appropriate information.” Additionally, FEF Managing Director 
Grunwald maintained an alternative communication channel: “In most of the cases, the 
Americans sent somebody from their European Affairs Desk. If he wanted to talk to
423 PolArch/AA B26, 110.240, 8 January 1975 (translation by author).
424 Ibid. Such a regular exchange of information was ensured for example through high-level visits such as 
the talks of Permanent Secretary Giinther van Well held in Washington in May 1975.
425 AdsD, HSC, BN/7340, Memorandum 2 July 1975.
426 Ibid.
427 AdsD, HSC, BN/7340, Document, 19 June 1975.
428 Ibid
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either the SPD or the German Confederation of Trade Unions (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund DGB) we would organise that.”429
As mentioned earlier, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s pessimism 
regarding the prospects for a democratic outcome of Portugal’s transition threatened to 
undermine European efforts to aid political parties in their struggle against Communist 
forces.
The U.S. Government could not be convinced that Portugal will honour its obligations 
as a member of NATO. The PCP’s increasing activities as well as radical public 
announcements by leading members of the MFA have conveyed an image of Portugal to 
the Americans, which bears some resemblance to Allende’s Chile and Fidel Castro’s 
Cuba. The recent replacement of Washington’s Ambassador illustrates the importance, 
which Portugal has been assigned as a result. The new Ambassador is a confidant of 
Secretary of State Kissinger and is widely regarded as a dynamic personality, who is 
being trusted with a more effective representation of American interests. However, 
despite their scepticism, the United States is prepared to support Portugal 
economically.430
Washington eventually warmed up to the idea of a European solution for the Iberian 
crisis and a report by the Auswartige Amt in February 1975 stated “In our meetings with 
the Americans it became clear that they would appreciate a greater involvement of West 
European countries”. The same report made clear that for West Germany’s state 
diplomacy democracy promotion on a sub-state level involving the political foundations 
was a central pillar of any foreign policy approach towards the Iberian country. “In our 
view” the document stresses, “bilateral contacts, particularly the activities of non­
governmental organisations seem to be the appropriate way to go because one needs to 
avoid any impression of an outside interference in Portugal’s internal affairs.” 431 
Throughout 1974 and 1975, the West Germans continued to lobby the U.S. 
Administration on the Portuguese case knowing that the U.S. Secretary of State had still 
substantial reservations and doubts concerning protagonists, processes and eventual
429 Personal interview with GUnther Grunwald, Bonn, 11 December 2002.
430 PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, FRG Embassy Lisbon, Annual Report, Political Affairs Portugal 1974 
(Politischer Jahresbericht) (translation by author).
431 PolArch/AA B26, 110.243, Report ‘Situation in Portugal’, Southern Europe Desk (Referat 203), 5 
February 1975.
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outcome of the transition.432 “We should convince him through direct contacts not to 
write off the Portuguese” advises an Auswartige Amt memorandum in May 1975, when 
the power struggle between MFA, PCP and PS had reached its climax, “the outcome of 
the elections has shown that the West still stands a chance to succeed.”433 Lobbying the 
U.S. administration on key issues within Portugal’s transitional process, FRG diplomats 
relied in their policy planning on behind-the-scenes information from Lisbon mostly 
provided by FEF analyst Bunger. The foundation official turned social affairs officer at 
the West German Embassy kept in close contact with the entire spectrum of Portugal’s 
political actors and enjoyed privileged access to Mario Soares and the PS leadership. 
Bunger in his multifaceted role brought together the governmental and the 
nongovernmental dimension thus illustrating how state diplomacy often benefited from 
the Stiftungen’s informal foreign policy operations in transition country. The FEF’s 
first-hand knowledge of the situation on the ground provided Foreign Office diplomats 
as well as the West German Government with constantly updated information, which 
was subsequently used in the foreign policy decision-making process. West German 
politicians therefore knew that the “revolutionary wing” and the “reform wing” within 
the MFA both commanded an equal amount of power and support within the junta and 
that such political parity justified a cautiously optimistic attitude towards the 
democratisation process.434
In the early days of 1975, when the PS, PPD and CSD’s bitter opposition to new 
trade union legislation brought tens of thousand of demonstrators out into the streets of 
Portugal’s biggest cities, another report recommended that the West German 
Government should “continue to support democratic forces through our political
432 See PolArch/AA B26 Notes ‘Gesprache des Aussenministers mit U.S. Botschafter Hillenbrand iiber die 
Situation in Portugal’, 31 January 1975, in which Kissinger and Defence Secretary Schlesinger were 
described as being “extremely concerned” about the political developments in Portugal.
433 PolArch/AA B26, 110.243, Report, ‘Situation in Portugal’, Southern Europe Desk (Referat 203), 12 
May 1975; Kissinger visited the FRG in July 1975 and was told that the West German Government not 
only believed to be able to help steering the political process in Portugal towards liberal democracy but that 
it also intended to invite more members of the Revolutionary Council such as Information Minister Jesuino 
or Labour Minister Costa Martins as well as MFA officers, see PolArch/AA B26, 110.243, Briefing Paper 
‘Situation on the Iberian Peninsula’, 8 July 1975.
434 PolArch/AA B26, 110.240, Report Elke Esters ‘Revolutionskommittee des MFA’, attached to letter 
from Dr. Gunther Grunwald (FEF) to Permanent Secretary in the Auswartiges Amt Walther Gehlhoff, 8 
August 1975.
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foundations and via inter-party contacts” thus echoing the call for the use of 
interventionist instruments of a non-governmental or ‘private’ nature.435 In particular, 
the results of the April 1975 elections for a constituent assembly convinced FRG foreign 
policy makers to continue with their support for democratic forces committed to 
political pluralism, party politics and market economic structures. The electorate had 
“rejected leftwing totalitarianism” and West German analysts were confident that 
progressive elements within the MFA would be influenced by the “public show of 
support” for democratic parties.436 Although Washington eventually toned down its 
rhetoric and adopted a more constructive attitude towards the political developments in 
Portugal, discussions within the American foreign policy establishment continued 
throughout the revolutionary struggles of 1975. Therefore, the Head of the Southern 
Europe Desk in the U.S. State Department Edward Rowell told his West German 
counterparts that there existed substantial differences in opinion among his colleagues as 
to the extent, timing and nature of public statements made by Western governments in 
reaction to political developments in Lisbon. “One is aware of the usefulness of Western 
support for moderate and democratic forces. At the same time one is also aware of the 
risk that such support might also lead to a radicalisation of the Communist leadership as 
a consequence of outside intervention.”437
In the summer and autumn of 1975, concerns in Washington grew again 
expressing fear that the group of moderate MFA officers led by the charismatic Melo 
Antunes were to be sidelined by the passive stance, which President Costa Gomes took 
on the issue of Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves’s resignation. Determined to strengthen 
the position of Antunes against his hard-line rivals within the MFA, the U.S. State 
Department urged the West German Government to have Ambassador Caspari 
personally put pressure on Gomes by making clear to the Portuguese President that 
especially on a multilateral level support by the Europeans crucially depended on a
435 PolArch/AA B26, 110.244, Report (Drahterlass), 27 January 1975.
436 PolArch/AA B26, 110.243, Report, ‘Die politische Situation in Portugal’, Southern Europe Desk 
(Referat 203), 18 May 1975.
437 PolArchAA B26, 110.245, Telex (Drahterlass), 27 August 1975; PolArch/AA B 2 6 ,110.245.
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pluralist and democratic transitional development.438 A similar demarche had been 
previously made by U.S. Ambassador Frank Carlucci, in which the U.S. diplomat had 
bluntly confronted Gomes with Washington’s belief that “currently, the Portuguese were 
oppressed by a government, which enjoyed only very little public support.” 439 
According to Carlucci, decision-makers in Western capitals were asked themselves if 
support by the international community was not “misused to finance the totalitarian 
restructuring of Portuguese society based on Communist principles.”440 The demarche 
also warned of possible consequences for Portugal’s NATO membership.
2.7.3. FEF Fact-Finding Mission
In May 1974, FEF analyst Elke Esters and senior government official Winfried Boll of 
the BMZ travelled to Portugal on a fact-finding tour, which came as a result of an 
unofficial agreement between the Chairman of the SPD committee for international 
relations Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski and PS leader Mario Soares.441 The task was to 
identify the main structural deficits of the Socialist Party and to develop soft power 
solutions for the most pressing problems. The two German visitors highlighted three 
major challenges to be targeted by any democracy promotion campaign -  the supply of 
basic political information on democratic procedures for the electorate, the 
strengthening of the PS’s capabilities to effectively communicate its political message to 
the Portuguese public, and finally the forging of medium- and long-term co-operation 
between PS and soft power actor FEF reaching beyond the immediate post-coup 
period.442 Esters and Boll quickly realised that the organisational capacities of 
Portugal’s Socialists were hopelessly fragmented and that this would mean a dangerous 
hazard in any upcoming political competition with Communist forces. In order to
438 The U.S. lobbying of West German decision-makers came also in response to a personal request by 
Antunes, who specifically asked the American government to bring about concerted diplomatic action by 
getting the UK, FRG and the Netherlands to co-ordinate their efforts. Ministerial documents however show, 
that the Auswartiges Amt rejected the idea o f an official demarche instead suggesting that have German 
concerns expressed through its Ambassador in a less public fashion, PolArchAA/B26, 110.245, Briefing 
Paper, 26 August 1975.
439 Ibid. PolArchAA/B26, 110.245, Telex (Drahterlass), 2 September 1975.
440 Ibid.
441 AdsD, BFC, BN/1535, Elke Esters, Winfried Boll, Report ‘Besuch in Lissabon’, 8 May -  11 May 1974, 
14 May 1974.
442 Ibid.
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establish counter hegemony and to balance Communist pressure during the transition 
phase, the PS needed to be organisationally stabilised through a transnationally operated 
soft power campaign. The situational analysis of the West German ‘expeditionary force’ 
turned out to be brief but precise:
The democratic groups [...] are suffering from a lack of mid- and lower career level 
cadres, publication and training facilities and equipment (ranging from desks and 
cupboards to copy machines). Most importantly, they are lacking in experience and 
technical know-how concerning organisation and public relations.44
The political training of activists, an urgently needed improvement of the PS’s public 
relations capacities and the strengthening of institutional structures were identified as 
future areas for political co-operation. FEF strategists knew that to mobilise 
‘multiplying factors’ was decisive to tangibly impact on course and outcome of the 
Portuguese transition. Political aid from abroad needed to
create opportunities for bridge-building between underground and exile forces on the 
one hand and the masses, especially the spontaneously developing and not always legal 
organisational initiatives (labour unions, producer cooperatives, committees for various 
economic and societal questions) on the other hand. That bridge has to be more solid 
than connections through manifestos, speeches and public demonstrations.444
Based on their findings, Esters and Bolke suggested a range of immediate measures for 
the period 1974 to 1975 to be supervised by FEF personnel on the ground. First, they 
suggested starting political training programmes. These were to be conceptualised and 
implemented by the PS organisation Coordenadas (Cooperativa Cultural de Estudios e 
Documentacao), which was destined to play the role of an executive front organisation 
to facilitate political training. Portuguese lecturers were to establish local centres for 
citizen education in which they taught a total of 74 courses thus activating “medium and 
bottom-level multiplying factors.”445 Additionally, trained PS cadres were to meet with 
representatives of African liberation movements as well as representatives of Portuguese
443 Ibid (translation by author).
444 Ibid (translation by author).
445 Ibid.
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settlers in order to deal with the pressing problem of decolonisation.446 Two non- 
regional seminars organised by Coordenadas were used as a forum for dialogue.
Another seminar series was to address “crucial structural questions and problems 
of modem industrialised societies” such as citizen rights and duties, state and society in 
the 20th century, institutions of modem democracy such as labour unions, consumer 
cooperatives, publishing houses and mass media, international organisations and others. 
The implementation of the seminar programme was the sole responsibility of 
Coordinadas and the funds necessary were to be paid to the Portuguese organisation in 
instalments via the FEF co-ordinator.447 The role and responsibilities of FEF experts 
involved were clearly defined. The experts were to “broaden the organisational horizon 
of the Portuguese partner” and to “contribute their experience in adult education and in 
the creation of democratic institutions.”448 The coordinator was to serve as the go- 
between between FEF and its respective partner organisation controlling and auditing 
the correct use of financial allocations. He was supposed to maintain contacts with those 
organisations in West Germany and Europe, which might be willing to provide further 
political assistance. The international seminars had to be “sharply separated from 
election campaigns and events of political agitation because it is essential to avoid any 
impression of an interference in Portugal’s domestic affairs.”449 The FEF report stressed 
that Mario Soares had explicitly requested the secondment of experienced political staff 
from West Germany to Portugal.450 The seminars discussing Portugal’s overseas
446 Soares informed the SPD leadership a few days before the coup d ’etat not only about his personal 
conviction that Portugal needed to enter into official negotiations with the African liberation movements in 
Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau quickly in order to avoid a deepening radicalisation o f their 
leaders but also that he himself had already opened talks with anti-colonial movements in Africa, see 
PolArch/AA B26, 110.214 (Notes Veronika Isenberg, 26 April 1974).
447 Ibid.
44iIbid.
449 Ibid
450 Ibid. FEF strategists were extraordinarily aware of the danger of appearing as a patronising external 
force, which would be seen as controling domestic actors by political remote control. Therefore, the 
activities o f the FEF team were regulated and precisely defined by a contractual agreement between 
Coordinadas and the FEF. In 1975, Soares also urged the SPD leadership to instruct the FEF to invite 
certain members of the MFA, a request to which Minister o f State in the Foreign Office and leading SPD 
politician Wischnewski replied that this “was not the job of the FEF” and that “the Auswartiges Amt would 
have to prevent such an invitation”, PolArch/AA B26, 110.244, Southern Europe Desk (Referat 203), 
‘Minister Soares’ Besuch in Bonn vom 14-15 June 1975’, 23 June 1975.
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territories were organised on the request of Kenneth Kaunda, who as President of 
Zambia maintained excellent contacts with West Germany’s Social Democrats.
Secondly, Esters and Bolke urged the West German Government and the SPD 
leadership to provide printing paper for the centre-left newspaper Republican as this 
would initiate a “publicity-effective show of solidarity on the part of the SPD. The 
SPD’s executive board was supposed to collect the money needed to buy the required 
quantity of printing paper.451 Thirdly, the improvement of working and production 
conditions at Republica and the acquisition of a newspaper-owned publishing house, 
which would broaden the political scope of the traditional daily would ultimately 
strengthen the public standing of the Socialist cause. Also, the FEF report pointed out 
that “if one can show the relevance (of the newspaper) for Portugal’s overseas territories 
and (Portuguese-speaking) Brazil plausibly”, Republica could be possibly supported by 
the FEF as a mass media project in the context of adult education in development 
studies.452 Fourthly, the West German observer team stressed the importance of a 
distribution of political information on issues of international trade union activism, 
European integration, energy and natural resources, the state of East-West relations or 
on the structural challenges of modem industrialised societies. Esters and Boll also 
suggested a range of public relation campaigns to be launched by the Council of Europe, 
the European Movement, national UN associations and broadcasting houses because 
they realised that “Portugal needs to be admitted into Europe long before any formal 
association is being established.”453 Their recommendations also included the launch of 
projects for a successful re-integration of Portuguese migrant workers returning to their 
motherland in the wake of the decolonisation process in Africa.454 The aforementioned 
transitional measures were discussed between the Germans and their Portuguese hosts 
whereby Boll and Esters noted that the financial expectations of their political partners 
were “fairly modest and restrained.”455 The well-known financial dimension of FEF 
democracy promotion projects in Latin America did not motivate the PS leadership to
451 Ibid.
452 Ibid.
453 Ibid
™ Ib id
455 Ibid
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request an equal share of the funds. The German experts estimated the total amount of 
financial support required for 1974 and 1975 with DM 970, 000 and DM 730, 000 
respectively.456
2.7.4. Party Management and Electoral Assistance
Two months later, the SPD’s international relations department in close co-operation 
with the FEF began to strengthen the institutional structures of the PS and to launch 
training programmes for political activists. Being afraid that PS leader Soares would be 
prevented by his duties as Foreign Minister from efficiently managing the party 
apparatus, the SPD strategists were aware of the danger that Socialist forces might be 
unable to counter the PCP’s institutional onslaught especially in the trade union sector 
where Communists “had already taken over command positions.”457 West Germany’s 
Social Democrats were worried about the lack of political know-how and lamented the 
fact that only a few “Portuguese friends possess a minimum of organisational and 
administrative skills.”458 SPD and FEF officials expressed deep scepticism about the 
prospects for further democratic developments in Portugal and predicted a high 
probability of intervention by the MFA if strikes would not cease and the economy 
would not be revived.459
In July 1974, the FEF sent Gunter Wehrmeyer, an expert for the training of party 
activists to the Portuguese capital where he was asked to help to set-up a model party 
branch on local level. His involvement was part of a two-phase strategy of 
transnationally provided transition support by the Foundation, the first phase of which 
was the creation of an early-response plan based on a sound assessment of the political 
situation 460 During a second phase, the FEF would then provide “technical assistance 
(material) necessary for the PS to campaign and to implement its programmes of
456 Ibid.
457 AdsD, BFC, BN/1535, Letter Hans-Eberhard Dingels to Willy Brandt, 24 July 1974.
458 Ibid. Despite the fact that theoretically PS party structures appeared to be extraordinarily diversified 
with 304 sub-regional councils (Conselhos) and approximately 4700 local branches (Fregesuia), party’s 
organisational capacities were seen by the SPD as deficient and weak not least because o f a lack of 
qualified political personnel. AdsD, BFC, BN/1535, Note, 4.7.1974.
459 Ibid
460 PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, Report (Siegfried Bangert), ‘Aktivitaten der 
Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung in Portugal’, 1 April 1975
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political education in the provinces.”461 Such technical support included the supply with 
sound trucks, recording and office equipment as well as “occasional financial aid to rent 
venues for political events in the provinces.”462 In order to ‘disguise’ the involvement of 
the FEF and to provide West German cross-border assistance with a Portuguese ‘face’, 
the PS used its centre for political education -  the C.E.D. -  with offices in Lisbon and 
Porto through which technical, financial and political support was provided and 
implemented.463 “This local PS office was to serve as a model for other regional and 
municipal party outposts to copy. SPD foreign affairs expert Dingels advised 
Wehrmeyer that in addition to his organisational tasks he should also “provide our 
Portuguese friends with a form of Social Democratic spirit and some self-esteem so that 
they can enter the upcoming elections with a firm stand.”464 The SPD was alarmed by 
suggestions of French Socialist Party leader Francis Mitterrand to form a united left-of- 
centre popular front in Portugal incorporating the PCP and other leftwing extremists. 
Therefore, the promotion of an ideological independence of Socialist forces in Portugal 
was an important point on Wehrmeyer’s agenda, with which SPD official Dingels hoped 
to “cause a certain immunisation effect.”465 Nevertheless, Dingels also pointed out that 
it could not be in the SPD’s interest to “talk our Socialist friends into a situation, in 
which they would uncritically adopt our concept of Social Democracy which has been 
developed under specific historical circumstances.” 466 Political co-operation during 
Portugal’s transition process appeared to be so delicate that Dingels advised party 
manager Wehrmeyer to avoid anything that could lead to the FEF activities being 
uncovered. “Either leave this letter back home” he advised his colleague about the
461 Ibid.
462 Ibid.
463 Ibid, The C.E.D. was founded in 1969 and served as an institutional cover for the PS o f Mario Soares 
during the final years o f its clandestine existence under the Caetano Regime with both organisations 
continue to share the same physical address after the 25 April 1974. See PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, FRG 
Embassy Lisbon, 18 June 1974.
464 Ibid
465 AdsD, WBC, BN/127, Letter Hans-Eberhard Dingels to Willy Brandt, 24 July 1974. Three months later, 
West German Ambassador Caspari cast doubt on the success of such an immunisation effect when he 
warned the Auswartiges Amt about a “two-track strategy” pursued by Soares’ which would have the 
Socialist leader “working towards the political unity of leftist parties and supporting their activities to bring 
about a Socialist society while at the same time dampening concerns of a people’s front in Western 
countries.” Telegram Ambassador Caspari to Auswartiges Amt, 15 October 1974.
466 AdsD, WBC, BN /127, Letter Hans-Eberhard Dingels to Gunter Wehrmeyer 17 July 1974.
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correspondence between them, “or destroy it. Don’t take it to Portugal.”467 Wehrmeyer 
was told that Communist activists mostly occupied leadership positions within trade 
union organisations, but that his chances of playing a constructive and successful 
advisory role within the union movement “at grass-roots-level” were promising.468 In 
this context, Dingels recommended the West German trade union official Dieter 
Wagner, head of the international relations department of the DGB as a possible briefing
469point.
The training of activists and the strengthening of the PS’s organisational 
structures as suggested by Esters and Boll and echoed by political consultant 
Wehrmeyer a few months later continued in 1975 by helping Soares’s PS to organise an 
effective political campaign in the run-up to the elections for a constituent assembly. 
Two FEF consultants assisted the PS leadership in the “organisation of awareness- 
raising measures”, which included the planning, implementation and analysis of 
countrywide political education programmes and which “aimed at generating sympathy 
and acceptance for Socialist positions, which are seen as necessary to protect democracy 
in Portugal.”470 At the same time, FEF-PS co-operation extended to the area of worker 
education organised within a broad range of industrial sectors to be able to 
counterbalance the dominance of PCP cadres with the labour union’s umbrella body 
Intersindical471 Unconnected to the PS election campaign, the FEF sent a third expert to 
the Iberian country after being asked by the Portuguese Government to assist in the 
evaluation of Lisbon’s mass media sector, which was to be modernised and seen as 
crucial in the area of civic education 472 Already reaching into the second phase of the 
FEF’s transitional Portugal programme, the aforementioned Studies and Documentation 
Centre C.E.D. not only served as a ‘blackbox’, in which West German democracy 
assistance was given a ‘Portuguese face’ but the Centre was also used as a platform to 
host a series of events in the area of civic and political education. Coordinated by the
467 ibid.
468 Ibid.
469 Ibid
470 PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, Report (Siegfried Bangert), ‘Aktivitaten der 
Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung in Portugal’, 1 April 1975.
471 Ibid
472 TU . .
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Head of the FEF’s Latin America Desk Elke Esters, two political consultants were sent 
to Portugal on request of PS leader Soares and assigned to the task of assisting their 
Socialist partners in the build-up of the C.E.D.’s training facilities. The FEF requested a 
total of DM 970, 400 in 1974 for 26 classes and DM 730,000 in 1975 for a total of 48 
classes of political training from the West German Ministry of Economic Co-operation, 
which was responsible for the approval of the StiftungerC s project funding.473
The goal was to achieve a multiplying effect through the establishment of local 
and regional education centres, which were to offer seminars, workshops and training 
sessions for a broad range of citizens. “In that way” the FEF wrote in its project expose, 
“we can provide the kind of political reconstruction, which religious academies, trade 
unions and producer co-operatives have provided in Germany after the war.”474 The 
Centre’s thematic focus and the political topics discussed in its seminars covered the 
“important structural questions and problems of modem industrial societies to set 
standards for public participation in the political running of the country.” 475 An 
understanding of the institutional reality in modem democracies and the issue of civic 
responsibility in companies, local communities, professional associations and political 
parties were among the list of seminar topics as were discussions on the role of 
Portugal’s overseas territories or the country’s authoritarian past.476 In particular, the 
C.E.D.’s seminars on decolonisation and Portugal’s African possessions were the result 
of contacts between Zambia’s President and prominent African nationalist Kenneth 
Kaunda, high-ranking SPD politicians and the FEF leadership. After the Portuguese 
Revolution, Kaunda had expressed his “urgent wish” to have representatives of the 
African liberation movements being invited to the Centre’s discussions on colonialism 
to be able to present their viewpoints to a Portuguese audience and to join the necessary 
dialogue on decolonisation and questions of political independence.477 The FEF’s
473 Ibid.
474 Pol Arch/A A B26, 110.242, Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (Dr. Gunter Grunwald), ‘Hilfe der Friedrich-
Ebert Stiftung fur das C.E.D. in Lisbon und Oporto’, 16 May 1974.
477 Ibid . The long-standing co-operation between FEF and the liberation movements in Lusophone Africa
was a constant thorn in the side of the Caetano Regime, which in 1970 launched an official protest through 
its Ambassador de Mello complaining to the West German Government about the Foundation’s alleged 
support for rebel fighters in Mozambique. In its reaction, the Brandt Government stressed that it had no
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financial support for the C.E.D. programme was to be monitored and approved by the 
Foundation’s officially appointed co-ordinator Elke Esters, who was also responsible for 
the “strengthening of the C.E.D.’s organisational capabilities by benefiting from the 
FEF’s experience in democratic institution-building.” 478 Furthermore, Esters was 
supposed to provide a link between the C.E.D. and its Socialist backers on the one hand 
and West German as well as European union organisations, publishing houses and co­
operatives.
However, the FEF project in its relatively partisan outlook was not particularly 
well received by the West German Embassy, which stressed that “given the specific 
circumstances in Portugal it seems necessary to point out that outside assistance shall 
not give critics the impression of an exclusive German support for one particular 
party.”479 Instead, Acting Head of Mission Heibach, whose closeness to conservative 
political circles was no secret on the diplomatic scene, suggested in correspondence with 
the Auswartige Amt to make a non-partisan project structure a precondition for approval. 
“The non-partisan approach could find its expression in a broader recruitment strategy, 
which would employ a teaching staff from various political backgrounds, not only 
seminar leaders from the FEF.”480 Yet despite the Embassy’s critical evaluation of the 
C.E.D. project, the Auswartige Amt's Southern Europe Desk re-connected public and 
private dimension of Bonn’s foreign policy by dismissing Heibach’s comments and 
stating that “it fits our foreign policy strategy to promote democracy in Portugal through 
private organisations.” Other private actors such as KAF or FNF would ensure fairness,
influence over the activities of the FEF, which was a private and independent organisation, and described 
the organisation’s support for FRELIMO as being merely “humanitarian assistance without military 
relevance”, PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, Notes ‘GesprSche zwischen dem portugiesischen Botschafter und 
StaatssekretSr Braun’, (Referat IA4), 8 January 1971; Pol Arch/A A B26, 444, Note ‘Westdeutsches 
Kommittee fur Angola, Guinea-Bissau und Mozambique’, 21 June 1971. However, the two-dimensional 
character o f West Germany’s foreign policy system with its conflation of private and public operational 
modes became clear when FRG officials subtly hinted at the diplomatic division of labour in certain 
political theatres. For example, SPD Minister Erhard Eppler pointed out to members o f the Kaunda 
Government during talks in Lusaka that “the FRG being a NATO member state cannot provide support for 
liberation movements” but that “the FEF maintains the necessary contacts with these organisations.” 
PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, FRG Embassy Lusaka, Report ‘Portugiesisch-Zambische Beziehungen’, 6 
August 1971.
478 Ibid.
479 PolArch/AA B 2 6 ,110.242, FRG Embassy Lisbon.
480 Ibid.
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political balance and ideological pluralism as representative trademarks of the FRG’s 
political system.”481
The democracy promotion activities of FEF and other political foundations were 
not only explicitly endorsed by West Germany’s ‘public’ diplomatic establishment but 
also integrated in a broader governmental strategy of strengthening democratic parties 
during the transition.482 In April 1975, a few days before the long-awaited general 
elections the German diplomat Laub travelled to Portugal to co-ordinate the ministry’s 
democracy promotion efforts with the West German Embassy. Upon return to Bonn, 
Laub was unambiguous in his analysis that “Westem-style liberal democracy still stands 
a chance in Portugal and we need to adopt a positive stance towards change.”483 Given 
the lack of political and international experience on the part of several MFA leaders, he 
recommended a governmental policy of co-operation instead of alienation and 
confrontation. Democracy promotion needed to take place on different levels of 
Portugal’s political system and therefore had to originate on different levels of the 
FRG’s foreign policy apparatus mobilising its public and private, governmental, 
ministerial and transnational actors and resources. “Despite all the support that we are 
currently providing to democratic parties, which is something that we should continue, 
we must avoid antagonising the MFA leadership to prevent them from fraternising with 
the Communists in a public display of solidarity.”484 Instead, Laub advocated a series of 
strategic short- and medium-term measures to stabilise democratic structures and 
facilitate political pluralism. He suggested urgent talks between Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger and West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in which 
the American should be persuaded by his German counterpart to adopt a more open- 
minded and optimistic approach towards the Portuguese transition. The Portuguese 
Foreign Minister Melo Antunes was to be invited by the West German Government 
“and we should let him have some success in his negotiations so that he can bring back
481 PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, Auswartiges Amt, Southern Europe Desk (Referat 203), 28 June 1975.
482 “The democratic political organisations in Portugal should continue to receive support from German 
parties and political Foundations before the April elections”, PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, Political Affairs 
Department (Politische Abteilung 2), Report ‘Unsere Portugal-Politik’, 28 April 1975.
483 Ibid.
484 Ibid.
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to Portugal tangible results.” 485 Less high-profile assistance was to include the 
promotion of positive German media coverage on political developments in Lisbon 
while positively reporting on the results of the Portuguese Revolution and the role of the 
MFA, the lifting of trade restrictions such as the reform of import regulations for port 
wine as well as “all possible forms of material support” 486
The strategy adopted by West Germany’s governmental diplomacy remained 
unchanged throughout 1975 and continued to be preoccupied with Portugal’s 
membership in NATO, the containment of Communist forces through the support for 
Socialist parties and the prevention of the emergence of a popular front alliance based 
on a tactical co-operation between PCP and PS. In transitional Portugal, West 
Germany’s Cold War version of power politics pursued state interests by employing 
‘softer’ foreign policy instruments within transnational spaces and often used by non­
state actors like the country’s political foundations. The stabilisation of Bonn’s 
operational environment in Europe’s southern comer required a combination of both 
public diplomacy with the FRG playing its classical role as a committed multilateralist 
with its privately packaged foreign policy. The former was responsible for lobbying 
alliance partners on key political issues thus having the Western or European 
community of states rallying behind specific courses of action while the latter worked 
more directly towards the shaping of political structures in target countries by co-opting 
influential political elites as recipients of West German democracy promotion 
programmes.
The level of co-ordination and strategic connectedness between public and 
private diplomacy changed regularly with the actors neither becoming completely 
delinked nor involved in overlapping activities within transitional processes. 
Governmental foreign policy faced the natural constraints of official diplomatic 
channels and practices, multilateral integration and domestic political environment 
while Stiftungen diplomacy retained more autonomy in the mobilisation of its niche- 
oriented power projection capabilities, which allowed it to display a greater degree of 
self-interest and national ‘narrow-mindedness’ while pursuing its democracy promotion
485 Ibid. Other members of the MFA to be invited by the Schmidt Government were Vice Admiral Pinheiro 
de Azevedo, Labour Minister Major Costa Martins and MFA official Ramiro Coreia.
486 Ibid.
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activities. The need for a division of labour was understood by both sets of actors often 
leading Auswartige Amt strategists to urge political decision-makers to entrust 
foundation(s) and party activists with the implementation of politically sensitive 
transitional projects that required longstanding contacts between protagonists. In 
September 1975, the Auswartige Am f s Southern Europe Desk therefore advised Foreign 
Minister Genscher and Chancellor Schmidt to “encourage Soares through party 
channels to maintain his demand not to allow the PCP into the cabinet beyond its 
proportional strength as expressed in the election results of 25 April 1975 and without 
participation in the running of Portugal’s security i.e. NATO.”487 West Germany’s 
career diplomats identified transnational cross-party connections as the most promising 
way to influence PS politicians to make them meeting Bonn’s demands or expectations. 
“In the medium to long-term” the memorandum continued, “we should convince Soares 
through the SPD leadership to reject any governmental co-operation between PS and 
the PCP.”488 In the eyes of West Germany’s political and ministerial elite, Portugal’s 
post-authoritarian democracy was to be modelled along the lines of the FRG’s own post­
war metamorphosis from dictatorship to pluralist polity. Therefore, the strengthening of 
Portugal’s slowly emerging multiparty system ranked high on Bonn’s democracy 
promotion agenda. Its official diplomacy was well aware of the importance of nonstate 
actors. The Auswartige Amt therefore recommended:
The support for Portugal’s most important democratic parties PS and PPD should be 
increased and continued through the FEF, and CDU and KAF should be encouraged to 
intensify their co-operation and contacts with the Centro Democratico Social (CDS) to 
prepare these parties for future work in a political coalition. Apart from material 
assistance -  preferably provided through the political foundations -  it would be moral 
support through invitations and seminars, which seems to be important.489
At the same time, West Germany’s coercive economic power could be best played out 
on a governmental and multilateral level, where Portugal’s power holders were 
confronted with a choice of compliance or non-compliance with potentially serious
487 PolArch/AA B26, 110.243, Southern Europe Desk (Referat 203), Briefing Paper ,Material fur 
Gesprache in Washington’, 12 September 1975.
™ Ibid.
489 Ibid (translation by author).
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consequences for the country’s socio-economic stability. “The promise of economic aid 
over the next few years” reads the strategic Foreign Office assessment of West 
Germany’s contribution to Westem-style democracy “needs to be tied to our expectation 
to see Portugal remain a member of the Western socio-economic order.”490 It was the 
collaboration of official and informal diplomacy as part of a systemic relationship 
between the two operational levels, which characterised West Germany’s foreign policy 
and provided a two-level operational framework for the exercise of soft power, and 
where necessary, for the use of often multilaterally configured instruments of coercion 
such as the threat of the withholding of economic aid.
2.8. Conclusions
This chapter has examined the ‘hot’ phase of Portugal’s transition spanning the 
immediate post-revolutionary period after the MFA’s coup d’etat in April 1974 and 
ending with the aborted attempt of leftwing extremists to take over power by similarly 
‘robust’ means in November 1975. During this time, Portugal’s democratic structures 
were under the existential threat of Communist counter-revolution with Bonn’s 
diplomacy seeking to stabilise the country’s new democratic parties against the risk of 
sudden annihilation accordingly. The chapter has exemplified West Germany’s attempt 
at safeguarding political pluralism in Portugal by singling out the FRG’s biggest 
political Foundation FEF and by highlighting its activities in the realm of civil society. 
The chapter has shown how institutions of governmental diplomacy such as the West 
German Foreign Office have repeatedly enlisted the services of the Stiftungen as actors 
of democracy promotion. The Auswartige Amt professed its strategy to secure West 
Germany’s national interest in a pluralist parliamentary democracy in Portugal based on 
a free market economy through sub-state actors like the FEF. Its previously cited 
internal memorandum emphasised that “the focus of our foreign policy towards Portugal 
remains the support for democratic forces through political parties and foundations” thus 
highlighting the two-layered nature of the West German foreign policy system.491 
Rather than displaying “provincialism in foreign affairs”, demonstrating abhorrence at 
the concepts of power politics and national interest, indulging in political altruism or
491 PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, Briefing Paper ‘Die Portugal-Politik der Bundesregierung’, 18 March 1975.
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exhibiting the practice of “a peculiarly extensive self-denial” in international affairs as 
‘forgetting power’ realists have alleged, the FRG Government tried pro-actively to 
shape the outcome of Portugal’s transition through a combination of soft power 
interventionism and multilateral diplomacy.
In a broad range of areas -  decolonisation, political management, campaigning, 
and civic education -  the FEF (besides the other West German foundations) sought to 
establish moderate left-of-centre counter-hegemony in the face of a continued PCP’s 
onslaught. Through its intermediary organisation Coordenadas, the Foundation helped 
to provide political training programmes and facilitated the establishing of local centres 
for civic education. A total of 74 courses between 1974 and 1975 were aimed at a 
stronger participation of members of the public in Portugal’s political life. The 
beneficiaries of Coordenadas's educational programmes were multipliers as their 
involvement in local politics and community affairs helped to spread ideas, introduce 
concepts and transfer skills on a larger scale. The organisation also provided a forum for 
the exchange of ideas and opinions between the liberation movements from Portugal’s 
African territories and the PS thus aiding the process of decolonisation. Further 
transition aid in the area of civic education was provided by the FEF through the Studies 
and Documentation Centre (CED) in another attempt to improve the skill and 
knowledge base of a population that had been starved of political information by 
Portugal’s authoritarian regime for decades. On request of PS leader Soares, the FEF 
provided campaign and media advisers in the run-up to the elections for a constitutional 
assembly to support Socialist efforts to establish a strong parliamentary representation in 
a future democracy. In addition, the Foundation strengthened the PS’s competency in 
the area of party management by sending a political adviser to help establish a nation­
wide network of local party offices. In sum, its methods and approaches towards 
democratisation sought to influence foreign public and elites alike through the supply 
with concepts, ideas and skills compatible with West Germany’s political and socio­
economic system. Instead of imposing its political convictions on its Portuguese partner, 
the FEF provided support mostly upon request and thus enjoyed a high degree of 
acceptance by the recipients of political aid..
N - /
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At the same time, governmental diplomacy sought to stabilise Portugal’s 
embryonic democracy by providing an emergency loan of DM 40 million and a renewed 
commitment to continued arms purchases from Portuguese manufacturers. The 
govemment-SPD-FEF axis supports the argument that non-multilateral channels of 
international interaction and a remarkable degree of diplomatic autonomy were in fact 
as much part of the FRG’s foreign policy as was Bonn’s multilateral diplomacy within 
NATO and EC. After November 1975, the dynamics of Portugal’s democratisation 
process began to change and increasingly political actors had to meet the challenge of 
capacity building, industrial relations management and conflict resolution in labour 
disputes rather than helping to defend the very existence of democratic actors. The next 
chapter will therefore trace the shift away from ensuring the survival of democratic 
structures towards the consolidation of Portugal’s structural transformation starting in 
1976 and ending in 1981.
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Chapter 3
Pursuing Soft Power Politics II: The Friedrich-Ebert 
Foundation in Portugal 1976-1981
3.1. Introduction
The previous chapter has focused on West Germany’s involvement on state and sub­
state level in Portugal’s transition from authoritarian rule. It has shown that only by 
conflating governmental diplomacy with the democracy promotion activities of the 
FRG’s political foundations -  here the SPD-affiliated FEF -  can one provide an accurate 
analysis of West Germany’s foreign policy in the Iberian country. It has been 
demonstrated through empirical evidence that the FEF pursued its goal of paving the 
way for a pluralist parliamentary democracy in Portugal through conferences, seminars, 
workshops, study trips and the establishment of civic education centres in the area of 
electoral assistance, research and the media. Furthermore, the chapter has highlighted 
the financial dimension of support for Portugal’s Socialist Party, an aspect of political 
aid that connected state and sub-state actors as the money was allocated by the West 
German Government but ‘invested’ in the transition country and distributed through the 
political foundations. In this chapter, the study will examine the FEF’s democracy 
promotion activities in Portugal during the phase of democratic consolidation from 1976 
until 1981. In particular, the focus will be on four thematic areas, in which the 
Foundation provided expertise, ideas and concepts for the creation of a modem civil 
society. Firstly, it will highlight a FEF media seminar for Portuguese journalists, which 
served as a platform for the exchange ideas bringing the first generation of democratic 
journalists in contact with professional colleagues in West Germany (see 3.3.). 
Secondly, the chapter will take a look at the workings of Lisbon-based think tank 
Institute* de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento (IED), which was partly financed by West 
Germany’s Social Democracy (see 3.4.). Thirdly, the spotlight will be on the FEF’s 
advisory role in the area of producer cooperatives predominantly in the agricultural 
sector (see 3.5. -  3.6.). Finally, the chapter is going to centre on the Foundation’s role in 
the promotion of Portugal’s Socialist-dominated union organisation UGT especially
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since industrial relations formed a traditional area of the FEF’s international operations 
(see 3.7.).
3.2. Changing Transitional Dynamics
Despite the PS’s tremendous efforts to prevent the country from plunging into the hands 
of yet another dictatorial regime, the FEF assessment of the prospects for Socialist 
politics in Portugal turned out to be a rather concerned and at times pessimistic analysis. 
FEF expert Biinger left strategists at Foundation headquarters in no doubt that after the 
preparatory phase and the achievements of the PS-SPD-FEF support axis, West 
Germany’s Social Democrats needed to “open a new chapter in the history book.”492 
Understandably, the PS leadership was determined to prolong the political partnership 
with its West German sister party hoping “to continue to obtain the help and assistance 
Germany has been providing to us, and which has been essential in many aspects to 
overcome the problem of our young democracy.”493 But it became also clear that since 
challenges had changed, tactics had to be adjusted and emphasis needed to be put on 
new ‘hot spots’ on the transitional road map. Soft power appeared to be a promising 
operational mode for the stabilisation of democratic structures and the realisation of 
milieu goals through the transfer of non-material and material support, knowledge, 
expertise and information keeping the focus of international actors firmly on the change 
of attitudes, the shaping of preferences and the strengthening of the PS’s political 
competitiveness. The phase of democratic consolidation, which began after the failed 
Communist coup d’etat in November 1975, did also lend itself to the employment of 
soft power in order to successfully manage the transformation of political infrastructure. 
However, the nature of political challenges had changed and called for an operational 
adjustment. Soon after November 1975, it became clear that democracy had become 
indeed “the only game in town”494 and the only legitimate framework for seeking and 
exercising political power. Now democratic structures needed to mature and deepen.
492 AdsD, Horst Ehmke Collection (hereafter HEC), BN/0403, FEF Report by Hans-Ulrich Biinger, 12 
February 1976.
493 AdsD, HSC, BN/6605, Letter Mario Soares to Helmut Schmidt, 18 November 1977.
494 Larry Diamond, Doh Chull Shin, ‘The Rough Road to Democracy’, Hoover Digest, 1999, no.4, 
available from http://www.hooverdigest.org/994/diamond2.html. cited on 23 March 2006.
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Therefore, the strategy of moderate centre-left politics as well as of soft power-based 
foreign policy required an overhaul and a process of Socialist re-positioning.
FEF analyst Hans-Ulrich Biinger pointed at the extreme right in Portuguese 
politics as the new menace for any future democratic development and he highlighted its 
potential to provide the breeding ground for future coup d’etats. He stressed the fact that 
sympathisers of PPD and CDS occupied various military positions and highlighted the 
intense circulation of rumours about a general sense of fatigue concerning party politics 
and secretly planned coups. “There is a widespread belief that the problems in Portugal 
are so enormous that given the Portuguese’s national trait to talk a lot and to act little, 
only a firm hand can provide stability and progress.”495 And he warns: “This threat does 
exist on all levels and requires a new strategy by SPD and FEF.”496 Biinger urged SPD 
and FEF planners to provide further material assistance to the PS and suggested FEF 
support for an effective public relations campaign in the run-up to the first general 
elections. He warned of an unjustifiably optimistic attitude regarding the PS’s prospects 
of winning the upcoming elections and lamented in bitter words the adverse and cynical 
attitude of the broader public towards the past achievements of Socialist politics:
If conservative forces in Portugal as well as abroad have so far shown sympathy for the 
PS because the party was perceived to be a bulwark in the fight against Communism, 
then this attitude has vanished. The PS has served its purpose and can be simply 
discarded. It is shameful to see how the rats are coming out of their holes and are 
starting to denounce the PS. There are now even those who are counting on the 
forgetfulness of the people and who accuse the PS or parts of it of sympathising with 
Communism despite the fact that it was the PS that led the nerve-wrecking fight before 
25 November 1975. Sa Cameiro is responsible for remarkable demagogic achievements 
by accusing the PS to be a Marxist party (whatever that means). I can say only one thing 
about all that and I believe to know the party: The fight against a leftist dictatorship has 
brought together the entire PS, which sees the PCP as its main enemy.497
495 AdsD, HEC, BN/0403, FEF Report Hans-Ulrich Biinger, 12 February 1976.
496 Ibid.
497 Ibid  (translation by author). The SPD’s leadership maintained its low public profile in its dealings with 
the PS. In April 1976, the party’s foreign affairs analyst Veronika Isenberg advised her party colleagues to 
“refrain from any comments about a possible single-party PS government, a possible role for the PS on the 
opposition benches or about any coalition. This would be seen as an interference in internal affairs and 
would be very careless indeed because unforeseeable changes would be possible at any time given 
Portuguese political practices.” AdsD, WBC, BN/128, Note Veronika Isenberg, 23 April 1976. After the 
general elections, Isenberg’s superior in the SPD’s department of international affairs Hans-Eberhard 
Dingels expressed similar concerns vis-&-vis an upcoming visit o f Mario Soares during which the Socialist
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Echoing thoughts that “democracy in Portugal can only exist as long as it is supported 
by Mario Soares and the PS”, Biinger’s message to those in SPD circles who may have 
still toyed with the idea of a political co-operation with the PPD was clear: “A support 
of the PPD of any kind can be interpreted by the PS only as treason.”498 He confirmed 
the assumption of many that “despite all tactically induced statements of its leadership. 
The PPD is everything but a Social Democratic party” and expressed his hope that “this 
will be acknowledged within the SPD as well.”499 Biinger also highlighted the emerging 
problem of thousands of mostly conservative Portuguese settlers returning from the 
country’s overseas territories in Africa to their homeland in the wake of the ongoing 
decolonisation process. Illustrating the urgent need for comprehensive reintegration 
measures, the political challenge to socially accommodate the returning settlers from 
Angola and Mozambique was thought to turn into another battle ground for party 
political competition causing Biinger to suggest that a “spectacular support campaign” 
initiated by SPD and FEF and co-ordinated by the PS Office for Angola Returnees 
would prove to be a “great help for our friends.”500
What had changed as far as the FEF’s soft power activities were concerned? The 
1976 FEF Annual Report laconically mentioned, “Since the end of the year, the 
Foundation operates through a representative in Portugal.”501 The need for clandestine 
activities had vanished, the PS had established itself as the dominating force in 
Portuguese politics and the uncertainty of a permanently changing political scenery had 
been replaced by a situation in which the focus of Portuguese politicians as well as of 
foreign supporters shifted towards the question of how to strengthen and deepen the 
structural fundament of democracy rather than how to establish it in the first place. The 
ever present danger of rightwing or leftwing counter-revolutionary activities with the
leader was planning to brief SPD Chairman Willy Brandt as well as West German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt about the political situation in Portugal. Dingels warned that Soares would tiy to exploit the visit 
for propaganda purposes, which might in turn “give the impression o f an interference in internal Portuguese 
affairs” and he pointed out that such public support could possibly create an impression o f Portuguese 
dependency on West Germany. AdsD, WBC, BN/128, Note Hans Eberhard Dingels, 5 May 1976.
498 Horst Seefeld, ’Solidaritat fur Portugals Sozialisten’, SPD-Pressedienst, 20 April 1976; AdsD, HEC, 
BN/0403, FEF Report Hans-Ulrich Biinger, 12 February 1976.
499 Ibid.
500 Ibid.
501 FEF Annual Report 1976, p.60.
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ultimate aim of destabilising the fragile Iberian democracy had not entirely disappeared, 
but Portugal’s democrats, who enjoyed an increased political breathing space after 25 
November 1975 were aware that more important challenges were waiting to be tackled. 
The transformation of political infrastructure, the development of a citizen mentality and 
the construction of a democratic framework for pluralist governance were the new 
demands of the day. SPD foreign affairs spokesperson Bruno Friedrich summarised the 
transitional problems that needed to be addressed by the FEF through soft power based 
democracy promotion campaigns: “The challenge is to overcome the economic and 
social problems, to stabilise democratic pluralism and to facilitate a close co-operation 
between a democratic Portugal and a democratic Europe”.502
The dramatic events between April 1974 and November 1975 caused the FEF to 
focus on financial assistance, party management and campaign support in order to 
prevent democratic socialism from a political death by drowning. The consolidation 
phase on the other hand required a different set of tools, a different type of expertise and 
a different organisational ‘rhythm’ vis-a-vis a significantly altered political dynamic. 
The FEF needed to prevent its transitional partner organisation from developing a fatal 
‘recipient’s attitude’, a mentality of dependency which “had to be curtailed 
immediately.”503 The simple handout of large-scale funds was to trigger a dangerous 
political lethargy and needed to be replaced by a more pro-active model of co-operation. 
From a donor’s perspective, the second phase of the democratisation process, which 
started in January 1976 required a contextual adjustment as well the linking of political 
aid programmes to criteria of efficiency and effectiveness.
Having opened an official office, the FEF’s transitional activities contained 
“political points of emphasis but no absolute priorities.” 504 Its first resident 
representative Gerhard Fischer recalls the enormous demand for political expertise in 
the thematic areas of regionalisation and local government, trade union organisation, 
producer co-operatives and mass media, after “the political chaos had ended.”505 In the 
area of devolution, regionalisation and local government, the FEF provided expertise
502 Bruno Friedrich, ’Soares braucht zuverl&ssige Partner’, SPD-Pressedienst, 27 April 1976.
503 Personal interview with Gunther Esters, Bonn, 18 April 2002.
504 Personal interview Gerhard Fischer, 25 April 2002.
505 Ibid
159
through its representative in Lisbon, who directly co-operated with the PS on various 
policies. These were to be subsequently used for parliamentary work and in election 
campaigns. Research studies, surveys and opinion polls, drafts of policy white papers 
and other legislative work provided the basis for FEF activities in Portugal. The 
Foundation’s work has been characterised as being “less of a political nature but with a 
strong focus on technical questions in the areas of a re-allocation of land, planning law 
and building regulations as well as the law of local government.”506 Portugal had not 
only to rely on the old public service personnel inherited from the former regime but it 
also had to accept the fact that large parts of the country’s corporatist legislation were 
not simply up for quick grabs of reform but required a long-term commitment of the 
new elites to change and modify them where appropriate and to replace them where 
necessary.
In this context, the FEF proved to be a useful partner for Soares’s Socialists by 
organising seminars and by publishing as well as translating up-to-date research on a 
wide range of issues. Once again, the employment of soft power led the FEF to provide 
expertise, skills and know-how, vast experience in a broad range of socio-economic, 
political and legal issue areas as well as platforms for the exchange of information. On a 
sub-state level, the Foundation continued to shape the FRG’s regional milieu in 
Southern Europe by organising and providing conceptual solutions for the process of 
post-authoritarian institution- and capacity-building. Its democracy promotion projects 
in Portugal were integral part of the non-multilateral dimension of the FRG’s foreign 
policy, a form of ‘soft power politics’ that sought to influence the process of political 
transformation through persuasion and co-option rather than coercion. Initially, 
Portugal’s withdrawal from NATO and its falling into the hands of Communist forces 
had to be prevented at almost any costs. This foreign policy goal was partly pursued 
through the kind of classical multilateralism that had so successfully helped to re­
integrate West Germany into the international community of states as well as through 
the ‘private’ and informal diplomacy of the political foundations, in particular the FEF 
with its close connection to the government. After November 1975, the transitional 
dynamics had changed and so had the strategic calculus for the West German
506 Ibid.
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Government. Now it was the long-term prospect of winning a democratic and politically 
stable Portugal as a reliable partner in the areas of trade and multilateral diplomacy, 
which became the expected pay-off.
3.3. FEF Media Assistance
One extraordinarily important societal playing field was the question of how to bring 
about a more balanced, diversified and professional media sector providing information 
for the general public. Many newspapers were insufficiently prepared for the economic 
challenges ahead. Programmes of state-run television channels were in parts infiltrated 
by Communist producers leaving a clear mark on the overall direction of public 
broadcasting. Three FEF media consultants were employed in Portugal’s public 
broadcaster in order to help change the political tendencies of broadcast programmes. 
“These experts provided new TV programme material to the Portuguese which did not 
glorify Communism.” 507 Besides the political adjustments ensuring an ideologically 
more balanced broadcast service, the FEF media consultants also assisted their 
Portuguese colleagues in overcoming technical difficulties to directly feed TV 
programmes that had been produced in EC member states into the Portuguese television 
market. FEF representative Fischer described Portugal’s TV programmes as consisting 
of 70% politically neutral shows whereas the remaining 30% “offered opportunities to 
subtly change the political content in order to get the people away from the numerous 
Eastern Bloc productions.”508
The media-related FEF activities were supplemented by a number of training 
seminars for Portuguese journalists who were invited by the Foundation to its 
headquarters in Bonn. The first of these media seminars took place between the 16 and 
26 May 1977 with six Portuguese journalists being invited to the Federal Republic on 
what was called an educational and information visit to evaluate and study the current 
political, economic and social situation in West Germany. The selection was not linked 
to any party political activities or even PS membership and the participants represented 
the entire spectrum of political beliefs as represented in the Portuguese Parliament 
except the PCP. The participating journalists had entered journalism after April 1974
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and had “relentlessly worked towards the consolidation of democratic structures in 
Portugal.”509 The Portuguese guests were introduced to West Germany’s economic 
policies and labour laws as well as to a variety of political concepts, which West 
Germany had developed during its own phase of reconstruction after the Second World 
War. The Portuguese participants learned about the FRG’s own transitional experiences 
when facing a comparable set of political, economic and social challenges in the context 
of a general overhaul and build-up of political infrastructure. The first set of seminar 
discussions focused on Portugal’s possible membership in the EC, covered West 
German legislation underlying vocational training in the Federal Republic and 
introduced the law of co-determination. The Portuguese guests were introduced to the 
situation of Germans returning to the FRG from former state territory east of the Oder- 
Neisse border after the Second World War and familiarised themselves with the way in 
which the West German Government had dealt with the problems of their integration. 
Parallels to the Portuguese situation with thousands of settler returnees from Portugal’s 
overseas territories were clearly recognisable.
Furthermore, the seminar focused on the structural reality of West Germany’s 
media market as well as on the situation of print media in Portugal. The Portuguese 
guests informed their German hosts that the ideological equilibrium in the Portuguese 
media sector resulted in balanced reporting, a diversified flow of information and a fair 
representation of political opinions. Newspapers run by political parties enjoyed 
widespread popularity. Given the fact that every Portuguese spent an average of 15 
Deutsche Mark per month on press products, a remarkable sum given the average per- 
capita income in Portugal in 1977, the media sector and the information business were 
seen as crucial for the outcome of the transition. Despite the generally positive nature of 
the transitional development of democratic mass media in Portugal, the FEF was fully 
aware that as a result of the nationalisation campaigns in 1977 still 70% of the national 
press remained firmly in public ownership. The media seminar therefore concluded that 
if the state had a continuous interest in the existence of a private media sector it would
509 AdsD, BFC, BN/1566, FEF Report ‘Besuch von sechs portugiesischen Joumalisten in der 
Bundesrepublik vom 16. to 26. Mai 1977’, 20 June 1977.
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need to subsidise the acquisition of printing paper by private publishing houses or offer 
tax benefits.
Finally, seminar participants were introduced to developments in the West 
German market for newspapers and magazines. In Portugal, readers were confronted 
with an almost inflationary number of publications and it was expected that the 
overburdened market would soon collapse under the weight of an unnaturally high 
number of competitors. The Portuguese guests learned that the West German media 
market had experienced a similar downturn in 1976, which ended a 20-year phase of an 
extraordinarily high density of competitors on the market. Despite the small number of 
only six participants, the organisation of seminars and information visits to FEF 
headquarters enabled key foreign experts, professionals and the ‘movers and shakers’ of 
Portugal’s democratisation process to interact with their West German partners and to 
exchange ideas and concepts on a broad range of topics. Soft power was employed once 
again in order to co-opt foreign elites and opinion-formers through the supply of 
knowledge, expertise and experience and by providing for the exchange of information. 
The seminar was based on the assumption that the handful of Portuguese guests would 
return to their country where they would prove to be effective multiplying factors 
‘spreading the gospel’ of possible conceptual responses to transitional challenges 
modelled on German experiences.
3.4. Instituto de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento (IED)
One of the most successful projects of political co-operation between West Germany’s
Social Democrats and Portugal’s Socialists was the Institute for Development Studies 
{Instituto de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento) founded in 1979. During the second half 
of the 1970s, the PS had to deal with the question of Portugal’s future accession to the 
European Community, something that by the end of the 1970s turned out to be an 
economic challenge for Lisbon’s political sector more than a political obstacle. 
Therefore, the FEF had to address the question of how to transfer urgently needed 
economic and technical know-how to its Portuguese partners. Analytical resources and 
transferable expertise were of decisive significance for the attraction of bitterly needed 
foreign investment. “Long-term problems can be seen in the strengthening of investor 
confidence through the effective protection of investment and common-sense economic
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and social policies” stated a document of the Chancellor’s Office in 1977 and pointed 
out that “we will try to give assistance for decision-making through bilateral 
negotiations and through the responsible and discrete activities of our political 
Foundations.”510
The initiative for the IED project originated in the FEF department for the study 
of developing countries, which in 1979 sent its researchers Konrad Stelzel and Gunther 
Esters to Lisbon in order to investigate the depth of existing economic expertise. The 
result of what was essentially a fact-finding tour to “evaluate the political research 
capacities” was devastating.511 “The question was: What do Portuguese know about the 
economy and the answer was - nothing.”512 Being confronted with the bleak reality of a 
prevailing knowledge gap during a crucial phase of democratic consolidation and being 
aware of the warning, that a leading foreign relations expert of the West German 
government had issued in 1977 saying that “in the case of a continuous failure of 
governmental economic policies, uncontrollable domestic political developments may 
be triggered”, Stelzel and Esters held background talks with approximately 20-30 
different organisations.513 The FEF’s point of departure was its belief that “a 
democratically organised parliamentary system requires an open scientifically-based 
discourse.”514 The Foundation’s findings suggested that apart from a single international 
seminar organised by the Portuguese Gulbenkian Foundation no domestic institution in 
the Iberian country had ever made an effort to spearhead the development of an 
institutional micro- or macroeconomic-focused research and analytical capacity. After 
Esters and Stelzel had met the managing director of the economic research section of 
one of Portugal’s private banks, they stressed the need for “an institution that would 
process economically relevant knowledge and which would thereby provide the political 
sector with expertise and consultancy services.”515
510 AdsD, BFC, BN/1566, Federal Chancellery Memorandum ‘Politische Beziehungen mit Portugal’, 20 
May 1977.
511 Personal interview with Michael Dauderstftdt, Bonn, 21 April 2002.
512 Personal interview with Gunther Esters, Bonn, 18 April 2002.
5.3 AdsD, HSC, BN/7279, Notes Federal Chancellery, 3 March 1977.
5.4 Personal interview with Gttnther Esters, Bonn, 18 April 2002.
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Although serving as an economic think tank for Socialist parliamentarians, the 
planned institute was anxious to maintain an organisational distance to the political 
arena. “It was supposed to be an institute which was politics-affiliated but not politics- 
integrated”, remembers Esters.516 The practical utility of IED research for Portugal’s 
day-to-day politics was ensured through a range of working relationships between IED 
staff and PS parliamentarians with the former ones often acting as research assistants in 
the MP’s offices. Its first Managing Director Heinz-Michael Stahl, who headed the 
Institute from 1978 to 1981 points out that the Institute was supposed to “support the 
PS’s parliamentary work in the area of socio-economic policies” and that “the FES’s 
vision was to have the PS run the IED as a party think tank.”517 Esters stressed the 
Foundation’s intention to ‘release’ the IED into institutional and, more importantly, 
financial independence as soon as possible to encourage the necessary institutional 
emancipation of the Institute and to hand responsibility for Portuguese affairs back to 
their owners. The FEF launched the IED’s think tank activities by providing an initial 
financial injection and through the transfer of managerial know-how including the 
appointment of a German managing director but it left the daily running of the Institute 
in the hands of its Portuguese staff provided the institute’s management would operate 
within the confines of social democratic and Socialist policies respectively.518 “At the 
beginning we were still pushing but during the final phase we had merely decorative 
function.”519 The FEF emphasised the need for a broadening of the Institute’s thematic 
scope once the deficits in the economic realm had been overcome. This was discussed 
between FEF experts and the PS leaders Mario Soares and Salgado Zenha both of whom 
shared the opinion that a broadening of topics and activities would be desirable to 
develop the IED as a useful research organisation for the time after the transition. A 
contractual agreement determined that the research director with overall responsibility 
for the political management of the IED would be always a selected FEF official, and 
the Portuguese academic and PS parliamentarian Teresa Ambrosio was appointed
5,6 Ibid.
517 Personal correspondence with Heinz-Michael Stahl, 18 April 2006.
518 Stahl remembers that the FEF retained its right to have its say on organisational and managerial 
questions but kept largely out o f the scientific work of the IED. Personal correspondence with Heinz- 
Michael Stahl, 18 April 2006.
519 Personal interview with Gunther Esters, Bonn, 18 April 2002.
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managing director. Zenha was appointed as official liaison person for maintaining 
contacts with the PS. Also, the IED worked on new developmental policies for 
Portuguese Africa, which opened up a new field of international activities at first sight 
unrelated to the democratisation process in Portugal.521 The IED remained the smallest 
FEF project in transitional Portugal counting for approximately 15-20 percent of the 
Foundation’s activities.
The IED encompassed three research departments, which were responsible for 
what the Institute’s first director Heinz-Michael Stahl described as a “remarkable degree 
of publicity.” 522 The three departments were the section for socio-political affairs, 
technical-economic studies as well as the research department for short-term studies. 
During the start-up phase between August 1979 and January 1980, a tangible dominance 
of research activities supervised by the department of socio-political affairs caused the 
FEF to modify the accounting procedures of the IED in order to strengthen the standing 
of the remaining two departments. A full-time research officer formed the analytical and 
organisational backbone of each of the three departments. In 1979, the department for 
socio-political research completed three major studies on ‘The Development of Power 
and Societal Structures since the Revolution’, which were to be evaluated and later 
published in an IED publication series. These studies dealt with the “electoral behaviour 
of the population in the light of demographic, economic and cultural explanatory 
factors.” They provided analysis of the “influence of the church on the political 
behaviour of the population” and measured out the “regional differences in the 
distribution of income in Portugal.”524
A second research area developed by the same department was entitled “General 
principles of an educational concept for Portugal” which sought to complete a report on 
the “sociological characteristics of students of higher education along regional
criteria.”525 In 1980, the IED launched another three research projects on “the situation
520 Personal correspondence with Heinz-Michael Stahl, 18 April 2006.
521 Personal interview with Michael Dauderstadt, Bonn, 21 April 2002.
522 AdsD, BFC, BN/1411, 2. Bi-Annual Report by Heinz-Michael Stahl, Instituto de Estudos para o 
Desenvolvimento
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of resources of the Portuguese regional authorities”, on the “technological progress and 
professional training in Portugal -  a project on behalf of UNESCO” and on Portugal’s 
foreign debt. The IED aimed at broadening the financial basis of its research activities 
by approaching major research organisations for funding such as the German Society for 
Peace and Conflict Research (in order to obtain financial assistance for a future project 
on ‘Cultural conflicts in Portugal’s developmental process’), the Thyssen Foundation (to 
deepen the research on ‘Portugal’s External Debt in the Context of its Economic 
Development’) or the German Marshall Fund of the U.S.526
Being able to mobilise a broad range of additional financial resources, the IED 
secured substantial funds, which enabled it to continue with a diverse research agenda 
throughout 1980 and during subsequent years. In 1980, public funding was received by 
the Portuguese Departamento National de Investigagao Cientifica totaling Escudos
500.000 (ca. £5000). This was seen as being not only financially important but also 
administratively and research-politically crucial for the recognition of the IED as a 
Portuguese research institution.527 Another project aiming at the modernisation of 
Portugal’s labour laws governing industrial relations in publicly owned companies was 
commissioned and paid for by the Fundacao Jose Fontana (FJF). This PS-affiliated 
Foundation, which was set up under the guidance and with the assistance of the FEF to 
oversee the development of the Socialist trade union organisation UGT paid a total of 
Escudos 242.000 (ca. £2800) to the IED for the completion of the legal project. In 
January 1980, the Institute had already secured a total amount of Escudos 3.700.000 
(ca.£40.000) for its research programme, a sum that would be supplemented by Escudos
10.500.000 (ca. £120.000), which were paid to the IED by the FEF as an annual 
contribution.528 This meant that during the first two years of its existence, 25 percent of 
the IED’s budget was secured through non-FEF sources. Furthermore, co-operation 
between the EC and the IED deepened over Portugal’s prime political project of future 
accession. Questions of European integration occupied a prominent place on the think 
tank’s research agenda. After having taken up membership in the Council of Europe
(CoE) in September 1976, the project of EC enlargement was to become the second 
major step of Portugal’s steady European integration.529 The IED took seriously the 
remark of then EC Commission President Francois-Xavier Ortoli, who on the occasion 
of the ratification of the Financial and Additional Protocol (which extended the relations 
to areas other than trade) as well as of the Interim Agreement between Lisbon and the 
EC stressed the fact that
The intensification of our relations is a logical element in the political plan of a 
Portugal, which is aware of having stabilised its newly restored democracy, eager to 
achieve economic recovery and keen to guarantee economic development, and which 
desires to take its rightful place among the European democracies.530
Acknowledging that “seen from a political perspective, Portugal’s accession to the EC is 
without alternative”531, the IED concentrated increasingly on providing Portuguese and 
European institutions as well as the Portuguese political sector with ‘hard currency’ in 
terms of economic expertise and political analysis. SPD and FEF assumed that the 
question of Portuguese EC membership and its consequences meant a “political sheet- 
anchor in the short-term” and a “pre-condition for the political and economic 
stabilisation in the long-run.”533 West Germany’s Social Democrats were aware of the 
fact that a future accession “will come at the price of immense economic and political 
difficulties for Portugal and the Community” and that first and foremost “a massive 
transfer of resources appears to be inevitable.”534 Therefore, the Portuguese partners of 
SPD and FEF had to be provided with the necessary analytical tools to thoroughly 
examine the multifaceted implications of the transition’s European dimension and to 
politically prepare the country for eventual membership. The Community and its
529 On 22 September 1976, the country’s Foreign Minister Jose Medeiro Ferreira deposited the instrument 
of accession to the Council o f Europe’s Statute and signed the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Report on the activities o f the Council o f Europe: September 1976 -  August 1977, p. 32.
530 The Community and Portugal, Bulletin o f  the European Communities, No 9, 1976, p. 18.
531 AdsD, HSC, BN/8951, Notes Federal Chancellery ‘Gespr&ch zwischen Ministerprasident Pinto 
Balsemao und Bundeskanzler Schmidt am 15. Juni 1981’.
532 A prominent member on the IED’s Board of Governors was the Deputy Director of the Portuguese 
Central Bank and Chairman of the Portuguese Commission for the Accession Negotiations with the EC 
Victor Constancio.
533 AdsD, HSC, BN/7279, Notes Federal Chancellery, 3 March 1977.
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member states on the other hand had to be kept informed about the exact nature and 
state of the Portuguese democratisation process to be able to adequately assess the 
prospects for Portugal’s EC entry. The IED thus fulfilled a bridge-building function 
between accession candidate Lisbon and EC authorities in Brussels and provided 
important analyses on selected topics of wider significance.
In December 1979, the IED signed a research contract with the EC which 
provided Escudos 2.563.000 (ca. £30.000) for a major study to be finished until 
November 1980, which was to be used in the political negotiations about Portugal’s 
accession. The study, which was conducted by the IED’s department for technical- 
economic research was to evaluate and scientifically predict the potential Portuguese 
reservoir of immigrant workers, who would seek employment in the various labour 
markets of EC member states following Lisbon’s accession to the Common Market over 
a period of 10 years. Furthermore, the EC was interested in the IED’s findings 
concerning the demand of Portuguese labour in EC member states. Another project 
examined possible effects of Portugal’s EC accession on the intra-European division of 
labour. A working group at FEF headquarters in Bonn dealt with those research areas, 
that concerned the impact of Lisbon’s EC membership on the industrial complexes of 
member states while the IED concentrated on the implications of membership for 
Portugal’s industrial structures. The project, which was later presented to the 
Volkswagen Foundation for funding was designed to provide the actors and institutions 
involved in decision-making in either private sector, legislature or political parties with 
a useful arsenal of scientifically-based findings forecasting the broadest range of 
possible political outcomes, economic implications and socio-economic problem 
scenario. It was intended to identify those sectors of Europe’s national economies that 
would have to expand in reaction to stiffened competition in a common European 
market as well as those sectors that would be subjected to a process of declining 
growth.535
The FEF deepened its focus on Portugal’s European integration by organising a 
major conference on the country’s European perspectives in June 1980 the findings of
535 AdsD, BFC, BN/1411, 2. Bi-Annual Report by Heinz-Michael Stahl, Instituto de Estudos para o 
Desenvolvimento.
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which were later published in a joint publication of IED and FEF.536 The delegates 
discussed various crucially important aspects of the future integration process. The 
conference highlighted possible risk factors and identified problematic economic 
implications deriving from Portugal’s position on the outset of the integration process. 
Given the country’s alarming economic key data with a per-capita gross domestic 
product reaching only 55 percent of the Spanish and 60 percent of the Greek level and 
its significantly underdeveloped agricultural sector, in which 27 percent of the total 
Portuguese workforce produced only 12 percent of gross domestic product, Portugal’s 
ability to adopt the EC’s acquis communitaire without major disruptions of its own 
economic development caused by the comparative weakness of its private sector 
structures appeared to be rather bleak.537 The FEF conference report highlighted the 
need for parts of the Portuguese economy to be adequately protected from the full wrath 
of common market forces and warned of a situation, in which Portugal would be 
confronted by a community of member states determined to protect their domestic 
markets in the few areas, in which Portuguese agriculture and industry could benefit 
from clear economic advantages.538
Rather than demanding additional investment in export capacities, the FEF-IED 
conference urged Brussels and the government in Lisbon to improve Portugal’s 
productivity in order to significantly strengthen its position as a trading partner. The 
authors of the conference report concluded that “if one accepts those propositions then 
there remains only one way of integration, in which the EC freezes its basic accession 
principles in favour of a general or at least Portugal-specific emphasis on regional, 
industrial and developmental aspects of community policies.” FEF and IED clearly 
realised the possibly disastrous consequences of an integration process without 
Brussels’ preparedness to walk the extra mile in what appeared to be in many respects a 
political and economic relationship with a developing country on the periphery of the
536 Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Abtlg. Entwicklungslanderforschung, Portugal’s Beitritt 
zur Europaischen Gemeinschaft: Perspektiven und Strategien, Diskussionsveranstaltung des
Forschungsinstituts der Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung in Verbindung mit dem Instituto de Estudos para o 
Desenvolvimento, (Lissabon, Bonn vom 2. bis 3. Juni 1980, Bonn 1981).
537 See Portugal’s application for membership, Bulletin o f  the European Communities, No 5, 1978, p.8.
538 Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Abtlg. Entwicklungslanderforschung, Portugal’s Beitritt 
zur Europaischen Gemeinschaft: Perspektiven und Strategien, p. 12.
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European Community. The FEF seemed to be uniquely qualified, experienced and 
credible to convince its own government as well as other political actors involved that 
the integration project did not consist only of the economic dimension but that it had 
also a crucial political side, which may well have been negatively affected by an 
unconciliatory stance on the part of Brussels. Having worked at the forefront of 
structural transformation in the aftermath of regime change in Portugal, being well 
connected with domestic political and economic actors and being familiar with political 
dynamics, mentalities and sensitivities in transitional countries, the FEF was predestined 
to advocate the interests of its Portuguese ‘client’ within the integration debate.
Portugal’s Foreign Minister Correia Gago pointed out the necessity for a longer 
economic transition period in order to achieve a complete opening of the agricultural 
market, as “in some cases productivity and prices in Portugal are further away from 
those of the Community than in others.”540 He highlighted the need for his country to 
“carry on with the task of modifying structures and modernising technologies in order to 
develop production capacities, to increase productivity and to guarantee wages and 
living standards in the agricultural sector to be on a par with those of other workers.”541 
The FEF was not only an invaluable helping hand of crucial importance for the success 
of such a structural modification process but also an international relations actor 
uniquely qualified to convince key individuals and organisations of the need to accept a 
longer transition in certain areas. The Foundation was favourably positioned to help 
reconciling the EC’s economic standards and expectation and the political and economic 
needs of a transitional society with still fragile democratic structures. Therefore, the FEF 
authors correctly observed:
The political system in this developing European country needs to absorb the 
competitive pressure generated by the EC and to translate this pressure into norms and 
priorities for Portuguese companies. Success or failure of the integration process will 
have to be measured and assessed on the analytical level of the company for a long time 
to come.542
540 Portugal: Opening of accession negotiations, Bulletin o f the European Communities, No 10, 1978, p.9.
541 Ibid.
542 Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Abtlg. Entwicklungslanderforschung, Portugal’s Beitritt 
zur Europaischen Gemeinschaft: Perspektiven und Strategien, p.32, op.cit. (translation by author) These 
remarks echoed what the EC itself acknowledged when it highlighted the fact that “the Community’s
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Back in 1979, the IED had already pushed for another international high-profile 
seminar, which was widely believed to be a highlight of the Institute’s activities during 
its Foundational phase. Under the title of the “Portuguese economic development in a 
changing international environment”, the IED approached two sets of political issues 
one of which highlighted the European focus of the organisation in years to come. This 
encompassed structural changes of the Portuguese economy in the wake of EC 
accession as well as the changing relationship between Lisbon and its former 
colonies.543 Besides providing the usual forum for dialogue and scholarly debate, the 
event was hoped to sharpen the IED’s profile in the public domain. According to IED 
managing director Stahl, the latter aim was fully realised with the IED becoming the 
object of intense media attention. The list of speakers guaranteed high-quality 
contributions and included Swedish Nobel Prize winner Gunnar Myrdal, EC 
Commissioner for Politics of the Regions Antonio Giolitti or the prominent Spanish 
diplomat Raul Morodo, who played an important role in the transitional processes of his 
own country. Pires Miranda as the head of the Portuguese delegation for the accession 
negotiations, the leading PS politician and future Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio or 
CDS leader Freitas do Amaral as well as the Portuguese economist Vitor Constancio 
were further political heavyweights on the list of participants.544
The conference initiated an elite-based brainstorming process, which helped to 
clarify conceptual approaches, solved disagreements among actors involved and 
determined necessary steps to take. Far from being an inward-looking scholarly summit 
designed to bring a handful of ivory tower experts together to let them enthusiastically 
talk to themselves, the symposium as well as any other conference organised by FEF 
and IED formed part of a communication chain carefully designed and set up by the 
West German soft power actor. The exchange of thoughts and concepts between policy 
specialists and between specialists and the interested public helped to develop more
structural policy corresponds with Portugal’s essential requirements and would therefore have beneficial 
effects. In its present form, however, it would probably prove inadequate to cope with the scale of the 
problems that need to be tackled.” Portugal’s application for membership, Bulletin o f  the European 
Communities, No 5, 1978, p.9.
543 AdsD, BFC, BN/1411, 2. Bi-Annual Report by Heinz-Michael Stahl, Instituto de Estudos para o 
Desenvolvimento.
544 Ibid, pp. 9-10.
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solidified concepts, which would subsequently find their way into practical political 
recommendations for delegations, political practitioners, civil servants and 
parliamentary committees. Convincing a few key actors in parties, think tanks or 
national institutions such as central bank of the value of the conferences’ conceptual 
findings could mean to activate formidable multiplying factors that would ‘spread the 
gospel’ and communicate political messages and programmes to electorate, party 
members, government ministers and leading intellectuals.
The activities of the IED were of great importance to the FEF as its Portuguese 
partner organisation turned out to be an exemplifying case study of institutional 
emancipation in the realm of transitional soft power politics. The FEF noticed a strong 
ambition by the Portuguese IED staff to independently ascertain and follow its own 
scientific and political agenda. The IED determinedly claimed exclusive authority 
concerning the identification, selection and preparation of research projects and rejected 
any interference by the FEF. Stahl concludes: “The German director may participate in 
committee meetings where he is free to voice his concern or support. His advice though 
will be ignored without hesitation if it does not mirror the Portuguese partner’s general 
policy line.”545 Far from being the remote-controlled institutional puppet in the hands of 
mighty West German political and economic interests, the determination of the IED 
management to remain master of its own affairs clearly documents the professional 
relationship between political aid actor FEF and its partner organisations in a 
transitional setting. It is important to note though that the emancipatory tendencies on 
the part of the IED were also responsible for a situation in which
The ideas of professional efficiency, the realistic and concrete nature of research as well 
as the practical usefulness of measures taken by the IED are only being implemented 
under certain conditions, which may have had a negative impact on the possibilities of 
financial support for research projects by the institutions responsible.546
545 Ibid, p. 14.
546 Ibid  (translation by author).
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The FEF was confident that the IED’s clear domestic profile would prevent a 
dependency on the West German donor.547 However, the principle of reciprocity still 
applied and the Foundation did exercise subtle means of keeping partner organisations 
in line with broadly defined policy directions. This was far from surprising given the 
substantial amounts of money, which were provided for the structural build-up and 
transitional aid. “Certainly, the German partner can achieve his political goals indirectly 
i.e. through its budget policy and the financial plan for 1980.”548 After all, one recalls 
Dieter Optenhogel’s remarks about the Foundation’s soft power goal to support long­
term democratic processes, which will eventually “generate social democratic ideas.”549 
Any serious attempt to turn the IED into a radical leftwing think tank that would 
generate ideas alien to social democratic thinking would not have been tolerated or even 
supported. And although the IED’s German director “retained the administrative and 
qualitative control of IED activities but held only little political authority”, the FEF did 
not completely waive its norm-setting authority as far as general policy guidelines were 
concerned.550 FEF analyst Gunther Esters remembers for example that “the principal 
pre-condition was that within the institute it could not be openly voted against Mario 
Soares and no anti-PS activities were permitted.”551
The fact that the IED became a battleground for party-internal faction fighting at 
the end of the 1970s illustrated the occasional difficulties for the FEF to stay clear of 
any involvement in internal disputes and controversies of its partner organisations. A 
situation characterised by what the IED’s former managing director Michael 
Dauderstadt described as “a cold split-up” of the PS brought about the formation of two 
opposing groups with the Portuguese Socialist Party assembling behind PS godfather 
Soares and his erstwhile ally Salgado Zenha respectively.552 FEF strategists viewed the 
feud between the two factions as a standoff between a catholic group led by Zenha and
547 Ibid.
548 Ibid.
549 Personal interview Uwe Optenhbgel, Berlin, 7 March 2002.
550 Personal interview with Guy Clausse, Luxembourg, 16 March 2003.
551 Ibid. Former IED director Guy Clausse remembers that “when the controversy between Soares and 
Zenha spilled out o f control the director of the IED fulfilled a balancing and moderating role but far from 
that o f a Politkommissar (political supervisor).
552 Personal interview with Michael Dauderstadt, Bonn, 21 April 2002.
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the ‘freemason’ group supporting Soares. Triggered by widespread cronyism under 
Soares’s leadership with the distribution of lucrative positions within the PS 
bureaucracy to members of a small clique of friends and Soares loyalists, the Zenha- 
wing was going to use the IED as its transitional power base.553 Although Soares 
alarmed his friends in FEF headquarters about the emerging internal threat to his 
leadership, the FEF consequently refused to interfere in the internal affairs of the IED 
and to reduce the freedom of political expression and individual manoeuvrability within 
the institute. This subsequently caused Soares to massively complain at SPD 
headquarters about the FEF’s de-facto “support for his enemies.”554 Generally, the IED 
was intended to be a genuinely Portuguese think tank and its West German mentors 
consequently rejected any attempts by political actors in Lisbon to implicate them in the 
internal politics of the organisation.
The IED and PS-internal conflict between Zenha and Soares reached its peak at 
the beginning of the 1980s, when Soares’s rival launched his bid for the Portuguese 
Presidency at that point resigning from the Presidency of the IED. Trying to prevent 
Zenha from reaching the highest echelons of political office, Soares tried to lobby his 
SPD allies to put pressure on his archrival in order to withdraw his bid. The episode of 
the party internal cabal between the two Socialist leaders also highlighted “strategic 
acting in the absence of strategic planning.”555 The FEF intended to provide a research 
tool for the development of political expertise in the long-term by setting up the IED. 
Therefore, the organisational character of the organisation required a long-term 
perspective as to who would dominate Socialist politics after Soares. Although “central 
planning was non-existing on the part of the FEF”556, the Soares-Zenha episode showed 
that the FEF “generally speaking only supported Portuguese socialism as a whole but 
that it also provided a certain political segment within the PS with a political focus and a 
“parking lot” to prepare for the time after Soares.”557 Almost the entire PS leadership
553 1bid.
554 Personal interview with Gunter Esters, Bonn, 18 April 2002.
555 Ibid.
556 Ibid.
557 Personal interview with Michael Dauderstadt, Bonn, 18 April 2002. Former IED Director Guy Clausse 
expressed a similar view saying tha tch  could be seen as a medium-term strategic planning not to exclude 
or marginalize the Zenha wing of the-PS.” Personal interview with Guy Clausse, Luxembourg, 16 March
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that was to dominate Portugal’s political arena during the second half of the 1980s had 
close institutional connections to the IED or was directly linked through membership on 
its executive board.558
The second German director of the IED was the FEF economist Guy Clausse, 
who took over from Stahl in 1980 and continued the range of activities of the 
organisation in the areas of education, migration and economic policies. Research 
studies on the situation of Portugal’s foreign debt and on Spanish-Portuguese economic 
relations were supplemented by surveys and analyses, which focused on problems of the 
reintegration of returning Portuguese migrant workers or on the development of 
agricultural policies. One third of the IED’s annual budget of approximately DM 1 
million (ca. £330.000) was provided by West German sources while the remaining two- 
thirds came from Portuguese or international donors or through the IED itself.559 A 
number of full-time staff was supported by approximately 50 freelance project assistants 
and consultants who worked on behalf of the IED on projects commissioned by 
institutions such as the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Institute for the 
Promotion of Technology.560 In the first half of the 1980s, selected research topics had 
to be increasingly marketable, which was a result of an increasing financial dependency 
of the IED on international sponsors. The latter were predominantly interested in various 
aspects of economic policies in the light of a Portugal’s future accession to the EC. 
Observers pointed out that “the pre-dominance of the political realm had been replaced 
by the pre-dominance of the economic realm” and they stressed that a phase had been 
reached, in which the PS had to ultimately clarify its position on the basic political 
principles of economic policies.561 Occasionally, the FEF would provide funds for 
certain projects in order to ‘test the waters’ and to develop a sense of viability, 
efficiency, quality of personnel and public perception. It would then transform the
2002. However, the SPD foreign affairs establishment wanted to “avoid the impression that the SPD 
interferes in the internal skirmishes and the faction fighting of its sister party by siding with one group or 
another.” AdsD, WBC, BN/106, Note for the Circles of Six (Sechserkreis) by Hans-Eberhard Dingels, 30 
October 1980.
558 Prominent IED alumni were Jorge Sampaio and Antonio Gutierrez both later Heads o f State.
559 Among the donors were the German Volkswagenstiftung and Thyssenstiftung as well as sponsoring 
institutions in Switzerland, Canada and the United States.
560 Personal interview with Guy Clausse, Luxembourg, 16 March 2002.
561 Ibid.
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project’s financial framework into a largely foreign funded operation resting on the 
broadest possible fundament of donor organisations.
Why was the IED such an important feature of West Germany’s transnational^ 
operated soft power strategy? In his widely acclaimed study on the Portuguese 
transition, Kenneth Maxwell described the Institute as a think tank which was “headed 
by very able foreigners, which have been a key source of excellent studies and 
blueprints for reforms with direct consequences on governmental programs.”562 The 
FEF served as a conceptual “incubator of ideas, which were of a top priority and could 
only be continued through outside financial sources.”563 The IED combined foreign 
expertise and indigenous talent and enabled political and scientific elites in Portugal to 
broaden their knowledge base, benefit from the experience of their German partner 
organisation and to strengthen their country’s position vis-a-vis the various political and 
socio-economic challenges by supplying policy concepts to decision-makers. The 
employment of soft power meant the channelling of non-material as well as material 
support from the FEF to the economists, sociologists and political scientists of the IED 
where external democracy assistance would be transformed into blueprints and studies 
for decision-makers in parliament and government. Within the wider context of 
transitional constitution building, policy planning and institution building, the IED 
helped to stabilise the structural framework for democracy and contributed to the 
successful political management of the democratic process. It helped to consolidate and 
further develop the democratic consensus among the Portuguese electorate through its 
institution-building activities and positively influenced the attitudinal and behavioural 
components of the democratisation process. Through the establishment of the IED, West 
Germany’s foreign policy and its transnational democracy promotion agency FEF 
provided a convincing interventionist approach based on the mobilisation of soft power, 
which sought to co-opt the Socialist leadership by supplying it with social democratic 
policy concepts, expertise based on German experience and the financial means to put 
ideas into practice.
562 Kenneth Maxwell, The Making o f Portuguese Democracy, (Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.213.
563 Ibid.
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The FEF realised that the Portuguese knowledge gap in the area of economics 
and international trade and finance carried the risk of prolonging the failure of 
governmental economic policies with potentially dangerous consequences for the 
stability of the democratic system. It was therefore crucial to enable Portugal’s new 
political elite to cope with the demands of the international political economy, to solve 
the problems caused by demographic changes and to take on the challenges posed by 
policy areas such as education, regionalism, foreign debt, European integration or 
development in Portuguese Africa. Questioned on the IED’s impact on policy making 
and on a possibly causal relationship between FEF input and democratisation output, 
former IED director Clausse speculates, “The institutionalisation of political deficits 
would have been significantly higher without the contribution of the FEF which set up 
the IED in the first place.”564 The prioritisation of key themes and topics at the earliest 
possible stage and the international interconnectedness of social science research carried 
out through the IED lastingly stabilised the professional continuity of elites and 
technocrats in Portugal.
3.5. Producer Cooperatives
A further challenge that was taken on by the FEF and its democratisation assistance 
programme in Portugal was to find a ‘middle-of-the-road’ approach to solve the 
problem of the tremendous social and economic differences between aristocratic 
landowners, small-holding peasants and other competitors in the agricultural market and 
to balance and dampen the effects caused by these grave socio-economic inequalities. In 
this context, the creation of farming cooperatives was seen as a compromise model of 
collective economic action, which avoided the anti-competitior^j oriented and centrally 
planned Communist model of nationalised economic structures while at the same time 
preventing small-farm holders from falling into the rough waters of unconstrained 
economic individualism. Former FEF resident representative in Portugal Gerhard 
Fischer described the FEF’s activities in the area of producer co-operatives as being part 
of the three-pillar-theory advocated by the international labour movement, the three
564 Personal interview with Guy Clausse, Luxembourg, 16 March 2002.
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pillars being party, labour unions and cooperatives.565 The FEF realised that the 
implementation of concepts of collective ownership or the introduction of co-operative 
management in transitional Portugal required careful supervision as well as “guidance 
and orientation” in order to prevent developments from heading towards an ideological 
radicalisation.
Our Portuguese friends needed urgent assistance in these matters since their models had 
been tried in different contexts before. In some instances like in the case of the so-called 
corporativas we could safely tell them to get their hands off these ideas because they 
have failed their test long ago.566
Other FEF planners in the Foundation’s international development department displayed 
greater scepticism as far as the implementation of co-operative models and the 
introduction of collective forms of trading in Portugal was concerned. The disagreement 
among senior FEF staff contradicts the assumption easily made by critics and supporters 
of the international activities of Germany’s political foundations alike that 
democratisation programmes in transitional settings are set up, launched, executed and 
completed in an organisationally unanimous, internally unopposed and ideologically 
homogenous fashion. The former head of the FEF’s development research section 
Gunther Esters thought about a remodelling of the country’s agricultural economy along 
the conceptual lines of cooperative theories as being “far too complicated without any 
practical value for the situation in Portugal.”567 Indirectly echoing his concerns with a 
particular view on Portugal’s accession to the European Communities, the SPD 
Chairman of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Nutrition, Agriculture and Forestry 
remarked that
It has no relevance for the Common Agricultural Market, what type of private 
ownership -  cooperative company or individual farming -  dominates. It is important 
that after the transition process, the Portuguese agricultural sector will be competitive.568
565 Personal interview with Gerhard Fischer, Bonn, 25 April 2002.
566 Ibid (translation by author).
567 Personal interview with GUnther Esters, Bonn, 18 April 2002.
568 Martin Schmidt, ’Den Weg in eine dauerhafte Demokratie konnen Portugal und Spanien nur im Rahmen 
der EG finden’, Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, vol.33, no.217, 10 November 1978 (translation by 
author).
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Esters pointed at Mario Soares’s political goal to create a Socialist model democracy 
based on the Zionist concept of collective economic and social action as being the 
party’s driving force, which explained why the PS focused so determinedly on the 
transfer of know-how concerning agricultural cooperatives. “The model of cooperatives 
mirrored the Socialist nature of the revolution of carnations, but on the other hand 
Portugal was planning the accession to the European Communities where economic 
criteria rather than social engineering were decisive.”569 Esters was convinced that the 
cooperative policies, which were temporarily supported by the FEF, was used by Soares 
as an instrument to satisfy the demands and respond to the ideological expectations of 
the PS left. “The leadership of the PS was merely interested in strengthening the 
political position of the party, to lead the trade union sector against the Communists and 
to only superficially pay tribute to the principals of Socialist thinking.”570
In the realm of producer or consumer cooperatives, the FEF delivered political, 
economic, social and technical expertise through intermediary organisations, which 
were set-up in order to efficiently outsource research and consulting capacities and to 
hand over overall responsibility for projects and campaigns to the Foundation’s partner 
organisation in Portugal. Besides the Fundaqao Antonio Sergio, which served as an 
umbrella body and a controlling device for agricultural cooperative projects, the 
Portuguese consulting agency SERVCOOP was an example for such an intermediary 
organisation underneath the organisational level of a foundation. The company provided 
management-consulting services for consumer cooperatives in the Lisbon region and 
promoted mergers and organisational alliances between farming and consumer
c n  i
cooperatives on regional and national level. SERVCOOP was supposed to serve as a 
political instrument for PS ministers enabling them to introduce organisational 
initiatives and conceptual proposals outside of the ministerial apparatus. Furthermore, 
SERVCOOP provided legal aid, conducted research and offered consulting services 
with which it tried to prevent the infiltration of agricultural cooperatives by the extreme 
left. An internal FEF report stresses that “the statutes of the cooperatives need to be
569 Personal interview with Giinther Esters, Bonn, 18 April 2002.
570 Ibid..
571 AdsD, BFC, BN/1566, FEF Report on SERVCOOP.
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legally sealed against any attempts of Communist forces to take over the management of 
the cooperatives.” In order to create an effective shield against a silent PCP onslaught 
by moving into positions of responsibilities within the various cooperatives, 
SERVCOOP set up a study group, which would make the necessary legal
c n 'i
recommendations and implement them in all existing cooperatives.
More than two years after the failed coup d’etat of November 1975, Socialist 
politics on all levels appeared to be still in a state of constant alert concerning the 
possibility of a creeping invasion of Communist activists into public spaces and 
administrative positions. This explained repeated attempts by organisations such as 
SERVCOOP to filter out possible Communist influences. A comparable project was a 
survey produced in co-operation with the Portuguese Ministry for Agriculture and 
Fishing mapping out the respective cooperatives, in which Socialists, Social Democrats 
and Communists were exerting predominant influence. Since PS-dominated agricultural 
cooperatives had to compete with the PCP-leaning Soviet-style ko lkh oz  organisations 
for grants being made available by the Portuguese Ministry for Agriculture, 
SERVCOOP began advising cooperatives on the successful launch of grant applications.
Furthermore, the FEF organised seminars, which would provide platforms for 
the exchange of concepts and ideas were also part of SERVCOOP’s services. Among 
the seminar projects planned in 1978 was a seminar on cattle trade and marketing as 
well as a consumer cooperative seminar. The FEF being still the coordinating and 
politically driving force behind SERVCOOP intended to invite participants of the 
seminars to West Germany in order to provide them with additional know-how in 
follow-up events.574 Although the question of leadership within SERVCOOP rested 
officially in the hands of the PS secretariat, it appears safe to assume that the FEF 
retained a significant influence in the area of human resources. The calm yet determined 
remark of two FEF officials present at the discussion about the appointment of a new 
secretary-general of SERVCOOP after the resignation of PS politician Rui Mateus, that 
“we made it clear that our preference would be Eduardo Perreira” instead of the second
572 Ibid.
573 Ibid
574 Ibid
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candidate, PS treasurer Tito de Morais, may be seen as the subtle exercise of ‘guidance’ 
by the ‘paymaster’.575 In sum, the FEF’s help to set up SERVCOOP and to sponsor and 
organise a range of seminars on questions of agricultural management were intended to 
facilitate the transfer of ideas, concepts and expertise in order to empower Portuguese 
recipients of West German support to take full responsibility for the running of their 
new democracy. Like in previous situations, this aid for the transformation of the 
political and socio-economic infrastructure in transition countries was provided through 
non-multilateral channels by a nongovernmental organisation.
3.6. The FEF and Organised Labour
In order to further strengthen civil society, the FEF supported the establishment of a free 
trade union organisation from 1977 as part of its soft power-driven democracy 
promotion programme realising that the PS had failed to counterbalance the dominance 
of PCP cadres in the single labour union umbrella body Confederagao-Geral dos 
Trabalhadores -  Intersindical National. Repeated attempts to work towards politically 
more balanced union policies through the PS dominated carta aberta trade unions 
failed.576 Intersindical, although being a political product of the Caetano regime, 
appeared to be heavily infiltrated by Communist activists who had received thorough 
training in member countries of the Warsaw Pact and who had successfully penetrated 
the Salazarist union body. Consequently, the PCP turned out to be well prepared for the 
silent take-over of the majority of the 480 individual union organisations after the 
revolution of carnations while their Socialist competitors remained organisationally 
fragmented suffering from a significant lack of trained personnel. Many Socialists were 
also trapped in their belief of the importance of a unity of action and a collective front 
with the PCP with which they were allied during years in exile.577 In order to respond to 
the urgent need for trained PS cadres, the party decided to set up the worker’s 
commission in 1974 headed by prominent PS politician Marcelo Curto, which in due
575 Ibid.
576 German Embassy Lisbon, Report ‘Politischer Jahresbericht Portuga’, 1976, 7 February 1977, p.15. The 
West German union leader Heinz-Oskar Vetter (DGB) announced as early as July 1975 that his 
organisation was planning to support its Portuguese colleagues in their efforts to modernise corporate 
legislation and to launch co-operation in the field o f cooperative forms o f management, dpa, 2 July 1975.
577 AdsD, HEC, BN/0403, Interpretative report on the PCP by Hans Ulrich BUnger.
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course started to identify possible trade union activists in co-operation with the Centre 
for Trade Union Studies (CES). At the same time, the Auswartiges Amt urged the 
German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) to intensify its contacts with the 
Portuguese labour movement “with the declared aim to support democratic labour 
activists in their struggle with Communist forces.” 578 Permanent Secretary in the 
Foreign Office Walther Gehlhoff in correspondence with DGB Chairman Oskar Vetter 
suggested assistance through the invitation of Portuguese labour activists and trade 
union officials to West Germany followed by a visit of high-ranking FRG union 
delegates to Portugal. In Gehlhoff s opinion, such an exchange of labour representatives 
“would demonstrate to Portuguese workers that it is possible to have trade unions that 
are free and powerful” thus highlighting an alternative to the Communist-dominated 
labour organisations.579
At the time, the DGB had already taken action through the International 
Association of Free Trade Unions (IAFTU) assigning a member of its International 
Affairs Division shortly after 25 April 1974 to assist his Portuguese counterparts as part 
of an international team of experts in the creation of a democratic union movement.580 
Vetter clearly realised that “as in the area of political parties, it became quickly obvious 
in the area of labour representation too that the Communists were determined to 
maintain and expand their power positions.”581 However, the DGB leadership adopted a 
far more pessimistic view concerning the prospects for democratic change than party 
activists, political Foundations or Auswartiges Amt. Realising that Intersindical leaders 
manipulated institutional processes, ignored procedural regulations and constantly 
lobbied cabinet ministers and MFA officers in order to maintain the upper hand over 
their mostly Socialist critics, Vetter left others in no doubt that in his view it would 
prove difficult to organise “a democratic majority within Portugal’s union 
movement.” 582 Nevertheless, West Germany’s powerful trade union organisations 
remained committed to the strengthening of political pluralism within Portugal’s
578 PolArch/AA B26, 110.242, Letter Permanent Secretary Gehlhoff to DGB Chairman Ernst Vetter, 24
June 1975.
workforce “trying to avoid anything that could possibly be seen as co-operation with the 
Communist trade union leadership.”583
Two mutually exclusive principles were driving the conflict between PS and 
PCP and would ultimately lead to the establishment of the new union body, the Uniao- 
Geral de Trabalhadores Portugueses (UGT), namely the principle of unity of the labour 
union movement through legislative provision, which sought to maintain the primacy of 
Intersindical, and secondly, the principle of unity of the labour union movement through 
free vote of individual members, which was the option pursued by Socialist forces. The 
FEF was aware that if political developments within Intersindical remained 
unchallenged and “the Communists were allowed to hold the monopoly over political 
power, this would generate a dangerous concentration of power in the hands of 
Communist activists in co-operation with the PCP.”584 After the failed coup d’etat of 
former President Spinola, the PCP doubled its efforts to marginalize the role of its 
Socialist rival in the trade union movement not least through the union law passed by 
the III. Provisional Government on 27 April 1975. In the aftermath of the political 
showdown in November 1975, the Communists maintained their dominant position 
within Intersindical whereby the attempt to organise a congress of political parity, 
which would represent all union organisations failed.585 This was indeed surprising 
given the virulent accusations by democratic union activists that the Intersindical was 
actively involved in the coup d’etat of 25 November 1975. FEF liaison officer Btinger 
informed political decision-makers back home that various pamphlets circulating in 
leftist union circles in Portugal alleged that Intersindical had instructed workers in all 
industrial sectors to actively support “progressive militaries” by occupying key 
ministries, public institutions and companies.586
Being a potentially decisive institutional tool to ‘blackmail’ democratically 
elected governments in case of an exclusion of the PCP from governmental 
responsibility, a Communist dominated single union association like the Intersindical
583 Ibid.
584 Personal interview with Michael Dauderstadt, Bonn, 21 April 2002.
585 AdsD, HEC, BN/0403, Report on the PCP by Hans Ulrich Blinger.
586 Pol Arch/A A B26, 110.242, German Embassy Lisbon, Report (Hans-Ulrich Biinger) ‘Rolle der 
Gewerkschaften wahrend des Staatstreiches’, 12 December 1975.
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remained an incalculable risk for any long-term PS policies. The bitterly needed 
economic reform process for the necessary overhaul of Portugal’s economic structures 
came close to being a transitional Russian roulette with at least one Communist bullet in 
the political barrel. The FEF admitted, “It seems to be difficult to implement the 
necessary concept for economic recovery. It will mean hardship for the great majority of 
workers if these parts of the population are represented by a Communist single union 
organisation which at the same time sees itself as the Socialist government’s main 
adversary.” The congress of Portugal’s union organisations, which was organised by 
the Intersindical in January 1977, was declared to be representative of 80 percent of all 
Portuguese workers and employees. FEF analyst Btinger held a different view:
The Congress represented only 20-30 percent of the Portuguese workforce. The problem 
was that the non-Communist forces were incapable of mobilising the silent majority for 
its ends. There cannot be any doubt that the overwhelming majority of Portuguese 
workers are not Communist-orientated, something that is clearly documented by the 
election results.”588
In 1976, the legislative situation changed allowing for the establishment of competing 
union organisations. A new government initiative to change the law and to hold 
elections for worker representations as well as the legislative attempt to outlaw the 
collection of monthly membership fees from being by employers were widely perceived 
as measures to effectively curtail the influence of the Communists on Intersindical 
structures and policies. In 1977, the FEF helped to establish the Fundagao Jose Fontana 
in order “to promote the development of a democratic trade union movement” through 
“the training and dynamisation of union activists and functionaries.”589 The ambivalent 
attitude on the part of Portugal’s Socialists where “one dreamt of the unity of the 
working class on the one hand but would respond to the call for a single union 
organisation by suggesting to split the union movement in Portugal and to establish a
587 AdsD, BFC, BN-1566, Notes Federal Chancellery, ‘Politische Beziehungen mit Portugal’, 20 May 
1977.
588 AdsD, HEC, BN/0403, Report on the PCP by Hans Ulrich Btinger (translation by author).
589 cited in Rainer Eisfeld, Demokratischer Pluralismus, op.cit., p. 175.
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Socialist but non-Communist labour union on the other hand appeared to be slowly 
dissolving.”590
Portugal’s Socialists and West Germany’s Social Democrats finally decided to 
set up a new union organisation after acknowledging that the democratisation of 
Intersindical was not feasible.591 In order to secure the expertise of foreign trade union 
officials, the FEF arranged visits of leading members of the West German DGB to 
Portugal. The Foundation also sought to influence the legislative process in the 
Portuguese Parliament to ensure that trade union involvement remained without 
negative professional consequences for the activists.593 Furthermore, the FEF drafted a 
preliminary budget and provided Socialist union activists with a financial plan for the 
months ahead.594 As a result, in 1979 the UGT was founded which brought together 
Socialist party members and PSD activists and “broke the monopoly of Communists in 
the labour union sector”595. The new organisation was politically embraced by the PS 
party conference, which took place between 2 and 4 March 1979 in Lisbon. The SPD’s 
Veronika Isenberg remarked that although “support was not unanimous, the opponents 
of the UGT did not manage to formulate a convincing alternative and did not appear in 
great numbers.”596
3.7. Conclusions
This chapter has focused on a selected blend of issue areas to highlight the FEF’s 
transnational assistance during the phase of democratic consolidation in Portugal. The 
Foundation strengthened pluralist structures within Portugal’s state-run media by
590 Personal interview with Gunther Esters, Bonn, 18 April 2002. Nevertheless, co-operation between SPD, 
FEF and PS cadres did not always develop smoothly and some West German observers expressed their 
frustration that “despite our relentless efforts to point out the importance of intensified union activism [...] 
everything came to a standstill before it had even started.” AdsD, WBC, BN-131, Note Hans-Eberhard 
Dingels, 13 June 1978.
591 SPD parliamentarians Uwe Holtz and Gunther Schluckebier reported upon return from a visit to 
Portugal: “The Communist union organisation is aware of the genesis o f a democratic rival.” Associated 
Press, 19 August 1977.
592 Personal interview with Gerhard Fischer, Bonn, 25 April 2002. In 1976, the Metalworkers Union IG 
Metall organised a seminar on organised labour representation in Germany for which it invited twenty 
Socialist union activists. AdsD, WBC, BN/45, Letter Eugen Loderer to Willy Brandt, 8 March 1976.
593 Ibid.
594 Ibid.
595 Ibid.
596 AdsD, BFC, BN/1537, Notes Veronika Isenberg, 12 March 1979.
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providing media consultants to help diversify programming and by organising seminars 
and study trips for Portuguese journalists. The latter were intended to have Portuguese 
media workers familiarise themselves with the workings and management of a 
democratic press thus enabling them to scrutinise government action on behalf of civil 
society. Furthermore, the FEF responded to the scarcity of research institutions by 
establishing the IED think tank, which conducted studies, organised seminars and 
advised a range of PS parliamentarians on social and economic policies. Thirdly, the 
Foundation supported Mario Soares’s efforts to establish a network of non-Communist 
producer cooperatives in the agricultural sector and fourthly, traditionally strongly 
represented in the area of trade union activism, West Germany’s Social Democracy was 
the ideal partner for co-operation in the labour sector. The FEF with its transnational 
channels of political communication and its international network of contacts was an 
obvious choice to assist Portugal’s Socialist forces with the creation of a non- 
Communist union organisation. Soft power was played out by supplying knowledge, 
expertise and information and through channels that connected FEF and SPD as 
nonstate actors with Portuguese civil society. The experienced West German union 
movement was a powerful ally and Portugal’s union activists could only benefit from 
the vast experience and professional know-how that its West German partners were able 
to muster. Within Portugal’s framework of democratic consolidation, the power to 
“convince with ideas and policies” (Nye) and the ability to attract foreign elites to 
certain conceptual approaches and models of political problem-solving were seen as the 
most promising way to shape West Germany’s regional milieu in Southern Europe. It 
was obviously desirable for the Federal Republic’s ruling Social Democrats to help 
develop socio-economic structures in Portugal largely compatible with the ones at 
home. Thus any soft power-driven contribution to “generate Social Democratic ideas” in 
the target country and to help creating a Social Democratic environment in Portugal by 
facilitating the creation of a Socialist union organisation would “pay high dividends and 
yet be a moral credit” (Wolfers) to West Germany’s foreign policy makers.
The proponents of the Machtvergessenheit narrative maintain that foreign policy 
behaviour driven by self-interest and the determination to actively influence 
international developments was only rudimentarily developed in Bonn’s diplomatic
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circles. However, the FRG’s informal diplomacy during the Portuguese transition 
suggested otherwise. The FEF’s democracy promotion activities showed that the SPD- 
led West German Government was determined to influence the future shape of 
Portugal’s socio-economic and political system in a way that ensured compatibility with 
the Federal Republic’s own structural make-up. Soft power was being channelled via the 
FRG’s transnational agencies of democracy promotion (Stiftungeri) and sought to 
contribute to the genesis of democratic institutions in post-authoritarian Portugal such as 
IED and UGT and the strengthening of their resource base. At the same time, Bonn’s 
national interest required that institutions and structures in the transition country 
resembled West German institutions and structures as much as possible. Therefore, 
neither the idea of a total ‘forgetfulness of power’ with an altruistically-driven foreign 
policy nor the notion of an exclusively multilaterally operated diplomacy are sufficient 
analytical tools to explain the concept of power in the FRG’s external relations. The 
case of regime change in Portugal illustrates the fact that rather than being lost, German 
power was subjected to a re-configuration after the Second World War, which 
profoundly lessened the importance of coercion in the pursuit of its foreign policy 
largely replacing confrontative means and strategies with the power generated by its 
post-war ideas, values and concepts. Instead of the formerly often loutish diplomatic 
appearance of Germans on the international stage, a largely persuasion-based and limber 
approach to international affairs had taken centre stage ‘selling’ the values and concepts 
of political pluralism, consensual forms of dispute resolution in industrial relations and 
the stabilising effects of the FRG’s constitutional framework in foreign societies 
undergoing transitions from authoritarianism. Not long after the overthrow of the 
Salazarist regime in Lisbon, its northern neighbour Spain began its long walk to 
democracy with the death of dictator Francisco Franco in November 1975 as the 
transition’s prelude. The next chapter will therefore examine the FEF’s role in the 
Spanish process of regime change thus enabling the analysis to approach political 
developments in the Iberian Peninsula as part of a broader geographical context.
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Chapter 4
Pursuing Soft Power Politics III: The Friedrich-Ebert 
Foundation in Spain 1976-1981
“The money that flows 
into the pockets of 
Spanish Socialists does 
not emanate from the 
Ebro, nor out o f the 
Guadalquivir or from 
any other ordinary 
Spanish river but out of 
the waters o f the far 
German Rhine.”597
4.1. Introduction
After the previous chapter has explored the non-multilateral dimension of West 
Germany’s foreign policy with its employment of soft power during Portugal’s phase of 
democratic consolidation, this chapter continues the analysis of the modality of West 
Germany’s foreign policy i.e. the way the Federal Republic operationalised its external 
relations during the Cold War era with an examination of the Spanish case of 
democratisation. It will again look at the interplay between the FRG’s state diplomacy 
and the FEF’s transnationally pursued informal diplomacy the latter resting the bulk of 
its democracy promotion activities on ‘softer’ forms of power with their operational pre­
disposition towards attraction and co-option. Again using a Social Democratic prism 
through which to exemplify the workings of Bonn’s diplomacy, the chapter will show 
how West German experiences with challenges of democratisation and its ideas, values 
and policies guided the FRG’s persuasion-based soft power interventionism in Spain. It 
will illuminate the close political co-operation between the Spanish Socialist Workers 
Party (PSOE) and West Germany’s ruling Social Democrats, an institutional connection 
that appears to be strongly redolent of the SPD-FEF-PS axis during the Portuguese
597 Spanish Communist Party leader Santiago Carillo as quoted in Walter Haubrich, ’Was hat der 
Bundeskanzler denn mit “Entesa dels Catalans'* zu tun? -  Die Deutschen im spanischen W ahlkam pf, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 28 February 1979 (translation by author).
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transition. After examining the FEF’s efforts to help broadening PSOE’s resource base 
and preparing the Spanish partner organisation for future elections (see 4.3.and 4.4.), the 
focus will be on the Foundation’s support for PSOE-affiliated actors such as the Union 
General de Trabajadores (UGT) (see 4.5.) and its involvement in the constitution- 
building process from 1977 (see 4.8). The contextual similarities to the Portuguese 
theatre of regime change are obvious and belie the realist allegation of a foreign policy 
stripped of national interest considerations. In both transition cases, bi-polarity and 
superpower confrontation led Western powers including the FRG to see Communist 
parties and their expansionist tendencies as the biggest menace to regional security. 
Hence in Spain as well as in Portugal, both tiers of West Germany’s foreign policy -  
state and sub-state, multilateral and transnational -  were geared towards preventing the 
Partido Comunista Portugues (PCP) and the Partido Comunista de Espana (PCE) from 
occupying crucial power positions during the transition and beyond. Like in Portugal, 
FEF (and other political foundations) backed by the West German Government sought 
to curb Communist influence by establishing counter-hegemony through the support for 
Felipe Gonzalez’s PSOE. It will become clear that besides the area of regional security, 
West Germany’s national interest was also guided by criteria of wealth maximisation, 
which required decision-makers in government, party and foundations to ensure the 
future compatibility of German and Spanish economic structures. This chapter will 
highlight the channels through which FEF diplomacy promoted the creation of a socially 
regulated market economy, the principle of a social partnership in industrial relations, 
the build-up of a strong Socialist labour movement and the drafting process of Spain’s 
democratic constitution the latter safeguarding basic human rights, the principle of 
private property and strongly decentralised structures.
4.2. The International Context o f  the Spanish Transition
Veteran German foreign correspondent Walter Haubrich who covered Iberian affairs for
more than thirty years for the prestigious German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
and who extensively commented on the transitions in Southern Europe noted in his 
acclaimed account of “Spain’s difficult path to freedom”:
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More than twenty years after the downfall of the dictatorship, a number of politicians 
and other contemporaries of the transition still alive produce some palliating accounts 
of these events, which assign the different political roles incorrectly. Relying on the 
short historical memory of the Spanish people, this eventually reaches the point of 
downright falsification of history. By creating a myth around the transition, they 
celebrate certain politicians involved and exaggerate their own role. It appears that part 
of this phenomenon is the desire to forget or deny the support one received from abroad 
whereby politicians and correspondents, political parties and foundations and other 
organisations especially from Germany have contributed significantly to the success of 
the transition. The support of the Europeans for Spanish democrats robbed the right- 
wing enemies of democratisation, which still held de-facto political power of their most 
important argument, namely that Spain would be right on track into chaos and 
Communism. 98
Indeed, Haubrich’s journalistic analysis hints at the important role, which the 
international environment played for Spain’s structural transformation during its 
transition from authoritarianism. International actors provided platforms for political 
dialogue bitterly needed in a society that had experienced deep social divisions ever 
since the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936. Haubrich’s remarks highlighted the 
widespread symptom of ‘national amnesia’ concerning outside support for Spain’s 
democrats. Just as Philippe Schmitter with his assertion of the overwhelming primacy of 
domestic factors for course, speed and success of transition periods in the scholarly 
realm, a significant number of Spanish politicians and intellectuals in the public realm 
frequently stressed the exclusive responsibility of Spanish actors for the establishment 
of democratic structures. These commentators outrightly rejected any notion of 
noteworthy logistical, financial and political support obtained from foreign 
democrats.599 During the Spanish transition about which the FEF resident representative 
in Madrid Dieter Koniecki once said that during its heydays there “was hardly a chair to 
sit on in the offices of the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE), which I had not 
paid for”600, the dependency of domestic democratic parties on foreign support was a 
natural consequence in a process, in which political actors with experience, expertise
598 Walter Haubrich, Spaniens schwieriger Weg in die Freiheit: Von der Diktatur zur Demokratie, (vol.2, 
1975-1977), p. 10 (translation by author).
599 Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain’, in Guillermo O ’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead (eds.) 
Transitions from  Authoritarian Rule -  Southern Europe, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
1986), p.
600 Personal interview with Dieter Koniecki, Madrid, 5 April 2003.
191
and financial resources supported those with an only theoretical knowledge of 
democracy in action. Drawing from its experiences during the Portuguese transition, the 
FEF in its soft power approach focused on political bridge-building, identified the most 
effective multiplying factors for translating the results of its democracy promotion 
projects into civic education and facilitated vital contacts between forces of the old 
regime and Spain’s new political actors. The former deputy Chairman of the Partido 
Socialista del Interior (PSI) and recipient of the FEF’s political aid Raul Morodo 
remembered:
At the end, the international Foundations played a very important role. Not so much 
economically but politically. They provided legitimacy and served as fora for bilateral 
relations and assistance. One needs to acknowledge that all of the Foundations within 
their respective political limitations played a very positive role in the preparation of 
democracy. And generally, they appeared to be discrete and did not act like doctrinal 
supervisors or political orientadores”60]
As in the Portuguese case, soft power was employed for the realisation of milieu goals 
i.e. the creation of an international environment, which would be conducive to close 
bilateral relations between the Federal Republic and a future Spanish democracy. The 
transnationally operated foreign policy strategy sought to co-opt or, as Gramscians 
would define it, to ‘socialise’ future democratic elites by helping to facilitate the 
emergence of a moderate left-of-centre political realm. In order to achieve the future 
political dominance of PSOE, soft power actor FEF in co-operation with SPD and West 
German Government had to strengthen, develop and improve its partner’s organisational 
structure, boost its financial potency and train its cadres to ensure Socialist 
competitiveness at the polls. The ‘power of attraction’ (Nye) was in fact a ‘power of 
conception’ and West German policies, ideas and concepts had to be ‘sold’ to Spain’s 
future decision-makers to achieve the highest possible compatibility between the two 
polities.
601 Raul Morodo, Atando Cabos: Memorias de un conspirador moderado, (Taurus, Madrid 2001), p.484 
(translation by author).
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4.3. FEF Office in Madrid, January -  June 1976
The Foundation’s democracy promotion activities in Spain became an almost tailor- 
made political project for a single individual -  the FEF resident representative in Madrid 
Dieter Koniecki, a former activist of the West German Liberal Students Association in 
Berlin. While on FEF assignment in Mexico, Koniecki was asked by Willy Brandt and 
SPD Finance Minister Hans Matthofer in 1975 to help open a Foundation office in 
Spain in order to co-ordinate and develop FEF activities and to oversee the Foundation’s 
support for the still exiled PSOE. Koniecki could draw from his vast experience as a 
political campaigner -  “not a political trainee anymore” as Willy Brandt used to say -  
and his fluency in Spanish proved to be an invaluable asset besides his outstanding 
organisational talent. In addition to his role as FEF country representative, he would be 
later remembered many of those involved in FEF-sponsored constitution-building 
conferences as the “permanent link between the German SPD and the Spanish PSOE, 
and the main channel for the German financing of the latter.”604
Koniecki also possessed various personal contacts to exiled Spanish political 
activists, a network he had developed during his time in Mexico. What exactly his 
mission was supposed to achieve was by his own recollection the great unknown in 
Social Democratic circles and among those who sent him. Koniecki remained officially 
on assignment in Mexico until August 1976 and pointed out that before any political co­
operation between FEF and PSOE could be conceptualised and implemented, the 
Foundation had to overcome serious bureaucratic hurdles convincing the Spanish 
authorities to let the West German nonstate actor establish an office in Madrid. “Under 
those circumstances it was necessary to solve a number of formal problems in order to 
ensure the legality of co-operation with social organisations, which were not officially 
recognised at that time.”605 In this context, the FEF’s worldwide network of contacts 
turned out to be of particular usefulness for West Germany’s sub-state diplomacy in 
Spain. The Foundation maintained lines of communication with the Spanish Minister of
602 Personal interview with Dieter Koniecki, Madrid, 5 April 2003.
603 Ibid.
604 Personal correspondence with Antonio Bar Cendon, 19 June 2006.
605 Dieter Koniecki, ‘Actividades de la Fundacion Friedrich Ebert en Espaha a traves de su oficina en 
Madrid’, in 20Afios de la Fundacion Friedrich Ebert en Espaha, (Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, 1996), p.21.
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the Interior and leading regime soft-liner Manuel Fraga Iribame ever since he was 
Franco’s Ambassador at the Court of St. James.606 In January 1976, Koniecki began 
talks with the Spanish Ministry of the Interior during which the West German Embassy 
and FRG Ambassador Georg von Lilienfeldt initiated the contacts.607 Fraga expressed 
his suspicion concerning the Foundation’s proposed Iberian activities telling Koniecki 
“the FEF in its international projects usually concentrates on developing countries, 
which makes it difficult to understand its interest in Spain.”608
In personal conversations, Fraga asked Koniecki with whom the FEF was 
planning to politically co-operate only to find Koniecki replying that he contemplated 
entering into partnership projects with the still outlawed labour union UGT and the 
equally banned PSOE. Koniecki reminded the minister that a Socialism a la PSOE was 
certainly more acceptable than the Socialist model Libyan-style with which he hinted at 
the ideological coquetries of Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) Chairman Tiemo 
Galvan’s Mediterranean Socialism.609 The message was unambiguous: The political 
situation in Spain was about to change fundamentally and sooner or later the 
government had to allow opposition forces to enter the political arena. By allowing for a 
co-ordinated re-admission of those political parties that promised to play the transitional 
game by the rules which the government had set thus ensuring stability and political 
order during the interim phase, Fraga on behalf of the Spanish Government would retain 
a maximum of control and secure influence on the emergence of pluralist structures.610
606 Personal interview with Dieter Koniecki, Madrid, 5 April 2003.
607 Ibid.
608 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF Report, ’Uber meine Aktivitaten in Madrid’, Dieter Koniecki, 28.1 bis 20 
March 1976. The exact classification of the country in overall terms of economic strength, social standards 
and political stability was indeed crucial for FEF democracy promotion projects since approval o f funding 
depended on the status of the target society as part of the developing world. Spain was classified as a 
developing country in political terms and was therefore eligible for funding by the West German Ministry 
for Economic Co-operation and International Development (BMZ) with an only minimal influence of the 
Auswartiges Amt on FEF activities, Personal interview with Dieter Koniecki, Madrid, 5 April 2003.
609 Ibid..
6,0 According to Koniecki, the FEF criticised him strongly for his frankness in his approach during his 
conversation with Fraga. The regular contacts between him and the Interior Minister were synonym for 
something the West German weekly Die Zeit described as the impossibility o f Bonn’s foreign policy to 
operate without maintaining contacts to governmental institutions as well as opposition forces. The 
newspaper described the task for West Germany’s foreign policy as stabilising Spain’s transition by 
providing a political framework that incorporated and accommodated both power holders and power 
contenders. This would lead in turn to a “division of labour” between Federal Government as a whole and 
the majority party. Die Zeit, 10 October 1975. On governmental level, West Germany’s Foreign Minister
Despite the constructive atmosphere of the talks, Fraga did not make a final decision 
until 15 February 1976, when Koniecki informed FEF headquarters that “because of 
Minister Fraga and his positive political attitude towards support for the opening of 
formal activities of the FEF, the establishment of a Foundation office in the near future 
seems to be likely.”611 Koniecki suggested a two-step approach to organise FEF projects 
in the Iberian country. During the first phase until June 1976, the FEF office in Madrid 
had to be set-up whereby it was suggested that renting and furnishing of the office could 
begin earlier. The second step was to launch political projects of democracy promotion. 
“The actual public seminar programme and those measures required for its set-up - 
unknown to the public -  are supposed to start from 1 January 1977. Until then, there 
will be sufficient time to think about the most appropriate form of accreditation for the 
FEF, which will depend not least on the question of the legalisation of PSOE and the 
institutions affiliated with it such as the Fundacion Pablo Iglesias.”612
Fraga, who had previously served as Franco’s Information Minister was about to 
establish himself as the “liberal leader of the political centre” and tried to rid himself of 
the image of being “an authoritarian, short tempered and quickly punishing” 
Francoist. He was promptly invited to visit the FEF headquarters in Bonn where the
Hans-Dietrich Genscher echoed Koniecki’s earlier thoughts on regime liberalisation while holding talks 
with Fraga during his consultations in Madrid in April 1975. Genscher expressed his belief that an early 
opening of the political system would be far-sighted and that this would ensure a smooth transition to a 
stable democracy. “Nothing would be more dangerous than being faced with regime change unprepared.” 
Genscher emphasised that the example o f Portugal demonstrated that democratic parties and unions had to 
be given a chance to operate legally if Communists were not to dominate the opposition in illegality. 
Siiddeuische Zeitung, 5 April 1975. SPD foreign policy spokesman Bruno Friedrich bluntly rejected an end 
to political communication with the Spanish Government arguing that the authoritarian regime would 
eventually collapse anyway and that large parts o f Spanish society are not under the control of the 
government anymore. Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 October 1975.
6.1 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF Report on the preparatory measures for the opening o f an FEF office in 
Madrid, 15 February 1976. FEF Managing Director Gunther Grunwald and Foundation Chairman Alfred 
Nau announced the opening of an FEF office in Spain at a press conference in Madrid. Officially, the FEF 
described its activities in Spain as/^organising courses for citizen education” and the creation o f a 
scholarship programme with which Spanish students should be enabled to study at universities in Spain and 
West Germany, ddp, 18 February 1976.
6.2 Ibid. The Fundacion Pablo Iglesias (FPI) focused on the three subject areas o f research, training and 
documentation, but used its resources predominantly to provide support for PSOE’s parliamentary work.
613 Walter Haubrich, ’Der neue Fraga’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 December 1975; Fraga 
described his role in the government from 1962 to 1969 as the attempt td^develop in my position as 
Information Minister the kind of liberalisation that would have made a transition/easier”. DNSA/KT 01885, 
Memorandum of Conversation, 25 January 1976.
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Foundation introduced him to its international programme.614 The visit was considered 
to be “very positive” and Fraga’s private secretary Carlos Argos Garcia subsequently 
informed FEF officer Koniecki in March 1976 that he could apply for a residence permit 
for him and his family “without having to expect difficulties.”615 The FEF office in 
Madrid was officially opened in April 1976 and Koniecki proceeded to enter what he 
retrospectively coined the “institutionalisation phase.”616
4.4. Party Management and Electoral Assistance
In order to speedily, adequately and effectively tackle the organisational and structural 
deficits of PSOE caused by decades of exile and clandestine existence, the FEF drew 
from the experience of those staff that had previously assisted Mario Soares and his PS 
in the summer of 1975. Former FEF campaign manager in Portugal Klaus Wettig 
advised his colleagues in Spain “the result of our involvement in Portugal should be that 
we start preparations in Spain for the era after Franco now and that we try to avoid the 
deficiencies and shortcomings of our work in Portugal”617. The FEF together with its 
Spanish partner developed the concept of an “Action Plan for the Establishment of a 
Nation-Wide Organisational Structure for PSOE.” Koniecki correctly observed that
The current epoch which is characterised by a wild jostling of illustrious personalities on 
the vanity fair outbidding themselves with ideas and attributes vis-a-vis one another and 
in front of an audience that gets tired very quickly appears to be simply a short-lived 
transition towards a situation, in which only those groups will survive that possess solid 
organisational structures besides strong personalities.618
614 Ibid.
615 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF Report, ’Ober meine Aktivitaten in Madrid, 28. Januar bis 20. Marz 1976’, 
Dieter Koniecki.
616 Dieter Koniecki, ‘Actividades de la Fundacion Friedrich Ebert en Espafia a traves de su oficina en 
Madrid’, op.cit., p.22.
6,7 AdsD, BFC, BN/1537, FEF Report ‘Ober die Situation in Portugal’ (Klaus Wettig), 7 May 1975. 
Wettig’s report was intended to be a/^flianual and guide for transitional activities in Spain" and 
subsequently submitted to the Circle o f  Six (Sechserkreis). Personal interview with Klaus Wettig, 
Gottingen, 23 October 2003. On the other hand, some observers such as prominent SPD politician Hans 
Matthdfer questioned the usefulness o f any comparison between Spain and Portugal. Matthdfer was 
convinced that “Spain is completely different from Portugal. The armed forces have not lost a war, Spain 
has completely different social structures, a different mentality and different party structure. I think one 
needs to see developments in Spain in a different light.” ZDF Bonner Perspektiven, 28 March 1976.
618 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF Report, ’Uber meine Aktivitaten in Madrid, 28. Januar bis 20. Marz 1976’ 
by Dieter Koniecki (translation by author).
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Especially the upcoming general elections scheduled for 1976 caused PSOE leader 
Felipe Gonzalez and the FEF to want to provide the Socialist party with a solid 
organisational framework in order to remain competitive as a serious contender for 
future governmental responsibility in the new democracy.619 During an initial phase of 
two years, the FEF would help PSOE to establish a network of 27 identification centres 
dotted over all of Spain’s provinces each of them managed by a newly appointed 
organisational administrator. The administrators were to be full-time party staff and took 
up their duties in April 1976. Furthermore, the Action Plan provided for the creation of a 
PSOE Press, Media and Campaign Office, which also opened on 1 April while operating 
under a different name. Also, an institutional strengthening of the PSOE-affiliated union 
movement UGT featured high on the agenda outlined by the FEF-PSOE catalogue of 
rapid-reaction measures. Koniecki himself organised the necessary training 
programmes for the organisational administrators, which were supposed to take place in 
the West German city of Mannheim. Koniecki subsequently travelled through Spain 
accompanied by a PSOE official to visit all of the party’s provincial committees and to 
supervise the newly trained administrative teams.
The Action Plan envisaged the start of project-based co-operation for 1977 with
ff) 1an initial duration of five years. Koniecki stressed a number of important measures in 
his conceptual outline for a long-term FEF involvement. Since Spain’s provincial and 
administrative structure were likely to change because of the passing of new electoral 
legislation, PSOE had to have 46 instead of the originally planned 27 provincial centres 
and an equal number of organisational administrators. This meant an additional financial 
burden that needed to be compensated for by budgetary discipline in other areas. 
Koniecki expected that in order to maintain the organisational structure for party offices 
in 46 provinces the required monthly sum would come up to DM 120.000 (ca. £40.000) 
for salaries, technical equipment and public relations material. He therefore emphasised
619 The Action Plan or ’Catalogue o f Priorities’ was discussed during a visit o f FEF Managing Director 
Gunther Grunwald and FEF-Chairman Alfred Nau and approved by PSOE and UGT. AdsD, BFC, 
BN/1540, FEF Report, ’Uber meine Aktivitaten in Madrid, 28. Januar bis 20 Marz 1976’, (Dieter 
Koniecki).
620 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF Report ‘Uber die vorbereitenden Massnahmen zur Eroffhung eines FES- 
Biiros in Madrid’, 15 February 1976.
621 Ibid.
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the importance of high-profile projects -  “neutral” seminars, scholarships etc. - which 
the FEF would have to organise and which would prove to be useful to explore potential 
areas of political activities and to identify possible partners for co-operation. Koniecki 
was aware that the Foundation’s soft power-driven strategy based on the supply of 
knowledge, expertise and information required channels through which political know­
how could be transferred. He therefore underlined the crucial importance of the creation 
of intermediary organisations to organise seminars, training courses and to provide other 
platforms for political communication with a low public profile. These officially 
independent institutions would provide political cover behind which FEF involvement 
would attract considerably less attention in the Spanish public.622 Koniecki wrote: “In 
future, the party needs contacts to those organisations which are not seen as 
‘organically’ belonging to PSOE.”623 In this context, he mentioned the Fundacion Pablo 
Iglesias and a number of private organisations in the field of adult education as possible 
partners for Spain’s Socialists. However, precise planning and a reliable strategic 
conceptualisation were difficult undertakings since transitional challenges arose 
unexpectedly and on very short notice. Koniecki stressed the importance for the FEF to 
ensure that despite the transitional uncertainties the maintenance of PSOE’s newly 
established organisational structure would be guaranteed. Only two people were fully 
informed about the exact scope and nature of political co-operation between FEF and 
PSOE -  Felipe Gonzalez and his secretary-general Alfonso Guerra. Koniecki writes:
For obvious reasons the number of persons completely familiar with the concrete form 
of our involvement is kept as small as possible. Seminars are organised under the 
participation of Prof. Luis Gomez Llorente. The other members of the PSOE executive 
know in principal about our contribution of solidarity but not about the exact amounts 
invested and specific forms chosen.624
622 The new Spanish legislation on party financing would soon outlaw foreign financial support for party 
political actors. Foundations on the other hand were not affected by the new legal situation so that FEF 
support channels would simply be re-directed but not lastingly disturbed. Personal interview with Dieter 
Koniecki, Madrid, 5 April 2003.
623 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF Report ‘Ober die vorbereitenden Massnahmen zur Eroffnung eines FES- 
Biiros in Madrid’, 15 February 1976.
624 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF Report,fj&ber meine Aktivitaten in Madrid, 28.Januar bis 20. Marz 1976’, 
Dieter Koniecki (translation by author).L/
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A commission was set up in order to monitor the use of funds by PSOE’s executive. It 
was not authorised to publish its findings and it could not question the origins of 
financial support unless they would have been illegally obtained. In the same way in 
which the secrecy and discretionary nature of FEF involvement was squeamishly upheld 
through the measures described above, the accounting procedure for the use of FEF 
funds was designed to ensure the low profile and behind-the-scenes operational mode of 
the West German Foundation. Firstly, the party official on the PSOE executive board 
responsible for liaising with the FEF resident representative had to issue a receipt over a 
particular project-related sum, which was listed in the budget. At a later stage, the PSOE 
official had to submit the receipts either as photocopies or as original documents and to 
send them to PSOE Secretary-General Alfonso Guerra.
Thereby one avoids that the provincial identification centres are becoming objects for 
speculation about the exact origins of the money and that one could make the argument 
about an outside interference in internal Spanish affairs. On the other hand, it ensures a 
precise and project-con form use of FEF funds which will subsequently convince the 
German taxpayer that the money is used in a correct way and had been fully accounted 
for.626
At this early stage, Social Democratic democracy promotion and the mobilisation of soft 
power for the support of democratic parties required the FEF to grant material assistance 
and to cover PSOE’s expenses. Koniecki requested immediate financial assistance to 
pay the wages of twelve PSOE caseworkers and to purchase furniture and equipment for
ff)*7the PSOE election and media office and for UGT headquarters. For future co­
operation, he identified seven issue areas in which the Foundation should launch 
democratisation projects. First, a wide range of seminars was to deal predominantly with 
PSOE’s organisational techniques. Secondly, the FEF intended to target centres of 
research in the academic field. The Faculties of Sociology and Political Science at the 
Autonomous University of Madrid were of particular importance. The consulting 
institute Consulta, which was managed by PSOE staff was named as a future partner for
625 Ibid.
626 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF Report ‘Uber die vorbereitenden Massnahmen zur Eroffhung eines FES- 
Bttros in Madrid’, 15 February 1976 (translation by author).
627 Ibid
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political co-operation with the FEF office in Madrid and provided political analyses. 
Thirdly, the Foundation proposed the establishment of a scholarship programme 
although with an only limited financial endowment. Koniecki believed that stipends 
appeared to be a measure “generally accepted by the Spanish public”. They were 
intended “to safeguard and partly “disguise” other measures.” Fourthly, the FEF 
planned to set up a small library in order to introduce visitors to the activities of the 
Foundation and to didactically prepare and implement seminars. Political analyses and 
monitoring, the maintaining of contacts and communication with key political 
personalities in the host country as well as the organisation of visits by high-profile 
politicians from West Germany was to supplement the FEF agenda in the foreseeable 
transition period.629
In March 1976, Koniecki warned of serious logistical problems for PSOE in the 
face of the new Law of Political Associations to be passed by the Cortes. This 
legislation allowed only a limited number of political groups to participate in municipal 
and general elections. Koniecki predicted the legislative process to be a long-lasting 
procedure that would require a constitutional amendment before any political 
association would be allowed to enter the political arena. Since members of the 
corporatist pseudo-parliamentary Cortes would have to vote in favour of their own 
disappearance from the political stage by constitutional amendment, the timeline for the 
new law would likely be stretched out indefinitely. Even if parliamentary deputies 
would pass the law quickly, it would take another two to three months until the final 
decision on any admission of political associations would be made. This would 
consequently create a situation in which a party unknown to large segments of society 
could not organise itself effectively before July 1976. Given that the municipal elections 
were scheduled for November of the same year, this meant a serious setback for any
628 Ibid. One of the beneficiaries o f the FEF scholarship programme was Eduardo Foncillas who later 
became the Spanish Ambassador in Bonn and who was one o f the politically best-connected interlocutors 
for the Foundation. His outstanding professional career in the diplomatic service illustrates how the 
operational FEF approach to identify multiplying factors and future key players worked in practice. Being 
Felipe Gonzalez’ representative in Bonn with excellent links to FEF and SPD, Foncillas was predestined to 
interconnect the sub-governmental with the governmental level and to promote bilateral relations between 
the two countries in a rather unique way. Personal interview with Dieter Koniecki, 5 April 2003.
629 Ibid
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electoral preparations.630 Ironically, the man who finally approved of the FEF’s 
presence in Spain enabling the Foundation to establish itself as PSOE’s most important 
foreign partner, Interior Minister Fraga Iribame, prepared himself for a future political 
career in the new and democratically legitimised Spanish political system by launching 
his own electoral platform GODSA (Gabinete de Orientacion y  de Documentation). 
Fraga’s attempt to split the heterogeneous opposition and to present himself as a new 
strong party leader who could guarantee law, stability and an orderly transition into a 
new era was likely to benefit from GODSA’s organisational advantage in the context of 
the new legislation. Commenting on the emerging competition with Fraga’s party, 
Koniecki remarked, “Our partners who are still very much trapped in a form of 
catacomb thinking can learn a great deal.”631 Foreseeing the stabilising effect an active 
democratic participation of the “reasonable right” would have, he even admitted that
For the sake of a non-violent transition from a dictatorial regime to democracy one 
should wish them (i.e. GODSA) success. In the long run, a tenser social and economic 
climate of crisis would not be beneficial for our political partners and for a genuinely 
progressive Spain.632
In summary, one can say that during the initial phase of the Spanish transition, the FEF 
in its utilisation of soft power concentrated on the strengthening of PSOE’s 
organisational structures to help the Socialist party launch a successful bid for political 
power in the newly emerging democratic system. Drawing from its expertise in the area 
of party management and electoral assistance, the Foundation aided efforts to establish a 
nationwide network of PSOE offices, trained and paid party functionaries and 
adminstrators and set up a PSOE Media and Campaign Office. It thus sought to 
influence the process of political socialisation, which a part of Spain’s new political elite 
experienced, through the transfer of knowledge, concepts and ideas on a transnational
630 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF Report, ’Ober meine Aktivitaten in Madrid’, 28. Januar bis 20. M2rz 1976’. 
op.cit.
631 Koniecki repeatedly emphasised the difficulties of transforming the specific ‘cell thinking’ caused by 
decades o f clandestinity on the part o f PSOE and UGT into a more ‘relaxed’, open-minded and less 
distrustful attitude, which would not affect the organisation’s daily political work. He stressed that the 
mentality o f “being feeling responsible for everything and anything” was prevalent among Socialists 
because throughout their exiled existence they could not implement any o f their political goals.” Personal 
interview with Dieter Koniecki, 5 April 2003.
622Ibid  (translation by author).
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level. In a next step, the FEF focused on the area of organised labour and the support for 
the Socialist union organisation UGT.
4.5. FEF and Organised Labour
The Union General de Trabajadores (UGT) was ideologically positioned in close 
proximity to PSOE and received financial, logistical and political backing from the FEF. 
The Foundation convinced the UGT leadership to establish a private Foundation -  the 
Fundacidn Largo Caballero (FLC) - in order to simplify technical aspects of co­
operation between West German Social Democrats and Spanish unionists as well as to 
outsource responsibilities and tasks to an officially independent but politically affiliated 
organisation. The FEF worked regularly with the FLC (as well as with the newly 
established party foundation Fundacidn Pablo Iglesias (FPI) organising a total of 20 
seminars between 1977 and 1978. Its Madrid office estimatecfthat the seminars reached 
approximately 2000 individuals during the first six months of 1977 while additional 
print material and brochures were distributed to an even broader range of individuals. 
The transitional connection between UGT and FEF as well as between the Spanish 
unionists and the West German DGB began with the visit by an UGT delegation and 
some PSOE officials to West Germany in July 1973. The delegation met with DGB- 
Chairman Oskar Vetter, who suggested that the West German union movement could 
provide financial assistance to cover the salaries of three full-time UGT employees 
assigned to the important job of printing and publishing union pamphlets, flyers and 
placards.634
Although the Germans certainly realised that it was not only an urgent challenge 
to assist UGT in its fight against the Communist labour union organisation Comissiones 
Obreras (CC.OO.) but also in the best interest of Socialism in Spain, the 1973 meeting 
did not bring about any concrete and binding decisions concerning possible DGB 
support for its Spanish counterpart. SPD, FEF and DGB as the three columns of West 
Germany’s Social Democracy were concerned about the unity of Socialist forces in 
Spain and demanded a guarantee that PSOE and UGT would adopt a collective
633 1bid.
634 Pilar Ortuno Anaya, European Socialists and Spain: The Transition to Democracy 1959-77, 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001), p. 172.
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approach and maintain unity in any future political endeavours.635 Three years later, 
West Germany’s Social Democrats had finally decided to pro-actively take on the 
transitional challenge by providing support for UGT and PSOE as well as to bring about 
an “approximation of the partners of the social contract”636 -  trade unions and employer 
organisations. SPD leaders, who in 1975 were sceptically questioning, “If Spanish 
Socialists are able to counterbalance Communist organisations given the latter’s 
material dominance” finally acted on the realisation that their Iberian party colleagues 
had to “receive every possible assistance.”637
In 1976, large-scale labour unrest and nationwide strikes paralysed the country 
and the UGT became a leading voice on strike committees while at the same time 
maintaining its critical attitude towards union organisations on the extreme left such as 
the Movimiento Comunista Espanol (MCE). For many years, the observation that “any 
form of compromise-oriented thinking was completely alien to the labour union”638 
described the prevailing attitude within the UGT leadership with great precision. Now, 
the Socialist union had at least tactically changed its approach demanding a genuine 
preparedness for negotiations on both sides of the labour market. It urged the 
government to initiate a reform of the Francoist system of vertical syndicalism in the 
area of organised labour but, as Koniecki noted, “without a clear idea of the modalities -
635 Ibid.
636 Personal interview with Dieter Koniecki, Madrid, 5 April 2003.
637 Notes Hans-Eberhard Dingels for Willy Brandt, ’Ober Dein Gespr£ch mit den spanischen Freunden am 
18. April 1975’, 17 April 1975, Depository Bruno Friedrich, Box No.1542. In 1976, DGB-Chairman Ernst 
Vetter together with the leader o f the industrial union IG Metall Eugen Loderer visited Spain in what was a 
show of support by West Germany’s labour unions for its UGT colleagues. Loderer expressed his belief 
that “our partner union organisation as well as PSOE need and deserve our support.” AdsD, WBC, BN/45, 
Letter Eugen Loderer to Willy Brandt, 8 March 1976. At a press conference, Loderer named four crucial 
steps expected from the Spanish authorities: Freedom of political association, legalised union activism, the 
abolition of special tribunals and the release o f imprisoned politicians and unionists, dpa, 6 February 1976. 
Loderer also held talks with PSOE leader Felipe Gonzalez, Metall Pressedienst, 5 February 1976. See also 
Carsten R. Moser, ’Mit Geld und guten Worten: Gewerkschafter und Politiker aus der Bundesrepublik 
bemuhen sich um den Export des “deutschen Modells”, Die Zeit, 17 December 1976. In 1977, the 
Chairman o f the public services union OTV  Heinz Kluncker as well as the miner’s union IG Bergbau boss 
Adolf Schmidt visited Spain. Kluncker held talks with the UGT leadership in Madrid, Schmidt travelled to 
the mining areas of Asturia. dpa 21.4.1977, 8 March 1977. DGB President Heinz Vetter intensified 
contacts with his Spanish UGT colleagues during talks in Diisseldorf where he welcomed a union 
delegation led by Nicolas Redondo as the UGT’s Secretary-General and Manuel Simon, member o f the 
UGT’s executive board and responsible for the organisation’s external relations. DGB Nachrichtendienst, 
17 March 1977.
638 Personal interview with Dieter Koniecki, Madrid, 5 April 2003.
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at the moment they only know what they do not want, namely a government-devoted
/ I Q
national union council.” He underlined the ideological character of the controversy 
and acknowledged that even the UGT for the most part dismissed pragmatic solutions as 
being reformist or opportunistic.640 However, the union organisation gradually adopted a 
more pragmatic attitude not least because the Ministry of the Interior had tacitly 
approved of the UGT union congress to take place in Madrid in April 1976. At the end 
of the transition period, FEF representative Koniecki could report with satisfaction from 
the UGT’s 32. Congress in 1980 that
The most important outcome of the Congress is the decision of the great majority of the 
delegates to embrace a policy of dialogue with the employer organisations and that the 
idea that power and strength of a labour union can be measured in terms of the number 
of strikes launched is not majority opinion anymore.641
Koniecki stressed the fact that a dogmatically pursued confrontational stance by UGT 
would have the general public regard the Socialist union as an obstructionist force not 
willing to show the urgently needed open-mindedness and preparedness for compromise 
in the face of the country’s disastrous economic pretext. By demonstrating a willingness 
to engage in constructive pragmatism rather than ideological armament, the UGT would 
be able to gain ground specifically in its rivalry with the CC.OO. Koniecki writes:
It is evident that UGT has gained important ground with the Spanish public and among 
those workers who are not organised in union organisations not least because of it 
demonstrated flexibility to embrace dialogue and displayed a sense of reality. UGT will 
consolidate itself if it can manage to bring those new members in line that used to 
previously advocate an uncompromising strategy of confrontation. The union will then 
be able to open up new membership reservoirs and to sharpen its profile vis-a-vis the 
workers commissions.642
In 1982, the elections to the workers committees became a major success story in so far 
as UGT secured a dominant position among the Spanish unions gaining 36.5% of the
639 Walter Haubrich, ’Volksfrontregierung nicht moglich’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,l 1 March.1976.
640 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF Report, ‘Ober meine Aktivitaten in Madrid’, 28. Januar bis 20. Mdrz 1976’ 
(Dieter Koniecki).
641 AdsD, HEC, BN/0403, FEF Report on the 32. UGT Congress, (Dieter Koniecki), April 1980 (translation 
by author).
642 Ibid  (translation by author).
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votes in all of the country’s provinces and leaving the Communist workers commissions 
with only 32.74% behind. From a regional perspective, UGT won majorities in the 
chemical industry, the energy and transport sector, food industry, the civil service as 
well as in the construction business and the mining industry while CC.OO. secured 
majorities in forestry and the garment and leather industries.643 Especially during 
election time, the FEF’s informal soft power diplomacy focused on the transfer of 
urgently needed knowledge and the know-how essential for successful political 
management and campaigning. Preparing the election campaign, UGT’s election 
committee and the union’s organisational secretary Anton Saracibar in co-operation 
with Koniecki’s Madrid office developed an information campaign, which was based on 
three pillars: Firstly, support and assistance for UGT election monitors and ‘flying 
squads’, which campaigned on provincial level and in companies during the ‘hot’ pre­
election phase from October to December 1982. These campaign teams were supposed 
to aggressively highlight the ideological and conceptional differences between UGT and 
its Communist rival. The UGT campaigners had to defuse the repeated message spread 
by Communist propaganda that a vote for the UGT would equal a vote for a future 
government-controlled official union (alluding to the UGT’s unofficial but publicly 
known affiliation and political proximity to PSOE).644
Secondly, a comprehensive programme of publications including an election 
guide was developed to provide practical solutions to deal with the various technical 
deficits and organisational flaws of the election campaign. Manuals were published 
describing the exact procedures and organisational details of the voting process and its 
technicalities. Thirdly, FEF and UGT organised locally based training seminars in order 
to provide additional know-how on ways to ‘reveal’ the Communist strategy and 
‘decode’ its propaganda.645 Furthermore, the FEF financially supported parts of the 
UGT poster and placard campaign and covered the costs for training course material. 
Koniecki described the defeat of the CC.OO. in the elections to the worker’s advisory 
committees in 1982 as a traumatic experience for the battle-hardened Communist trade
643 AdsD, HEC, BN/0403, FEF Report ‘Uber die Wahlen zu den Arbeiterkommittees’, 1982, (Dieter 
Koniecki), 27 January 1983.
644 Ibid.
645 Ibid.
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unionists while pointing out that the poor performance by the Spanish Communist Party 
(PCE) at the polls was not exactly reflected by the CC.OO.’s performance in the private 
sector. In his analysis, the workers’ commissions were able to draw from a vast 
experience in political campaigning and could advantageously cash in on the high- 
quality training of their cadres, which operated as part of a nationwide network. He 
envisaged a radicalisation of the CC.OO. as a result of the election defeat making it 
difficult for UGT’s leadership to live up to the expectations of its members and to 
participate in justified strike action while at the same time avoiding any significant 
damage for the Socialist government.646
The approval of UGT activities by the Spanish authorities was still not more than 
a tacit acceptance and the organisation remained officially outlawed throughout 1976. 
Therefore, its leadership was faced with the difficult task of raising its public profile 
without being able to use mass media or publicly visible campaigns for canvassing and 
recruitment. This deficit was partly offset by the assistance provided by PSOE’s newly 
established Press and Media Department, which had been set up as part of the FEF 
Action Plan. “PSOE hopes that the unmistakable tendencies within the UGT to strive for 
total institutional autonomy will in the long-run work out in its favour and might even 
mobilise political potential in areas that were so far not accessible to the party.”647 But 
Koniecki was under no illusions that institutional animosities between UGT and PSOE 
were still the order of the day and that many PSOE members viewed the union 
organisation as simply an extended arm of the party categorically denying the 
autonomous movement within the UGT any legitimacy.648 During the 30th UGT- 
Congress in April 1976 the motion to declare parallel membership on PSOE and UGT’s 
governing boards to be mutually exclusive was rejected with great a majority.649
The underlying tensions though remained a constant feature of UGT-PSOE 
relations. In April 1980, Koniecki reported from the 32. UGT-Congress about two 
rivalling factions led by former Executive Secretary Manuel Gamacho and the member
646 Ibid.
647 Ibid
648 Ibid
649 Walter Haubrich, ’Erster GewerkschaftskongreB seit 37 Jahren’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 
April 1976.
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of UGT executive board Jose Maria Zufiaur respectively. Arguing in favour of an 
‘organic development’, Gamacho intended to tie the union organisation closely to the 
party and to maintain a relationship of dependency and subordination whereas his 
opponent Zufiaur tried to initiate a process of political opening in order to re-position 
and re-structure UGT to be accessible to a broad range of political forces on the left.650 
Being able to fight off his most outspoken critics, Zufiaur managed to achieve a partial 
opening of the UGT whereas Gamacho ceased his efforts to be re-elected.651 During 
talks between Koniecki and the UGT leadership at the end of March 1976, the Spanish 
union activists expressed their hope that certain forms of assistance provided by the 
West German DGB, which had previously been dealt with by the International 
Association of Free Labour Unions (IAFLU) and the European Union Association, 
should in future be preferably batched off through the FEF office in Madrid. Koniecki 
remarks: “I am on-site and can deal with everything much quicker and less 
bureaucratically than the IAFLU.”652 UGT would appreciate international support but 
the fact that a large number of people were involved would also lead to unwanted 
publicity. In anticipation of the upcoming new legislation on political associations, UGT 
appeared to be keen to establish covert channels of foreign support rather than receiving 
political assistance from high-profile sources that would be subject to constant public 
scrutiny and a possible legal ban. Koniecki suggested background talks between the 
Spanish union and its West German counterpart.653
Co-operation between West Germany’s Social Democrats and Spanish trade 
unionists and the organisational support provided for UGT cadres by SPD, FEF and 
DGB found the approval of King Juan Carlos who expressed a notable interest in the 
creation and long-term development of a strong, pluralist and independent union 
movement in post-authoritarian Spain. In the spring of 1977, prominent SPD anti- 
Franco campaigner Hans Matthofer advised the royal Head of State in a written report 
on the reform of Spain’s syndicalist union organisations that it would be desirable to
650 AdsD, HEC, BN/0403, FEF Report on the 32. UGT Congress by Dieter Koniecki April 1980.
651 Ibid.
652 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF Report, ‘Ober meine Aktivitaten in Madrid’, 28.Januar bis 20. Marz 1976’, 
op.cit.
653 Ibid.
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create a “big confederation of union organisations, which would be comparable with the 
German DGB.” 654 Matthofer outlined necessary steps towards an operational 
strengthening of UGT such as an improved political training programme for union 
activists as well as the publishing of newsletters and other printed material in order to be 
able to counter the “propaganda of employers.”655 He stressed the crucial importance of 
a continuously high-profile recruitment campaign especially among “those workers in 
Spanish companies who are the most representative of the country’s workforce.”656 Juan 
Carlos was told that West Germany’s ruling Social Democrats regarded UGT as “the 
only organisation, which has the potential to become a truly independent and democratic 
union organisation.”657 In such a way, Socialist union activists could successfully take 
on the challenge posed by Santiago Carillo’s PCE who benefited greatly from UGT’s 
relative weakness with its lack of organisational infrastructure. According to Matthofer, 
UGT’s main task being a political centre of gravity was to organisationally absorb and 
integrate smaller groups of organised workers. Matthofer in his report to the King 
advised UGT to integrate the entirety of corporatist union organisations -  “its leadership 
and institutions” -  in its own apparatus.658
Finally, the German SPD leader stressed the operational advantages of the 
FRG’s model of a single union organisation. Representatives of the DGB and its various 
branches sat on the boards of directors of major companies and were responsible for the 
control of the executive management. Being members of these important entrepreneurial 
decision-making bodies DGB officials were fully informed about the economic policies 
of their corporate negotiation partners and vice versa private sector representatives were 
aware of the fact that the union interacted with employers being in command of such 
knowledge about key economic data. Therefore, Matthofer argued, the “demands of 
West Germany’s unions are realistic demands and the divergence of opinions about 
concessions necessary to be made is pretty marginal.”659 The SPD politician concluded
654 AdsD, WBC, BN/121, Report for King Juan Carlos by Hans Matthdfer, no date.
655 Ibid.
656 Ibid.
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that the ability of West German workers to articulate their demands with one voice 
made possible by the existence of a single union organisation and the absence of any 
internal rivalries within the labour movement was a crucial ingredient for a constructive, 
smooth and productive working relationship between union and employers. In his view, 
the active participation of union officials in the management of private businesses 
greatly strengthened the former’s bargaining position and prevented union activists from 
formulating unreasonable demands.660
From the FEF’s perspective, UGT had managed to successfully unbalance the 
Communist Comisiones Obreras in “their tactical approach towards the UGT’s specific 
form of labour representation, which was oriented towards the institutional models of 
industrial relations in Western Europe”. The CC.OO. on the other hand described itself 
not as a conventional union organisation but as a permanent action group.661 Triggered 
by growing internal dissent within CC.OO, the FEF expected a wave of new 
applications for membership in the UGT, which carried the risk of overcharging the 
organisation’s still fragile provincial infrastructure and to cause a “creeping infiltration 
or structural reorientation whereby one can safely assume profound experience on the 
part of comisiones members not to reveal their identity.”662 Koniecki emphasised the 
urgent need to provide FEF support for the build-up of organisational infrastructure and 
suggested to increase the number of training programmes for UGT cadres on provincial 
level.663 Furthermore, it was suggested to co-ordinate administrative as well as technical 
and financial assistance on an international level in co-operation with the IAFLU to 
strengthen the infrastructural consistency of UGT. Koniecki intended to bring together 
UGT representative Javier Solana and European union leaders such as Oskar Vetter and 
Alfons Lappas. From 1977, Koniecki also hired experts on union management as well as 
opinion polling and electoral analysis with the latter producing working papers every 3- 
6 months. These area studies were subsequently used for political projects of both UGT
660 Ibid.
661 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF ‘Bericht tiber die politische Situation in Spanien nach der 
Regierungserklarung des Ministerprasidenten Carlos Arias am 28. April 1976’, (Dieter Koniecki), 11 May 
1976.
662 Ibid
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and PSOE.664 Furthermore, the FEF continued to provide a media monitoring service 
reaching a total of thirty different institutions that held subscriptions. In order to support 
Spain’s Socialists in their efforts to keep up with political developments in Latin 
America, the FEF also published a Latin America Bulletin, which was distributed 
monthly to various departments of UGT (as well as PSOE).665 Two additional staff 
members were hired by Koniecki’s office and a further two FEF staff were assigned to 
UGT’s monitoring programme dividing their work between union organisation and the 
Foundation.
In sum, the creation of electoral platforms and the model of institutional 
‘tandems’ of co-operation -  UGT and PSOE being formally independent but 
institutionally intertwined as supporters of the same political cause -  were seen as 
important components of the FEF’s transitional activities. The Foundation realised that 
the organisational platform to be developed for the union organisation needed to be seen 
by the public as being separate from PSOE. At the same time it had to serve “as a 
transmission belt during the election campaign” reaching a level of electoral strength 
and efficiency “unrivalled by any other opposition party.”666 The ambition of West 
Germany’s sub-state diplomacy embodied in the FEF’s democracy promotion 
programme was to enable PSOE, UGT and affiliated Socialist organisations to stand 
operationally on their on feet, to help them to successfully take on their political 
competitors at the polls and to assist them in their political preparation for the eventual 
takeover of governmental power and responsibility. West Germany’s public diplomacy 
provided knowledge, expertise and information to help Socialist forces during the 
Spanish transition to become independent actors on the political scene well equipped for 
the political challenges ahead. The supply of know-how, skills and varied forms of non­
material and material support were to contribute to systemic stability. The democratic 
process rests on the principle of political competition and ideological pluralism and only 
a competitive Socialist party with adequately developed organisational structures was 
able to build a reputation for efficiency. Soft power and inter-party assistance would
664 Ibid.
665 Ibid
666 Ibid
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therefore shape the behavioural and attitudinal component of the transition and 
consolidation phase. In the following section, the FEF’s democracy promotion activities 
in the area of industrial relations will be examined thereby identifying the future socio­
economic context within which the mass appeal of Socialist institutions would have the 
greatest effect.
4.6. Social Partnership
In order to introduce Spanish democrats to the idea of a social partnership, which was 
developed in West Germany in the post-war era and which became an essential 
component of the concept of a ‘social market economy’, FEF representative Koniecki 
launched a string of transitional political aid projects bringing together employer 
associations and organised labour. In the summer of 1976, the SPD foreign affairs 
spokesman Bruno Friedrich during a visit to the Spanish capital had made remarks about 
the “connection between market economy, economic democracy and social policy 
typical for West Germany’s Social Democracy and our labour unions”, and he had 
suggested in talks with the Spanish Ambassador in Bonn Emilio Garrigues y Diaz- 
Canabate that “of course the Godesberg Programme667 and our policies should not 
become export products. However, the self-perception of West Germany’s Social 
Democracy may be of interest in the process of transformation in Spain.”668 The idea of 
helping Spanish Socialism to familiarise itself with the concept of a social partnership 
was clearly an attempt to use soft power by presenting an example that demonstrated 
one’s own political practice and handling of certain issues. West German foreign policy 
makers of SPD and FEF seemed to act on Klaus Knorr’s observation that “achievements 
and successes can generate the admiration of other societies and their decision-makers 
and provide them with new insight.” 669 By demonstrating the concept of a social 
partnership’s successful performance in West Germany, FEF and SPD would use soft 
power to attract their Spanish colleagues to their conceptual strategy. In talks with Willy
667 In its Godesberg Programme o f 1959, the SPD eliminated any reference to Marxism as a guiding 
political manifesto for West Germany’s Social Democracy and declared its commitment to a market 
economic system and private ownership o f the means of production.
668 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, Letter Bruno Friedrich to Emilio Garrigues y Diaz-Canabate, 2 June 1976.
669 Klaus Knorr, The Power o f  Nations -  The Political Economy o f  International Relations, (Basic Books, 
New York 1975), p.256.
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Brandt and Hans Matthofer, even King Juan Carlos had expressed an interest in the 
West German model of labour representation and asked his visitors what advise they 
could give.”670
Even West Germany’s Christian Democratic Party (CDU) advocated the concept 
of a social partnership as an essential prerequisite for economic success. During the 
‘German Week’ in Madrid in 1977 at a time, when most Spanish trade unions were still 
illegal, CDU-Chairman Gerhard Stoltenberg told Spanish entrepreneurs that the fact that 
the DGB was a knowledgeable, reliable and moderate partner in negotiations with the 
private sector was an important aspect of West Germany’s economic stability.671 The 
fact that the SPD’s main political rival equally supported the idea of a social partnership 
made it extremely credible in the eyes of Spain’s transitional elites. The FEF appeared 
to be the perfect instrument to promote tried-and-tested West German policies abroad 
and to ‘sell’ it to a ‘transitional customer’. The Foundation provided a great amount of 
expertise to enable Spanish Socialists to successfully manage the difficult task of 
reconciling the often diametrically opposed interests in industrial relations disputes. 
Koniecki and his colleagues could effectively cash in on their traditionally excellent 
contacts with the FRG’s labour union movement. The soft power actor described itself 
as “an institution that had turned into a discreetly operating but open platform where the 
representatives of the private sector and unionists could express their concerns 
concerning everything that affects them in the area labour relations in an informal
670 AdsD, HSC, BN/6566, Telegramme Lilienfeldt to Auswartiges Amt, 8 December 1976. Matthofer 
promised the King to provide him with an expose outlining the organisational structures of the West 
German labour unions.
671 Friedrich Kassebeer, ’Traumland soziale Stabilitat’, Suddeutsche Zeitung, 22 April 1977. The CEO of 
West Germany’s Dresdener Bank Reinhold Stoessl who frankly admitted that “we have suggested to our 
unions to make their experience available to the unions of other European countries so that we can ideally 
achieve a maximum of stability everywhere” echoed Stoltenberg’s positive assessment. Ibid. The West 
German entrepreneur and CDU politician Elmar Pieroth and the conservative Norbert Blum travelled to 
Spain in 1976 to promote the West German model o f an industrial union organisation Carsten R. Moser, 
’Mit Geld und guten Worten: Gewerkschafter und Politiker aus der Bundesrepublik bemiihen sich um den 
Export des deutschen Models’, Die Zeit, 17 December 1976.
672 Dieter Koniecki,’Erdffnungsworte anlaBlich des l.Treffens der Arbeitnehmer- und Arbeitgebervertreter 
aus Westdeutschland und Spanien’, in: Em presay Sindicato en un Estado Social de Derecho, (Documentos 
y Estudios, Fundacidn Friedrich Ebert, February 1978), p.2.
212
One year after the Madrid office opened its transitional gates, the FEF began to 
work towards bringing leaders of PSOE and UGT on the one hand and labour lawyers
f . n ’i
and employer representatives on the other hand together at the negotiation table. 
Koniecki was convinced that the entrepreneurial side had a “much more difficult task to 
democratise itself than the unions, because they were not integrated in any international 
movement.”674 He therefore sought to provide Spain’s employers with an international 
framework in order to enhance their legitimacy and credibility. Additionally, the profile 
of private sector entrepreneurs had to be sharpened because “the people were on strike
£.nc
precisely for the reason of not knowing with whom to negotiate.” The concept paid 
off and Koniecki recalls that corporate leaders quickly realised that they were able to 
greatly improve their reputation as a collective bargaining unit by using the international 
stature and the European connections of their negotiation partners. This notion was 
reinforced by the psychological appeal that “if they in West Germany can organise 
matters in that way then we can do it as well.”676 Once one was able to overcome old 
habits and mentalities, a “sophisticated form of labour representation and a collective 
approach to negotiations emerged in contemporary Spanish history.”677 In private talks 
with the West German Ambassador and in the presence of King Juan Carlos, Spanish 
managers accepted the close co-operation between West Germany’s SPD and PSOE. 
According to Ambassador von Lilienfeldt, Iberian business leaders were conscious of 
the fact that PSOE could claim a “key role in the process of stabilising a pluralist
f.n o
democracy in Spain especially as far as industrial relations were concerned.” The 
entrepreneurs welcomed the international context of political aid and democratisation 
assistance although some of them hinted at the structural differences between West 
Germany and Spain, which made the application of foreign socio-economic models 
desirable but problematic.679
673 Ibid, p. 12.
674 Personal interview with Dieter Koniecki, Madrid, 5 April 2003.
675 Ibid.
676 Ibid
677 Ibid
678 AdsD, HSC, BN/6634, Letter Lilienfeld to Helmut Schmidt, 25 January 1977.
679 Ibid
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On the other hand, the belief that by facilitating dialogue between private sector 
and union organisations, the FEF would be able to convince the two sides to adopt a 
consensual rather than a confrontational approach towards labour disputes was certainly 
not shared by all people and institutions involved in the daily running of the West 
German economy. A number of businessmen strongly criticised co-operation between 
SPD and PSOE and described Spain’s Socialists as a political force driven by Marxist 
ideas and without much influence on the working class sector. They feared negative 
economic repercussions caused by the policies of a party, which promoted the 
nationalisation of key industries. Their sentiment was clearly not shared by Prime
Minister Adolfo Suarez who appeared to be convinced of the “immense importance” of
£ 0  1
political assistance provided by the FEF for the creation of a stable political system. 
Ambassador von Lilienfeldt writes in a letter to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt:
Those diametrically opposed opinions reflect the lively if not passionate interest with 
which one follows our efforts to stabilise Spanish democracy in general and our 
relationship with PSOE in particular. The change of attitude since the PSOE party 
conference regarding the party’s future role seems to be very encouraging and is 
certainly due to the intensification of the dialogue between government and opposition 
and to your visit together with Willy Brandt. The negative reaction by representatives of 
West Germany’s industrial sector seems to me explainable by the fact that they had to 
fight hard for new orders and that they see a risk for their own existence because of the 
deterioration of the economic situation, an increasing strike rate and the general 
uncertainty which accompanies the process of democratisation. In order to avoid any 
misinterpretation of our attitude towards PSOE, it seems to be advisable to introduce 
employers back home more thoroughly to our policy planning.
The FEF office in Madrid described mediation and platform building as its most 
important transitional contribution.683 The question of how to efficiently restructure 
industrial relations after the slow death of Franco’s authoritarianism and how to replace
680 Ibid. Von Lilienfeldt tried to calm his guests by pointing out that contacts and political interaction 
between the two parties were taking place with the full knowledge of the King and Prime Minister and that 
they were intended to “prevent a drift o f Spain’s strongest democratic workers party towards Communist 
waters.” In a conversation with Felipe Gonzalez, Helmut Schmidt had stressed the crucial importance to 
establish a “relationship based on co-operation between employers and employees” and emphasised that the 
labour unions had to be integrated into a framework of responsibility.
681 AdsD, HSC, BN/6566, Telegramme Lilienfeldt to Auswartiges Amt, 8 December 1976.
682 AdsD, HSC, BN/6634, Letter Lilienfeld to Helmut Schmidt, 25 January 1977 (translation by author).
683 Personal interview with Dieter Koniecki, Madrid, 5 April 2003.
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the legacy of a syndicalist union organisation by a pluralist system of unions and 
employer associations engaging in free and self-determined negotiations was of the 
utmost significance not only for PSOE and its foreign backer but also for the Spanish 
Government. For West Germany’s foreign policy elites, soft power as an operational 
mode for diplomatic action was the most promising tool to aid the transformation of 
political infrastructure on a transnational level. In January 1976, the country’s Foreign 
Minister Jose Maria de Areilza expressed his interest in the creation of an independent, 
united and powerful system of labour unions in talks with SPD Foreign Office Minister 
Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski.684 The Permanent Forum for Social Partnership between the 
different agentes sociales hosted a total of 40 meetings between 1978 and 198 8.685 The 
FEF published numerous economic analyses of the findings of the meetings between 
employers and labour representatives organised by the Foundation under the title of 
Encuentros entre empresarios, laboralistas y  sindicalistas.
One example was the thirteenth volume of the FEF series Documentos y  
Estudios, which contained a number of West German contributions on the topic of 
‘Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitrary Decision’.686 The FEF had invited West German 
trade union official and member of the executive of the West German Metal Workers 
Union I.G. Metall Friedrich Neudel as well as the Managing Director of the West 
German Employers Association Peter Knevels as a political counterweight. The Spanish 
seminar participants were being told about the crucial importance of keeping an 
equilibrium between the two warring sides in a labour dispute following the principle of 
institutional autonomy of employers and unions (free collective bargaining). If the 
necessary balance of power between the two sides would not be maintained and if one 
side would impose its demands on the weaker negotiation partner, the probable 
consequence were continuous clashes and strike action on the labour market. 
“Therefore, the system that we are discussing here can only solve labour disputes if
684 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, Notes on a conversation between Hans-JUrgen Wischnewski and the Spanish 
Foreign Minister on the 9 January 1976 in Bonn ( Hans-Eberhard Dingels).
685 Dieter Koniecki, 20 Ahos de la Fundacidn Friedrich Ebert en Espaha, op. cit., p.22.
686 Fundacion Friedrich Ebert, Mediacion, conciliacion y  arbitraje: Estatuto de los trabajadores 
productividad, (Documentos y Estudios 13, 1979).
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there exists a situation of equilibrium or almost equilibrium between the players and if 
there exists a desire to arrive at an agreement.”687
In 1978, bridge-building efforts undertaken by the FEF were indirectly rewarded 
with the creation of the Acuerdo Marco Interconfederal (AMI) between employer 
association Confederation Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE) and 
UGT. It incorporated the West German model of orderly negotiations between the two 
sides as a quintessential component of social partnership. The agreement also provided 
for the obligation of the parties to the labour dispute to call on a mediator in cases in 
which they would reach a political cul-de-sac. The framework agreement of 1978 
between corporate leadership and UGT followed exactly this mechanism by 
incorporating a tried-and-tested model of social co-operation into the new operational 
code for a democratic Spain. The FEF through its soft power strategy continued to 
systematically strengthen the institutional capacities and resources of UGT. A range of 
projects together with various union branches were launched in particular with the 
Teachers Union and supported by a number of West German industrial unions and the 
Union for Education and Science (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft GEW). 
The latter co-operation took on challenges in the area of schoolbook didactics and
/TO O
reform. Furthermore, the FEF developed a working relationship with the Union de 
Cooperativas Obreras (UCO), which paved the way for a joint project in the area of 
producer cooperatives.
In sum, the FEF’s use of soft power in the area of industrial relations sought to 
transfer the idea of a social partnership to the transitional context of Spain’s nascent 
democracy. Operating on a sub-state level, the Foundation helped Spanish political 
actors and business entities to familiarise themselves with the consensus-oriented 
approach of collective bargaining, dispute mediation and reduced strike action as 
successfully practised by West Germany’s union movement and the country’s employer 
associations such as the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der deutschen 
Industrie BDI). The FEF brought in German expertise, facilitated contacts between
687 Peter Knevels, ‘Mediacion y conciliacion en Alemania’, in Mediation, conciliation y  arbitraje: 
Estatuto de los trabajadores productividad, (Fundacion Friedrich Ebert, Documentos y Estudios 13, 1979) 
, p.45.
688 AdsD, HEC, BN/0451, FEF Report Madrid Office, no date and author.
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PSOE, UGT and West Germany’s DGB and promoted a system of compromise-seeking 
industrial relations, in which trade unions and private sector organisations would be less 
militant in the pursuit of their interests and more interested in fair competition and 
negotiations. By ‘exporting’ the concept of social partnership, the Social Democratic 
Foundation helped to set the transition agenda and shape the preferences of Spain’s new 
elites thereby working towards the stabilisation of the FRG’s extraterritorial 
environment through soft power. In the following section, the focus will shift towards 
the FEF’s effort to bring academic experts and Socialist political decision-makers from 
PSOE and UGT together on a common platform to exchange ideas and concepts.
4.7. PSOE Summer School, September 1976
Between 16 and 23 September 1976, PSOE and UGT’s training departments assisted by 
the FEF organised a political training seminar with 120 leading functionaries of party 
and union organisations in Escorial near Madrid. This nationwide Summer School was 
conceptualised in preparatory talks between the head of the PSOE’s education 
department Professor Luis Gomez Llorente, FEF resident representative Dieter Koniecki 
and the future political training expert of the Foundation Etelvino Gonzalez in order to 
introduce the Spanish public to PSOE’s training activities through co-operation with 
Spain’s mass media.689 The event was not without risk given UGT and PSOE’s still 
illegal status. Therefore, Koniecki acknowledged the need for extraordinary discretion 
stressing that a mentioning of FEF involvement had to be avoided and that producing 
the required teaching material turned into a delicate task.
Didactical and material assistance provided by the FEF was crucial in making the 
seminar a success and this included a preliminary preparation seminar in order to train 
Summer School staff and to professionally stage-manage the event. Given the political 
and psychological importance of the seminar, no failure was allowed.690
The Summer School offered two types of classes: Plenary sessions which centred 
around a presentation and the so-called evening seminars, which were run by a lecturer 
and two monitors supported by two technical assistants, and in which the 24 participants
689 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF Report ‘Sommerschule vom 16. bis 23. August 1976’, (Dieter Koniecki), 9 
September 1976.
690 Ibid (translation by author).
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had to develop and present their own opinion on a range of topics. In order to simulate 
the organisational processes governing political work within party apparatuses, they 
then had to prepare a motion e.g. for a PSOE congress. Felipe Gonzalez (discussing 
PSOE’s political direction), Gregorio Peces-Barba (lecturing on Socialism and the rule 
of law), UGT Secretary-General Nicolas Redondo (outlining UGT’s political 
programme), Miguel Boyer (introducing participants to PSOE’s economic policies) and 
Pierre Guidoni as member of the executive board of the French Socialist Party (giving a 
panoramic view on European Socialism) were ‘hired’ by Koniecki as the seminar’s 
main speakers to ensure a high-level of media interest.691 Although still being officials 
of an illegal organisation, parts of Gonzalez and Peces-Barba’s presentations were even 
broadcast on Spanish television, something Koniecki described as “sensational.”692
The seminars were platforms for the display of frequent verbal clashes between 
PSOE ‘ideologues’ and ‘pragmatists’. The political mindset of using Marxism as an 
analytical tool for the dealing with any political question was formed during decades of 
forced exile, and Koniecki realised that the problem of ideological pragmatism would 
become a future playground for FEF projects seeking to prepare PSOE-UGT cadres 
effectively for the ‘real world’ of parliamentary politics. Gonzalez tried to strike a 
compromise by declaring PSOE to be a Marxist and class-based party. At the same time, 
he rejected “the maximalist approach of the high priests of dogmatic Socialism” and 
argued in favour of using Marxism as a “methodology.” The Summer School 
connected a broad range of political opinion-formers and helped to instil in them an idea 
of the necessary organisational division of labour between and within PSOE and UGT. 
By organising seminars, discussion groups and workshops, the FEF aimed at subtly 
setting the agenda through a selection of participants, the raising of important issues for 
debate and the inclusion of its own experts to provide outside experience. With its
691 Manuel Boyer would declare his resignation from the PSOE executive and renounced his membership in 
February 1977 allegedly because o f the general stance adopted by PSOE’s leadership on economic policies, 
which he deemed as “being too unrealistic, theoretical and politically leftist to be implemented in 
contemporary Spain.” Walter Haubrich, ’Bruch im Parteibund der Sozialisten’, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 7 February 1977.
692 Ibid. However, Gonzalez asked his West German supporters “particularly during the complicated 
transition and of course in the run-up to the PSOE-Congress to shield our contribution from public view -  a 
wish which does not require further explanations.” AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, FEF Report ‘Sommerschule vom 
16. bis 23. August 1976’, (Dieter Koniecki), 9 September 1976.
693 Interview Ramon Pi with Felipe Gonzalez, La ActualidadEspanola, 6 December 1976.
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Summer School, the Foundation provided a forum for the exchange of different views 
within the realm of Socialist politics thus helping to stimulate the dialogue between 
various wings within PSOE and the union movement and enabling delegates to 
reconcile their differences and find compromise solutions.
4.8. The FEF in Spain during 1977
During the first half of 1977, the FEF’s general transition strategy did not significantly 
change. At the end of the previous year, the influential SPD ‘Circle of Six’ as an 
interdepartmental working group on foreign affairs that incorporated members of SPD, 
Cabinet, FEF and SI had decided to “continue with our support for PSOE though we 
should not deny ourselves contacts and talks with other actors politically close to us”694. 
In Madrid, Koniecki continued to target the infrastructural, organisational and 
educational deficits of PSOE and UGT in order to help the electorate realise that the two 
organisations had become a credible alternative to its competitors on the left and right of 
the political spectrum. Koniecki’s office in Madrid acknowledged a “slight modification 
of the initial timing and selection of topics.” It organised seminars with a higher number 
of participants than usual “at venues other than the FEF office” while keeping PSOE’s 
German connection hidden from the full view of the general public.695 On the other 
hand, its co-operation with UGT appeared to be subjected to lesser scrutiny and there 
appeared to be no need to disguise the fact, that a Spanish union obtained support from a 
West German partner organisation. Hence a seminar between the German Union for 
Education and Science (Gewerkschaft Eziehung und Wissenschaft GEW) and its Spanish 
counterpart could take place in the full light of the public.
In 1977, the FEF organised a range of seminars to take place in its Madrid office, 
which focused on a selected range of political questions. The seminar findings and 
concluding reports would later be used in future workshops and, depending on quality 
would be published in a new series of short analyses under the title of Documentos y
694 AdsD, HEC, BN/0748, Notes by Hans-Eberhard Dingels 10 December 1976. Dingels writes: “The SPD 
is well advised to continue the privileged relationship with PSOE while at the same time maintaining 
connections with other opposition groups and even with Suarez.” AdsD, HSC, BN/6566, Notes 22 
December 1976.
695 AdsD, BFC, BN/1541, FEF Bi-Annual Report (Halbjahresbericht), FEF Office Madrid, (Dieter 
Koniecki), 1 January-30  June 1977.
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Estudios. A slide show on the history of PSOE was to supplement the range of 
educational instruments of PSOE’s training specialists and was used in eight subsequent 
public events for the recruitment of new members and activists. Because of the show’s 
extraordinary success, the FEF was planning to provide a similar multimedia survey for 
UGT. FEF representative Koniecki predicted the exponential growth of new tasks to be 
taken on by the Foundation in the area of political communication and the dispersion of 
party information. An example for a news and media-related project was the weekly 
press review edited and published by the FEF’s Madrid office since March 1977. One of 
the main challenges for soft power-driven democratisation assistance was the 
preparation of a negotiation process in order to develop a democratically legitimated 
constitution for the Spanish people, which would safeguard human and basic individual 
rights, re-structure the realms of labour and criminal law and redefine the 
responsibilities and limitations of and for state organs.696 This was “seen as being of the 
utmost importance.”697
A symposium discussing the constitutional significance of political parties 
served as a point of departure for the FEF (see next section). Again, the identification of 
multipliers and the ‘socialising’ and shaping of future elites appeared to be the decisive 
factor in the Foundation’s conceptualising of projects. Since a number of seminar 
participants went on to become members of the newly assembled Cortes (three of them 
as delegates for PSOE) and some would move on to take their seats on parliamentary 
committees, which were to deal with the drafting of a final democratic constitution, it 
was assumed that they would carry their seminar experiences and the political concepts 
discussed within these fora into the political arena. The symposium served as a door 
opener for future activities in the academic field and, which was even more important to
696 Especially in the area of human rights, the transitional ship had still to manoeuvre through troubled 
waters. Official German-Spanish relations were vehemently criticised by the Federal Republic’s Amnesty 
International Section, which in 1976 expressed its regret about the support provided by West Germany’s 
Government for Spain’s future membership in the EC. AI stressed the fact o f an only partial legal amnesty 
declared in November 1975 and highlighted Prime Minister Arias Navarro’s responsibility for the 
draconian Anti-Terrorist Law and the execution o f five ETA prisoners in 1975. Therefore, the organisation 
concluded that “one cannot speak o f a democratisation process because nothing important has changed”, 
AdsD, BFC, BN/1122, Letter Heinz Br&ndle (Amnesty International Section Germany) to Herbert Wehner 
MP.
697 AdsD, BFC, BN/1541, FEF Bi-Annual Report (Halbjahresbericht), FEF Office Madrid, (Dieter 
Koniecki), 1 January -30 June 1977.
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PSOE’s leadership, showed a politically wary public that the FEF was far from being 
the clandestine and secretive organisation, which semi-legally supported PSOE and 
UGT in the shadows. It could be shown that the FEF was a transparently operating 
organisation engaged in political and citizen education as well as democracy-building 
and that it provided services, which were generally beneficial to Spaniards from all 
walks of life irrespective of their political affiliation. Another seminar in Valladolid on 
‘Christians and Socialists’ was organised in co-operation with the University of 
Salamanca, the Institute of Advanced Philosophy and the Association of Protestant 
Religious Communities and showed the FEF in a similar light as a politically and 
operationally vitreous organisation, which moved and manoeuvred freely and openly in 
Spain’s community of societal actors and institutions.
To sum up, it can be concluded that thanks to the political intuition of FEF 
representative Koniecki who managed to regularly identify and thematically 
operationalise key political issue areas to be tackled by Socialist forces, the 
Foundation’s democracy promotion programme built valuable bridges connecting PSOE 
with societal and political actors with which the party had no previous relations. 
Koniecki pointed out that: “it does not need much imagination to understand the 
importance of such an opening of one’s channels of communication for PSOE’s future 
electoral support, which can be easily manipulated e.g. by working with the Church.”698 
In 1977, the Foundation’s soft power with its transfer of ideas, concepts and expertise 
continued to be operationalised through seminars and workshops with findings made 
available to a broader public through a FEF-sponsored publication series. According to 
Koniecki, the pragmatic nature of the seminars helped to overcome also the “politically 
obstructive trauma” of PSOE’s Marxist wing, a trauma he attributed to years of “winter 
sleep in the subculture of illegality” that “pure ideologues” went through. 699 After 
transnational democracy promotion projects in the realm of party management, electoral 
assistance, organised labour and policy planning, the following section will highlight the 
FEF’s contribution to the Spanish process of constitution-building.
698 Ibid.
699 Ibid.
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4.9. Constitution-Building
During his assignment to Mexico, Koniecki helped to establish the Ibero-American 
Institute for Constitutional Law (IAICL). The Institute’s activities would serve him as a 
reference point for one of the FEF’s most important democracy promotion projects 
during the Spanish transition, namely the assembling of legal experts to discuss and 
accompany the political process towards a new Spanish constitution. The Institute 
organised a number of international conferences in Latin America where experts met to 
discuss “the development of the political and constitutional order on the continent 
between 1950 and 1975.”700 The constitutional expert Professor Pedro de Vega was 
invited to initiate the opening of a Spanish section of the IAICL and to establish contacts 
with Portuguese constitutional jurists in order to launch a legal democracy promotion
701programme in the neighbouring country. The Foundation’s links with the prestigious 
Faculty of Law at the University of Salamanca was an important channel for 
institutional co-operation throughout the transition phase and “predominantly organised 
by constitutional lawyers who were members of PSOE or at least politically sympathetic 
towards its goals.”702 Initially, the suggestion to open a Spanish section of the IAICL 
was met with a certain degree of hesitation and scepticism as the regime occasionally 
reacted with repressive measures to political activities organised by academics. 
However, at the end of 1976 the project got on its way and a group of constitutional
70^experts formed a first working group discussing the role of political pluralism.
After the FEF office in Madrid had been opened in April 1976, Koniecki began 
to establish contacts with the Instituto de Estudios Politicos, which was politically close 
to the Franco-Regime. Koniecki initiated a permanent dialogue with a number of young 
Spanish constitutional experts, which quickly turned into a series of twelve seminars on
700 Personal interview with Dieter Koniecki, Madrid, 5 April 2002.
701 AdsD, HEC, BN/0351, FEF Report ‘1. Symposium fiber die verfassungsmassige Rolle politischer 
Parteien’, 28 April 1977.
702 Ibid.
703 The group consisted of Carlos Ollerom, Chair for Constitutional Law in Madrid, Gumersindo Trujillo, 
Chair in La Laguna and self-declared Socialist, Juan Ferrando, Chair in Alicante, Manuel Ramirez, Chair in 
Zaragoza and PSOE member, Francisco Rubio Llorente, Chair in Madrid and member of PSOE and UGT 
and Pedro de Vega, Chair in Salamanca without PSOE membership but co-operating member in a 
constitutional committee of the party. Ibid.
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various topics of constitution building.704 Constitutional experts were invited to 
establish a professional network while using the seminar framework as a platform for 
the exchange of information, the holding of discussions and the interaction with foreign 
colleagues. The FEF also helped establishing the Asociacion Espanola de Ciencias 
Politicos being the result of a seminar series in Barcelona.705 The first international 
constitution-building symposium on the constitutional role of political parties, which 
took place in April 1977 with more than 70 delegates in Salamanca, was an example of 
the manner in which the FEF provided platforms for domestic actors in the transition 
country. The conference provided a forum for debate and a platform for the exchange of 
information while incorporating foreign experts who would support the constitution- 
making process through their presentation of concepts and approaches applied in other 
countries. By organising an international conference, the Foundation also enabled the 
participants to develop comparative historical perspectives useful in the discussion of a 
future democracy in Spain. “The seminars held with constitutional jurists and politicians 
during the constitution-building phase were particularly important because they 
provided a forum for the contextualisation of theoretical concepts and enabled the 
experts involved to compare them with the experiences of a multifaceted political reality 
in other western European countries” remembers political scientist Hans-Jiirgen Puhle, 
who by his own account “attended numerous constitutional as well as party conferences, 
meetings of Spanish party executives and training seminars for Spain’s new political 
elites”.706
Furthermore, workshops and seminars “provided an opportunity to discuss 
certain essentials of democracy, political priorities including cost-benefit analyses and 
strategic alternatives in a more differentiating manner with a stronger focus on 
implementation and decision-making.” 707 Although Puhle points out that the 
transnationally operationalised and soft-power-based activities of the FRG’s political
704 We deliberately chose a new generation of constitutional jurists who would embody the future on the 
legal debate and would provide the interest and open-mindedness required for the intellectual process of 
democracy-building; Interview Dieter Koniecki. See also Dieter Koniecki, 20 Ahos de la Fundacion 
Friedrich Ebert en Espaha, op.cit., p.22.
705 Personal interview with Dieter Koniecki, Madrid, 5 April 2002.
706 Personal correspondence with Hans-Jiirgen Puhle, 24 June 2006.
707 Ibid.
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foundations “did not implement detailed concepts developed by the West German 
Government”, he concedes the existence of a “general concept” that underlied the 
democracy promotion projects of Bonn’s sub-state diplomacy, namely the “regulatory 
idea of West Germany’s civil society-oriented development policies in various parts of 
the world since the 1960s to ensure an optimal support for democratisation with the 
necessary resources.”708
One of the country’s leading constitutional jurists for example, Pedro de Vega, 
highlighted possible lessons to be learned from earlier German experiences with 
democratic transitions and constitutional orders by pointing wamingly at the latter’s first 
parliamentary democracy. “An institution that seems to be theoretically perfect does not 
always lead to an acceptable practice in reality. In this sense, my country needs to see 
the constitution of Weimar as a clear example; despite its perfection it could not prevent 
the emergence of a dictatorship.”709 But clearly of greater relevance than the Weimar 
Constitution were the constitutional concepts and mechanisms enshrined in West 
Germany’s Basic Law.
Because of a range of functional and historical similarities between the German and 
Spanish processes of democratisation -  the necessity for an institutional stabilisation in 
the aftermath of authoritarianism and previous breakdowns of democracy, anti-party 
sentiments, negative majorities and fragile democractic traditions -  and because a 
number of German advisers had participated in Spain’s post-Franco constitution- 
building process while many Spanish constitutional experts were very familiar with the 
West German legal system, the Basic Law to a disproportional extent turned into a 
model for Spain’s constitutional design e.g. the constructive vote of no-confidence, the 
Constitutional Court, the constitutionally guaranteed role for political parties, a bill of 
rights, constitutional protection of the environment etc.710
Puhle’s Spanish colleague Antonio Bar Cendon agreed. “Many scholars” he 
remembered about the decentralised nature of West Germany’s constitutional design, 
“myself among them took German federalism as the model to follow for the future
709 ‘Inauguration del simposio sobre constitutionalidad de los partidos politicos’, La Gaceta Regional, 
20.4.1977.
710 Personal correspondence with Hans-Jiirgen Puhle, 24 June 2006 (translation by author).
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Spanish democratic system.”711 Pointing at the Estados de las Autonomias as Spain’s 
version of the West German Lander structure, he expressed his conviction that “the 
present Spanish political system and its constitutional organisation owes a lot to the 
German influence.”712 At a later stage of the constitution-building process, the FRG’s 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) “was taken as a model to follow by the 
Spanish Constitutional Court”.713
The series of constitution-building conferences was therefore another example of 
how the FEF sought to exert influence by means of soft power i.e. transnationally 
provided political aid. Koniecki stressed that “it should not come as a surprise that the 
FEF is active in the area of constitutional law since 1920 and that it is practically the 
only civil society organisation that has survived the Third Reich.”714 It was within these 
parameters that the Foundation decided to take on the “authentic scientific challenge” 
that the Spanish situation posed to constitutional experts. Koniecki’s realisation of the 
enormous importance of political parties for the stability of any democratic system was 
shared by many Spanish observers, who became aware of the impact that forty years of 
authoritarianism had on independent political thought in the Iberian country. “Although 
our political parties did manage to escape persecution, they were never able to rid 
themselves of their clandestine reflexes and organisational fragmentation the latter 
caused by very time-consuming internal skirmishes and debates.”715 The Salamanca 
seminar was described by the FEF as “of crucial importance for the development of 
democracy in Spain” 716 The morning sessions were arranged around a total of 29 
presentations in plenary and working groups whereas the afternoon sessions facilitated 
further discussions. Furthermore, a range of conferencias magistrates invited several 
foreign guest speakers in the ongoing discussions, among them the Italian Socialist and 
constitutional expert Antonio La Pergola (‘The constitutional position and 
constitutionality of political parties), the President of the IAICL Dr. Fix Zamudio (‘The
711 Personal correspondence with Antonio Bar Cendon, 19 June 2006.
712 Ibid.
713 Ibid; See also Personal correspondence with Klaus von Beyme, 11 July 2006.
714 La Gaceta Regional, 21 April 1977.
715 ‘El Vacio’, La Tarde, 27 September 1977.
716 FEF Annual Report 1977, p.78.
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Mexican constitution regarding individual and collective basic rights’) or the Spanish- 
American political scientist Juan Linz of Yale University (Power structures and political 
parties). The FEF sent its own constitutional experts to Spain. Initially, FEF 
representative Koniecki tried to convince the German constitutional law professor, 
foreign policy expert and SPD politician Horst Ehmke to make a contribution to the 
constitutional debates by attending the high-profile meeting in Salamanca. In a letter to 
the politician, Koniecki reasoned about the seminar in Salamanca:
For the first time, this event will provide us with the opportunity to present our activities 
to the public via the academic realm. This will be of the utmost importance for our 
Spanish partners and us. From the Spanish side there will be more or less the entire 
academic rank and file. Also the fact that currently a Spanish television team produces a 
series on the activities of the German political foundations in Spain, which will focus in 
particular on the symposium in Salamanca, adds a further political element to my 
decision to ask you to participate. Your position as foreign policy spokesman of the SPD 
is an additional reason.717
Since Ehmke responded negatively to Koniecki’s request, the FEF official invited the 
German law professor Hans-Peter Schneider from the University of Hanover as an 
expert on federalism to the symposium in Salamanca. Schneider, who described the 
Spanish transition as a “historically unique revolutionary process leading from one 
constitutional order to another” while not being the “result of a fight but one of 
arguments and reason” 718 was ‘hired’ not only as a conference speaker. Besides 
attending the seminar, Schneider was asked to professionally support his Spanish 
colleagues from PSOE who worked on the constitutional committee of the newly
710elected Cortes under the chairmanship of Gregorio Peces-Barba. The committee was 
to consult with constitutional experts of three countries: Mexico because of its exile 
contacts with Spanish Republicans (through the IAICL), Italy because of its experience
77 0with regionalism and West Germany. Schneider attended the conference in
717 AdsD, HEC, BN/0544, Letter Dieter Koniecki to Horst Ehmke, 5 March 1977 (translation by author).
718 ’El proceso espafiol de transicidn a la democracia es unico y sorprendente’, El Pais, 21 April 1977.
719 The parliamentary constitutional committee o f the Cortes had seven members who represented the main 
political forces in the country: UCD (P6rez Llorca, Cisneros, Herrero de Miiion), PSOE (Peces-Barba), 
Alianza Popular (Fraga Iribame), PCE (Sol£ Tura) and Catalan nationalists (Roca Junyent).
720 Personal interview with Hans-Peter Schneider, Hanover, 4 April 2002.
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Salamanca where he gave a presentation on “The Constitutional Position of Political 
Parties in the Federal Republic of Germany.”721
The Salamanca seminar received a high degree of public attention, something 
Koniecki and the FEF “had not expected to that extent.”722 The FEF office in Madrid 
reported back to its headquarters that Spanish as well as West German TV crews had 
covered the meeting and that the news programme Telediario had reported on the 
seminar with a ten-minute trailer. The participants in Salamanca concluded their 
findings in a common statement in which they publicly outlined the requirements any 
future democratic constitution must address in order to represent a nation still suffering 
from historical divisions. The document demanded that the future Cortes would have to 
be a constituent parliament and it vehemently condemned any attempts to ridicule or 
even deny the “constituent character of the current historical situation.”723 The authors 
also demanded that equal access to state media was granted to all political actors, urged 
the government to stop exploiting its privileged access to means of communication and 
clamoured for a nation-wide general amnesty for political activists who were prosecuted 
by the old regime as a gesture of reconciliation.724 Furthermore, the Salamanca 
Declaration of Spain’s leading constitutional lawyers stressed the importance of a 
constitutional role for the country’s political parties and described political pluralism as 
a pre-requisite for any successful creation of a diverse democratic system. The Spanish 
jurists realised the high risk posed by the “hegemonic ambitions of all those groups that 
think of their own interests as being the interest of the whole country.”725 They stressed 
the necessity to provide the electorate with “clearly distinguishable political choices that 
are easy to understand and which are based on the premise that all ideologies should be 
guaranteed the right to co-exist.” 726 A broadly based consensus among the wide 
spectrum of political forces was seen as crucial to ensure constitutional stability and the
721 Schneider’s work as a constitutional adviser to PSOE’s legal team was later published by the Centro de 
Estudios Constitucionales under the title Democraciay Constitution, (Madrid 1991).
722 AdsD, HEC, BN/0351, FEF Report ‘1. Symposium iiber die verfassungsmassige Rolle politischer 
Parteien’, 28 April 1977.
723 ‘Clausurado el I Simposium sobre Constitucionalizacidn de Partidos Politicos’, El Adelanto, 23 April 
1977.
724 Ibid.
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main parties were urged to guarantee the safeguarding of minority rights in order to 
satisfy the “democratic expectations of the whole of Spanish society.”727 The declaration 
did not fail to underline the pressing problem of a lack of autonomy for Spain’s regions 
and it made it cleajy^hat a continuation of Spain’s traditional centralism would trigger 
potentially disastrous consequences. In the opinion of the assembled constitutional 
experts, the idea of decentralisation, which would integrate structural elements of 
regionalism and federalism into the new constitutional order, was posing no threat to the 
principle of Spanish unity. Last not least, a catalogue of basic democratic institutions, 
mechanisms and checks-and-balance provisions was added i.e. control of the executive 
by parliamentary majority and the creation of a Supreme Court as a supervising and 
regulating legal institution particularly in the area of constitutional law, basic individual 
rights and regional autonomy.728 In short, the constitution was to be what the historian 
Juan Pablo Fusi later said about the final product namely “neither the unilateral 
imposition of one party nor the expression of a single ideology but the synthesis and
72 Q
reconciliation of ideologically divergent and potentially antagonistic positions.”
In his own assessment of the seminar, Koniecki emphasised that the FEF was 
able to present itself as a natural partner to a broad range of political actors on the 
centre-left and to recommend itself for further co-operation on constitutional matters. 
One leading constitutional expert, however, describes Koniecki’s own role as of “key 
importance” for the success of the conference series and the degree to which Spanish 
and foreign experts were able to trade ideas and exchange conceptual approaches 
concerning Spain’s new constitutional make-up.730 His report notes that all of the 
academics involved expressed their interest in future co-operative projects with the West 
German Foundation and two more symposiums were organised, one in La Laguna on 
the question of ‘Federalism and Regionalism’ and one in the city of Zaragoza on the 
“Position of Municipalities in Spain’s Constitutional System” and on “Parliamentary 
Control of the Government in Pluralist Democracies”. The former discussed the
727 Ibid.
™ Ibid.
129 Juan Pablo Fusi, Jordi Palafox, Espana: 1808-1996. El Desqflo de la Modernidad, (Espasa Calpe, 
Madrid 1997), p.379.
730 Personal correspondence with Manuel Contreras Casado, 3 May 2006.
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question of federalism and Spain’s political decentralisation firmly within the context of 
other European and Latin American constitutional orders.731 The Spanish academic 
Gumersindo Trujillo as one of the co-organisers of the conference stressed the 
importance of this platform-building event for the successful solving of problems posed 
by the various demands for provincial autonomy that swirled around during the 
transition process. “During the transition from autocracy to democracy, it becomes 
necessary to develop certain constitutional formulae, which permit the integration of the 
different nationalities the Spanish state is composed of.”732 Hence the regionalism 
conference provided leading Spanish and foreign constitutional experts with a stage to 
“play their technical role” namely to arrive at the aforementioned formulae through 
discussions and to “identify and to offer solutions and alternatives to political 
parties.”733 On the German side, Koniecki invited political scientist Hans-Jiirgen Puhle 
of the University of Munster to provide the conference with an introduction to the 
federal element in West Germany’s political system. Puhle’s connection with the FEF 
dated back to his years as Managing Director of the FEF-affiliated Institute 
Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales (ILDIS) from 1966 to 1968 in Santiago de 
Chile and his role as a co-ordinator of the FEF’s political programmes in 
Latinamerica.734
Six months later, more than fifty lawyers, sociologists and political scientists 
discussed the separation powers and forms, methods and functions of parliamentary 
control of the government at a third conference -  the Jornadas Internacionales de 
Ciencia Politico y  Derecho Constitucional: El control parlamentario del Gobierno en 
las democracias pluralistas - in Zaragoza.735 Among the assembled legal scholars and 
social scientists, the Heidelberg-based academic Klaus von Beyme focused on questions 
of stability in coalition governments and the impact of interest groups on the policy
731 ‘Comenzaron las sesiones de trabajo del Simposio sobre Regionalismo y Federalismo’, El Dia, 28 
September 1977.
732 ‘Apertura del Simposio Intemacional sobre Regionalismo y Federalismo’, El Dia, 27 September 1977.
733 ‘Comienza el Simposio sobre Sistemas Regionales y Federales Contemporaneos’, La Tarde, 26 
September 1977.
734 Personal correspondence with Hans-Jiirgen Puhle, 24 June 2006. FEF resident representative Koniecki 
held an ILDIS scholarship before he took over the Foundation’s office in MefaKQ.
735 ‘Jornadas de Derecho Constitucional en Zaragoza’, Heraldo de Aragon, 12 March 1978.
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making process.736 Finally, the FEF organised another legal conference, which took 
place in June 1979 in Granada. Again, delegates from a broad range of national, political 
and academic backgrounds exchanged their views on the development of Spain’s 
democratic structures, among them prominent public figures such as senator Luis 
Sanchez Agesta and the Catalan Communist MP Jordi Sole Tura.737 In addition to the 
conference series, the FEF suggested establishing institutional long-term arrangements 
for scholarly co-operation between research centres in West Germany and the Spanish 
section of the IAICL. The symposium resulted in a final resolution by the Spanish 
IAICL section to establish a permanent working group with interested colleagues from 
Germany and Italy, which was to accompany the constitution-building process in 
Spain.738
However, the meeting in Granada came after the Spanish people in a 
referendum had finally approved a new constitution in December 1978 with 87% of all 
votes cast. Despite the majority of ‘yes’ votes in favour of the constitution, the senior 
Spanish politician and former Foreign Minister Jose Maria de Areilza warned of the 
“current climate of unhappiness and protest” caused by a “state of affairs dominated by 
mismanagement of the public domain”, which had led 41% of all eligible voters to 
abstain or vote against the constitution.740 He stressed that such a public mood could not 
be changed by putting forward a new constitution but required the holding of general 
elections.741 Other commentators agreed by urging the political class to “identify ways 
and develop concepts that raise the public’s interest in the functioning of democratic 
institutions”.742 It was at this point that any future FEF activities had to depart from as 
the constitution-building process with its final document was in fact “not the conclusion
736 ‘III Jornadas Intemacionales de Ciencia Politica y Derecho Constitucional’, Heraldo de Aragon, 18 
March 1978.
737 ‘La Fundacion Ebert patrocina jornadas sobre ciencia politica’, El Pais, 10 June 1979.
738 Ibid
739 67% o f eligible voters heeded the call by Spain’s democratic parties to vote in the referendum with 
7,83% voting against the constitution, Ya, 22 December 1978.
740 ‘Existe hoy otro marco de tendencias’, ABC, 9 December 1978.
741 Ibid. See also ‘Analisis de Urgencia”, ABC, 8 December 1978.
742 ‘Despu6s de la Constituci6n’, El Pais, 8 December 1978.
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in the long chapter about the transition and the democratic process” but only one 
necessary task that needed to be continued in the legislative work of parliamentarians.743
4.10, SPD and PSOE -  The Transnational Party Connection
In her doctoral thesis on the European dimension of Socialist political aid and
transnational party solidarity, Spanish scholar Pilar Ortuno Anaya concluded: “It was 
clear, that for many SPD leaders and German trade unions fear of Communist 
dominance among Spanish workers in Spain was a constant preoccupation.”744 West 
Germany’s Social Democrats were not only mobilising financial, logistical and political 
resources to prevent the creation of a popular front between Socialists and Communists 
that could potentially set the pretext for a fully-fledged Communist take-over of power 
positions. They were also aware of significantly more radical ideological tendencies 
within PSOE and UGT. In October 1977, the FEF office in Madrid reported that
If one follows the resolutions of the 27th PSOE Congress and the ongoing communiques 
of the federal executive committee of the party it becomes very clear that a majority 
within PSOE sees the party as a Marxist organisation and believes that a number of 
discrepancies exist between PSOE and SPD.74
Initially, West Germany’s SPD provided financial support to the Partido Socialista del 
Interior (PSI), a party chaired by the popular law professor and future mayor of Madrid 
Tiemo Galvan. The SPD also maintained cross-party links with the exiled PSOE 
histdrico enabling the senescent Socialist party leader Rodolfo Llopis to “monopolise 
international relations, prevent any contacts between the European Socialist parties and 
members of the PSOE inside Spain.”746 The situation changed when from 1972 West 
Germany’s Social Democrats with their new Chairman Willy Brandt switched their 
support to the newly established PSOE renovado led by the charismatic young Seville 
labour lawyer Felipe Gonzalez.747
743 ‘Manos a la obra’, La Vanguardia, 7 December 1978.
744 Pilar Ortuno Anaya, European Socialists and Spain, op.cit., p. 183.
745 AdsD, BFC, BN/1542, FEF Report ‘Die PSOE vor dem Treffen der Sozialistischen Intemationalen in 
Madrid vom 14. bis 16. Oktober 1977’, (Dieter Koniecki), 28 October 1977 (translation by author).
746 Pilar Ortufio Anaya, European Socialists and Spain, op.cit., p. 166.
747 Ibid., p. 172.
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This was partly due to the ideological independence displayed by the Gonzalez-led 
PSOE wing, which clearly distanced itself from any co-operation with Carillo’s PCE 
and rejected the idea of Mediterranean Socialism. In 1975, the West German Embassy 
in Madrid informed the Auswartige Amt:
PSOE does not believe the PCE to be a democratic party. It believes that the 
Communist’s ultimate aim is to occupy key power positions within the Spanish political 
system including the military after ending the tactical alliance with Bourgeoisie and 
Socialist parties to rule the country single-handedly. Felipe Gonzalez has expressed his 
fear that in such a case Socialists would become the PCE’s first victims.748
Brandt’s SPD colleague Hans Matthofer summarised West German expectations when 
he expressed his confidence that “PSOE has the ability to integrate numerous leftist 
splinter groups and to become the decisive force for political change towards a 
democratic Socialism in Spain.”749 The PSI would later be incorporated into PSOE and 
Tiemo Galvan was to become Honorary President of the party.
In the meantime, the SPD leadership offered its services as a mediating force in 
order to bring about a greater unity of the Spanish left.750 Its transnational party support 
became even more important since Foreign Minister Genscher hesitated to establish 
official contacts with what the Foreign Office described as “radical democrats” for fear 
of putting his working relationship and channels of political dialogue with reform- 
minded members of the Spanish Government at risk. The Foreign Office warned 
“despite the temporary tolerance displayed towards PSOE activities by the Spanish
• 7 c  1
Government discretion remains crucial for West Germany’s official institutions.” 
Geopolitical considerations and multilateral priorities ranked most prominently on the 
agenda of West Germany’s public diplomacy. It’s declared goal was Spain’s gradual
policy strategists admitted that it was imperative “to secure the country’s geostrategic
748 PolArch/AA B26, 110.257, FRG Embassy Madrid, Reportr^paniens Innenpolitik und die Position der 
Kommunistischen Partei’, 12 August 1975 (translation by authtfr).
749 Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 22 April 1976.
750 AdsD, HEC, BN/0748, Notes Veronika Isenberg on the findings of the meeting o f the Sechserkreis, 4 
June 1976.
751 PolArch/AA B 2 6 ,110.256, Auswartiges Amt, Notes .Spanish Party System’,14 May 1975.
European integration including its future membership in the EC and the FRG’s foreign
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position and considerable military potential for the Western alliance.”752 As in the case 
of Portugal’s transition, Bonn offered its good offices to the government in Madrid 
indicating its preparedness to act as an advocate for Spanish interests within multilateral 
fora. However, Genscher and his advisers were afraid that any closer interaction with 
opposition members other than ‘soft-liners’ within the regime could lead to unwarranted 
publicity thus undermining German efforts to tie Spain closely to EC and NATO. “We 
had not been credible if the minister had received members of the radical opposition 
(e.g. PSOE) during his official visit,” states a Foreign Office report in the wake of 
Genscher’s visit to Spain in March 1975.754 On the other hand, so-called “reformers” 
within the Franco Regime (among them Carlos Arias Navarro, who took over as Prime 
Minister after his predecessor General Carrero Blanco’s death) described as being 
“socially acceptable” were considered useful to prepare Spain’s eventual membership in 
both organisations and West Germany’s public diplomacy “insisted on meeting with 
them.”755
At the same time, public diplomacy realised the importance of transnational 
democracy promotion pursued by private actors i.e. political parties and foundations. 
“PSOE maintains close contacts with the SPD and is also member of the Socialist 
International. In the long-term, this relationship can help us to soften certain tendencies 
towards political co-operation between Communists and Socialists based on the idea of
752 PolArch/AA B26, 110.213, Auswartiges Amt, Notes for Foreign Affairs Select Committee ‘Situation in 
Spain’, 23 April 1975. However, Bonn’s diplomatic circles were also aware how important a cautious 
pursuit o f these foreign policy goals was as domestic opposition to Spain’s Nato accession in West 
Germany forbade any “spectacular” policies in this area, which could have drawn public attention to 
Bonn’s external relations with the authoritarian regime, PolArch/AA B26, 110.258, Report ‘Situation in 
Spain’, 9 May 1975.
753 West Germany’s Embassy in Madrid also pointed out that political developments in Spain’s immediate 
neighbourhood had an impact on Western strategic thinking. “Spain’s strategic importance for the United 
States and the Western alliance increases because of the situation in Portugal.” PolArch/AA B26, 110.258, 
FRG Embassy Madrid, Annual Report Political Affairs (Politischer Jahresbericht) 1975, 22 January 1976.
™ Ibid.
755 Ibid. Also PolArch/AA, B26, 101.442, Auswartiges Amt, ‘Deutsch-Spanische Ministerberatungen’, 6 
March 1975; PolArch/AA B26, 110.258, Letter Ambassador v. Lilienfeldt to Chancellor Schmidt, 6 
January 1975. At the same time, the Auswartige Amt was careful not to damage West Germany’s foreign 
relations with Spain’s ‘illegal’ opposition by behaving in a way that could be seen as “granting 
demonstrative support for the regime in the eyes of its critics” thus making the FRG’s ‘private’ diplomacy 
via its politica] Foundations and parties impossible, PolArch/AA B26, 110.258, Auswartiges Amt, Southern 
Europe Desk (Referat 203), Report ‘Situation auf der iberischen Halbinsel’, 8 July 1975.
233
a Mediterranean Socialism a la Mittterand.” 756 The Auswartiges Amt therefore 
concluded that “the contact between SPD and PSOE needs to seen as positive and merits 
our support, which should be provided discreetly.”757 And the same assessment suggests 
that “the Associacion Reforma Social Espanola seems worthy of West German 
assistance possibly through the FEF” and maintains that “we should also encourage SPD 
and FEF to continue their co-operation with PSOE .”758 The selection of partners, issue 
areas and operational modality of governmental diplomacy and transnational actors 
illustrate the conflation of private and public elements in the FRG’s post-war foreign 
policy with both sets of actors operating on two different levels within the international 
system to deliver policy outcomes to two different audiences but guided by a broadly 
identical hierarchy of state interests. “A practical foreign policy towards Spain should 
not take place only between governments but should be implemented simultaneously 
also by political parties and their affiliated foundations” advises the Foreign Office’s 
Southern Europe Desk and points out that
contacts already exist between CDU, SPD and Stiftungen with the opposition Christian 
Democrats and the Socialist Party in Spain. They should be urgently extended to help 
train a political elite, which will be able to take political responsibility after Franco’s 
death. The political foundations are playing a particularly important role in this context 
by training junior politicians abroad. 59
Shaping Spain’s future leadership and creating structural similarities with West 
Germany’s post-war democracy were the main goals of Bonn’s ‘softer’ form of power 
politics. It pursued this agenda as much through transnational channels as it operated 
within the familiar spaces of multilateralism realising that “in the eyes of the younger 
generation of Spanish politicians (including members of the opposition), the FRG’s
756 Ibid.
757 Ibid.
758 Ibid. Also PolArch/AA B26, 110.257, AuswSrtiges Amt, Southern Europe Desk (Referat 203), Report 
‘Politische Gruppierungen und Parteien in Spanien’, 24 July 1975.
759 PolArch/AA B26, 110.258, Memorandum ‘Vorschlage fur eine praktische Politik gegeniiber Spanien in 
den nSchsten Monaten’, 25 October 1975 (translation by author); PolArch/AA B26, 110.258, Telex 
(Femschreiben), FRG Embassy Madrid, 27 October 1975; PolArch/AA B26, 110.258, Auswartiges Amt, 
Southern Europe Desk (Referat 203), Report ‘Demokratische Krafte in Spanien und ihre deutschen 
Kontakte’, 6 November 1975.
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political and social structures serve as model and example”.760 In fact, the FRG’s 
governmental diplomacy acknowledged that “owr most effective way of influencing key 
political actors in a future democratic Spain” were West Germany’s political 
connections maintained by its political foundations.761 At the same time, public 
diplomacy continued to operate on a govemment-to-govemment level. In November 
1975, diplomats at West Germany’s Embassy in Madrid outlined a package of measures 
of bilateral assistance in a ‘Draft Plan of Encouragement for a Policy of Democratic 
Opening by the Spanish Government’. The plan suggested three areas of possible 
support namely in the realm of foreign policy, domestic politics and military affairs.762 
The international dimension of the plan included a positive response to democratic 
change shown by the member states of the European Community, an invitation for a 
visit of the Spanish Prime Minister to the Federal Republic, a subsequent state visit by 
the West German President to Spain and closer diplomatic co-operation with “special 
attention being paid to Spanish requests in multilateral fora.”763
Domestically, the memorandum suggested the creation of a German-Spanish 
Parliamentary Association, the deepening of political contacts through West Germany’s 
political foundations and assistance for Spanish trade unions.764 Militarily, the authors 
recommend a return to the tradition of officer exchanges and joint meetings of the 
general staff, co-operation in the area of defence industries and the training of Spanish 
officers at the Leadership Academy of the FRG’s armed forces. “The aim of these 
measures” declares the report “is to make it easier for the Spanish military to co­
ordinate its activities more closely with NATO. It therefore aims at increasing the 
familiarity of Spanish officers with NATO doctrines and operational plans, their 
participation in joint training sessions and the implementation of NATO strategies 
within the framework of military exercises of the Bundeswehr. Economically, the
760 PolArch/AA B26, 110.258, FRG Embassy Madrid, Country Study Spain 1975 (Landeraufzeichnung), 
10 October 1975.
761 PolArch/AA B26, 110.258, AuswSrtiges Amt, Southern Europe Desk (Referat 203), Report 
‘Demokratische Krafte in Spanien und ihre deutschen Kontakte’, 6 November 1975.
762 PolArch/AA B26, 110.258, ‘Entwurf eines Planes zur Ermutigung einer demokratischen Offnung’, 4 
November 1975.
763 Ibid.
764 Ibid.
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Federal Government was urged to launch an official campaign promoting German 
investment in Spain, provide loans when requested and intensify the scientific-technical 
co-operation. Culturally, the plan called for increased activities of the Kulturinstitut, 
renewed exchanges between universities, additional Max Planck scholarships and 
deepened co-operation in the areas of film, play and opera.765 Finally, like private 
foreign policy actors so did public diplomacy realise that “for a long time now Spanish 
politicians and journalists have expressed an interest in getting to know the inner 
workings of the Federal Republic’s parliamentary system, German experiences with 
solving domestic political disputes, the functioning of the Bundestag, political parties, 
trade unions and media organisations.”766 It was this area in which the ‘power of 
attraction’ aimed at helping to create an environment structurally compatible with post­
war society in West Germany, and power politics of such a configuration remained the 
stronghold of private diplomacy on a transnational level.
In April 1975, the new PSOE leadership held talks with Willy Brandt in which 
both sides discussed possible forms of future co-operation between the two parties as 
well as logistical, organisational and financial questions. Brandt and his colleagues were 
aware that Santiago Carillo’s PCE and its affiliated union organisation CC.OO. 
appeared to be the widely acknowledged representation of working class interests and 
that Communist forces commanded the “best functioning apparatus.” SPD international 
relations expert Dingels stated unambiguously “it is acknowledged that Spanish 
Socialists ought to receive every conceivable form of assistance” and he stressed the 
importance for PSOE “to create a counterweight given the material dominance of 
Communist organisations.” 767 Antonio Bar Cendon, a constitutional lawyer and 
participant in FEF-sponsored conferences points out that at the outset of Spain’s 
democratic transition, PSOE was “almost nonexistent” and that in terms of financial and 
political backing from abroad “no other party received a similar amount or so qualified 
help from foreign organisations.”768 At a meeting in September 1974, the Foundation 
brought together thirteen political activists from five different organisations in six
765 Ibid.
766 Ibid.
767 Ibid. AdsD, BFC, BN/1542, Notes Hans-Eberhard Dingels for Willy Brandt, 17 April 1975.
768 Personal correspondence with Antonio Bar Cendon, 19 June 2006.
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Spanish provinces. The participants of the meeting agreed, “it was a political necessity
nfiQto act in a co-ordinated and united way.” The idea of a unification of the political left 
by means of merging various Socialists groups into a single party was rejected and 
instead one proposed the establishment of a “Socialist Confederation” to overcome the 
“long-standing fragmentation” of Spanish Socialism.770 The FEF-facilitated conference 
which was initiated in co-operation with PSOE expressed its intention to co-opt 
additional Socialist groups in the near future but rejected any co-operation with Rodolfo 
Llopis and his PSOE historico as well as with Tiemo Galvan’s PSI. According to West 
German trade unionist Max Diamant who attended the conference both politicians “were 
characterised as representatives of the most flagrant personality cult.”771
He also pointed out that Galvan’s political integrity was in doubt because of his 
“tactical co-operation with Carrillo’s PCE.” 772 Galvan’s growing political isolation, 
which left him cut-off from any significant support by centre-left parties in Europe, 
continued well into the second half of the 1970s. According to a West German observer 
at the party’s third congress in June 1976, not a single representative of a major Socialist 
or Social Democratic party attended the event and “one can get the impression that only 
Communist parties and parties of the Third World are supporting the PSI.”773 Koniecki 
was opposed to any form of tactical alliance on the left and reported to FEF 
headquarters that Gonzalez while speaking at PSOE’s 27th Congress had left no doubt 
that “any form of revolutionary Socialism under the current Spanish circumstances is an 
utopian idea.”774 He warned Helmut Schmidt during the latter’s visit to Madrid in 
January 1977 about possible questions by members of the press which might try to 
insinuate West German support for PSOE’s alleged Marxist “maximalism.” Koniecki 
advised Schmidt to counter these questions by dismissing any “over-accentuated
769 AdsD, WBC, BN/22, Report Max Diamant, without date. Willy Brandt writes on the question o f a 
united political left : “This is a problem which needs to be solved by the Spanish Socialists themselves. In 
my view, external mediation seems to be a promising approach only if  all parties involved would request 
it.” AdsD, WBC, BN/43, Letter Willy Brandt to Tiemo Galvan, 12 July 1976.
770 Ibid.
771 Ibid.
772 Ibid
773 AdsD, WBC, BN/43, Report Volkhart Muller
774 AdsD, BFC, BN/1542, FEF Report ‘Die PSOE vor dem Treffen der Sozialistischen Intemationalen in 
Madrid vom 14. bis 16. Oktober 1977’, (Dieter Koniecki), 28 October 1977.
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ideological approaches” on the part of PSOE as the “natural result of a party that had 
operated in illegality for 40 years.”775 Earlier, the SPD’s head of international affairs 
Dingels had characterised PSOE as the “possible nucleus for a future Social Democratic 
party in Spain.”776 Consequently, SPD politician Ludwig Fellermaier who attended the 
PSOE Congress in December 1976 made a financial donation on behalf of the social 
democratic parliamentary group in the Bundestag totalling DM 25.000 (ca. £8000).777
Besides financial support, PSOE activists enjoyed political protection by the 
SPD, which continued to closely monitor Spain’s political situation. Spain’s Socialists 
also enhanced their prestige through their partnership with West Germany’s majority 
party and its political foundation, and the FRG’s governmental diplomacy 
acknowledged that PSOE’s “recognition by SI and other West European Socialist 
parties has greatly strengthened its reputation.”778 West Germany’s Social Democrats 
supported leading PSOE personnel whenever the Franco regime tried to silence the still 
illegally operating opposition with additional repressive measures.779 The excellent line 
of communication between SPD and the West German Embassy would more than once 
serve as an early-warning system. When in October 1975, the international secretary of 
the PSOE Luis Yanes was arrested and PSOE leader Felipe Gonzalez was put under 
intense surveillance by the Spanish secret police, a diplomat of the German Embassy 
informed SPD international relations envoy Veronika Isenberg about the fact that the 
political right rather than the Prince or the Prime Minister was behind the draconic 
action.780 The FRG’s diplomatic representation in Madrid called on the SPD to officially 
protest against the arrest but advised party officials not to accuse Juan Carlos of bearing 
any responsibility for the incident. At the same time, a high-ranking German diplomat 
would deliver a demarche to the office of the Prime Minister highlighting the grave
775 Ibid.
776 AdsD, HSC, BN/6566, Notes Hans-Eberhard Dingels, 22 December 1976.
777 AdsD, Ludwig Fellermaier Collection (hereafter LFC), BN/072, Letter Ludwig Fellermaier to Hans- 
Eberhard Dingels, 26 November 1976.
778 PolArch/AA B26, 110.258, FRG Embassy Madrid, Annual Report Political Affairs (Politischer 
Jahresbericht), 1975,22 January 1976.
779 At a press conference in Bonn in October 1975, Brandt described transnational party co-operation as 
“humanitarian support" and admitted “good contacts” between SPD and PSOE politicians some of which 
had already visited West Germany. Die Welt, 16 October 1975.
780 AdsD, WBC, BN/127, Letter Veronika Isenberg to Willy Brandt, 31 October 1975.
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consequences that would follow any arrest of Gonzalez.781 Strong transitional ties 
between PSOE and SPD and especially between opposition matador Felipe Gonzalez 
and his fatherly mentor Willy Brandt also helped to secure the political backing of 
international organisations such as the Socialist International (SI). As mentioned in 
Chapter Two, after his resignation in April 1974, Brandt had played an increasingly 
active role in the SI and took over the chairmanship in 1976. His influence within the 
Socialist organisation made it arguably easier for PSOE’s leadership to establish itself as 
the undisputed champion of progressive, left-of-centre transitional politics in Spain not 
least in the eyes of its politically and financially potent European sister parties.
The session of the Si’s Spain committee in Amsterdam on 16 November 1975 
shortly after Franco’s death was an example for the usefulness of such exclusive 
contacts. Expressing his concern about contacts between European Socialist and Social 
Democratic parties and Tiemo Galvan’s PSP as well as Santiago Carillo’s PCE, 
Gonzalez’s representative on the committee asked the assembled party leaders to 
exclusively support PSOE.782 The party official urged his colleagues not to send high- 
ranking delegations to Madrid neither to the dictator’s funeral nor to the enthronisation 
of his handpicked successor Prince Juan Carlos, which was supposed to take place a few 
days later.783 In return, the SI agreed to organise a Day of Solidarity with its Spanish 
comrades with money being collected for the financial support of PSOE. SI member 
parties committed themselves to a public relations campaign in order to raise the 
political profile of Spanish Socialists. They agreed that West European governments 
ought to change their standoffish attitude towards Spain’s new political leadership only 
if the new head of state was to take concrete steps towards real democratisation.
781 Ibid.
782 Felipe Gonzalez made no secret o f his concerns about the contacts between various European Social 
Democratic parties and PCE boss Santiago Carillo. He warned his SPD friends that these links meant 
“political advertisement for the PCE, which should not be underestimated.” AdsD, WBC, BN/128, Note 
Veronika Isenberg, 23 January 1976.
783 Members of the international community concerned PSOE about any expression o f support for the 
regime. For Gonzalez, developments such as a possible closer co-operation between Madrid and the EC 
would mean an “international revaluation of the current regime.” dpa, 4 August 1975. Consequently, no 
Head of State attended the dictator’s funeral while a number o f Western leaders followed the invitation to 
attend Prince Juan Carlos coronation, among them West German President Walter Scheel, the French 
President Giscard d’Estaing, U.S. Vice President Rockefeller and the Duke o f Edinburgh. Raymond Carr, 
see Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, (George Allen & Unwin, London 1979),
p.208.
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Although sooner or later PSOE would have become a member of the SI anyway, SPD 
advocacy on its behalf certainly helped to speed up the process and secured precious 
support during the transition’s initial phase.784
Although it was vital for PSOE to secure international political assistance in 
order to acquire bitterly needed political know-how for any upcoming political 
elections, and although at times the party had to “be encouraged by us and to be 
reminded that it was not fighting on its own but that it was embedded in and assisted by 
an international Socialist movement”785, party leaders had to dissolve the widespread 
fear and perception on the part of the Spanish public that PSOE was a mere puppet in 
the hands of foreign powers and remote-controlled by West Germany’s SPD. According 
to one West German observer, the integration in international support structures did not 
pose a problem to the domestic reputation of political parties. It would rather have an 
advantageous effect. What had to be avoided at all costs was the impression of being 
surrounded by “patronising advisers who would publicly warn or criticise.”786 Often the 
polemic discourse culminated in popular bon mots such as that “if PSOE wins the 
elections Spanish politics will be made in Bonn.”787 SPD Chairman Brandt angrily 
rejected any accusation of an external tutelage and an imposition of foreign political 
concepts by West Germany’s Social Democrats.
This is the difference between democratic Socialism and other political movements. Our 
way is not an ideological export product and it is not a recipe which we impose on our 
sister party. The basic values of democratic Socialism is one thing, their application to 
particular national and historical situations quite another. We do not see the principle of 
international solidarity as an instrument of manipulation or even as an instrument to
784 In Amsterdam, the different parties pledged to provide financial support to PSOE: £7500 from the 
Swedish party, £1000 from the British Labour Party, £4000 from the SI and £1000 from Israel’s Labour 
Party. Ibid.
785 Personal interview with Dieter Koniecki, Madrid, 5 April 2003.
786 Walter Haubrich, ’Mit Pablo Iglesias als Symbolfigur: Die Spanische Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei hofft 
auf eine fuhrende Rolle’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 December 1976.
787 Quoted in Walter Haubrich, ’Was hat der Bundeskanzler denn mit „Entesa dels Catalans" zu tun? -  Die 
Deutschen im spanischen W ahlkampf, Franltfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 28 February 1979. The French 
philosopher Jean Paul Sartre who accused the SPD of being the accomplice of the United States made a 
similar argument. “It is obvious that Germany’s Social Democracy is one of the preferred instruments of 
American imperialism in Europe.” According to Sartre, the SPD had restored capitalism in West Germany 
and had collaborated with the “Nazis of capital.” In the international arena, the SPD interfered in the 
internal affairs o f other states aiming for the position of “German proconsul in Europe.” Vorwdrts, 14 
April 1977.
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exercise hegemony over our sister party. The phrase of ‘restricted sovereignty’ does not 
have a place in our vocabulary.788
In striking resemblance of Portugal’s political developments, Gonzalez rhetorically 
rejected any suggestion that foreign political concepts were imposed on domestic actors 
in the Spanish transition and he claimed to follow a uniquely ‘Spanish way’ just as 
Soares had done to convince his fellow party members and the electorate of his 
independent standing among the multitude of foreign friends.789 FEF representative 
Koniecki writes:
PSOE seeks to prevent at all costs accusations of an outside influence on its decision­
making by West Germany’s SPD, which is the most powerful Social Democratic party 
in Europe. Many of the partly obscured, partly openly launched attacks on Social 
Democrats as being mere lackeys of capitalism’ are identical with the political position 
of Communist parties.790
On the other hand, in direct talks with their West German counterparts Socialist leaders 
were not holding back with their affirmation of how much the SPD’s support was 
appreciated, crucial and influential.
The PSOE leadership reiterated once more in my talks with them how influential the 
West German Government and the SPD were in Spain and told me how valuable the 
SPD’s assistance was. They explicitly mentioned Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt and 
others who would make their job of establishing relations with the public much
791easier.
Among the many services of transnational and bilateral co-operation were various 
humanitarian interventions on the part of the German Embassy and continuous efforts to 
help PSOE leaders to obtain passports.792 However, the “battle for jackpots”793 as SPD
788 Speech Willy Brandt at the PSOE party conference in December 1976., SPD Pressedienst (translation 
by author).
789 AdsD, BFC, BN/1542, FEF Report ‘Die PSOE vor dem Treffen der Sozialistischen Intemationalen in 
Madrid vom 14. bis 16. Oktober 1977’, (Dieter Koniecki), 28 October 1977.
790 Ibid  (translation by author).
791 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, Notes Veronika Isenberg on the visit o f a SI delegation to Spain from the 14.-18. 
Januar 1976,21 January 1976 (translation by author).
792 In concerted efforts, Ambassador von Lilienfeldt, SPD foreign relations expert Dingels, the Chancellor’s 
Office as well as SPD Chairman Willy Brandt would put pressure on King Juan Carlos and Spain’s
241
international relations director Hans-Eberhard Dingels had coined the transitional 
practice of establishing political links with foreign donors needed to unfold with the 
lowest public profile possible. The position of PSOE’s leadership receiving support 
from SPD and FEF appeared to be particularly tricky as Carillo’s Communists were 
determinedly trying to portrait Gonzalez’s party as occupying the centre-right of the 
political spectrum thereby claim-staking leftist politics in Spain for the PCE. At the 
same time, the PCE approached the electorate in a moderate manner and managed to 
find access to centrist voter segments.794 Felipe Gonzalez tried to disperse fears of a 
West German ‘dictatorship of ideas’ when he outlined his political relationship with the 
SPD:
If I would be German I would be probably on the left of the SPD. That means that I 
would be a member of the SPD. However, the Spanish and German situations cannot be 
compared. Brandt and Germany’s Social Democracy enjoy the support of the working 
class. One needs to take into account that the Germans deal with totally different 
societal and economic structures. Furthermore, there is the constant presence of East 
Germany. You cannot compare that to Spain. On the other hand, if I would be French I 
would be a member of the French Socialist Party. If I would be Italian, I would 
nevertheless belong to the Italian Socialist Party. And if I would be Hungarian or Czech 
I would certainly not be a member of the Communist Party. 795
Writing in the acclaimed political journal Diario 16, Spanish journalist Luis Garcia San 
Miguel observed changing political attitudes on the part of the anti-Franco left after the 
dictator’s death. According to San Miguel, the new transitional climate had generated a 
situation in which the aim was not to “destroy franquismo but to build democracy”.
political leadership. In December 1975, PSOE leader Gonzalez was refused a passport to follow the 
invitation o f the Socialist group in the European Parliament. Lilienfeldt was instructed to intervene on 
Gonzalez’ behalf. Writes Dingels: “The delaying tactics of the Spanish authorities is obvious. Ambassador 
v. Lilienfeldt made abundantly clear to the King that we have the utmost interest in Gonzalez’ visit.” AdsD, 
WBC, BN/127, Letter Hans-Eberhard Dingels to Willy Brandt, 26 November 1975.
793 Personal interview with Hans-Eberhard Dingels, Bonn, 18 April 2002.
794 A few years later, PCE leader Santiago Carillo himself publicly advocated a close co-operation between
SPD and PCE. Willy Brandt’s former Chief o f Staff Klaus Harpprecht recalls a train ride with Carillo. 
While both men were scheduled to attend a party conference o f the Italian Communist Party in Livorno, 
Carillo used the opportunity to raise the issue of closer ties between PCE and SPD and asked Harpprecht to 
arrange a direct meeting with the Sl-President. “Brandt rejected the former Stalinist’s request immediately 
not least because of his memories o f the Spanish Civil War.” Interview Klaus Harpprecht. According to 
observers, this change in Carillo’s political orientation was based on the conviction that “the SPD has 
become an important factor for stability and political balance in Europe.” AdsD, WBC, BN/132, Note
Gerhard O. Klepsties, 31 January 1980.
795 Interview with Ram6n Pi, in: La Actualidad Espanola, 6 December 1976 (translation by author).
242
Throughout the 20th century, Communist propaganda had bandied the stereotype about 
that “Social Democracy equals social treason, an instrument in the hands of the 
bourgeoisie to discipline the proletariat.”796 Even years after the beginning of political 
co-operation between PSOE, SPD and FEF, Gonzalez’s international connection 
remained a useful weapon in the hands of his political foes and the PCE spearheaded the 
banging of the drums holding SPD Chairman Brandt responsible for the prevention of 
unity among Spanish leftwing forces.
Others were equally keen to drive a wedge between the two parties, attempts that 
did not go unnoticed by the SPD’s international affairs department. West Germany’s 
Social Democrats were concerned that certain political groupings with political 
aspirations to replace Gonzalez’s PSOE as the sole recipient of West German political 
and financial soft power assistance would try to undermine the institutional fundament 
of trust between party headquarters in Bonn and Madrid. Their efforts were seen as an 
attempt to “get back into talks with the SPD” after having successfully destroyed the 
axis Brandt-Gonzalez.797 These groups were identified as ‘Spanish Social Democrats’ 
and as members of the old historical wing of PSOE apparently trying to provide the 
Spanish media with background information on statements allegedly made by SPD 
leaders. Brandt was quoted as describing the PSOE as “a maximalist doctrinaire and 
immature party without any humility”, and the Madrid-based newspaper ABC reported 
that the SPD would financially support PSOE historico and the Socialist Party of 
Catalonia.798 Furthermore, SPD foreign affairs expert Veronika Isenberg pointed out 
that the aforementioned efforts to undermine the SPD-PSOE alliance were met with 
only thinly disguised sympathies in Spanish government circles. The government tried 
“to convince the SPD that PSOE was a party far more radical than West Germany’s 
Social Democrats and that other parties in Spain existed in greater ideological proximity 
to the SPD’s political positions.”799
796 Luis Garcia San Miguel, ‘La Socialdemocracia, a la vista (I): Socialdemocracia, Socialismo y 
Comunismo’, Diario 16, 21 February 1977.
797 AdsD, BFC, BN/1542, Notes Veronika Isenberg on a press campaign in Spain, 7 January 1977.
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By and large, the political tandem SPD-PSOE maintained its channels of 
communication, preserved and strengthened cross-party connections and continued 
unperturbed to co-operate throughout the transition phase. Although the frequent 
allegations of a meddling in the internal affairs of the Spanish state appeared to not have 
failed to have an effect on public opinion and although the Spanish Government may 
have welcomed the opportunity to disrupt the exchange of political ideas between the 
two parties in order to weaken PSOE as a future contender for political power, Madrid’s 
official attitude remained unagitated. In an interview with Cambio 16, Spanish Foreign 
Minister Areilza had unambiguously stated that his government would not perceive SPD 
support for PSOE as outside interference, and that it appreciated inter-party links.800 
Echoing Areilza’s position, the Spanish Ambassador in Bonn Emilio Garrigues reasoned 
in a frank letter to SPD foreign policy spokesman Bruno Friedrich:
The days when non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state was seen as a 
national taboo are long gone and I am asking myself if that has been always so 
particularly since -  according to Talleyrand’s cynical but important opinion -  the 
principle of non-intervention appears to be the one with the most similarities to the 
principle of intervention.801
According to Garrigues, PSOE appeared to be still strategically and ideologically tom 
between working towards “a Social Democracy German style or a people’s front a la 
Mitterrand.”802 He stressed the fact that the path ultimately chosen by the party “will be 
of the utmost importance for Spanish politics” and that therefore the guiding hand of its
800 It is important to note that the Spanish Government requested in talks with German diplomats a 
“discrete approach which would be in the interest o f all parties involved although in principal it welcomed 
the inter-party contacts”, AdsD, HSC, BN/6566, Country Report Spain (Ldnderbericht), German Embassy 
Madrid, 1976. In talks with SPD foreign affairs expert Hans-Jiirgen Wischnewski, Spanish Foreign 
Minister described Gonzalez as a “modem young politician of absolute integrity” and he promised that he 
and his colleagues would “support the creation of a truly democratic leftist movement in order to prevent 
Spain from falling prey to left or rightwing extremism.” Areilza also supported the creation of a strong 
union organisation. AdsD, WBC, BN/131, Note Hans-Eberhard Dingels, 11 January 1976. In this context, 
it is important to note Koniecki’s statement that “bilateral assistance according to the official line does not 
exist (e.g. between SPD and PSOE) but that assistance is provided via international organisations e.g. the 
SI or the International Association of Free Trade Unions”, AdsD, HSC, BN/6566, Recommendations by 
Dieter Koniecki for background talks with German journalists in the Embassy.
801 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, Letter Emilio Garrigues to Bruno Friedrich, 28 April 1976 (translation by 
author).
802 Ibid.
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West German mentor SPD was crucial during the transition*03 SPD official Isenberg 
concludes: “Our diplomatic mission here does not only interpret this as the desire of the 
Foreign Minister to maintain an orderly relationship with the SPD but it goes on the 
assumption, that he sees the tempering influence on the Spanish Socialists as 
positive.”804 Earlier, West Germany’s Ambassador von Lilienfeldt had informed SPD- 
Chairman Brandt about the positive attitude displayed by the Spanish Government vis-a- 
vis the democracy promotion activities of SPD and FEF:
The King as well as Foreign Minister Areilza and Interior Minister Fraga confirmed to 
me that without the participation of PSOE their reform projects would be doomed to 
failure. They all want to see a strong Socialist party under the leadership of Felipe 
Gonzalez, which is going to compete politically within the newly emerged democratic 
structures in Spain. Therefore, they welcome the contacts between SPD and PSOE and
80 Sappreciate the positive influence the former has over the latter.
Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez was interested in the creation of two equally potent power 
blocs in Spain’s transitional arena, which would dominate the political scenery on the 
centre-left and centre-right of the ideological spectrum. His own party Union de Centro 
Democratico (UCD) was to represent the Conservative segments of the electorate, 
Gonzalez’s PSOE being a moderate Socialist party would represents progressive 
voters.806 Together, they would stake a sufficiently large claim on the transitional and 
post-transitional chessboard, which would permanently exclude radical parties. In 1977, 
FEF resident representative Koniecki wrote:
According to Suarez’s plan, it will be crucial for UCD and PSOE to maintain the current 
distribution of power and to occupy future political spaces. Together, the two parties are 
representing circa 80 percent of the electorate and if they continue to adopt moderate 
positions in their political programmes the regular rotation of political power from one
803 Ibid.
804 AdsD, BFC, BN/1540, Notes Veronika Isenberg ‘Der Besuch einer SI-Delegation in Spanien vom 14. 
bis 18. Januar 1976’, 21 January 1976.
805 AdsD, WBC, BN/45, Letter Lilienfeldt to Willy Brandt (translation by author).
806 Interior Minister Fraga had earlier remarked about the role o f political parties in Spain’s new 
democra<^;'C]rhey are like fungus now. There are too many of them. We would like to see four main 
parties, tv^ojpn the right and two on the left.” DNSA/KT 01885, Memorandum of Conversation, 25 January 
1976
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party to the other is going to become a normal democratic development accepted by the 
Spanish citizenry.807
The importance of the German-Spanish political aid connection and the importance that 
PSOE's leadership attached to the SPD's opinion on crucial political questions became 
evident in cases in which the PSOE leadership consulted the SPD before policies were 
finalised, laws conceptualised or even parliamentary decisions taken. The visit of two 
members of the PSOE’s Defence Committee in April 1978 -  Enrique Mugica and Luis 
Solana -  to Germany to discuss the PSOE’s defence policies and related parliamentary 
proceedings with a number of individuals and institutions can be seen as an example 
that highlighted the nature of the relationship between PSOE and SPD and PSOE and 
the West German Government respectively. FEF Resident Representative Koniecki 
writes:
The visit, which was initiated by the SPD executive and not by us, is of the utmost 
urgency. Concerning the final wording of certain parts of the Spanish constitution which 
will also include the question of defence alliances the decisions need to be taken until 
the end of the month. It goes without saying that the PSOE will need to take into 
account the opinion and expertise of the West German Ministry of Defence and of the 
Federal Government during the parliamentary debate in the Cortes. The Federal 
Republic is one of the major West European powers and my conversation partners see 
their talks in Bonn as crucial.808
The FEF acted not only on behalf of Germany’s Social Democracy in order to 
strengthen the electoral position of PSOE but the Foundation also helped to reduce what 
Koniecki called the PSOE’s “ideological frigidity.” 809 The FEF needed to ease its 
Spanish partner’s political fears of being indefinitely trapped in what at times appeared 
to be an image-cracking Faustian pact with one side selling its political soul and 
ideological convictions in exchange for urgently needed technical and financial support.
807 AdsD, WBC, BN/62, Report ‘Die politische Situation in Spanien’, (Dieter Koniecki), 17 October 1977 
(translation by author).
808 AdsD, BFC, BN/1542, Notes Dieter Koniecki ‘Besuch des PSOE-Verteidigungsausschusses in 
Westdeutschland’ (translation by author).
809 Ibid
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4.11. Conclusions
This chapter has set out to highlight the channels through which West Germany’s 
foreign policy pursued a transnational form of soft power politics towards regime 
change in Spain. Rather than abstaining from interventionist approaches to further its 
state interests during the phase of political transformation, the SPD-led government 
supplemented the diplomatic efforts of the German Foreign Office by encouraging the 
pursuit of an informal diplomacy operationalised via Germany’s political foundations in 
general and the FEF in particular. Bonn’s security interest of containing Communist 
influence and preventing the PCE from occupying crucial power positions in Spain’s 
emerging democratic system was best served by pursuing a diplomatic bottom-up 
approach, in which external democracy promotion activities sought to establish counter­
hegemony through the support for Socialist forces. This support was provided by means 
of soft power and aimed at the transformation of Spain’s political infrastructure by 
influencing and ‘socialising’ future democratic elites. Without the necessary experience 
to ‘work the electorate’ as it were after decades of exiled existence, Spain’s political 
parties were firm in their political values and beliefs but lacked policies and concepts 
and hence the ability to put these values and beliefs into practice. It was on this practical 
level that West German soft power politics sought to shape the political preferences of 
PSOE’s leadership and to help setting the party’s agenda for change.
With its Action Plan, the FEF sought to help PSOE, which emerged from exile 
after decades of clandestine existence, to develop durable organisational structures and 
to establish a nationwide network of party offices. The Foundation filled a significant 
skill gap by training political activists and party workers thus boosting PSOE’s capacity 
to successfully contest elections at a later stage. After having prepared PSOE for the 
electoral battles ahead by helping the party to establish a countrywide network of 
offices, train party activists in campaigning and political communication and get the 
Socialist message across to the public through pamphlets, manifestos and flyers, the 
Foundation set out to strengthen the labour union UGT as the second pillar of Spain’s 
Socialist movement. In particular, the model of consensual strategies of dispute 
resolution in West Germany’s industrial relations provided UGT as well as Spanish 
employers with a template that could be used in the process of re-structuring Spain’s
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labour relations. Furthermore, the FEF’s Madrid office helped to set up the Fundacion 
Largo Caballero (FLC) as UGT’s policy planning and research arm. The Foundation’s 
traditional democracy promotion activities in the realm of industrial relations found their 
further expression in a range of seminars and publications on the model of a social 
partnership as practised between employers and organised labour in West Germany. 
Also, in order to aid the process of policy planning and to help shape PSOE’s political 
positioning on socio-economic issues, the FEF organised a Summer School programme 
in 1977 with the question of Marxism’s continuous relevance for PSOE’s policy making 
a hotly contested issue.
After the phase of institutionalisation, additional guidance was provided in the 
area of constitution building, where the FEF helped to facilitate the process of legal 
debate on the various aspects of the new constitutional document. The decentralisation 
of political power became a central theme in the discussions and West Germany’s 
experiences with political federalism and devolution neatly fitted into the conceptual 
vacuum of the transition. In sum, West German soft power driven foreign policy on its 
sub-state level of operation facilitated the transfer of ideas, policies and concepts in 
order to ensure the highest possible degree of compatibility between German and 
Spanish political and socio-economic structures. The ultimate aim was to stabilise the 
FRG’s extraterritorial environment and regional milieu through promoting political 
pluralism while actively obstructing Communist efforts to play a leading role in Spain’s 
new democracy. Several statements by the German Foreign Office demonstrated the 
systemic relationship between state and sub-state diplomacy and showed that the FEF’s 
democracy promotion projects were welcomed and encouraged by the FRG’s official 
diplomacy as important ‘pioneering’ work with democratic actors on the ground, which 
only transnational actors could engage in. In the words of the Auswartige Amt, the 
political foundations were supposed to “train future political elites”810 in the transition 
country thus binding Spain’s democratic leadership closely to West Germany’s political 
establishment. The diplomatic ‘division of labour’ with governmental diplomacy being 
engaged in bilateral and, regularly, multilateral endeavours of promoting democracy and 
the FEF’s transnational co-operation with PSOE, UGT, FLC, FPI and other Socialist
8,0 See p.219.
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organisations illustrates the two-tier nature of West Germany’s foreign policy system 
whereby the operational mode on sub-state level is best described by Joseph Nye’s 
concept of soft power.
In the following chapter, the FRG’s non-coercive power of attraction, co-option 
and persuasion based on the transfer of ideas, concepts, values and expertise will be 
explored in a third transition setting. After the study in Chapter Two to Four has 
examined West German involvement in the Iberian processes of regime change 
throughout the 1970s, the next case study will focus on regime change in South Africa 
thus scrutinising a process of political transformation that spanned most parts of the 
1980s and extended into the post-Cold War era ending with the country’s first 
democratic elections in 1994. Again, it will be shown how (West) Germany’s foreign 
policy operationalised soft power on a transnational level and outside multilateral 
frameworks. As in the Iberian cases of regime change, political foundations worked 
abreast governmental foreign policy actors furthering state as much as party interests. 
However, the chapter’s focus will shift away from the Social Democracy-led 
governments of the 1970s towards the democracy promotion activities of the 
conservative Konrad-Adenauer Foundation (KAF) backed by a Christian Democratic 
dominated coalition government in Bonn.
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Chapter 5
Pursuing Soft Power Politics IV: The Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation in South Africa 1982-1994
5.1. Introduction
After having examined the role of West Germany’s nongovernmental diplomacy in the 
Iberian Peninsula by maintaining an exclusive focus on the democracy promotion 
activities of the FEF throughout the 1970s, this chapter will put the spotlight firmly on 
channels of sub-state foreign policy during South Africa’s ‘long walk to freedom’811 
between 1982 and 1994. The case study differs in several respects from the previous 
investigations into the uses of German soft power in transitions from authoritarian rule. 
Firstly, the chapter shifts the scope of its inquiry from highlighting developments in 
European theatres of democratisation towards an African setting. This altered 
geographical orientation finds its justification in the prominent rolg^vhich South Africa 
played in the considerations of German industrialists. In addition, ethno-cultural links 
with Southern Africa’s white minority population and its significant proportion of 
settlers of German descent had the apartheid state feature prominently on Bonn’s 
foreign policy agenda. Secondly, the chapter continues the approach previously adopted 
in this thesis to single out the one political foundation affiliated with the majority party 
in the FRG Government. Although such a selective account will ineluctably fall short of 
providing an empirical analysis of the Stiftungen model as a whole, it will at the same 
time allow for a more detailed evaluation of democracy promotion projects and a closer 
interaction between state and sub-state diplomacy. In 1982, West Germany’s political 
landscape had changed when CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl took office after his Social 
Democratic opponent Helmut Schmidt was forced to resign after a vote of no confidence 
in West Germany’s Lower House. This chapter will therefore provide an analysis of the 
role played by the Christian Democratic Konrad-Adenauer Foundation (KAF) in the 
transformation of South Africa’s apartheid system. This focus will also help to shield
811 Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom  -  The Autobiography o f  Nelson M andela’, (London, Little 
Brown, 1994).
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the empirical part of this thesis from critical objections of having placed a rather 
lopsided emphasis on SPD-led foreign policy approaches. Finally, following KAF 
activities in South Africa until the holding of South Africa’s general elections in 1994, 
the timeframe chosen in this chapter obviously exceeds the commonly accepted 1991 
demarcation for the end of the Cold War. This does not seem to be entirely reconcilable 
with the general argument sketched out in the thesis to broaden existing narratives on 
German power during the Cold War and to add a previously under-researched 
operational dimension to the analysis of West German foreign policy. After all, most 
writers on German politics adhere to the distinction made between the historical periods 
of pre- and post-reunification marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. However, it 
would seem incomprehensible to accept such an artificial historical bifurcation for an 
analysis of German foreign policy as if conditions, circumstances and policies for 
Bonn’s diplomatic establishment had changed overnight. In order to show lines of 
operational continuity, it seems therefore justified to extend the period of inquiry into 
the soft power-based activities of one of Germany’s political foundations a few years 
into the 1990s ending the analysis with the first democratic elections in 1994.
This chapter seeks to appreciate the transnational dimension of the FRG’s 
informal diplomacy and to gain a greater understanding of the channels through which 
the KAF’s sub-state activities were being operated. It will highlight the various phases 
of political co-operation between KAF and the South African Zulu movement Inkatha 
led by the ambivalent Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi while placing the former’s support 
for the latter squarely within the context of (West) Germany’s national interests (see 
5.5). As in previous transitions, Bonn’s foreign policy towards regime change in South 
Africa sought to ensure the highest possible level of compatibility between German and 
South African political and socio-economic structures as structural congruence would 
facilitate political stability and create a favourable investment climate for German 
industry (see 5.2. -  5.4.). The chapter will show how the Foundation’s range of co­
operation partners and policy areas in its democracy promotion activities was 
significantly broadened after President Frederick Willem de Klerk’s historical 
announcement in February 1990 lifting the ban on the African National Congress 
(ANC) after decades of political stasis (see 5.7.). It will focus on the KAF’s efforts to
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help domestic actors and experts to write a new South African constitution (see 5.9.) and 
visit the Foundation’s capacity-building programme with its emphasis on traditional 
leadership, local government and small business development (see 5.10. -  5.11.). At the 
same time, the chapter will compound its analysis of Stiftungen diplomacy with a 
parallel reflection on the FRG’s official foreign policy to compare preference formation 
and show interaction between the two levels of Germany’s foreign policy system. The 
argument is that contrary to the Machtvergessenheit paradigm, both tiers of foreign 
policy - state and sub-state -  were guided by state interests, which in turn were pursued 
not only within multilateral organisations such as the European Community (EC) but 
also through soft power on a transnational level.
5.2. South Africa and West Germany's National Interest
The Konrad-Adenauer Foundation (KAF) launched its democracy promotion activities
in South Africa as early as 1981. Its Africa expert Frank Spengler described the country 
as an exception on the FRG’s foreign policy agenda towards the African continent as in 
West Germany “there existed no coherent Africa policy. South Africa was a special case, 
on the one hand because many German investors had substantial business interests 
there812, and on the other hand, because we were already sensitised to the problem of 
European minorities in Southern Africa through our cultural affinity to white settlers of 
German descent in neighbouring Namibia.”813 West Germany’s national interest in 
South and Southern Africa was therefore multifaceted resting on five interrelated 
motivational pillars. Firstly, for decades the African continent had become a 
battleground in the Cold War with both sides keen to attract an increasing number of 
postcolonial regimes to their cause. Within this bipolar context, FRG foreign policy in 
both its ‘public’ as well as ‘private’ variant’ sought to contain Communist activities and 
to keep as large a part of Africa free from Soviet influence as possible. The safeguarding 
of free market economic structures was crucially linked to the second area of German 
interests, namely the protection of the FRG’s significant economic investments and 
business interests. Bonn’s concern about the potentially revolutionary nature of the
8,2 See pp.241-242.
813 Personal interview (phone) with Frank Spengler, 13 June 2005.
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ANC’s liberation struggle needs to be also seen as a protectionist reflex with regards to 
its economic interests in the apartheid state.
Thirdly, South Africa’s extraordinary wealth in natural resources and its role as 
a supplier of precious raw materials needed for production processes in important 
industrial sectors in the FRG created a sense of vulnerability on the part of Europe’s 
industrial societies including West Germany.814 It was therefore in the FRG’s vital 
interest to prevent any possibly disruptive effects on the chain of supply from 
materialising. Fourth, West Germany depended in its international dealings on what may 
be called ‘reputational power’ i.e. a form of globally acknowledged moral integrity, 
which qualified the FRG for international leadership roles in the areas of bridge- 
building, conflict-resolution and mediation. This variant of the national interest was 
regularly put at risk by the often-hesitant stance of Bonn’s government diplomacy with 
regards to tougher action vis-a-vis the apartheid regime. The danger of an erosion of 
Germany’s ‘reputational power’ was highlighted by liberal MP Ulrich Irmer in 1988, 
who warned that “if we remain passive, South Africa’s economic and strategic 
importance will one day turn against us, because we are at risk to lose our credibility 
with the countries of the Third World when they accuse us of reacting only verbally to
QIC
this unacceptable situation.” Finally, West Germany’s national interest derived also 
from a certain cultural affinity to Southern Africa’s white settler population, a 
significant percentage of which were of German ancestry. “I believe” said the Minister 
of State in the German Foreign Office Helmut Schafer in 1990, “that nothing has 
changed, that the Federal Republic of Germany still has a considerable responsibility for 
Southern Africa. We still have a significant interest in this region. Our involvement in 
Namibia forces us to confront the situation in the whole of Southern Africa.”816
Officially, the West German Government presented itself prepared to engage 
in working relationships with “all politically and socially relevant groups in South
814 Ulrich Albrecht, ’The Policy of the Federal Republic o f Germany towards the South’, in Ekkehart 
Krippendorf, Volker Rittberger (eds.), The Foreign Policy o f  West Germany -  Formation and Contents', 
(German Political Studies, vol.4, Sage Publications, London, 1980), p. 173.
815 Stenographic Report Deutscher Bundestag, 10th Legislative Period, 80th Session, 19 May 1988.
816 Stenographic Report, Deutscher Bundestag, 11th Legislative Period, 202nd Session, 15 March 1990.
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Africa.” Bonn’s public diplomacy thus adopted the role of honest broker and a 
potential facilitator of dialogue between the opposing camps by “talking to the South 
African government as well as to the opposition [...] in particular to the labour 
unions.”818 However, the CDU-led government shunned direct and public interaction 
with South Africa’s most important liberation movement, the African National Congress 
(ANC) and its smaller rival Pan African Congress (PAC) because of their commitment 
to the armed struggle and violent forms of resistance.819 In addition, the ANC’s distinct 
Socialist orientation as well as its political co-operation with the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) led by veteran activist Joe Slovo remained a stumbling block 
for any high-profile diplomatic support by the West German government. 820 In 
particular, the CDU’s Bavaria-based coalition partner Christian Social Union (CSU) and 
its leader Franz-Josef Strauss thought it necessary to see the apartheid problem within 
the broader context of Cold War confrontation. Volkmar Kohler, former CDU Minister 
of State in the Ministery for Economic Co-operation and International Development 
(BMZ) remembered that Strauss “who was a great friend of the Afrikaner” was an 
example, “that certain CDU/CSU politicians viewed South Africa as a bulwark against
ft*? YCommunism.” Kohler himself highlighted South Africa’s economic importance based 
on its wealth of mineral resources.
The geographic and economic position of southern Africa and its deposits of raw 
materials make it imperative to counteract the Soviet Union’s attempt to extend its 
influence to other states in Africa. A particular danger consists in the influence and the
817 Statement o f the Federal Government/Motion, (Drucksache 10/833), 21 December 1983.
818 Ibid.
819 Personal correspondence with Alois Graf v. Waldburg-Zeil, 30 November 2005.
820 However, CDU politician Volkmar KShler stresses the fact that the FRG Government did in fact 
maintain contacts with the ANC and that in his function as a Minister o f State, he had personally held talks 
with several leading ANC members in Bonn. These contacts intensified in the first half o f the 1990s, when 
the ANC prepared for governmental responsibility and the CDU-led government aimed at “influencing the 
direction of the ANC’s economic policies, which at the time were of a strongly Socialist nature.” Personal 
interview (phone) with Volkmar Kdhler, 27 January 2006.
821 Ibid.. According to Kohler, Strauss had changed his opinion after talks with Soviet leader Michail 
Gorbatchev who told him that the relation between input and output, investment and profit had become 
completely disproportionate in the eyes o f the Soviet Union. Kdhler therefore concluded that the “argument 
o f the defense o f the West’s raw material and commodity security in South Africa had been invalidated.” 
The former editor o f the West German publication Afrikaforum and CDU development expert Alois Graf 
von Waldburg-Zeil also described South Africa as a “battlefield of the Cold War”. Personal correspondence 
with Alois Graf v. Waldburg-Zeil, 30 November 2005.
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operations of other non-African Communist states, the instigation of wars by proxy and 
the terrorist activities of organisations which, under the guise of freedom movements, 
are in reality pursuing totalitarian aims.822
Furthermore, the lack of coherence in the FRG’s foreign policy towards the apartheid 
regime appeared to be also the result of policy differences between CSU foreign policy 
experts and the FDP-dominated Auswartige Amt. While CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss 
displayed barely concealed sympathies for South Africa’s white minority and expressed 
concern about their prospects of survival in a majority-ruled system, Foreign Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) favoured the 
stabilisation of the so-called frontline states such as Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe 
as part of a regional strategy of peaceful change.823 Chancellor Helmut Kohl although 
initially hesitant backed the more inclusive and less divisive approach of the Auswartige 
Amt, which rejected Pretoria’s controversial homeland policy, sought to assist the 
independence of neighbouring Namibia and pursued the goal of ending the system of 
racial segregation through multilateral channels as well as through private and 
individual initiatives.824
This approach was guided by the idea of a ‘critical dialogue’ as a strategy of 
“constant push and demand based on an anti-apartheid stance and being part of the 
FRG’s ‘quiet diplomacy”.825 Generally speaking, the conservative elements in the FRG 
Government rejected any confrontative stance towards the white minority government 
in Pretoria instead advocating “a policy of association with South Africa as the best
822 Volkmar Kdhler, ‘Europe’s role in Africa: A German view’, International Affairs Bulletin, 1982, Vol.6, 
p.38.
823 Minister o f State in the Auswartige Amt Helmuth Schafer, Stenographic Report Deutscher Bundestag, 
11th Legislative Period, 80th Session, 19 May 1988. In an interview with the author, Volkmar Kohler 
criticised the strategy of supporting democratic forces in the frontline states as promoted by Genscher and 
his Auswartige Amt, which he said was introduced by the previous SPD-led government o f Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt, as being “absurd” given the natural limitations on budgetary allocations for development 
aid. Instead, he urged the governing coalition to help establish a “co-operative relationship between South 
Africa and the frontline states” ultimately leading to Pretoria’s admission into SADC. “South Africa’s 
economic potential was crucially important for a successful development of sub-Saharan Africa.” Personal 
interview (phone) with Volkmar Kfihler, 27 January 2006.
824 ’Die Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion der SPD: Politik der 
Bundesregierung im Siidlichen Afrika’, Auswartiges Amt (ed.), Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und 
Afrika, (Bonn 1985), pp.99-100.
825 Claudius Wenzel, Die Sudafrikapolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1982-1992 -  Politik gegen 
Apartheid ?, (Opladen 1994), p.63.
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strategy to nudge the apartheid regime towards instituting necessary political and socio­
economic reforms.” 826 Its development spokesman Karl-Heinz Homhues in a 
parliamentary debate outlined the official position of the government in May 1988. 
According to Homues, the FRG’s foreign policy sought to bring about “peaceful 
change” in South Africa through a three-level approach. The first level envisaged a 
“massive involvement of the politically and economically most important countries” in 
the West in order to facilitate negotiations between white rulers and black majority.827 In 
a second step, the West German Government and its European allies through training 
and education programmes, development aid and the ending of sanctions should support
• • O O Oa democratic transition. Finally, West German foreign policy needed to aid attempts 
at two-track diplomacy, which were aimed at dispelling prejudices and stereotypes
o^o
through dialogue. One dissident government ministers, senior CDU politician Norbert 
Blum, was more critical of the officially adopted strategy for change advocating a “a 
tougher gait” towards the racist regime in Pretoria and rejecting the primacy of national 
interests in what they perceived to be a “fight for human rights” as “human rights are 
not ‘national’.”830
With its adherence to a policy of evolutionary change, the CDU-led West 
German Government acted in accordance with the policies of President Ronald 
Reagan’s conservative U.S. administration. Reagan’s foreign policy adviser and main 
theorist of critical engagement, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker
O l  1
describing “effective coercive influence” as a “rare commodity in foreign policy” had 
defined the task for Western diplomacy in its dealing with the apartheid regime as 
steering “between the twin dangers of abetting violence in the Republic and aligning 
ourselves with the cause of white rule.”832 Crocker, who was described by the CDU’s
826 Bolade Michael Eyinla, The Foreign Policy o f West Germany towards Africa, (Ibadan University Press 
1996), p. 127.
827 Stenographic Report Deutscher Bundestag, 11th Legislative Period, 80th Session, 19 May 1988, p.5371.
828 Ibid.
829 Ibid
830 Personal correspondence with Norbert Blilm, 30 March 2006.
831 Chester A. Crocker, ’South Africa: Strategy for Change’, Foreign Affairs, vol.59, no.2, p.326.
832 Ibid, p.325.
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South Africa expert Kohler as “an old friend of the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation”833 
saw both Washington and Bonn following the same path of nimble diplomacy of 
maintaining channels of political communication with a broad a spectrum of actors as 
possible foreboding that it was “risky to bum one’s bridges in any direction”.834 He 
described the West’s foreign policy approach towards the South African problem 
including the strategy adopted by the FRG Government as standing in contrast to the 
elephantine position of many left-wing critics of the policy o f ‘constructive engagement’, 
who argued that the invoked was nothing more than a cloak for foreign intervention and 
a disguise of the fact that “the West’s relationship with Africa was largely predicated on 
a long-term strategic alliance with the apartheid regime.”835. Questioned on the wisdom 
of decision-makers in Western capitals to maintain a sometimes almost piqued distance 
to the revolutionary cadres of the ANC, Crocker remarked:
I believe we handled this question effectively, having low-level diplomatic and 
intelligence contacts from time to time and then raising those contacts to a higher level 
as events unfolded. It is not necessarily a wise thing to ‘recognise’ one organisation in a 
fast moving and fluid political situation such as in South Africa’s in the 1980s, but it is 
also unwise to cut oneself off from contact with an important movement such as the 
ANC.836
The seeming inefficiency of West Germany’s quiet diplomacy and its critical dialogue 
often paraphrased as “co-operation without change” by its critics, and the continuous
833 Volkmar Kohler, ‘Europe’s role in Africa: A German view’, op.cit., p.43.
834 Chester A. Crocker, ’South Africa: Strategy for Change’, op.cit., p.342.
835 Julie Hearn, ‘Aiding Democracy? Donors and civil society in South Africa’, Third World Quarterly, 
vol.21, no.5, p.821.
836 Personal correspondence with Chester A. Crocker, 27 March 2006. His diplomat colleague Princeton 
Lyman, who headed Washington’s diplomatic mission in South Africa during the Clinton presidency, 
adopted a more critical attitude towards the transition policies of Western leaders. “Had the western 
governments been more open to the ANC earlier, it might have softened the rather deep anti-western 
feelings that exist within the ANC, feelings that linger today and contribute to some difficulties in the 
relationship between South Africa and western countries.” He points at the only restricted insight o f 
Western governments into the internal developments o f the ANC. “The West was not privileged to the 
debates going on within the ANC during the 1980s, when the whole strategy of armed resistance was being 
rethought.” Lyman admitted, “Had we understood that better, we might not have been so influenced by 
ideology and the overall impact o f Cold War concerns when looking at the ANC. We certainly should have 
opened channels of communication before 1987.” Personal correspondence with Princeton N. Lyman, 3 
May 2006.
837 Uschi Eid, Green Party Development Spokeswoman, Stenographic Report Deutscher Bundestag, 11th 
Legislative Period , 80th Session, 19 May 1988, p.5372.
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deepening of economic relations with South Africa became increasingly subject of a 
heated public debate, which escalated into the subsequent controversy over sanctions, a 
policy towards which the FRG displayed a traditional hostility. The International 
Development Spokesperson and South Africa expert of the opposition Green Party 
Uschi Aid, later Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry for International Development 
in the government of Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, points out that
The policy of ‘critical dialogue’ was unrecognisable and any efforts of promotion 
democracy based on this strategy were simply not crowned with success. South African 
President Botha was not forced to resign as a consequence of the Kohl Government’s 
C ritical dialogue’. Our point of criticism was that the Federal Government during the 
1980s refused to jointly implement the sanctions and boycotts, which were imposed by 
the European Community. West German politicians still travelled to South Africa and 
economic sanctions were not adopted at all.838
Together with the United States, West Germany’s private sector ranked among the 
biggest suppliers of goods for the South African market since 1977. In 1984, the FRG’s 
total exports to South Africa amounted to DM 6,65 billion (ca. £2,2 billion) making 
Pretoria the third-biggest export market for West German products in the Third 
World.839 An estimated 400 West German companies led by industrial giants Daimler- 
Benz, BMW, Siemens, AEG and Bosch benefited from South Africa’s extraordinarily 
cheap labour force, which until the second half of the 1980s was effectively controlled 
by the apartheid government thus enabling West German investors to extract high 
profits in a relatively stable business environment. Given the substantial economic 
interests at stake, it came as no surprise that the CDU-led government did not embrace 
coercive and potentially disruptive measures to end apartheid and, as the next section 
will show, only reluctantly went along with the application of hard power as expressed 
in the sanctions policy adopted by the EC in 1985.
838 Personal interview (phone) with Uschi Eid, 13 April 2006.
839 Rainer Falk, ’Das Apartheid-GeschSft -  Dimensionen der deutsch-siidafrikanischen 
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und ihre Rolle bei der Stabilisierung des Apartheidsystems’, Blatter fu r deutsche 
und internationale Politik, Koln 1985, pp. 1046-1047.
5.5. The Pros and Cons o f Economic Sanctions
Given its status as one of the world’s most export-dependent trading states, the FRG 
categorically rejected any suggestion of bringing about political change through 
economic pressure. The opponents of economic sanctions stressed the FRG’s extreme 
dependency on a number of raw materials and minerals such as chromium, platinum, 
different types of asbestos, manganese and antimony. Some even went as far as to argue 
that a 30% reduction in the supply with these raw materials would cause a 25% 
reduction in West Germany’s GNP with high unemployment as a consequence.840 The 
government also argued that the social hardship caused by economic sanctions would 
only hit the already impoverished and disenfranchised parts of the population.841 “Our 
experience shows” argued the Minister of State in the Auswartige Amt Lutz 
Stavenhagen in 1986, “that economic sanctions are not an effective tool to ensure the 
implementation of political demands.”842
Contrary to the government’s position on the usefulness of economic sanctions 
and cultural boycotts, the SPD and Green Party opposition in West Germany’s Lower 
House demanded emphatically the tightening of diplomatic pressure and the use of 
economic coercion to force the apartheid regime to change its segregationist policies. In 
May 1988, the SPD parliamentary party introduced an (unsuccessful) motion in the 
Bundestag, which called for the withdrawal of the FRG’s Ambassador to South Africa, 
the tightening of existing visa requirements for South African citizens travelling to West 
Germany, the refusal of landing rights for South African aircraft und a total stop of 
flights operated by West Germany’s airline industry to the African country.843 A year 
later, another motion initiated by Green Party MPs Halo Saibold and Uschi Eid urged 
the Kohl-Govemment to put a stop to South Africa promoting activities by publicly 
owned German companies in the tourism industry. The government-dominated Select 
Committee for Economic Affairs rejected the motion describing it as an attempt to
840 GUnter Poser, ‘Sudliches Afrika und deutsche Sicherheit’ in Uwe Vogel, Gunter Poser, Afrika und 
deutsche Sicherheit, (Deutsche Afrika-Stiftung, Schriftenreihe 5, Bonn 1980), p .17.
841 Stenographic Report Deutscher Bundestag, 11th Legislative Period, 80th Session, 19 May 1988.
842 Lutz Stavenhagen, Deutscher Bundestag, 10th Legislative Period, Bulletin (Drucksache) 10/5887, 18 
July 1986, p.3.
843 Deutscher Bundestag, 11th Legislative Period, Bulletin (Drucksache) 11/2326, 18 May 1988.
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unilaterally impose economic sanctions on Pretoria and stressing the need for a 
concerted Europe-wide approach if sanctions should be effective.844
Bonn’s position on the issue remained unchanged until the EC decided at its 
meeting of foreign ministers in September 1985 in Luxembourg to adopt a tougher 
diplomatic stance including restrictive measures to facilitate and accelerate democratic 
change in South Africa and to react to the continuing violation of human rights. The EC 
catalogue built on the 1977 EC Code of Conduct for companies involved in business 
activities in South Africa and contained the imposition of a weapons embargo, the 
ending of any military co-operation, the temporary freeze on cultural and scientific 
contacts, a sports boycott, the end to oil exports, a ban on the supply of ‘sensitive’ 
equipment to the South African police forces and an end to nuclear co-operation. This 
package of restrictions was followed by a ban on iron and steel imports from South 
Africa and the recall of military attaches accredited to Pretoria.845 Among the positive 
policies adopted by the West German Government was the ‘Special Agenda Southern 
Africa’ {Sonderprogramm Sudliches Afrika), the support for the activities of non­
governmental organisations and the EC Code of Conduct for companies trading with
Q A / l
Pretoria. The Special Agenda Southern Africa sought to improve the situation of 
educationally disadvantaged non-white South Africans and was endowed with a budget 
of DM 33 million between 1981 and 1990.847 Despite a stronger foreign policy role for 
the CSU-led BMZ towards the end of the 1980s, the FRG did not provide official 
development aid, as South Africa did not qualify for developing country status 
according to the classification of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).848 However, between 1975 and 1990 West German NGOs were 
financially assisted in their work with a total of DM 106,4 million, chiefly among them 
religious and humanitarian organisations but also the parties’ political foundations
844 Deutscher Bundestag, 11th Legislative Period, Bulletin (Drucksache) 11/4453, 28 April 1989.
845 Charles M. Becker, ’The Impact o f Sanctions on South Africa and its Periphery’, African Studies 
Review, vol.31, no. 2, 1988, p.61.
846 Claudius Wenzel, Die Sudafrikapolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, op.cit., p. 107.
847 Ibid.
848 CDU development expert Kohler even argues that Foreign Minister Genscher “had lost any hope that 
the conflict in South Africa would be ended peacefully” with his ministry taking an increasingly low- 
profile stance on the issue. Personal interview (phone) with Volkmar KOhler, 27 January 2006.
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including KAF.849 Their soft power-based transition strategy will be discussed in the 
next section.
5.4. KAF, Cold War Context and Transition Strategy in South Africa
While Bonn’s governmental diplomacy locked horns with its critics over the usefulness
of economic sanctions and the justification for cultural boycotts, private foreign policy 
actors like the Stiftungen explored possible ways of “facilitating peaceful change 
through partnerships with an organisation representing the country’s black majority”.850 
In focusing on democratic change in South Africa, the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung 
(KAF) acted on the realisation that the apartheid state was “politically and strategically 
important particularly when seen through the prism of West German interests.”851 While 
official diplomacy was reluctant to adopt coercive measures towards South Africa in 
either unilateral or multilateral form, the sub-state actor KAF sought to influence the 
political process in the apartheid state by attracting South African partner organisations 
to its concepts, ideas and proposals. It represented a German foreign policy approach 
outside of multilateral fora, which was nevertheless guided by state interests despite 
being first and foremost a vehicle for the promotion of party political values.
Like West Germany’s government diplomacy, the KAF’s democracy 
promotion activities -  directly or indirectly - sought to contain Communism in Southern 
Africa, secure the supply with raw materials, protect West German business interests in 
the country, maintain German advocacy on behalf of South Africa’s white minority and 
to preserve the FRG’s reputational credentials at the same time. Like other political 
foundations, the KAF pursued these interests through the use of soft power i.e. the 
transfer of ideas, values and policies through transnational channels in the pursuit of 
state interests outside multilateral frameworks. Instead of seeking the death of the 
apartheid regime through political strangulation from the outside, the Foundation like its 
Social Democratic equivalent FEF in Spain and Portugal aimed at preparing 
ideologically compatible political actors for leadership roles in the future democratic 
polity. Thus KAF democracy promotion experts sought to identify the most promising
849 Claudius Wenzel, Die Sudafrikapolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, op.cit., p. 108.
850 Personal correspondence with Josef Thesing, 9 January 2006.
851 Ibid.
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channels through which South Africa’s authoritarian system could be effectively 
undermined from within after the Foundation had come tcTthe conclusion that “ever 
since the assassination of (former Prime Minister Hendrik Frensch) Verwoerd, apartheid 
had become a discarded policy”. 852 The aim was to identify a political partner 
organisation, which would be able to organise political campaigns free from the 
patronising interference by the South African authorities and without facing the risk of 
legal prosecution. 853 In the medium term, KAF strategists saw political change as 
inevitable and a memorandum published by the Foundation’s first resident 
representative, Gerd D. Bossen in 1983 outlined the organisation’s principle attitude vis- 
a-vis a future democratic transition.
Bossen described the Foundation as being committed to working towards 
democratic change in the apartheid state and to strengthening opposition forces as the 
"interests of the Federal Republic as being part of the free West and being a member of 
NATO should be directed towards the aim of keeping South Africa within the Western 
camp."854 South Africa’s strategic position and its natural wealth were described as 
important aspects, West German foreign policy decision-makers should take an interest 
in. The author argued, "in general, it is in the interest of the West to prevent a further
O f f
expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence in Southern Africa." Bossen stressed 
West Germany's economic interests and highlighted the importance of mutual trade 
relations.
Therefore, a violent conflict in South Africa would bring not only the economy to a 
complete standstill, something which cannot be in our interest. We should be rather 
interested in contributing to a peaceful evolutionary political process, something that 
will only become possible by the step-by-step elimination of racial segregation.856
853 U lf Engel, Hans-Georg Schleicher, Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika -  Zwischen Konkurrenz und 
Koexistenz 1949-1990, (Hamburger Beitrage zur Afrika-Kunde, 57, Hamburg 1999), p.344; Theodor Hanf, 
Rolf Hofmeier, Stefan Mair, ’Evaluierung der Aktivitaten der politischen Stiftungen in der Republik 
Sudafrika’, Berichtsentwurf, January 1995, p.34.
854 Gerd D.Bossen, ‘Uberlegungen fur eine neue deutsche Aussenpolitik in Richtung Afrika, Asien/Pazifik 
und Lateinamerika’, Teil 2, IIS-Auslandsinformationen, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, 29.3.1983, p .14.
855 Ibid.
856 Ibid, p. 15 (translation by author).
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Finally, Bossen pointed at the "human rights considerations, which should cause us to 
press South Africa for change into this direction."857 In the strategy paper, the KAF 
South Africa expert urged West Germany’s governmental foreign policy planners in 
Bonn to replace what he perceived to be an idealistic conception of democratic change 
characterised by unrealistic demands on the part of European powers by a more tactical 
approach. He accepted the widespread fears of many white South Africans to end up 
marginalised in a political system controlled by the country’s black majority as an 
important social dynamic and did not hide his belief that therefore the principle of ‘one 
man - one vote’ was an utopian demand and an illusory principle. In fact, KAF analyst 
Bossen perceived the political and operational radicalisation on the part of South 
Africa’s liberation movements and the intensification o f ‘white fears’ taking place at the 
same time to be the most serious threat to any peaceful solution of the conflict. In his 
opinion, the majority of the country’s white community rejected any real political 
participation by black, mixed-race and Indian-South Africans while the oppressed 
developed an increasingly uncompromising attitude towards any conciliatory solutions 
the longer the authoritarian structures remained in place.
It is within these coordinates, that the KAF developed its operational strategy 
for the promotion of political change in South Africa. After consultation with its 
International Relations Department, the KAF Board of Directors decided to devote 
financial and human resources within a strategic democracy promotion framework 
designed to help overcome the apartheid system. Although the decision-making process 
of the Foundation remained “free from governmental interference”, the fact that 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl was a KAF board member since 1968 and “always has been 
actively involved in decision-making” ensured close interconnectedness between 
‘public’ and ‘private’ foreign policy institutions.858 Former CDU-Minister of State in the 
Ministery for Economic Co-operation and International Development Wighardt Hardtl 
points out that “the Foundation’s ‘deployment’ by CDU-led governments has a long 
tradition. The KAF can be seen indeed as a foreign policy instrument and operates more
857 Ibid.
Personal correspondence with Josef Thesing, 9 January 2006.
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effectively in many areas than the diplomatic missions”. 859 Furthermore, the link 
between government and Foundation was maintained through the regular exchange of 
information between government ministers, members of the CDU parliamentary party, 
officials in party headquarters and KAF analysts. Once in the field, the Foundation’s 
resident representative filed regular reports, which were circulated among the CDU rank 
and file in parliament, government and party and provided Christian Democratic 
decision-makers with unvarnished information, something the official diplomatic 
bulletins and embassy reports often lacked.860 KAF seminars and conferences on South 
African issues supplemented the intelligence supplied by the KAF office in Durban, 
whose activities were financially supported after both the BMZ and the Auswartige Amt 
had approved funding for the Foundation’s South Africa programme.861 The gradual 
dissolution of racial prejudices, the eradication of ethnic stereotypes and the initiation of 
a process of societal interaction between the different ethnic groups were seen by the 
Foundation as the most important aspects of its transitional strategy. KAF officials 
realised that only a massively increased degree of political co-operation between black 
South Africans and their white compatriots would enable the country to free itself from 
the looming scenario of civil war and political chaos.
This leads to the realisation, that besides the approach to exerting influence on the 
government, one needs to co-operate with those political forces committed to peaceful 
change. Unfortunately, there are not too many people among blacks, coloureds and 
Asians anymore, who would advocate peaceful change. Many of them are leaning 
towards more radical movements.862
Although the KAF acknowledged that the black liberation movements PAC and ANC 
were political factors that "had to be taken into account"863, the Foundation emphasis on 
the non-violent nature of any democracy promotion activities in South Africa as well as
859 Personal interview (phone) with Wighardt Hardtl, 30 March 2006.
860 Ibid.
861 Personal correspondence with Alois Graf v. Waldburg-Zeil, 30 November 2005. His CDU colleague 
Wighardt Hardtl remarked that although the German Government and the BMZ had not provided the KAF 
with additional funds, they assessed and looked at them with great „sympathy“ . Personal interview (phone) 
with Wighardt Hardtl, 30 March 2006.  -
862 Gerd D.Bossen, ‘Oberlegungen fur eine neue deutsche Aussenpolitik in Richtung Afrika, Asien/Pazifik 
und Lateinamerika’, p. 17 (translation by author).
863 Ibid
264
significant ideological differences prevented the Foundation from establishing 
partnerships with the two aforementioned organisations. The pre-condition of non­
violence was one of the few operational restrictions imposed on the Foundation by the 
government although KAF strategists never seriously entertained the possibility to 
politically co-operate with organisations involved in the armed struggle. 864 The 
following section will therefore focus on the question of political co-operation by taking 
a closer look at the political partnership between KAF and the South African Zulu 
movement Inkatha.
5.5. KAF and Inkatha
The conservative Zulu movement Inkatha headed by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was 
thought to be the political force, which "deserves more support by the West and the 
Federal Republic."865 The organisational forerunner of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
seemed to be the ideal partner organisation for the West German foundation because of 
its status as being the mainstream cultural representation of South Africa’s largest ethnic 
group combined with the fact that as a political party it was tolerated by the apartheid 
government and furthermore officially committed to non-violent means of political 
activism. However, the Foundation was aware of the militancy of certain segments of 
the Zulu movement. “We knew that Inkatha was not free from violence,” admits KAF 
manager Josef Thesing not without immediately pointing out “in its rivalry with ANC 
both sides used violence.”866 In order to guide its South African partner on a path of 
peaceful change and negotiated political settlement while confronting both the apartheid 
regime and its main rival ANC, foundation diplomat Thesing emphasised that “in our 
contacts with leading personalities of the Inkatha movement, we always tried to have a 
tempering effect on their self-conduct.”867
864 The insistence on the non-violent nature of any resistance to the apartheid regime was adopted not only 
by the KAF but by the CDU/FDP coalition government as a whole, see e.g. Statement by Helmut Schafer, 
Minister o f State in the Auswartige Amt, Deutscher Bundestag, 11th Legislative Period, Bulletin 
(Drucksache) 11/2647,29 June 1988.
865 Gerd D.Bossen, ‘Oberlegungen fur eine neue deutsche Aussenpolitik in Richtung Afrika, Asien/Pazifik 
und Lateinamerika’, op.cit., p. 18.
866 Personal correspondence with Josef Thesing, 9 January 2006.
867 Ibid. However, opposition politician Hans-Gunther Toetemeyer questioned the ‘pacifying’ impact the 
KAF had on its South African partner. Despite substantial financial support provided by the Christian 
Democratic democracy promotion agency, Toetemeyer argues that the Foundation “could not
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Nevertheless, the principal of non-violent activism was frequently violated in the first 
half of the 1990s although never towards the white minority regime. Rather Inkatha’s 
political rivalry with the ANC led to regular violent clashes between the two groups 
particularly in Buthelezi’s home province of KwaZulu-Natal. The KAF leadership knew 
that its South African partner organisation’s self-conduct “was not free from violence” 
but later pointed out that “we tried to bring our moderating influence to bear on Inkatha 
leaders, which was not always successful but generally possible.”868 And another KAF 
analyst added that “future conflicts no matter if expressed in the increasing polarisation 
over the Inkatha connection in West Germany or visible in the violent power struggle 
between Inkatha, ANC and other black political groups could not be foreseen when the 
KAF started its democracy promotion activities.” 869 However, certain government 
officials were cautiously critical of the often-aggressive political strategy and public 
appearance of Inkatha “One could get the impression that Buthelezi regularly mobilised 
tribal structures to eliminate political rivals” recalls CDU minister Kohler and adds that 
“it was therefore pretty obvious that support for him needed to have limits.”870 Buthelezi 
himself described his own attitude towards political violence as the attempt to honour 
the initially peaceful methods of the rival ANC, which he saw as the historical legacy of 
South Africa’s black resistance movement.
I, for one, endorsed the original strategy of the ANC, which was based on non-violence, 
passive resistance and the seizing of the moral high ground to promote and negotiate a
constructively influence the democratisation process, to the contrary, it only helped to promote Buthelezi’s 
segregationist policies.” Personal correspondence with Hans-Gunther Toetemeyer, 13 April 2006.
868 Personal correspondence with Josef Thesing, 9 January 2006.
869 Silke Krieger, ‘Ziele, Aufgaben, Arbeitsweisen und Erfahrungen der politischen Stiftungen in Afrika 
und im Nahe Osten am Beispiel der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’, in Udo Steinbach, Volker Nienhaus (eds.), 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Kultur, Recht und Wirtschaft -  Grundlagen und Erfahrungen aus Afrika 
und Nahost, (Festgabe fur Volkmar Kohler zum 65. Geburtstag, Leske + Budrich, Opladen 1995), p.353.
870 Personal interview (phone) with Volkmar Kohler, 27 January 2006. According to political analyst Klaus 
Freiherr von der Ropp, K6hleiv£\vas one of the few CDU politicians, who was conscious of the fact that 
among the liberation movements it was the ANC and not the IFP that was the most important actor”, ‘Die 
Entwicklungsgemeinschaft im Sudlichen Afrika (SADC) -  Utopie oder kunftige Realitat?’, in Udo 
Steinbach, Volker Nienhaus (eds.), Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Kzultur, Recht und Wirtschaft -  
Grundlagen und Erfahrungen aus Afrika und Nahost, op.cit., p.219.
266
solution. The Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, and through it the German Government, 
were very conducive to this approach finally prevailing.
And he thanked his German supporters for having demonstrated a rare pragmatism in 
their dealing with the IFP.
I am personally indebted to the government of Germany for the support it gave me when 
I took a principled stand for a negotiated solution to the South African dilemma, rather 
than the path of the armed struggle and military confrontation. Other governments 
isolated leaders of the liberation struggle such as myself, who did not jump on the 
bandwagon of the armed struggle, international sanctions against South Africa, and the 
campaign for disinvestments. But the German Government maintained a more 
pragmatic approach.872
The organisation was undoubtedly one of the most powerful opposition forces with an 
estimated 400.000 members at the outset of the 1980s. It was well noted by the German 
foundation that Buthelezi and his party vehemently opposed economic sanctions by the 
international community, and that the Zulu leader had adopted a much more 
compromise-oriented approach to political change than ANC, PAC or SACP arguing 
that “through limited participation in the system of ‘separate development’, the system 
could be changed from within.”873 Succinctly describing the attraction, Buthelezi and 
his movement held for many conservative parties and governments in the West, New 
York Times journalist Christopher S. Wren wrote in 1991:
His friends, among them conservatives in the United States, Britain and West Germany, 
applaud Buthelezi for denouncing the ANC’s alliance with the South African 
Communist Party and find his endorsement of free market economics more palatable 
than the ANC’s talk about nationalisation and redistribution of wealth. They like 
Buthelezi’s opposition to economic sanctions and to the guerrilla struggle that the ANC 
finally suspended last August. They like Buthelezi, in short, for the very reason his
871 Mangosuthu Buthelezi, ’The role of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in the past ten years of South 
African democratic evolution’, Remarks made at the Goethe Institute Symposium ‘Promoting Democracy! 
-  The world o f the German political Foundations’, available from 
http://www.KAF.de/publikationen/2005/5973 dokument.html. cited on 25 January 2006.
*12Ibid.
873 Michaela Frischauf, Inkatha, Zulu Nationalismus und Neuerfindung der Vergangenheit in Sudafrika 
(Verlag Dr. KovaC, Schriften zur intemationalen Politik, 2003), p.38.
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enemies, at home and overseas, hate him: his ideology sounds neither revolutionary nor 
romantic but pragmatically middle-of-the-road.874
Western diplomatic observers involved in the transition process agree with Wren’s 
assessment. “Buthelezi presented himself as pro-capitalism, against armed resistance, 
and for a negotiated settlement” remembers Princeton Lyman, Washington’s 
Ambassador in Pretoria between 1992 and 1995, “both the UK and the German 
government and foundations were enthralled with Buthelezi. So too were the AFL-CIO 
in the U.S., along with conservative members of Congress and business interests.”875 
The logic behind the proposed political partnership with the Zulu party was that an 
increased level of international recognition made possible by Inkatha’s West German 
connection would ’’cause the South African government to deal seriously with Inkatha’s 
offer of peaceful and fair reconciliation of the conflicting interests between black and 
white.” The KAF urged the West German Government to maintain its criticism of the 
white minority regime’s homeland policy and to refuse diplomatic recognition for the 
Pretoria-controlled satellite states while KAF partner Mangosuthu Buthelezi strictly 
refused to accept any form of homeland ‘independence’, rejected negotiations with the 
apartheid government as long as ANC leader Nelson Mandela had not been released 
from prison and uncompromisingly obstructed Pretoria’s segregationist divide and rule 
policy. Acting on the realisation that the “ideal partner did not exist”, KAF strategists in 
co-operation with CDU leaders opted for a transnational partnership with the Buthelezi 
party because the Zulu movement was the “only legally recognised opposition in South 
Africa.”877 His West German mentors saw the Zulu aristocrat as a “special factor”, as 
the “peace-loving black man”878 who was indispensable for any “all-inclusive South 
African solution” to the country’s political conflict.879 “By co-operating with Inkatha,
874 Christopher S. Wren, ‘The Chief Steps Forward’, New York Times, 17 February 1991.
875 Personal correspondence with Princeton N. Lyman, 3 May 2006.
876 Gerd D.Bossen, ‘Oberlegungen fur eine neue deutsche Aussenpolitik in Richtung Afrika, Asien/Pazifik 
und Lateinamerika’, p. 19. Apparently, the head o f the KAF Southern Africa Desk, Josef Luetke-Entrup on 
a visit to South Africa in 1981 began to establish links with the Inkatha movement, which he saw as a 
potential political partner for the Foundation, in U lf Engel, Hans-Georg Schleicher, Die beiden deutschen 
Staaten in Afrika, op.cit., pp.341-342.
877 Personal correspondence with Josef Thesing, 9 January 2006.
878 Personal interview with Karl-Heinz Homhues, Berlin, 3 December 1999.
879 Personal interview (phone) with Frank Spengler, 13 June 2005.
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we hoped to train and support future leaders for a democratic South Africa. Without our 
financial support, it can be safely assumed that Buthelezi would have had to close down 
his activities.”880
Inkatha appeared to be the ideal recipient for political aid because the 
movement was able to occupy political niches in the apartheid system and was tolerated 
by the South African government. It advocated a strategy that sought to facilitate change 
from within the system to achieve the political goal of overcoming white supremacy and
o o  1
to bring about democratic change. Inkatha's economic agenda contained a 
commitment to the principle of market economy and competitive entrepreneurial 
structures, and it embraced the prospect of a federalist constitution for a democratic 
post-apartheid South Africa. In an official report on the activities of West Germany’s 
political foundations, Inkatha was described as “an interesting partner for the KAF 
because of the movement’s preparedness to work towards the improvement of living 
standards of the disadvantaged majority in South Africa even before South Africa’s 
political system experienced fundamental change.” The Inkatha connection would 
therefore reflect “the interests and values” of the conservative Foundation and its 
affiliated political party in Germany.883 The efforts made by the KAF to be allowed an 
official representation in the country dated back to 1981 and were met by the stem 
opposition of the South African Government. “Pretoria’s argument always was that if 
the KAF was allowed to run its projects” remembers CDU development expert Volkmar 
Kohler, “other NGOs would demand similar concessions, namely to interfere in South 
Africa’s internal affairs.”884
However, the more obstructive the authorities in Pretoria became, the more 
demanding the West German Government appeared in its attempt to convince Pretoria 
to let the KAF operate from a base in South Africa. Kohler remembers that “I and my 
cabinet colleagues supported the negotiations conducted by KAF Chairman Bruno Heck
880 Personal interview with Michael Lange, Johannesburg, 6 October 1999.
881 For a history o f the Inkatha movement from a German perspective see Franz Ansprenger, Inkatha -  
Eine politische Kraft in Siidafrika, (Bouvier Verlag, Bonn 1999).
882 Theodor Hanf, Rolf Hofmeier, Stefan Mair, ’Evaluierung der Aktivitaten der politischen Stiftungen in 
der Republik SUdafrika’, op.cit., p.34.
883 U lf Engel, Hans-Georg Schleicher, Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika, op.cit., pp.342.
884 Personal interview (phone) with Volkmar Kohler, 27 January 2006.
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with the authorities by making clear to representatives of the South African Government 
that we expected them to give us the green light for the opening of a KAF office and that 
any negative decision would certainly trigger disadvantageous consequences.”885 This 
was confirmed by the former Head of the KAF’s International Relations Department 
Josef Thesing, who frankly concedes, “the Federal Government subjected the South 
African authorities to a lot of pressure as far as KAF activities were concerned”.886 In 
addition, both KAF and West German Government lobbied the South African 
Ambassador in Bonn and after KAF President Bruno Heck had signed a co-operation 
agreement with Inkatha Chief Buthelezi, the first KAF representative Gerd Bossen 
opened an official office in the coastal city of Durban making the Christian Democratic 
organisation West Germany’s first political foundation to operate in South Africa. 
However, Bossen was forced to leave the country regularly to renew his visa.887
Having identified the Inkatha movement as its South African partner, the KAF 
began to pursue a democracy promotion programme, which can be described as 
“partisan support of specific sections of the social and political realm whose existence is 
in their opinion a necessary ingredient for the functioning of a pluralist democracy.888 
This partisan support found its expression in financial allocations to various political
Q O Q
campaigns and initiatives” during “decisive stages of the transition period.” The 
political partnership, in which the recipient of political aid retains its organisational and 
ideological independence helped to prevent the Foundation from accusations of external 
interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state.890 In its activities, the KAF 
followed a kind of ‘Trojan horse’” principle to strengthen political values and 
democratic forces. It co-operated with an ideologically compatible partner organisation, 
which served as a vehicle for the transfer of political ideas and concepts. In doing so, it 
promoted a future political system that would guarantee a sufficiently high degree of 
“justice, pluralism, competition and control of the political sector by parliament and
886 Personal correspondence with Josef Thesing, 9 January 2006.
887 U lf Engel, Hans-Georg Schleicher, Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika, op.cit., pp.342.
888 Stefan Mair, The Role o f the German ‘Stiftungen’ in the Process o f Democratisation, ECDPM Working 
Paper, no.32, June 1997, pp.5-6.
889 Ibid
890 Personal interview with Michael Lange, Johannesburg, 6 October 1999.
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media.” The Foundation’s co-operation with Inkatha and its democracy promotion 
activities resulting from this partnership bore witness to a form of modem power politics, 
which was based on noncoercive instruments and methods and did not require a 
multilateral configuration for its operationalisation. Instead of abstaining from the 
attempt to shape the outcome of South Africa’s democratic transition thus displaying 
Machtvergessenheit, the Foundation sought to co-opt and persuade one segment of 
South Africa’s future political elite through transnationally transferred concepts and 
expertise thereby meeting Joseph Nye’s criteria for the classification of international 
interaction as soft power. Although leading parliamentary Africa experts within the 
CDU warned that “the exclusive connection with Inkatha should have been dissolved, 
because we ended up in an impasse, which significantly limited our ability to 
manoeuvre”, the Zulu movement was to remain the KAF’s political partner in South 
Africa for a long time. It was a political force with a significant numerical 
constituency and it was the only political representation for black South Africans that 
provided a credible electoral alternative to the dominant ANC in a post-apartheid 
democracy its existence guaranteeing a minimum of political diversity and 
pluralism.Together with its partner, the KAF set out to focus on a programme of 
capacity-building on regional and municipal level, which will be examined in the 
following section.
5.6. Capacity-Building -  Inkatha I, II and III
The so-called liberalisation phase is often the most important phase of the regime 
change process bringing about a crucial destabilisation and weakening of authoritarian
OQ1
structures caused by internal power struggles within the regime. During the 
liberalisation phase, the activities of international actors can help to open up societal 
spaces, in which opposition groups can gather, prepare and develop their strategies. 
Mediation between rulers and opposition can take place and the first steps towards the 
launch of a sustainable dialogue can contribute to an atmosphere of reconciliation.
891 J.Stoll, ‘Die DemokratiefSrderung durch Projekte der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung e.V. in Stidafrika’, 
Vortragskonzept, St.Augustin, 23 May 1993, p.l.
892 Personal interview with Karl-Heinz Homhues, Berlin, 3 December 1999.
893 Philippe C.Schmitter, Guillermo O’Donnell , Transitions from  Authoritarian Rule -  Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1986), p.7.
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During the liberalisation phase, soft-liners in the authoritarian government are beginning 
to ‘test the waters’ and to explore the opportunities for talks with anti-regime forces 
while particularly open-minded members of the nomenclature express their willingness 
to cross the political divide often in a symbolic way. After having established its 
political connection with Inkatha, the KAF launched its democracy promotion 
programme in the liberalisation phase with the intention to “build bridges between 
political adversaries” and to bring representatives from “all political forces” to the 
negotiation table.894 The pre-condition, was that the beneficiaries of its political aid 
campaigns had to “have the will to work towards social peace.”895 KAF experts believed 
that "only by supporting internal opposition groups it would be possible to overcome the 
apartheid system." 896 They favoured a combination of socio-political and socio­
economic activities in order to “re-gain confidence, something that is important to 
blacks because the future in this country belongs to them and something that counts for 
whites because they are the key to this future.”897 Besides its partnership with Inkatha, 
the German Foundation maintained only “sporadic contacts with the ANC”, an 
organisation, which had called off its previously peaceful means of resistance. “As a 
partner” insists Thesing, “the ANC was out of the question because of its concept of 
armed struggle.”898
Based on the co-operation agreement, which Inkatha Secretary-General Oscar 
Dhlomo, the Zulu leader Frank Mdlalose, KAF representatives and the leader of the 
CDU opposition in the Bundestag Helmut Kohl signed in March 1982 after talks in 
Bonn, the KAF launched three initial democracy promotion projects in South Africa. 
Inkatha I  set out to explore development opportunities within the South African 
municipal district of Msinga. This programme lasted only for a short period of time and 
was later taken over by another West German NGO. The remaining two projects 
became the backbone of KAF activities in the Cape Republic during most parts of the
894 Silke Krieger, KAF-Auslandsinformationen, December 1990, p .l.
895 Ibid
896 Frank Spengler, ‘Entwicklungspartnerschaft der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung mit der Republik Sudafrika’, 
St.Augustin 1995, p.2.
897 Gerd D.Bossen, ‘Oberlegungen fur eine neue deutsche Aussenpolitik in Richtung Afrika, Asien/Pazifik 
und Lateinamerika’, op.cit., p.21.
898 Personal correspondence with Josef Thesing, 9 January 2006.
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1980s. Inkatha II was the internal KAF code name for the Community Service Training 
Programme (CSTP) while Inkatha III was the project title for the co-operation between 
Foundation and the Inkatha Institute in Durban with the Inkatha Research and 
Information Centre (INREC) at its centre.899 The Inkatha Institute was established in 
1988 in an attempt to provide the Zulu movement with the resources of a political think 
tank. KAF and Inkatha officials realised that Buthelezi’s political force “lacked the 
quantity and quality of intellectuals available to the National Party and the ANC” while 
at the same time “it was fighting on two fronts (trying to understand the nature of 
change in both the rural and the urban areas) whereas the NP and ANC were primarily 
urban movements”.900 It conducted research in the areas of land development (especially 
housing and services), urbanisation, municipal and regional boundary re-definitions and 
development projects. Furthermore, the Institute provided policy papers and research 
services to the KwaZulu provincial government on topics such as taxation, allocation of 
resources and municipal services.901 Initially, the Institute’s organisational structure 
included three departments, namely Research headed by the former IFP parliamentarian 
Gavin Woods who was also the think tank’s executive director, Finance and Library. 
The research section was divided into the Departments for Economic and Social 
Research respectively whereby the former provided expertise to the KwaZulu 
Government while the latter was given “watching briefs for developmental activities 
where the IFP was represented.902
As the violent clashes with Inkatha's main rival ANC intensified, the Violence 
Monitoring Unit was added as a fourth division to the Institute’s already existing 
departments. The unit sought to counter the ANC own statistics of fatalities. Former 
Inkatha Institute analyst Errol Goetsch remembered:
899 According to internal budgetary documentation on KAF-administered democracy promotion projects, 
INREC was financially supported with DM 19,574.152 (approximately £6.3 million). Furthermore, the 
Foundation spent a total o f DM 5,919.220 (approximately £2 million) on the Inkatha Development Office 
between 1986 and 1992. Budgetary Supplement 1993 (Begleitpapier zum Entwurf des 
Bundeshaushaltsplans), Single Financial Plan 23 (BMZ), Personal correspondence with Hans-Gttnther 
Toetemeyer, 13 April 2006.
900 Personal correspondence with Errol Goetsch, 20 March 2006.
901 Ibid.
902 Among those activities were the Durban Convention Centre, the Durban Waterfront and Cato Manor, 
the Ndwedwe electrification and the Water 2000 projects. The Social Research Department was headed by 
Errol Goetsch, the Economic Research Desk by Peter Christensen. Ibid.
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The IFP was media-shy whilst the ANC was media-sawy. The ANC had mobilised its 
monitors first, so it had the advantage of feeding the news media with its combination of 
facts and spin. In its news reports, the dead were either ANC leaders, or members of the 
community. News of deaths of IFP leaders and supporters were suppressed. The 
Violence Study [...] highlighted how often IFP leaders were the victims of ANC 
aggression. Interestingly, the unit attempted to depoliticise the numbers by showing that 
some portion of the violence was not tied to IFP vs. ANC and belonged to tribal and 
local land disputes, thefts, vigilantism etc.903
Inkatha II encompassed a variety of measures aimed at enhancing, improving and 
strengthening the position of the Zulu movement as a central actor in the area of local 
and regional development and community management.904 Buthelezi’s organisation was 
to become a more accessible and competent partner for KwaZulu’s rural and urban 
population alike. The strengthening of Inkatha's role as a representation of the 
disenfranchised black masses sought to counter the ANC’s claim to be the sole 
legitimate representative of the oppressed majority. The CSTP provided professional 
support for Inkatha leaders, offered educational programmes, organised research 
activities and developed strategies for the development of rural and urban areas.905 The 
Foundation provided a total amount of DM 3.7 million between 1983 and 1993 for the 
running of Inkatha II.
Inkatha III or INREC was financed with DM 3.2 million between 1983 and 
1992 for the purpose of establishing an Information- and Consultation Centre within the 
Inkatha Institute.906 The project provided information about the Zulu movement to the 
public, organised legal aid and advice on employment and labour market issues and 
supported black communities in the KwaZulu/Natal region in legal and administrative 
disputes.907 A monthly publication on problems of socio-economic development on 
local level as well as a published introduction to basic development projects was to 
increase the movement’s attractiveness as a political representation and a future 
electoral alternative for black South Africans. In short, by establishing a direct channel
903 Personal correspondence with Errol Goetsch, 20 March 2006.
904 U lf Engel, Hans-Georg Schleicher, Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika, op.cit., 346.
905 Ibid
906 Ibid
907 Amelie Maier-Oswald, Die Politik deutscher politischer Stiftungen in Sudafrika in den Jahren 1990 bis 
1994, unpublished MA thesis, University of Munich 1998, p.55.
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between INREC and Inkatha, KAF strategists hoped to strengthen the communication 
and public relation capabilities of the IFP, and to provide the party leadership with 
necessary expertise for political decision-making through the Centre’s research 
activities.908 However, the Foundation realised the need to extend its democracy 
promotion programme to other political actors as well as ordinary South Africans after 
the conditions for political activism had changed at the beginning of the 1990s. The 
Democracy Development Programme (DPP), discussed in the following section, 
reflected this strategic shift in capacity-building and civic education.
5.7. Democracy Development Programme (DPP)
On 2 February 1990, South African President Frederick Wilhelm de Klerk declared an 
end to apartheid and the system of racial segregation after a parliamentary session in 
Cape Town. KAF strategists found themselves rather unexpectedly confronted with a 
different political landscape and subsequently adjusted their democracy promotion 
programme thus reflecting Philippe Schmitter and Guillermo O'Donnell’s observation 
that “factors that were of crucial importance in undermining a dictatorship, such as the 
conflict between hard-liners and soft-liners within the regime or the institutional decay 
of the military, become less relevant once new actors have been mobilised and the rules 
have begun to change."909 In 1991, the Foundation opened an office in South Africa's 
economic capital Johannesburg. This “important step for the broadening of our spectrum 
of partners” was followed two years later by the launch of the KAF project Institute for 
Federal Democracy (IFD) - Democracy Development Programme (DDP).910 The IFD- 
DDP project replaced the Inkatha Institute and was conceptualised as a "political 
education and consultation programme for leaders in the field of democratic 
development.”911 The IFD-DDP project “took the political development and changes,
908 The CDU-led government in Bonn insisted that it did not „directly provide financial aid for the Inkatha 
movement. However, the government provides project-related assistance via an NGO (Konrad-Adenauer 
Stiftung) for an Inkatha training and information centre, Lutz Stavenhagen, Deutscher Bundestag, 10th 
Legislativer Period, Bulletin (Drucksache) 10/5887, 22 July 1986, p.5.
909 Philippe C.Schmitter, Guillermo O’Donnell, Transitions from  Authoritarian Rule -  Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, op.cit., p.65.
9,0 Frank Spengler, ‘Entwicklungspartnerschaft der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung mit der Republik Siidafrika’, 
op.cit., p.3.
911 J.Stoll, ‘Die Demokratiefbrderung durch Projekte der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung e.V. in Siidafrika’,
op.cit., p.6.
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which evidently occurred since 1990 stronger into account.”912 In the first half of the 
1990s, the Foundation adjusted its thematic focus to the changing political landscape in 
South Africa, which was characterised by a gradually emerging competition between 
apartheid and anti-apartheid forces. The KAF provided funds specifically “for research, 
which would allow parties to articulate their policies” and which would “strengthen the 
capacity of political parties involved in the negotiation process.” 913 The changing 
political environment since de Klerk’s announcement in 1990, which paved the way for 
a re-admission of the ANC and other previously outlawed opposition groups into the 
political arena, required a modified operational strategy by KAF with a shift away from 
maintaining the life support for opposition movements in order to facilitate regime 
change towards the creation of a full-fledged system of political parties as the backbone 
of the new democracy. “During a time of transition to democracy” writes Clarence 
Tshitere, “there are likely to be no established party organisations. Help from abroad 
albeit on a temporary basis, may therefore play a positive role in helping new parties to 
build themselves from scratch.”914
The Foundation implemented a concept of democracy promotion through 
political education, consultation and analysis thus moving away from its pre-transitional 
agenda during the 1980s. The latter largely focused on the strengthening of the IFP as a 
political representation within South Africa’s black community and as a principled 
opponent of the apartheid government. During the democratisation process from 1990 to 
the first democratic elections in 1994, KAF policy planning worked towards a situation 
in which the transitional, "largely unpredictable effect on how and by whom the normal 
political game will be played in future" would become a bit more predictable.915 The 
Foundation received DM 2.5 million between 1990 and 1992 out of a total DM 47 
million, with which the German Government funded the activities of its political 
foundations as well as the work of other German NGOs “in support of South African
913 Caroline Kihato, Shifting Sands: The relationship between foreign donors and South African civil 
society during and after apartheid, Research Report no.86, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, August 
2001, p.9.
914 Clarence Thsitere, Securing democracy: Party finance and Party Donations -  the South African 
Challenge, Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No.63, November 2002, p.6.
915 Philippe C.Schmitter, Guillermo O’Donnell (eds.) , Transitions from  Authoritarian Rule -  Tentative 
Conclusions, op.cit., p.66.
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institutions and projects”.916 Towards the end of the 1980s, the question of foreign 
funding developed into an increasingly thorny issue for the apartheid regime, which 
enacted several laws to force South African civil society organisations to disclose the 
origin and amount of their financial support from abroad. In particular, the Disclosure of 
Foreign Funding Act (Act 26 of 1989) obliged anti-apartheid groups to report 
meticulously their budgetary support received from outside South Africa to the 
government in Pretoria.917
The Foundation recognised the need to broaden the spectrum of potential 
political partner organisations. This, however, did not mean a sudden break with its 
well-established IFP partnership. “The KAF’s co-operation with the Inkatha Freedom 
Party (IFP)” writes Frank Spengler as late as 1994, “does not limit our ability to enter 
into a dialogue with other parties.918 For example, we had high-ranking ANC officials 
participating in our seminars, joining us in round-table talks and following our invitation 
to visit us on study trips to Germany. KAF is recognised by all political parties as an 
honest broker.” 919 Others were more explicit in their explanations as to why KAF 
strategists and Germany’s governmental foreign policy had sought a shift away from 
Inkatha. “One realised” admits one senior administration official, “that with Inkatha, 
KAF would never play a central role on the new South Africa’s political scene and that 
co-operation with a minor political force such as the IFP would marginalise German 
democracy promotion.”920 The pluralist nature of democratic competition as well as the 
Foundation's bridge-building function in its role as a transnational actor that operated 
within a deeply divided society were compelling reasons for the strategic re-focusing of 
KAF activities in South Africa. It was therefore only a matter of time for the 
conservative Foundation to supplement its close political connection with Inkatha. The
9,6 Parliamentary Secretary of State (BMZ) Hans-Peter Repnik, Deutscher Bundestag, 12th Legislative 
Period, Bulletin (Drucksache) 12/3047, 7 July 1992, p.73.
917 Caroline Kihato, Shifting Sands, op.cit., p.6. In addition, three other laws sought to restrain the financial 
maneuverability o f apartheid-critical civil society organisations: the Prohibition o f Foreign Financing of 
Political Parties Act of 1985, the Affected Organisations Act (Act 31 of 1974) and the Fund-Raising Act 
(Act 107 o f 1978).
918 The Inkatha movement had been re-named Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in July 1990.
919 Frank Spengler, Beeinflussung der Rahmenbedingungen in der Republik Sudafrika, KAF Report 1994, 
p.24.
920 Personal interview (phone) with Wighardt Hardtl, 30 March 2006.
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DDP illustrated this change. Although at the beginning, the project was organised on the 
basis of an organisational unity with the Inkatha Institute921 (which was re-named in 
IFD in 1994), it subsequently opened its programmes to include the entirety of the South 
African political spectrum soon after its launch. The Foundation set the transitional goal 
of “spreading and stabilising a democratic value system within every sector of society” 
and aimed at the “integration of all political forces for the purpose of the joint creation 
of a socially, politically and economically strong community while concentrating its 
programmatic efforts on three areas.”922 Like the FEF in the Iberian Peninsula, KAF as a 
sub-state foreign policy actor used soft power to help aid the transformation of political 
infrastructure in a country deemed important for Germany’s national interest. By 
providing political education for political leaders, mayors, civil servants, journalists, 
teachers and entrepreneurs through a variety of seminars, workshops and study trips, 
KAF strategists sought to shape the agenda and preferences of South African decision­
makers in a way that would ensure the emergence of political structures comparable to 
and compatible with German models. In the area of political consulting, the Foundation 
supported political decision-makers by providing political expertise via foreign experts 
as well as by organising seminars and workshops, which discussed issues of 
parliamentary democracy, the political management of democratic parties and questions 
of local government and municipal administration.923
The third sector of the DDP project focused on political analysis. Like the IED in 
Portugal, the DDP project provided academic expertise for the political decision-making 
process and aimed at strengthening the competency of political representatives during 
the transition. The lack of political knowledge, experience and parliamentary skills in 
South Africa’s newly emerging democratic system were seen by the Foundation as 
obstacles for the smooth functioning of a pluralist and politically stable polity. 
Democracy promotion experts in KAF headquarters realised the threat posed to the new
921 The Inkatha-Institute and its successor organisation received approximately DM 6 million between 1983 
and 1995, Statement Wighardt HSrdtl, Minister o f State in the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (BMZ), in Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographic Report, 9 March 1994, 18567C.
922 Frank Spengler in KAF Annual Report 1994, Institute for Federal Democracy -  Democracy 
Development Programme, Durban 1995, quoted in Amelie Maier-Oswald, ‘Die Politik deutscher 
politischer Stiftungen in Sudafrika in den Jahren 1990 bis 1994’, op.cit., 56.
923 Ibid, pp.56-57.
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and still fragile democratic structures by the legacy of authoritarianism. They warned in 
an internal memorandum:
It is of a particular importance for the country’s future development that its political 
actors are able to agree on a new constitution, which will take the interests of all South 
Africans adequately into account. South Africa’s political stability depends on how a 
democratically elected government will be able to meet the materialist expectations of 
the formerly disadvantaged parts of society. Within this framework, the KAF has 
launched activities to contribute to the creation of a truly democratic order, to a greater 
degree of social justice and to the development of a humane political culture.”924
KAF strategists realised that “a// South Africans” could not be fairly, adequately and 
equally considered and treated in a new political system, in which no provincial, 
regional or tribal counterweight was being constitutionally enshrined and they warned 
that “a centralist system would not work in South Africa’s multicultural society”.925 A 
“truly democratic order” as defined by the KAF emphasised the aspect of political 
pluralism and the creation of a broad political party spectrum. “In this context”, another 
KAF representative put it with regard to the Foundation’s democracy promotion projects 
in South Africa, “the crucial point is not the transfer of European models to South 
Africa, but primarily to offer assistance for reaching political decisions, assistance in the 
light of German experiences.” The DDP project launched more than 300 different 
activities between December 1993 and the end of April 1994.927 In the run-up to South 
Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, it focused particularly on the drafting of a 
national constitution with strong federalist elements as well as on a provincial 
constitution for KwaZulu/Natal (KZN). The draft of the provincial constitution would 
be then used to support the legislative process in other provinces. Furthermore, the
924 J.Stoll, ‘Die Demokratiefbrderung durch Projekte der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung e.V. in Sudafrika’, 
op.cit., p.2 (translation by author).
925 Personal interview (phone) with Frank Spengler, 13 June 2005.
926 Frank Spengler, KAF Annual Report 1994 -  Political Dialogue Republic o f South Africa, p.2. South 
African constitutional expert Hugh Corder stressed the causal nexus between the effectiveness of 
Germany’s democracy promotion programmes administered by its political foundations and the non­
patronising mode of operation. In his view, the “interventions were precisely more effective for being so 
prescriptive/soft. Very few politicians/negotiators like to be told what to do and how to do things and the 
German approach worked far more effectively than did that o f the USA in this country.” Personal 
correspondence with Hugh Corder, 20 April 2006.
927 Amelie Maier-Oswald, Die Politik deutscher politischer Stiftungen in Sudafrika in den Jahren 1990 bis 
1994, op.cit., p.58.
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Foundation used its role within the DDP project to push the IFP, and its hesitant leader 
Buthelezi to participate in the 1994 elections, a crucial task given the tense atmosphere 
between ANC and IFP in parts of the country. KAF officials had prepared several 
meetings between Buthelezi and Chancellor Kohl since the mid-1980s and many 
credited the West German statesman and his influence with the achievement of having 
convinced the stubborn Inkatha leader to participate in the electoral process.928
5.8. KAF, Inkatha and Political Violence
In the meantime, Buthelezi’s party had gained notoriety in parts of the German public
for its hard-line attitude in its dealings with the ANC. Towards the end of the 1980s, the
close partnership between KAF and the Zulu party had stirred up public controversy in
West Germany, which broke out over the question of Buthelezi’s “opaque”929 political
role, his responsibility for acts of political violence in his homeland of KwaZulu-Natal
and his alleged collaboration with the South African police and military. In particular,
the FRG’s Protestant Church criticised the Foundation for its unflinching support for the
Zulu leader, a public condemnation, which KAF officials dismissed as a product of the
Church’s liberation theology with its strong sympathies for methods and strategy of the
armed struggle.930 However, the ‘robust’ way, in which the Inkatha leader allegedly
dealt with dissenting voices within his homeland communities turned into a potential
public relations disaster for KAF and CDU. Buthelezi’s militant followers were
increasingly implicated in massacre-style killings of political opponents in KwaZulu’s
townships and the Zulu leader himself was politically linked to these atrocities in his
capacity as KwaZulu’s Chief Minister, President of Inkatha as well as KwaZulu’s
Minister of Police. Between 1987 and 1990, the clashes between Inkatha and its main
rivals ANC and the United Democratic Front (UDF) had cost the lives of an estimated
3000 people in Buthelezi’s provincial stronghold of KwaZulu-Natal and particularly in
1
the urban ghettos of the province’s administrative capital Pietermaritzburg. Inkatha’s
obvious superiority in terms of weaponry and the fact, that arrests for the unlawful
928 Personal correspondence with Josef Thesing, 9 January 2006.
929 Personal correspondence with Norbert Bltim, 30 March 2006.
930 Personal correspondence with Josef Thesing, 9 January 2006.
931 Eddie Koch, ‘Angel o f Peace or War?’, Inter Press Service, 11 April 1990; Bill Schindler, ‘Africa’s 
Zulu leader Buthelezi fights ‘collaborator’ image’, Toronto Star, 15 April 1990.
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possession of firearms were made almost exclusively among ANC and UDF supporters 
while Zulu warriors remained unchallenged by the police and were being allowed to 
carry their traditional weapons led many observers to presume a collusion between the 
apartheid regime’s security forces and Inkatha.932. The possibility that a German 
political foundation, which was linked with the government in Bonn via its affiliated 
party and which pursued external relations on a transnational and sub-state level in order 
to further the FRG’s interests in Southern Africa could be accessory to the attempts of a 
controversial group of Zulu militants “at establishing hegemony” and of “smashing 
progressive political organisations” 934 proved too outrageous for some German 
opposition politicians as to not to be challenged politically.
In 1995, the German Green Party MP Uschi Eid and her parliamentary party 
inquired during a session of the Bundestag if the government was able to confirm media 
reports, according to which “millions of Deutsche Mark in development aid had been 
channelled to South Africa via the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation in order to be used for 
the financing of an intelligence service for the Inkatha Freedom Party.”935 Buthelezi 
always angrily denied the accusations levelled against him stating “Inkatha does not act 
in co-operation with the police or anybody else to increase violence.” Claims made by 
a retired officer of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in 1991, that the army had 
in fact provided Inkatha supporters with an unspecified number of AK-47 assault rifles 
to strengthen their position in fights with militant ANC activists were categorically 
disavowed by Buthelezi.937 The allegations of weapons proliferation to the IFP were not
932 Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg, (David Phillips 
Publishers, London, 1990), p. 128; ‘Ex-Officer Says Military Arming Inkatha, Planned To Discredit ANC’, 
The Associated Press, 12 June 1991.
933 Nkosinathi Gwala, ‘Political Violence and the Struggle for Control in Pietermaritzburg’, Journal o f  
Southern African Studies, vol.15, no.3, April 1989, p.506.
934 Ibid, p.518.
9 3 5 Deutscher Bundestag, Bulletin (Drucksache) 13/2397, 20 September 1995. Eid admits that the fact o f 
“Inkatha being a political partner for KAF was a constant thorn in the side of the Green Party not because 
we thought that the ANC was the only game in town but because Inkatha never laid any claim to being an 
organisation with internal democracy.” Personal interview (phone) with Uschi Eid, 13 April 2006.
936 ‘Buthelezi attacks Tutu Statement on Police Support for Inkatha’, South African Press Agency (SAPA), 
27 December 1988; ‘Message to Church Leaders: Inkatha Not To Blame For Spiralling Violence’,Clarion 
Call, vol.l, 1990; ‘violence -  What Lies Behind It’, Clarion Call, vol.l, 1990.
937 ‘South Africa Buthelezi categorically denies allegations of IFP-SADF collusion’, South African Press 
Agency (SAPA), 11 June 1991, reprinted by BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, 13 June 1991.
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only serious within the domestic context of South Africa’s transition but also threatened 
to derail KAF activities as soon as speculations surfaced about a possible involvement 
of the political Foundation in the arming of Inkatha cadres.938 However, the white 
minority government in Pretoria admitted in mid-1991 that it had indeed paid US$ 
700,000 to Inkatha, which the Zulu chief had officially used to finance “rallies to 
oppose international sanctions against apartheid”.939 Despite the scandalous nature of 
the allegations, which were quickly dubbed ‘Inkathagate’, not even further revelations 
about the apartheid regime’s financial support for the Inkatha union UWUSA and the 
training of Zulu death squads in SADF camps in Namibia could bring the KAF 
leadership to question its increasingly controversial partnership with the IFP.940
5.9. Constitution-Building
In 1992, the KAF set up its programme Political Dialogue South Africa (PDSA). 
Between 1992 and 1995, the project was financed with a budget of DM 1,12 million to 
ensure a “peaceful competition between political decision-makers.” 941 The PDSA 
targeted the entirety of South Africa’s political forces:
The KAF co-operated with all relevant political forces on various projects (e.g. 
programmes that initiated dialogue on economic issues, round-table talks, trips to 
Germany). The Foundation generated an atmosphere of trust, which made it possible 
since 1 January 1992 to organise the political programme “Political Dialogue South 
Africa.942
The political goals of the PDSA project were to influence constitution-building 
processes during South Africa’s transition and to promote federalist structures. The 
South African constitution was to provide for gender equality, the creation of local
938 Personal interview (phone) with Volkmar Kohler, 27 January 2006.
939 Barry Renfrew, ‘Secret Funds Scandal Embroils Controversial Zulu Leader’, Associated Press, 22 July 
1991.
940 Ulf Engel, Die Afrikapolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 -  1999 -  Rolle und Identitdten 
(Habilitationsschrift, Lit Verlag, Hamburg 1999), p.79. As the use of violence was unequivocally rejected 
by the KAF, its co-operation with the IFP in the light of the credible allegations o f Inkatha's
941 Frank Spengler, KAF Annual Report 1994 -  Political Dialogue Republic of South Africa, op.cit., p .l.
942 J.Stoll, ‘Die Demokratiefbrderung durch Projekte der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung e.V. in Siidafrika’, 
op.cit., p.7 (translation by author).
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government structures and the initiation of an institution-building process guided by the 
rule of law. Furthermore, the PDSA programme worked towards the societal acceptance 
of democratic values through programmes of political education and aimed at 
influencing the public debate in favour of a socially responsible and ecologically 
sensitive market economy. Finally, the reduction of politically motivated violence and 
the promotion of political tolerance featured prominently on the KAF agenda during the 
first half of the 1990s.943
The constitutional vacuum after the demise of the apartheid government was 
filled by an interim constitution enacted on 27 April 1994, which was replaced two years 
later by the final constitution after being approved by the Second Certification Judgment 
of the South African Constitutional Court in December 1996. The constitution-building 
process turned out to be one of the most controversial and divisive issues during the 
transition.944 During the constitutional negotiations, the KAF tried to shape the legal 
debate by regularly highlighting the pros and cons of a federalist versus a more 
centralist constitutional model in seminars and symposiums. KAF activities in the area 
of constitution building needed to be seen in the context of Germany’s specific historical 
experiences during the 20th Century. The constitutional shortcomings of the Weimar 
Republic, the emergence and reign of terror of the National Socialist regime between 
1933 and 1945 with its bureaucratic centralism and the readiness of German society 
after the demise of the Hitler regime to ‘learn’ from these historical experiences were 
crucial components of the Foundation’s political and operational approach to 
democratisation in foreign countries. Legal advisor to the constitutional committee and 
law professor Hugh Corder, who was intimately involved in the drafting process of the 
interim constitution between 1994 and 1996, remembers that “the whole structure and 
approach to rights-protection was modelled on the post-war experience of West 
Germany, latterly as representative of the emerging European approach to Bills of 
Rights.”945 He stresses the enormous symbolic value that the ‘German experience’
943 Ibid, pp. 1-2.
944 Thomas Michael Grupp, Sudafrikas neue Verfassung -  Mil vergleichender Betrachtung aus deutscher 
und eduropaischer Sicht, (Schriftenreige Recht und Verfassung in Siidafrika, vol.4, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1st edition, Baden-Baden 1999), p. 149.
945 Personal correspondence with Hugh Corder, 20 April 2006.
283
carried for South African negotiators based on the realisation that the “German 
constitution had been drafted for a society emerging from a ghastly period in which 
fascism had caused huge suffering, and the constitution and Bill of Rights was the 
‘never again’ symbol.”946 Frank Spengler, the KAF resident representative in South 
Africa during the democratic transition noted in 1992:
During the course of the debate about the future distribution of power in South Africa, 
political decision-makers, especially representatives of NP and ANC are increasingly 
oriented towards constitutional models used in other countries. It seems, that particularly 
Germany’s federalist state structures are being looked at as a guiding concept for a 
future constitutional template in the Cape Republic.947
Furthermore, Thomas Michael Grupp in his study on South Africa’s post-apartheid 
constitution remarked vis-a-vis the West German Basic Law and its influence in 
Pretoria:
The reason for South Africa to incorporate similar legal solutions in its new constitution 
may be related to a similar concern. In future, the disdain and disregard for fundamental 
human rights as expressed in the history of both countries should be prevented.948
This does not only explain the KAF’s strong focus on the problem of constitutional 
development during the transition but its prioritisation of federalist templates 
counterbalancing more centralist proposals. The federalist constitutional model offered a 
compromise for political parties like IFP or the conservative National Party (NP), which 
were in favour of a radical constitutional de-centralisation of the country’s power 
structures to avoid a possibly dangerous concentration of power in the hands of the 
ANC. Buthelezi’s warning that the Zulu people “do not want to replace an awesomely 
powerful apartheid regime with any other awesomely powerful regime” was an
946 Ibid. Corder points at the hate speech exclusion in the South African Bill o f Rights, which mirrored the 
holocaust-denial outlawing in German law.
947 Frank Spengler, ‘Republik Sudafrika: UnitUrer Staat, Staatenbund oder Fbderation? -  Die Positionen der 
wichtigsten Parteien und politischen Gruppierungen’, KAF-Auslandsinformationen, 10/92, p. 11 (translation 
by author); Frank Spengler, ‘Entwicklungspartnerschaft der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung mit der Republik 
Stidafrika’, op.cit., p.4.
948 Thomas Michael Grupp, Siidafrikas neue Verfassung -  Mit vergleichender Betrachtung aus deutscher 
und eduropaischer Sicht, op.cit., p. 149 (translation by author).
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expression of deeply rooted fears of a new form of ethnic domination by non-Zulu 
power holders and had to be taken into account by KAF officials in their dealing with 
KwaZulu’s Chief Minister.949 In a meeting with a five-member delegation of the 
German-African Parliamentary Group, Buthelezi provided his guests from the FRG’s 
Lower House with two constitutional drafts, one for his province of KwaZulu Natal, the 
other for a future democratic South Africa. Both legal documents were a manifestation 
of the Zulu leader’s rejection of the constitutional compromise negotiated between the 
ANC and the South African Government and demanded autonomous rights for 
KwaZulu Natal and the involvement of independent legal experts in the constitution- 
building process. Understandably, the ANC tried to achieve a maximum of political 
centralism to take real advantage of its position as a majority representation.950 
Buthelezi quickly realised the ANC’s desire for a unitary state solution: “The ANC 
approached negotiations from the viewpoint of a centralising philosophy to state and 
government.” 951 Mandela’s liberation movement had rejected earlier IFP proposals, 
which put forward the idea of the holding of a referendum in Buthelezi’s homeland of 
KwaZulu-Natal on the federal structure of the future South African state as an attempt 
“by those who spawned apartheid to perpetuate this crime against humanity under a new 
guise”, and warned of the “balkanisation” of the country.952 Buthelezi’s fears made him 
temporarily enter into co-operative agreements with rather strange bedfellows such as 
the Afrikaaner leader Ferdinand Hartzenberg’s extremely rightwing Conservative Party
949 ‘South Africa: ‘Buthelezi tells o f fears by whites’, Inter Press Service, 7 November 1990. He re-phrased 
the same sentiment one year later saying that “we would not like to exchange one intolerant master for 
another. The that it is a black master does not make any difference” in Christopher S. Wren, ‘The Chief 
Steps Forward’, op.cit.
950 The SPD’s Southern Africa expert Hans-Giinther Toetemeyer insisted that Buthelezi’s preference for 
models of constitutional federalism remained an isolated position within the transition context and was 
driven by egoistic motives. He stresses that in case Buthelezi had been supported by Germany’s opposition 
Social Democrats in his desire to decentralise the future South African state, other groups such as 
Conservative Afrikaaners had to be granted equal concessions. „Therefore, the SPD had no reason to bring 
the ANC (its traditional partner) to change its policies on federalism." Personal correspondence with Hans- 
Giinther Toetemeyer, 13 April 2006. This recollection is not entirely accurate as German federalism expert 
Hans-Peter Schneider was sent to South Africa by the SPD’s party foundation FEF to assist the ANC in the 
constitution-building process.
951 Mangosuthu Buthelezi, ’The role of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in the past ten years of South 
African democratic evolution’, op.cit.
952 ‘ANC lashes out at Buthelezi’s proposals for a new federal state’, Agence France Press, 3 December 
1993; The proposal envisaged the creation of a provincial President, KwaZulu’s own constitutional court, 
an autonomous central bank and its own armed forces.
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(CP) and the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU) with whom he founded the ‘Concerned South 
Africans Group’ (COSAG) in 1992 after the first two rounds of constitutional 
negotiations commonly known as Codesa I and II had broken down. Buthelezi pulled 
his IFP negotiating team out of the constitutional talks with the ANC threatening to let 
the process finitely derail and hinting at the possibility of civil war. Some prominent 
observers at the time speculated that the IFP leader’s real plan was to have a strongly 
federal constitution agreed upon by the transitional negotiation teams rather than by a 
constituent assembly, in which his political importance would be severely diminished. 
Ultimately, they claimed, Buthelezi aimed at establishing his independent Zulu state.953
Together with its South African partner organisation Groundswell, the KAF 
launched a joint project ‘Federalism -  Making it work’ in 1992. The Foundation invited 
CDU politician Hartmut Perschau, the former Interior Minister of the German federal 
state of Saxony-Anhalt to attend the event as a legal expert and to present the model of 
democratic federalism as embodied in the West German constitution.954 Together with 
the ANC and Groundswell, the organisation organised the international seminar 
‘Federalism -  The Great Debate’ as well as workshop events on ‘Federalism -  A 
Comparative Perspective’ and ‘The Dawn of Constitutionalism in South Africa’ in co­
operation with the Centre for Constitutional Analysis of the Human Sciences Research 
Council (HSRC). Furthermore, in co-operation with the Centre for International and 
Comparative Politics of the University of Stellenbosch, the Foundation facilitated debate 
on ‘The Political Economy of Federalism in South Africa: Policy Opportunities and 
Constraints of the Interim Constitution’ as well as on issues of ‘Parliamentary 
Dynamics: Understanding Political Life in the new South African Parliament’. It also 
supported the KwaZulu Foundation through the seminar on ‘A Constitution for South 
Africa’.955
A further component of the federalism programme, the KAF organised round­
table talks with decision-makers from all political parties as well as study trips to 
Germany for high-ranking parliamentarians and participants in the multi-party
953 Allister Sparks, ’Examining a leader’s motives’, The Toronto Star, 28 July 1993.
954 Amelie Maier-Oswald, Die Politik deutscher politischer Stiftungen in Sudafrika in den Jahren 1990 bis 
1994, op.cit., p.60; U lf Engel, Hans-Georg Schleicher, Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika, op.cit., 358.
955 Frank Spengler, ‘Beeinflussung der Rahmenbedingungen in der Republik Siidafrika’, op.cit., p. 17.
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negotiations.956 West German constitutional experts were sent to South Africa to serve 
as contact, liaison and consultation partners for politicians and jurists. Among them the 
academics and legal experts Ulrich Karpen (University of Hamburg), Christian Starck 
(University of Hanover), Rudolf Dolzer (Office of the Chancellor)957, Peter Molt 
(University of Trier), Walter Rudolf (University of Mainz), Dieter Umbach (University 
of Potsdam) and Johannes Vocking (Under-Secretary of State).958 In particular, the 
Hamburg-based law professor and CDU politician Ulrich Karpen became one of the 
KAF’s most productive constitution-building experts and a semi-permanent legal 
adviser to Chief Buthelezi and his IFP colleagues. Together with his FEF counterpart 
Hans-Peter Schneider from the Institute of Federalism at the University of Hanover, 
Karpen travelled frequently to South Africa between 1993 and 1994 to advise the Zulu 
party during the constitutional negotiations. “In South Africa, I and my team focused in 
our legal advice on the system of the West German Lander as a model for the newly 
decentralised constitutional design because the FRG’s Basic Law provided a prime 
example for a legal framework guaranteeing order in a pluralist and very heterogeneous 
society.” 959 The legal expert, who undertook similar constitution-building missions for 
the KAF in Chile, Guatemala, Afghanistan and Cambodia, was aware of the fact that his 
role was to secure indirect influence in the host country. “The Foundation has always 
aimed at influencing political developments in the highest echelons of the target society, 
namely in constitutional courts, governments and national parliaments.” 960 Inkatha 
leader Buthelezi himself recognised the KAF’s importance as a constitutional ‘coach’ 
although the IFP initially rejected the compromise solution agreed upon by ANC, NP 
and a few smaller political parties at the Codesa III negotiations at Kempton Park in 
November 1993:
956 The KAF invited five South African parliamentarians on a study trip to Germany -  Dr. Conny Mulder 
(Freedom Front), Tony Leon (Democratic Party), Ncumisa Kondlo (ANC), Dr. Ziba Jiyane (IFP) and 
Danie Schutte (National Party).
957 In his meeting with delegates from South Africa’s political parties, churches, the judiciary and 
academia, constitutional law expert Rudolph Dolzer focused on principal questions o f federal systems. 
German experiences with constitutional federalism were central to his advisory role as were references to 
the political system of the United States. Personal correspondence with Rudolph Dolzer, 11 May 2005.
958 Ibid.
959 Personal interview with Ulrich Karpen, Hamburg, 10 February 2006.
960 Ibid
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At the negotiating table, the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation also had a major influence. 
While American political Foundations, like the National Democratic Institute and the 
International Republican Institute, were less inclined to participate in the process with 
actual inputs of thinking, reflection and critical analysis, the Konrad-Adenauer 
Foundation made several inputs available to all participants to highlight the importance 
of a federal model of democracy.961
However, by the end of 1993 the constitutional impasse had not been resolved and 
Buthelezi’s stubborn refusal to accept a compromise on the question of homeland 
independence threatened to undermine the electoral process with incalculable 
consequences for domestic security. In March 1994, the Zulu leader still showed no 
signs of coming around stressing the possibility to boycott the elections if his demands 
for KwaZulu self-rule were not met.962 In order to cajole Buthelezi into joining the 
electoral contest, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl had not only received the South 
African politician twice for talks in Bonn, but also sent his envoy, Minister of State in 
the BMZ Volkmar Kohler to see Buthelezi in South Africa.963 In several background 
talks, Kohler made clear to the IFP President that “help and support from Germany is 
linked to the IFP’s preparedness to take part in the elections.”964 Kohler informed 
Buthelezi “the German Government was not interested in seeing the IFP play simply a 
regional role. In that case, there was no willingness to support him further.”965 The 
former U.S. Ambassador to South Africa Princeton N. Lyman echoed Kohler’s 
recollection of Germany’s stance on IFP participation in the elections: ”As the election 
approached and Buthelezi sought support from Germany to help him oppose the
961 Mangosuthu Buthelezi, ’The role of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in the past ten years of South 
African democratic evolution’, op.cit.
962 Tina Susman, ‘Buthelezi Reiterates Zulu Homeland Demand’, The Associated Press, 2 March 1994.
963 Personal interview (phone) with Volkmar Kbhler, 27 January 2006; ’Inkatha-Chef soli Gesprache mit 
anderen Gruppen fortsetzen, Buthelezi besucht Bundeskanzler, Kohl fordert Fortsetzung des
Reformprozesses in Sudafrika’ Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 1 September 1993; ’Buthelezi lehnt Ruckkehr an
Verhandlungstisch ab’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 2 September 1993. In 1992, Kohl had urged Buthelezi, 
President de Klerk and ANC leader Nelson Mandela to set their differences aside and to return to the 
negotiation table, Response of the Federal Government to the motion o f der Ursula Fischer MP and the 
parliamentary group PDS/Linke Liste, Bulletin (Drucksache) 12/4853,4 May 1993.
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negotiated constitution and the election, he came home empty handed. This was very 
much a turning point for him. His international support had dried up.”966
Also, an international attempt at mediation was made, which was initially 
supported by all parties involved. After consultations with the ANC, Inkatha leader 
Buthelezi appointed West German political scientist Paul Kevenhorster as an adviser to 
the so-called Kissinger-Carrington Group of Mediators in March 1994, his appointment 
financed by the KAF.967 “We made it clear to Buthelezi that it was better to sit around 
the table instead of lurking in the trenches” recalls the former KAF resident 
representative and IFP adviser Frank Spengler his negotiation strategy.968 The mediation 
effort was an attempt to break the deadlock, which had ensued when ANC and NP 
negotiators agreed on changes to the draft of the interim constitution without consulting 
the IFP leadership.969 Shortly after the high-profile mediators, former U.S. Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger and former British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington had arrived 
in South Africa, ANC delegation leader Cyril Ramaphosa and NP negotiator Roelf 
Meyer began to change the terms of reference governing the mediation process 
demanding acceptance from the IFP that no amendments to the text of the interim 
constitution will come into effect before the elections and that the result of the 
Kissinger-Carrington mission equalled a recommendation to the Constitutional
966 Personal correspondence with Princeton N. Lyman, 3 May 2006.
967 Personal correspondence with Paul KevenhOrster, 25 April 2005; Frank Spengler, ‘Siidafrika. Die Rolle 
der Regionen und Kommunen im Verfassungsprozess’, KAF-Auslandsinformationen, 4/94, pp.12-17; Frank 
Spengler, ,Verfassungsentwicklung in der Republik Siidafrika’, KAF-Auslandsinformationen, 6/95, p. 18; 
Frank Spengler, ‘Republik Siidafrika: UnitSrer Staat, Staatenbund oder Federation’, op.cit., pp.7-11; Ulrich 
Karpen, ,Sudafriika auf dem Weg zu einer demokratisch-rechtstaatlichen Verfassung’, KAF- 
Auslandsinformationen, 1995, pp.8-13; Hans Friedrich Heese, Thomas H. Boehnke, ’Die neue 
Obergangsverfassung der Republik Sudafrika. Ende der Apartheid -  Aufbruch in die Demokratie’, 
Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee, vol. 27, no.4, 1994, pp. 491-515; Kader Asmal, ’Federalism and the 
Proposals o f the National and Democratic Parties’, in Robert A. Licht et.al. (eds.), South A frica’s Crisis o f  
Constitutional Democracy -  Can the US Constitution help? (American Enterprise Institute, Washington 
D.C. 1994); Mervyn Bennum, Malyn D.D.Newitt (eds.), Negotiating Justice -  A New Constitution fo r  
South Africa, (Exeter 1995); Chris R. Cilliers, ‘The Prospects for Federalism in South Africa’, Responsa 
Meridiana, vol,6, 1995; Hugh Corder, ‘Towards a South African Constitution’, The Modern Law Review , 
vol.57, no.4, 1994, pp.491-533.
968 Personal interview (phone) with Frank Spengler, 13 June 2005.
969 Dirk Kotz6, Mediation during the Transition in South Africa, Paper presented to the 2nd Pan-European
Conference on International Relations, European Consortium on Political Research, Paris, available from 
http://www.unisa.ac.za/default.asp?Cmd=ViewContent&ContentID= 14553. cited on 22 February 2006.
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Assembly.970 “The deal was supposed to be made between ANC and NP,” remembers 
Spengler “and Buthelezi should be sidelined and isolated.” 971 Expectedly, the IFP 
leadership rejected the conditions and Kissinger ended the discussions declaring the 
mission to be a failure. KAF mediator Kevenhoerster also left South Africa empty- 
handed despite his previously optimistic assessment that “the problem can be solved 
within 3-4 days”.972
However, Kenyan mediator Washington Okumu continued his efforts “on his 
own account”973 and behind the scenes the international community including KAF 
officials stepped up the pressure on the Inkatha chief to come to some form of 
agreement that would enable the IFP to join the electoral process. Finally, one came to 
an understanding in the ‘Memorandum on the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation’ 
in April 1994, which constitutionally secured status and independence of the Zulu 
kingdom. Although Buthelezi stressed Okumu’s shuttle diplomacy as a crucial factor for 
the IFP’s last minute compromising, KAF adviser Spengler pointed at the enormous 
pressure put on Buthelezi by the U.S. Administration, which had led to Inkatha's 
participation in the elections. However, his governmental colleague Kohler believes that 
“agreement was reached between the two ‘aristocrats’ Mandela and Buthelezi.” 974 
Kohler, who was in South Africa at the time in his capacity as the FRG Government’s 
election monitor, remembers that the deal came on such short notice that he personally 
helped to put the IFP logo on countless newly printed ballot papers while voting had 
already started.975
The IFP Chief credited Germany’s nongovernmental diplomacy directly with 
the incorporation of strong federal elements into South Africa’s interim constitution 
after its finalisation in 1993. Stating that “we could not have achieved what we did 
without the assistance of the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation”, he stressed the KAF’s
971 Personal interview (phone) with Frank Spengler, 13 June 2005.
972 Willi Germund; ,w ir miissen erst die Toten begraben’, Die Tageszeitung, 30 March 1994.
973 Personal correspondence with Paul KevenhOrster, 25 April 2005.
974 Personal interview (phone) with Volkmar Kohler, 27 January 2006. KAF adviser KevenhOrster comes to 
a similar conclusion saying that besides strong American pressure, “revisions o f certain stipulations o f the 
constitutional draft as well as property rights seemed to have played a crucial role” in getting Inkatha to 
take part in the elections. Personal correspondence with Paul KevenhOrster, 25 April 2005.
975 Ibid.
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important role in convincing the ANC critics of federal concepts of the benefits of a 
decentralised constitutional order.976 Buthelezi pointed out that the Foundation’s 
influence was exercised “not only on us as one of the participants who were devoted to 
the notion of federalism, but also and foremost on those who were against it.”977 By 
introducing concepts into the South African debate that expressed the FRG’s political 
ideals and values, the KAF exercised soft power through agenda setting and the shaping 
of transitional actors’ preferences. The ‘seductive’ qualities of its non-multilateral, semi- 
autonomous and transnationally operated diplomacy were based on what Joseph Nye 
described as the effects of “an attractive ideology, culture and institutions”978 The 
‘private’ dimension of German foreign policy refrained from coercive measures instead 
seeking to shape the mind-sets of elites in target countries and providing practical 
solutions based on tried-and-tested concepts to political actors in transformation 
processes. “The Konrad-Adenauer Foundation made available a wealth of knowledge to 
the ANC, which enabled it to move away from the fears it had that federalism or the 
devolution of power was tantamount to the Balkanisation of South Africa.” 979 
Exercising its ‘power of attraction’ was not an example for German selflessness as 
“cases of political altruism are very rare and normally, soft power is normally based on 
a combination of different intentions and motives.”980 Instead of using the conventional 
carrot and stick approach of hard power based foreign policy, Stiftungen diplomacy 
attempted to convince foreign political actors of the utility value of Germany’s public 
policy concepts and to spread the FRG’s basic administrative, legal or economic 
principles to enhance the social knowledge of foreign decision-makers about established 
political concepts. “The more the ANC leaders became familiar with the German 
models” remembers Buthelezi, “the more they realised that they had nothing to fear
976 Mangosuthu Buthelezi, ’The role of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in the past ten years of South 
African democratic evolution’, op.cit.
977 Ibid.
978 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, op.cit., pp.5-6.
979 Mangosuthu Buthelezi, ’The role of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in the past ten years o f South 
African democratic evolution’, op.cit.
980 Personal interview with Joseph Nye, Oxford, 19 May 2005.
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from opening the door to federalism and devolution of powers.” 981 The greater 
familiarity with policy proposals previously associated only with the political opponent 
“resulted in an even greater appreciation of the German federal model after the adoption 
of the interim constitution, as the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation was extremely active in 
providing wealth of information to the Constituent Assembly, which began drafting the 
final constitution right after the April 1994 elections.”982
Publications proved to be an important tool to provide parts of the 
abovementioned “wealth of information”. With its published seminar reports as well as 
the ‘Occasional Papers’ series, which was described by South African legal experts as 
“very useful in popularising and giving greater depth to the analysis of several important 
constitutional issues, especially the federalism question”983 and a federalism reader, the 
KAF hoped to achieve a more profound understanding of the constitutional concept of 
federalism and its stabilising effect on West Germany’s post-war democracy.984 The 
federalism debate on national level was only one side of the coin. The Foundation 
realised that an equally strong focus had to be on the strengthening of the role of South 
Africa’s provinces and the development of new provincial constitutions. However, KAF 
legal experts freely admitted that although the FRG’s Basic Law with its model 
character of being the legal fundament for a decentrally-administered modem 
democracy formed the backbone for West Germany’s advice in the area of constitution- 
building, the complex social reality of transitional countries were anything but 
conducive to an ‘one size fits all’ approach. “In South Africa as anywhere else, it is far 
from clear what ‘federalism’ actually contains. There are as many concepts of
Q Q C
federalism as there are federal states.” In this context, the KAF (not least because of 
its traditional partnership with the IFP) sought to shape the debate about South Africa’s 
political decentralisation by supporting the constitution-building process in 
KwaZulu/Natal. Using soft power in its attempt to convince future elites of the idea of
98'Mangosuthu Buthelezi, ’The role of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in the past ten years of South 
African democratic evolution’, op.cit.
9i2Ibid.
983 Personal correspondence with Hugh Corder, 20 April 2006.
984 Frank Spengler, ‘Beeinflussung der Rahmenbedingungen in der Republik Siidafrika’, op.cit., pp.21-22.
985 Ulrich Karpen, ’Siidafrika auf dem Wege zu einer demokratisch-rechtstaatlichen Verfassung’, Jahrbuch 
des Offentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart, vol. 44, 1996, p. 618.
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political decentralisation and federal state structures tried and tested in the FRG, the 
Foundation transferred German expertise, experience and personnel organising a 
number of workshop with parliamentarians both from KwaZulu/Natal as well as from 
West Germany. In order to overcome the language barrier and to help South African 
negotiators to familiarise themselves with German concepts, the KAF had a large 
number of federal state constitutions {Landerverfassungeri) translated into English and 
subsequently published. In addition to its involvement in the area of constitution- 
building, which was aimed at providing a future democratic South Africa with a stable 
framework for political pluralism and the safeguarding of human rights, the Foundation 
sought to pave the way for democracy on municipal and regional level through its 
programme of local government and traditional leadership, which will be examined in 
the following section.
5.10. Local Government and Traditional Leadership
In October 1994, the head of the civil service in the West German city of Siegen, Dr. O. 
-W. Rappold, travelled to Johannesburg and Durban to offer his expertise in the area of 
local administration. Rappold travelled on a KAF ticket and participated in seminars, 
acted as a political consultant and held talks with his South African hosts on West 
German experiences with local government. His work in South Africa reflects the 
Foundation’s aim to work towards the “democratisation of the lowest administrative 
levels in the light of German experiences.”986 In addition, the KAF in co-operation with 
the University of Pretoria, the HSRC and a number of NGOs launched a range of 
educational programmes for political decision-makers on local level including city 
councillors as well as members of the South African National Civic Organisation 
(SANCO). Once again, the KAF seized the opportunity to have South African 
participants benefit from West Germany’s values and visions and its tried-and-tested 
methods and models. The members of the management committees of the Local 
Government Negotiating Forum, who had to negotiate the reform of South Africa’s 
municipal administration, were invited to visit West Germany and in 1994 and 1995 and 
several experts in local administration participated in a seminar at the University of
986 Frank Spengler, KAF Annual Report 1994 -  Political Dialogue Republic of South Africa, op.cit., p.16.
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Marburg. The international symposiums on ‘Perspectives on Local Government 
Management and Development in Africa’ (in co-operation with the University Durban- 
Westville) as well as on ‘Key Issues for a New System of Local Government’ (in co­
operation with the School for Public Management and Administration at the University 
of Pretoria) were part of this framework of communal reform.987
Through the launch of another projected entitled ‘Rural communal 
administration’, the Foundation recognised the importance and unique societal role of 
tribal authorities. Particularly in rural areas, these traditional leaders were often the only 
representatives of the lowest administrative level of government. Although not 
democratically elected, they wielded significant political and cultural power and exerted 
strong influence on large parts of the rural population. KAF bureau chief Spengler 
realised the importance of the integration of traditional leaders for peace and stability 
particularly in rural communities. “You cannot just ignore traditional forms of 
governance. The idea of getting elected was simply unknown and unacceptable to these 
traditional leaders and tribal elders. This did not mean that traditional forms of local 
government were entirely undemocratic.”988 The Foundation rightly identified the issue 
of integrating traditional authorities into the newly emerging democratic structures as 
being a question of potentially “great political explosiveness” especially since it was 
intertwined with the problem of political rivalry between ANC and IFP. It enabled these 
“stakeholders...to make substantial inputs in the White and Green papers on local 
government.” 989 Its focus on the traditional elements of governance in rural areas 
highlighted the bridge-building and meditating role of the KAF. The Foundation helped 
to kick-start political dialogue between political competitors by providing fora like the 
workshop on ‘The Role of Traditional Leaders in Local Government’, which for the first 
time brought ANC and IFP opponents together for discussion. Later, the Chairman of 
the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA), Chief Patekile 
Holomisa said: “The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa expresses its 
gratitude to the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung for organising this seminar, particularly to
987 Frank Spengler, ‘Beeinflussung der Rahmenbedingungen in der Republik Siidafrika’, op.cit., p. 19.
988 Personal interview (phone) with Frank Spengler, 13 June 2005.
989 Mangosuthu Buthelezi, ’The role of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in the past ten years of South 
African democratic evolution’, op.cit.
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Mr. Frank Spengler, the Resident Representative of the Foundation, for his wisdom in 
highlighting the constitutional role of traditional leaders in local government.”990
In addition to its democracy promotion projects in the area of constitutionally 
enshrined federal structures, the KAF also contributed to the formation of South Africa's 
legal system and to the strengthening of the rule of law by aiding the creation of a South 
African constitutional court. Some South African legal experts have expressed their 
conviction that “the ready acceptance of the idea of a constitutional court can be directly 
ascribed to the German model, representing a new start, a break with the past.”991 In 
April 1994, the Foundation invited the German law professor and constitutional court 
judge Hans Klein to act as an adviser to his South African colleagues. In return, the 
country's newly appointed constitutional court judges were invited to Germany in 
November 1994 to exchange information with judges at the West German constitutional 
court in Karlsruhe. Klein published an article on the ‘Unconstitutional Nature of the 
Imperative Mandate’ in the KAF’ ‘Occasional Papers Series.’ Later, party officials of 
the Democratic Party (DP) introduced the same issue of a rotating parliamentary 
representation to the political debate on national and regional level.992 In co-operation 
with the University of Bloemfontein, the Foundation published a textbook on South 
Africa's new constitution, which was supposed to help making the constitutional 
document more easily accessible to the general public. Translations into several native 
South African languages were to enhance the public understanding of the new 
constitution as the founding document of a radically changed political system. The KAF 
tried to avoid adopting too narrow a focus on heavily theoretical debates, which had shut 
the door on the initiation of the necessary public discourse. Instead, it attempted to bring 
the constitution and its implications to the attention of a broader public. South African 
society needed to overcome decades of institutionalised racism and authoritarianism and 
its people had to realise that the new political era provided them with the advantages of 
a system based on the rule of law.
990 Frank Spengler, KAF Annual Report 1994 -  Political Dialogue Republic of South Africa, op.cit., p. 17.
991 Personal correspondence with Hugh Corder, 20 April 2006.
992 Ibid
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In sum, through their targeting of local government structures and its strategy of co­
opting traditional leaders into the new political system, KAF activities refute the realist 
notion of a ‘forgetfulness of power’. Instead, the Foundation tried to introduce South 
African decision-makers to forms of local government relied upon in the Federal 
Republic since the beginning of the Cold War era. Through support for institutions such 
as the Local Government Negotiating Forum, KAF strategists sought to attract South 
African politicians to their ideas, values and policies thus working towards the long­
term stabilisation of the emerging democratic system and the highest possible degree of 
of political and socio-economic compatibility between the two countries. Once again, 
soft power was used on transnational level to integrate political shareholders -  
traditional leaders being one example -  into the transition process and to make them 
susceptible to German proposals. In a further step, the Foundation sought to enhance the 
South African populace’s understanding of the benefits of private sector initiatives and 
the running of small businesses, which the following section will look at.
5.11. Economic Transformation and Entrepreneurial Initiative
Furthermore, the KAF offered its expertise in the process of economic transformation
and utilised its experience with the problem of an economic reintegration of the five 
new German Lander into the economic framework of the Federal Republic after the 
demise of the Communist system in East Germany. The White Paper on the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which was published in 
September 1994, provided the framework within which the Foundation could launch its 
democracy promotion activities.993 From 1989, the KAF’s ‘Programme for Economic- 
Political Dialogue’ consisted of economic symposiums in Johannesburg and the 
Zimbabwean capital Harare with representatives of all relevant political parties. KAF 
strategists highlighted West Germany's post-war economic success story, which was 
based on a capitalist private sector balanced and ‘tamed’ by strong regulatory 
mechanisms to reconcile competitive requirements and social needs. The concept of a 
market economy with a social conscience was meant to provide South Africa with a 
possible guiding light for the reshaping of its own economic future. In co-operation with
993 Ibid.
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the University of Stellenbosch, the KAF organised an international seminar on 
‘Democratisation in South Africa -  The Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes 
and the Role of the IMF.’ Prominent ANC leaders like Trevor Manuel, who was to 
become Minister of Finance in South Africa’s first democratic government, were invited 
to visit the German Bundesbank (Central Bank) in Frankfurt. Besides various 
publications the Foundation also organised short-term visits by German economic 
experts who provided their insight in talks and lectures to South African audiences 
covering issues such as the German model of a socially ‘tamed’ market economy or 
regional economic co-operation.
Apart from its democracy promotion activities in the area of economic 
transformation, constitution-building and local government, the KAF helped to stimulate 
socio-economic education on grassroots level through co-operation with the South 
African Get Ahead Foundation (GAF). The GAF was set-up as a community-based, 
non-for-profit organisation, which worked towards the strengthening of South Africa’s 
slowly emerging non-white middle-class through loan-based financial support for the 
establishment of small and medium-sized businesses within South Africa's informal 
sector. During the apartheid era, black entrepreneurs were "discriminated against in two 
regards.” 994 The white minority government in Pretoria curtailed entrepreneurial 
initiatives of its non-white citizens, and the black liberation movements despised private 
sector initiatives by fellow Africans as distracting from the political goal of freeing the 
oppressed masses. In order to promote black entrepreneurial activities, the GAF worked 
in close collaboration with traditional ‘saving clubs’ (Stokvels) that offered loans to 
their members provided the borrower first participated in a special training programme 
for managers, the ‘Specialised Training Programme’ (STP).995 Until 1995, GAF projects 
were subsidised by the KAF with DM 200,000 (approximately £ 70,000) annually.996 
Besides its Stokvel Programme, GAF had adopted a distinctly multifaceted approach 
towards community development, which included social programmes, financial services
994 Frank Spengler, KAF Annual Report 1994 -  Political Dialogue Republic of South Africa, op.cit., p. 17.
995 The (/Business Loan Programme’ offered loans from R5000 to R30,000 and the Micro Credit 
Programme provided loans of up to R5000, Amelie Maier-Oswald, Die Politik deutscher politischer 
Stiftungen in Siidafrika in den Jahren 1990 bis 1994, op.cit, p.70.
996 Ibid.
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i.e. business loan programmes and partnership lending schemes as well as non-financial 
services such as business skills training and marketing courses.997
The Rural Foundation (RF) was another KAF partner organisation operating in 
the area of rural and social development. The Foundation aimed at "mobilising self-help 
activities to generate higher incomes and to promote local government and institution- 
building" among the rural population by identifying small farmers and farm workers as 
potential recipients of political and development aid.998 The RF programme offered 
leadership training for "qualified personalities” and provided support for self-help 
groups in rural areas .999 The improvement of the socio-economic situation of South 
Africa's rural population through the promotion of its vocational qualifications was seen 
as a remedy to the pressing problem of economic and political transformation. It seemed 
imperative to eradicate the devastating effects triggered by the Group Areas Act with an 
unemployment rate of up to 70% in South Africa’s rural areas. The 1994 land reform 
legislation needs to be seen as a supplementary transitional measure to respond to this 
dangerous situation.1000 Notwithstanding the aforementioned democracy promotion 
campaigns launched by the KAF in co-operation with various partners, Buthelezi’s 
Inkatha remained an important recipient of political aid. The Zulu party’s activities in 
the area of poverty eradication were supported by the Foundation through the ‘Co­
operative Development Programme’ (CDP). Previously named the Inkatha Development 
Office (IDO), the project featured under the label of "The Promotion of Self-Help- 
Groups and Co-operatives throughout KwaZulu/Natal" from 1989. It focused 
particularly on the participation of women working in the informal sector, who were 
given an opportunity for further education.
997 See C.Churchill, ’Case Studies in Microfinance: South Africa -  Get Ahead Foundation (GAF)’, World 
Bank -  Sustainable Banking with the Poor, 1996, which also provides a critical analysis o f the 
involvement o f international donors in GAF programmes. Available from
www.microfinancegatewav.org/content/article/detail/2014?PHPSESSID=0560925f7a6. cited on 5 March
2006, p.2.
998 J.Stoll, ‘Die DemokratiefSrderung durch Projekte der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung e.V. in SUdafrika’, 
op.cit., p.8.
999 Frank Spengler, ‘Entwicklungspartnerschaft der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung mit der Republik Sudafrika’, 
op.cit., p.7.
1000 Amelie Maier-Oswald, Die Politik deutscher politischer Stiftungen in Siidafrika in den Jahren 1990 bis 
1994, op.cit., p.72
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5.12. Conclusions
The FRG pursued its foreign policy goals towards apartheid-ruled South Africa on an 
inter-governmental level within the EC’s multilateral framework as well as through the 
instrument of its Stiftungen on a transnational platform. This ‘tandem’ approach 
between Foundation(s) and government has been described as a form of 
“complementary division of labour”, in which the government “as being publicly more 
exposed to criticism maintains contacts with the governments of developing countries in 
order to pursue short-term state interests of a mostly economic nature.”1001 The political 
Foundation(s), however, “pursue long-term interests in the public realm protected by 
their anonymity but endowed with the political weight of a party in government”1002 
Therefore, the Stiftungen system of sub-state foreign policy actors not only in Africa 
anticipates a broad range of political scenarios in target countries as part of a “policy of 
re-insurance”, which has Stiftungen act on the realisation that “whatever political force 
occupies power positions in the host society at any given time, there is a high 
probability that one of the political Foundations commands sufficient influence to 
ensure Bonn’s continued presence.”1003 Although all four Foundations -  KAF, FEF, 
FNF and HSF1004 -  were involved in democracy promotion projects in South Africa 
from the beginning of the 1990s onwards, only the KAF operated from an official base 
in the target country with the permission of local authorities from as early as 1981. Its 
ideological proximity to the CDU as the majority party in the West German Government 
enabled it to mobilise political pressure in order to secure operational space to 
manoeuvre within South Africa’s authoritarian system. Although the KAF was not 
merely the extended arm of the conservative majority in government, it clearly 
promoted the values, visions and goals that featured on the CDU’s foreign policy 
agenda. At the same time, the Foundation’s operations in South Africa blended into the 
FRG’s overarching foreign policy parameters towards Southern Africa, which
1001 Rainer Tetzlaff, ‘Grundziige und Hintergriinde Bonner Afrika-Politik: Eine Einfuhrung’, in Helmut 
Bley, Rainer Tetzlaff (eds.), Afrika und Bonn, (Reinbek 1978), p.62.
1002 ib id :
1003 Ibid.
1004 For an overview of FEF activities in South Africa see for example Ernst Hillebrandt, Volker Vinnai, 
‘The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and German Policy on Africa -  Some remarks’, in Ulf Engel, Robert Kappel 
(eds.), Germany's Africa Policy Revisited - Interests, Images and Incrementalism' (Politics and Economics 
in Africa, Lit-Verlag, Hamburg, 2nd ed., 2006).
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irrespective of their shortcomings and deficits followed a set of nationally defined 
interests predetermined by Cold War dynamics. Through its long-standing co-operation 
with Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s Inkatha movement and its political support for the IFP, 
KAF strategists sought to parlay conservative influence on political actors in a future 
democracy, counterbalance the massive dominance of the ANC within the anti-apartheid 
movement and transfer as much free-market ideology into the democratisation process 
as possible. The stronger Inkatha became the more effective it could neutralise the 
revolutionary fervour and Socialist programme of ANC and PAC both of which were 
seen as potential threats to West Germany’s economic interests on Bonn’s government 
benches.
The FRG’s sub-state foreign policy in pursuit of the national interest required 
persuasion rather than coercion and depended largely on the attractiveness of the 
‘exported’ policy concepts. The KAF’s informal diplomacy and its democracy 
promotion activities were based on soft power and sought to influence structures and 
actors in emerging democracies thus working towards what Arnold Wolfers has called 
milieu goals. As elaborated upon in the first chapter, the ‘soft’ pursuit of these milieu 
goals encompasses multiple facets ranging from the promotion of co-operative bi- and 
multilateral relations to the safeguarding of socio-economic stability in developing 
countries. The KAF’s Inkatha I, II and III projects were an expression of such 
stabilising influence. Their focus on regional development, improvement of community 
management skills, enhancement of Inkatha’s research capacities and legal aid advice as 
well as information on employment issues came in reaction to the paucity in 
administrative competency, political management skills and the lack of experience in 
running local government bureaucracies. The ‘power of conceptual attraction’ was 
played out in the area of capacity building, in which serious deficits hampered Inkatha's 
ability to sell itself as the credible representation of South Africa’s black majority. After 
the legalisation of previously outlawed liberation movements, civic initiatives and union 
organisations by President de Klerk in 1990, the KAF launched its DDP project, which 
continued the capacity-building efforts of the liberalisation phase only that this time 
political assistance was offered to a multitude of individuals and actors with more than 
just the IFP as the programme’s only beneficiary. In trying to influence the
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transformation of political and economic structures and to steer the course of events 
towards a democratic society based on free market principles protected by the rule of 
law, the Foundation continued to safeguard German business interests, to secure 
minority rights for members of the white community and to cash in on its ‘reputational 
power’. In that sense, the DDP was only the continuation of the KAF’s soft power-based 
informal diplomacy of the 1980s, which promoted the values and priorities of German 
conservatism as well as state interests. The KAF’s transnationally operationalised 
democracy promotion contradicted the Machtvergessenheit narrative of realist critics 
while showing that contrary to constructivist belief in its civilian, tamed or 
behaviouralist middle power fabric, power politics in its ‘soft’ configuration did not 
require multilateral frameworks to be pursued. The programme’s emphasis on political 
education, its incorporation of foreign experts and its targeting of future elites was 
designed to ensure democratic stability through the integration of the broadest possible 
spectrum of political forces. The KAF’s focus on the promotion of a constitutionally 
integrated federalism needs to be seen as an example of the Stiftungen's soft power 
approach, which expected the recipients of political aid to determine their preferences 
under the influence of alluring German concepts and ideas.
Finally, the Foundation’s activities within the ambit of traditional leadership in 
South Africa were meant to re-visit the fundamentals of African societies, particularly in 
rural areas, and to help anchor the political structures of modernity in hierarchically 
composed communities, which after almost a century of oppression were given the 
freedom to manage their own affairs. Its decision to pick out as a central theme the 
integration of tribal elders, chiefs or sangomas i.e. traditional healers into a political 
system, which for the most part derived its legitimacy not from family or clan-based 
authority but from public acclamation through elections was intended to further stabilise 
the emerging democracy. In sum, the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation’s transnationally 
configured diplomatic’ activities of democracy promotion in South Africa from the 
beginning of the 1980s until the holding of democratic elections in 1994 appear to be a 
befitting operational approach to influence the structural transformation of a transitional 
country, based on Germany’s state interests and outside of multilateral fora. Such an 
approach, which certainly does not translate into the surreptitious workings of a “secret
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diplomacy”1005 as Rainer Tetzlaff has labelled the Stiftungen operations, contrasts with 
the widespread belief that West Germany’s relations with African states during the Cold 
War were merely the strategically incoherent product of ad lib diplomacy.
1005 Rainer Tetzlaff, ‘Grundziige und Hintergninde Bonner Afrika-Politik’, op.cit., p.64.
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Conclusions
This thesis has provided supportive evidence that the realist depiction of post-war 
Germany as being ‘forgetful’ of its power cannot be sustained. On the contrary, 
empirical research strongly suggests that the counter-claim the FRG had pursued power 
politics driven by state interests cannot be dismissed as mere escapism but provides a 
convincing description of a multilayered foreign policy system, which was based as 
much on self-interest and power as the diplomacy of other states only that German 
power in the post-war world was ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’. The latter assumption 
constituted the vantage point for this study and subsequent efforts were made to come to 
terms with the ramifications this noncoercive dimension of power holds for attempts to 
explain some of the main features of the FRG’s international relations. The argument as 
presented in the light of the relevant literature on West Germany’s foreign policy was 
that the main narratives dominating the discourse over autonomy, self-interest, power 
and sovereignty in Germany’s external relations during the Cold War did not adequately 
reflect the configuration and complexity of their subject.
On the one hand, the Machtvergessenheit label with which predominantly realist 
scholars and public commentators dismissed the FRG’s strong multilateral integration 
after the war in partly sneering manner and partly in high dudgeon reduced Bonn’s 
external relations management to an interest-free ideational foreign policy. The fact that 
the country did not possess nuclear weapons, had developed a deeply rooted aversion 
against the use of military force and refrained from acting unilaterally in international 
crisis scenarios led scholars such as Hans-Peter Schwarz to argue that the FRG’s state 
and society had banished the very notion of power from its political vocabulary. 
Although the ‘forgetting power’ narrative gained a remarkable level of acclaim in 
academic circles and in the public debate, it obviously focused too narrowly on military 
capabilities and a state’s preparedness to mobilise the coercive potential of its economy 
by unilateral means at the expense of softer forms of power. On the other hand, the 
constructivist approaches and here most notably the ‘civilian power’ paradigm 
acknowledged the continuing relevance of power and state interests in the pursuit of the 
FRG’s foreign policy because they focus on alternative dimensions of power different
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from military capabilities and coercively used economic strength. Unlike realists, 
constructivists did not perceive of West Germany’s diplomacy as being flaccid and 
driven by altruism and deliberate self-neglect. However, civilian, tamed and middle 
power narratives conceived of the exercise of power in the international realm only as a 
multilateral endeavour without leaving sufficient room for more autonomous forms of 
diplomatic action pursued on a sub-state level.
The argument developed in the first chapter recognises that constructivist 
authors have included those forms of power into their analysis that seek to influence 
other actor’s behaviour through co-option and attraction rather than coercion and 
threats. It nevertheless maintains that constructivism’s almost exclusive focus on 
multilateral frameworks obstructs the necessary view on the transnational and 
nongovernmental dimension of West Germany’s post-war diplomacy. Therefore, the 
hypothesis introduced at the outset of the study sought to do justice to both the 
multilateral as well as transnational components of the FRG’s foreign policy system by 
putting forward the argument that a) West Germany was anything but forgetful of its 
power, b) that Bonn pursued its power politics predominantly ‘softly’ i.e. by non­
coercive means and that c) this soft power-based foreign policy was exercised not only 
multilaterally. Such a hypothesis acknowledges West Germany’s exceptionally strong 
multilateral predisposition while at the same time freeing up new areas of inquiry into 
non-collective forms of external action. I have argued that without paying due attention 
to the conflation of the government’s public diplomacy with its often multilateral 
operational mode and the party foundation^ ‘private’ diplomacy, which was played out /
parallel to the frameworks of action provided by NATO and EC and unfolded on a sub­
state level where it pursued state and party interests through transnational channels, any 
analysis of West Germany’s foreign policy needed to remain one-dimensional and 
incomplete. Throughout the era of bipolar confrontation, West Germany’s political 
foundations with their democracy promotion campaigns have made their contribution to 
the establishment of “democratic hegemony” in various parts of the world and the power 
of attraction which was generated by the FRG’s post-war political pluralism, the success 
story of its economic prosperity and its model of a socially ‘tamed’ yet capitalist-driven 
private sector became one of the metronomes that would prevent democratic novices in
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transitional countries from losing the beat during the process of political change.1006 The 
Stiftungen played this role of transitional metronome being in a unique position within 
the institutional structures of the West German foreign policy system. They are 
politically connected with either government or opposition thus partly integrated into 
state and governmental structures. Through their de-facto embeddeddness in the 
network of public institutions they frequently serve as vehicles for the promotion of 
state interests.
At the same time, their role and agenda extend beyond the mere representation 
of state interests and their largely autonomous way of conceptualising and implementing 
their international democracy promotion programmes shows that they are not as ductile 
a foreign policy instrument as some critics have alleged. This study has focused on KAF 
and FEF activities because these foundations commanded the greatest financial 
resources, were affiliated with the respective majority parties in government and are 
widely seen as the most active and influential foundations in all three transition 
processes. Both of the foundations were ‘in government’ as it were since their respective 
mother parties led the government coalitions with the much smaller Free Democratic 
Party (FDP) during the 1970s and 1980s. It was the thesis’s ambition to sketch out the 
operational requirements, situational specifications and political modes of action, which 
underpinned West Germany’s foreign policy and its pursuit of soft power politics. The 
challenge as set out in the introduction has been to find a way to exhibit how Bonn’s soft 
power politics has been exercised to enable the West German Government, its majority 
parties SPD and CDU and their political foundations FEF and KAF as transnational 
foreign affairs actors to work towards shaping the political attitudes of foreign partners. 
The case studies aimed at showing in what ways the Stiftungen got themselves involved 
in agenda-setting, assisted foreign political elites in their choice of policies and helped 
facilitate the transformation of political infrastructure through the provision of material 
and non-material support, knowledge, expertise and information. It has been noted 
earlier that the analytical role of empiricism in the research on political foundations 
remains rather limited as far as establishing a causal nexus between Stiftungen 
democracy promotion input and transition outcome is concerned. Since soft power’s
1006 Adrian Karatnycky, ‘The Democratic Imperative’, The National Interest, Summer 2004, no.76, p.107.
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working and effectiveness are difficult to circumstantiate, the thesis has eschewed from 
trying to prove causal linkages and has sought instead to identify and highlight the 
channels and operational modalities of West Germany’s informal diplomacy. The thesis 
intended to unravel the complexities of some of the foreign influences accompanying 
regime change in the Iberian Peninsula and South Africa. The FEF’s top international 
relations expert Dieter Optenhogel explains:
Concerning the measurability of success one needs to say that we influence only a 
fraction of socio-political variables and that societal processes bring constant change. 
Probably the most appropriate way to make statements about the impact which political 
Foundations have on the course and the outcome of democratic transitions seems to 
have a look at the legislation that was passed by national parliaments after it had been 
supported by the Stiftungen. Countries that could be mentioned in this context would be 
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Chile, Brazil, South Korea, South Africa, Namibia and Serbia. 
The political Foundations also work towards a change in the working relationship 
between capital and labour. At the same time, they help union organisations to transform 
from being para-governmental foot soldiers to service institutions.1007
A revealing picture of the role of West Germany’s employment of soft power in the area 
of democracy promotion has emerged through charting the historical events in Lisbon, 
Madrid and Cape Town from 1974 onwards. In contributing to the necessary 
transformation of political infrastructure in the two South European countries and in the 
apartheid state, German soft power diplomacy had to adjust to different political, social 
and cultural circumstances. As previously mentioned, the political foundations adapted 
their strategies, approaches and methods to the specific dynamics of different transition 
situations ranging from the post-revolutionary phase in Portugal and the gradual 
democratic opening of Francoism during the liberalisation phase in Spain to the outright 
authoritarian structures of apartheid South Africa. However, a core set of political issue 
areas and a basic arsenal of operational approaches and instruments can be made out 
largely irrespective of political affiliation.
Main Findings
The FEF concentrated its soft power resources on five major areas of political support 
for Iberian Socialists. It is through an identification and exploration of these that the
1007 Personal interview with Uwe OptenhOgel, Berlin, 7 March 2002 (translation by author).
case studies on regime change in Spain and Portugal have been drawn together. Firstly, 
the governmental-transnational support axis of Federal Chancellery and FEF in close co­
operation with the DGB brought its concentrated expertise in the area of labour 
representations to bear and made a major contribution to the build-up of democratically 
elected union organisations in Portugal and Spain. In Portugal, workers were left with 
only one choice when it came to the question of which organisation was supposed to 
represent them at the negotiation table. Being forced to either support the heavily 
Communist-infiltrated Intersindical as the powerful umbrella body for approximately 
480 equally Communist-dominated member organisations or to remain politically 
passive, the call for the establishment of a second union organisation was simply a 
matter of time. From a West German perspective, the growing influence which PCP 
cadres exerted not only on the ideological course and leadership composition of 
Portugal’s single union association but also on the future constitutional set-up of the 
country’s private sector posed an almost uncontrollable risk to the SPD-led government 
in Bonn. Given the SPD’s commitment to the economic prerogatives of a capitalist 
market economy and considering the ongoing process of further economic integration of 
the European Common Market, it did not come as a surprise that the Federal Republic’s 
political leadership actively tried to prevent the Portuguese economic system to slide 
into the authoritarian grip of Stalinist forces after having actively supported the 
transition from fascist rule only a few months before.
One of the biggest challenges for the FEF was the lack of training and political 
experience on the part of Socialist activists. This was a great cause of concern and the 
establishment of the Fundagao Jose Fontana in 1977 as a training ground for future 
trade union functionaries had to be seen in the light of these deficiencies. The West 
German soft power actor also pursued the realisation of milieu goals by organising 
bilateral contacts between DGB experts and members of the PS planning committees 
who were involved in the set-up of the new union organisation UGT. The Foundation 
took over limited responsibility for the financial consolidation of the UGT project and 
drafted a preliminary budget for the new organisation. Based on these measures, an 
urgently needed transfer of organisational and political know-how i.e. international 
public goods was initiated and the Portuguese ‘patient’ received a bitterly needed
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injection deemed suitable to cure her with a cocktail made of experience in political 
management, administrative skills for the successful operation of union organisations 
and an understanding of the game of power politics within the labour movement
In Spain, the situation appeared to be fundamentally different. The gulf between 
the ideological agenda of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and the political 
programme of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) was nowhere as 
irreconcilably and unbridgeable wide as it was in the case of PS and PCP in Portugal. 
The undogmatic and politically open-minded Euro Communism of party leader Santiago 
Carillo caused alarm only on the reactionary benches of Spain’s fascist falange 
movement, with right-wing nostalgics in the politically geriatric Cortes and within 
certain circles of the officer corps, but certainly not in European capitals. Soft power 
was used to strengthen the Socialist labour union organisation UGT bringing it into a 
favourable position vis-a-vis the Communist-dominated Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.) 
To this end, the FEF played out its experience of many years of electoral campaigning 
for parties and trade unions on national as well as international level and it supported 
political cadres of UGT (and PSOE) on various campaign trails in the run-up to a 
multitude of elections to worker advisory committees on company level. During the 
1982 elections in Spain, the FEF’s political aid programme was set up with public funds 
promoting the establishment and training of political ‘flying squads’, providing printed 
election manuals and guides for the workforce, creating and distributing political posters 
and organising training seminars on local and regional level. Again, the knowledge 
transfer intended to fill large gaps in the areas of political expertise and democratic 
experience, which came as the result of more than thirty years of dictatorial rule. By 
enabling the Socialist union movement in Spain to stand on its own feet and to become a 
strong, well-organised, effective and widely respected political player in the new 
democratic order, West German soft power positively shaped the Federal Republic’s 
operational environment in Southern Europe. Political pluralism and a well-grounded 
sector of civil society organisations actively participating in public policy decision­
making would structurally and institutionally arm Spain’s democracy against its future 
enemies from within the ranks of the military, the falange or any other institution of the 
old authoritarian order.
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FEF support was used to enable Spanish labour activists to effectively compete 
with the CC.OO. The two major tasks were to convince the majority of the workforce 
that a vote for the UGT would not mean a vote for future government-controlled unions 
and, secondly to “decode Communist propaganda” which, expressed in a less polemic 
way, meant to engage in a head-on debate about the pros and cons of political concepts 
and ideas. With his experience as a political manager, FEF resident representative in 
Madrid Dieter Koniecki often acted as an early warning system to SPD and West 
German Government when it came to political counter-manoeuvres by the Communist 
workers commissions such as the attempt to silently infiltrate the ranks of UGT activists 
on provincial level. The decision to invest heavily in the organisational infrastructure of 
the Socialist union organisation and to provide the UGT with an electoral platform to 
provide workers with political messages paid off and helped to secure a dominant 
position for the UGT in the labour movement for years to come.
Another crucial aspect of FEF soft power support for the UGT in Spain was 
clearly the formation and strengthening of what came to be known as social partnership, 
a model for the consensual resolution of conflicting interests on the labour market 
between employer associations and worker representations. A dense network of union 
organisations could only positively contribute to a fairly balanced situation at the 
negotiation table and would thereby minimise strike action and unwarranted disruptions 
of industrial production with damaging effects on the economy. Also, the existence of 
two left-of-centre union organisations would ensure the utmost degree of democratic 
pluralism and would provide workers with a real option of choice between two political 
programmes. Since 1976, the FEF resident representative in Madrid made the 
replacement of syndicalist structures in the area of labour representation a top priority 
on his transitional agenda. The West German model of economic conflict resolution 
which was promoted by the FEF in its co-operation with UGT and PSOE was later 
incorporated in the acuerdo marco confederal of 1978 and provided Spain’s economic 
system with an urgently needed conciliatory framework to reconcile corporate interests 
and the professional grievances of the working class. The idea of a social partnership in 
the realm of labour relations and its calming effect on disputes related to wages, 
working conditions and entrepreneurial commitment to social security benefits would
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also send a signal to Spanish society as a whole that the end of Franco’s rule and the 
democratisation of the political system did not equal the take-over of power positions by 
Communist forces who would irresponsibly drive the country straight into the arms of 
the Soviet Union. The way the transition unfolded and the political sensitivity with 
which PSOE and FEF approached the transformation process clearly demonstrated to 
the more sceptical segments of the Spanish public that the legalisation of left-of-centre 
political parties and civil society organisations did not lead to economic chaos and 
disorderly political management but helped to stabilise the fragile young democracy.
Secondly, the FEF quickly realised that a political party, which had spent many 
decades in exile bore more resemblance with an organisational paper tiger than with a 
battle-hardened campaign weapon. Therefore, PSOE in Spain and PS in Portugal could 
not be expected to effectively and successfully compete for political power against their 
well organised and solidly trained competitors on the far left without foreign support. 
With a view on the then embryonic organisational structures of Spain’s Socialists and 
their lack of political experience, constitutional expert Antonio Bar Cendon says that 
“consolidating and educating PSOE, modernising its discourse -  then anchored in the 
thirties -  and adapting it to West European -  German -  standards was crucial for the 
success of the Spanish transition.”1008 Similarly in Portugal where an evaluation team of 
experts from FEF and the Ministry for Economic Co-operation was sent to the country 
in order to provide Social Democrats in Bonn with a clearer understanding of the 
immediate post-coup challenges. Supplemented by a number of official visits by key 
foreign policy makers such as Brandt, Friedrich and Wischnewski, the FEF campaign 
targeted the obvious institutional and organisational deficits of the PS such as the lack of 
trained party activists and political cadres, the absence of printing devices, office 
equipment and training facilities as well as the rather embryonic shape of the party’s 
public relations department. The Foundation focused on the rapid improvement of 
campaigning skills and worked towards the development of party structures on 
provincial, municipal and regional level in order to quickly get the PS’s political 
message across to the Portuguese electorate. Every trained PS activist would serve as an 
ideological catalyst, a multiplying factor to spread the message of the party’s manifesto
1008 Personal correspondence with Antonio Bar Cendon, 19 June 2006.
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across the country. Especially the generation of young voters between the ages of 18-24 
who were initially neglected by the PS campaign was targeted after FEF suggestions.
The Foundation also convinced the Socialist leadership that a successful election 
campaign had to be construed around the charismatic personality of party Chairman 
Mario Soares. Between May 1974 and December 1975, approximately DM 1.7 million 
(ca. £500.000) in political aid were provided by SPD and FEF, a financial commitment 
without which the Socialist cause in transitional Portugal would have been in peril of 
becoming marginalised and politically sidelined. The secondment of the FEF party 
manager Gunther Wehrmeyer in July 1974 and the support mission of FEF analyst 
Klaus Wettig and his colleagues as campaign advisers in the run-up to the elections to a 
constituent assembly in April 1975 were concrete and crucial steps towards the goal of 
turning the PS into a serious political contender for political power. Without any 
practical experience of political activism other than its conspiratorial activities in West 
European countries during the many years of exile, Mario Soares and his Socialist 
faithful were heavily dependent on the form of political ‘nursing’ which the West 
German government in co-operation with the FEF provided. In addition, Soares’s 
contacts to SPD elder statesman Willy Brandt played an immensily important role 
during the transition’s ‘hot phase’ opening channels of political communication and 
providing access to the highest echelons of West German and European politics. Soft 
power enabled the FEF to lead the process of organising political party management for 
the PS in Portugal by example drawing from many years of campaign experience in 
West Germany. Concepts, ideas and approaches of political advertisement, public 
relations in election times and office as well as campaign management on national, 
regional and provincial level which had successfully stood the test of time in the Federal 
Republic naturally appealed to Portugal’s Socialists as they had proven to be both 
effective and ideologically compatible. The power of attraction therefore helped to 
motivate the influencee to adopt certain political models, behavioural patterns and 
organisational tactics, which promised long-term returns for the power exerciser.
In Spain, the situation appeared to be of similar bleakness. The 1976 transitional 
action plan which was set up by FEF resident representative Koniecki after the opening 
of a Foundation office in Madrid came in response to the conspicuous structural deficits
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of a Socialist party that continued to suffer from a severe political and organisational 
trauma caused by its years in exile. The FEF enabled the largely defunct partner 
organisation to rest its various election campaigns on a properly laid out country-wide 
organisational party structure with 46 PSOE offices (‘identification centres’) which 
were headed by newly appointed organisational administrators. The FEF also 
strengthened the organisational capacities of the PSOE headquarters and supervised and 
monitored the training of political cadres for the party’s provincial committees. The 
creation of a media and campaign office was one such FEF brainchild, which enabled 
PSOE to launch its political public relations operations from a central unit. The 
presumed banalities of daily political life such as public relations material, printing 
presses and office equipment turned out to be of vital importance for an effective and 
smooth functioning of the Socialist electoral campaign. The creation of cover 
organisations run by the FEF in co-operation with PSOE (and UGT) helped to set up a 
program of training courses and seminars which covered a broad range of political 
topics while allowing the FEF to keep a distinctly low profile and to prevent itself from 
becoming a magnet of public attention and political criticism.
The improvement of PSOE’s organisational structures and the enhancement of 
its capacities to succinctly formulate political manifestos and to provide analyses were 
supplemented by the creation of a Madrid-based think tank Consulta. Further 
transitional ‘investments’ were the organisation of a Socialist summer school in 
September 1976 and the creation of a scholarship programme, which would finance the 
studies of a selected group of Spanish students at West German universities and would 
enable its participants to learn the language, to follow their academic interests and to 
participate in political training seminars. The PSOE-FEF Summer School on the other 
hand helped political activists and union cadres to familiarise themselves with key issue 
areas for future political campaigns. In all of the aforementioned cases, the aim was to 
significantly solidify the electoral position of PSOE and UGT, and to organisationally 
help these organisations to stand on their own feet.
Thirdly, the FEF organised a range of legal seminars in Spain, which served as 
communication platforms on which the Socialist intelligentsia in close co-operation with 
legal practitioners and academic constitutional experts were able to debate the future
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constitutional outlook of the post-Franco polity. FEF resident representative Koniecki 
quickly realised that his political partner organisation had to be able to competently 
shape the new constitution with its own legal handwriting. Being able to draw from his 
previous experience with the Ibero-American Institute for Constitutional Law (IAICL) 
in Mexico, he promoted the creation of a Spanish office of the IAICL. The prioritisation 
of constitutional issues by the FEF even led the Foundation’s Madrid office to facilitate 
contacts between Spanish constitutional experts and Portuguese jurists via the Spanish 
branch of the IAICL. The Foundation realised that in order to ensure the constitutional 
implementation of key issues such as the decentralisation of political power, Socialist 
forces had to be provided with a platform for the exchange of political and scholarly 
concepts. The series of constitutional conferences organised and funded by the FEF 
brought together a formidable ensemble of leading constitutional lawyers and political 
scientists who would pass the clear message to the general public that the democratic 
transition was not only undoubtedly a defining historical opportunity to reclaim ‘law’s 
empire’ but also an obligation to guarantee the constitutional role of political parties in a 
country that had not seen any ideological pluralism for several decades. One of the 
participants of the constitutional seminar series and frequent collaborators was Gregorio 
Peces-Barba who was to become PSOE representative on the constitutional committee 
of the Cortes from 1977 onwards.
Like Eduardo Foncillas in the realm of diplomacy, Peces-Barba acted as a 
political ‘transmission belt’ translating the findings of FEF-sponsored transitional 
brainstorming sessions into concrete steps towards the development of sustainable 
democratic structures. His case exemplifies that the merit of FEF involvement in the 
pre-drafting period of the post-Franco constitution did not derive from any patriarchal 
attempt to provide the politically ‘guiding light’ for the Spanish partner organisation and 
to impose its will on Spain’s centre-left democrats. Instead, the FEF provided the PSOE 
leadership as well as Socialist intellectuals with the indispensable logistical and 
financial framework for an undisturbed analytical comprehension of the transitional 
phase and offered political advice only when it was explicitly sought. Although it goes 
without saying that constitutional experts from West Germany such as the law professor 
Hans-Peter Schneider of the University of Hanover would try to make the Federal
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Republic’s Basic Law and its core principles palatable to the most influential members 
of PSOE, the FEF’ subtle approach would never anticipate the results of political 
discussions and would always leave sufficient space for finding a genuinely Spanish 
solution for Spanish problems by Spanish actors. West German soft power in the area of 
constitution building can therefore be seen as being based on “diffuse reciprocity” 
which according to Nye is “less tangible than an immediate exchange.”1009
Fourthly, in order to strengthen the standing of its transitional partner 
organisations in Portugal’s mass media sector and to undermine the monopoly of 
Communist forces in newspapers, radio and national television, the FEF invited a 
number of Portuguese journalists as participants to a range of media seminars to West 
Germany. It also provided PS media experts with politically ‘neutral’ broadcast material 
to be incorporated into news and current affairs programmes of public broadcasters. It 
even positioned three German news experts among the ranks of the Portuguese state- 
broadcasting corporation to ‘supervise’ and monitor the political tendencies of public 
programmes. Furthermore, during the ‘hot phase’ of the Portuguese transition between 
April 1974 and November 1975 the FEF stepped up its support for Socialist flagship 
media institutions such as the prestigious newspaper Republica, which it provided with 
printing devices and paper. The FEF invited foreign journalists in order to let them 
develop familiarity with specifically German solutions for social or economic problems, 
which arise during phases of the transformation of political infrastructure. Participants 
in these seminars learned about the often-striking similarities between the transitional 
challenges, which West Germany had to face during the first twenty years of its post- 
World War II history and those of post-Salazar Portugal. By and large, this was a 
promising way of inter-societal knowledge transfer in the context of the supply of 
international public goods, which, in the hands of political journalists would ensure the 
utmost degree of publicity and a widespread effect on the Portuguese public.
The supply of economic expertise for its Socialist sister party in transitional 
Portugal began to feature prominently on the FEF agenda as soon as the imminent threat 
of a Communist onslaught had disappeared. Having detected alarming deficits in the 
area of applied economics, the West German soft power connection proved to be crucial
1009 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, op.cit., p.16.
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for enabling Portuguese decision-makers to forcefully contribute to the debate on the 
country’s future accession to the European Communities. It also helped the new 
democratic elite to develop analytical capacities in order to adequately tackle a broad 
range of socio-political questions with an economic relevance such as the reintegration 
of Portuguese immigrant workers and overseas returnees from the country’s former 
colonial territories in Africa into Portuguese society and its labour market. Therefore, 
the Foundation in co-operation with the Portuguese Socialist Party set up the Institute de 
Estudos para o Desenvolvimento (IED) as the party’s major think tank on socio­
economic issues. Again, soft power actor FEF adopted a low-profile approach leaving 
the day-to-day running of the IED largely in the hands of its Portuguese staff. Of course, 
a radical departure from political common ground between PS and FEF would have had 
an impact on future inter-institutional co-operation with possibly negative consequences 
for further allocations of financial aid. But within the established confines of Socialist 
and social democratic economic and social politics -  private property rights, market 
economy etc. -  the Portuguese IED team was not subjugated to any foreign pressure. 
Whenever the greater political experience of the FEF could add more weight to a 
particular research project’s policy recommendations, the West German Foundation 
would willingly provide its expertise.
The IED was established as a well-resourced training ground for Portuguese 
economists and fitted well into the overall soft power-based support strategy of the FEF, 
which promoted the transfer of democratic know-how into an institutional framework in 
order to develop in-depth expertise on political issues. Yet again, the aim was to 
favourably shape Bonn’s operational environment in Southern Europe, to lay the 
foundation stone for future bilateral relations and to pave the way for productive 
political co-operation with Portugal’s new democratic and preferably social democratic 
government. Providing economic expertise and enabling the influencee to use such 
expertise to develop its own capacities meant to realise milieu goals through 
noncoercive forms of influence. The institute’s very existence also highlighted the 
particular way in which the FEF tried to shape the future direction of political 
developments in a transitional setting through the employment of soft power. Towards 
the end of the 1970s, the IED provided a political hideout for PS politician Selgado
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Zenha who as Mario Soares’ greatest rival was able to prepare his future leadership bid 
and his role in Socialist politics. The institute produced a variety of analysis papers, 
medium and long-term studies and background briefs on a thematically broad range of 
socio-economic issues. The finding of the IED often enabled Socialist MPs to contribute 
to the parliamentary debate in an informed and adequately prepared manner and helped 
to stimulate and strengthen not only portfolio-related competency but also the 
democratic process in general.
A second pillar of the FEF’ foreign aid programme to facilitate the 
transformation of private sector structures and to provide social democratic solutions for 
the economic challenges lying ahead through soft power was the Foundation’s political 
assistance for the set-up of producer co-operatives in the agricultural sector. Targeting 
the country’s hopelessly anachronistic quasi-feudal structures and the problem of 
economic survival arising from the great discrepancies between landowners, small­
holding peasants, landless peasantry and day-labourers, the FEF supported the 
establishment of a number of Foundations, agencies and companies which would 
provide management consulting services and which would form the link between the 
farming sector and consumer cooperatives. The example of the instigation of co­
operative forms of production, marketing and consumption in transitional Portugal also 
illustrates two important aspects of the FEF’ political aid programme. Firstly, according 
to West German observers it was the PS as the recipient of political aid, which insisted 
on keeping a distinct focus on collective modes of economic action although the concept 
was widely believed to be outdated and irrelevant as a solution for the problems in the 
agricultural sector. This might refute those critics who would persistently stress the 
overwhelming hegemonic influence that soft power actors like the FEF would exercise 
over their junior partners. Secondly, the disagreement between certain members of the 
FEF department of international affairs over the usefulness of co-operative models does 
highlight the fact, that often the ultimate course and direction of the Foundation’s 
programmes of democracy promotion was less the result of a carefully orchestrated and 
unanimous institutional strategy but the outcome of a bureaucratic process in which 
individual responsibilities, personal political convictions and the freedom of operational 
manoeuvrability for FEF personnel in host countries played an important role.
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On a governmental level, close bilateral relations between the two South 
European countries and West Germany backed up the Iberian activities of the FEF as 
did inter-party co-operation between SPD, PSOE and PS characterised by a busy 
exchange of political activists and functionaries. Felipe Gonzalez’ connection with West 
German Social Democrats turned out to be more of a liability during the second half of 
the transition process because of the often polemic and politically overcharged 
hostilities on the part of mostly Communist forces which the public was only too eager 
to absorb. However, party and union leaders in Spain and Portugal were able to reap 
tangible benefits from the spotlight on the international stage which their West German 
mentors would bestow upon them. Particularly in Portugal, the advocacy of SPD 
Chairman Willy Brandt for his Socialist protege Soares as well as Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt’s frequent intervention on behalf of non-Communist democrats within the 
European multilateral framework turned out to be a great advantage for the PS leader in 
several ways. On the one hand, it was clearly a demonstration to the Portuguese public 
that foreign governments and international policy makers would wholeheartedly 
embrace and trust a PS-led government in Lisbon and that Mario Soares was seen as a 
credible democratic figure with an international stature. At the same time, the European 
embeddedness and international connectedness of Mario Soares and his PS left the 
ruling MFA junta in no doubts that to tolerate or even to encourage a Communist take­
over of power would certainly cause Portugal’s total economic and political isolation in 
Europe. The political aid connection between PS, FEF and SPD worked both as a 
reassurance towards the general public at home as well as a deterrent towards the ruling 
clique of left-wing officers in the MFA.
In South Africa, the KAF supported West Germany’s official foreign policy line 
towards the apartheid regime, which rejected economic sanctions, favoured gradual 
change through regime liberalisation and sought to contain anti-Western activities by 
exiled liberation movements. The Foundation’s strategic calculation maintained that 
West Germany was dependent on the supply with South Africa’s raw materials, that 
German companies held massive investments in the apartheid economy and that Bonn 
needed to honour its cultural affinity towards South Africa’s white community many of 
whom were of German descent. Therefore, both Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s CDU being
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the majority party in government as well as its political Foundation were anything but 
interested in abrupt and radical change in Pretoria accompanied by permanent 
diplomatic fracas. Instead, they sought to identify a politically compatible South African 
partner organisation with the potential to take on leadership tasks and governmental 
responsibility after the demise of apartheid. Therefore, West Germany’s soft power- 
based diplomacy aimed at changing the political structures of racial segregation while 
maintaining social peace and preserving the economic framework of South Africa’s 
capitalist business sector. It promoted the FRG’s own political ideals and values thereby 
trying to shape the preferences of its foreign partners and recipients of political aid. The 
political force deemed capable to play the role of constructive opposition and to 
safeguard German interests during a possible transition was the Zulu movement Inkatha 
of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, with which CDU and KAF shared not only the 
emphasis on a business-friendly environment but also the conviction that change in 
South Africa needed to be brought about by negotiated settlement rather than armed 
struggle.
At the beginning of the 1980s, Inkatha was first and foremost a cultural 
representation of the Zulu nation resting on ethnic appeal rather than political 
credibility. KAF strategists therefore began to involve the Foundation’s Durban-based 
office in programmes of capacity building. During the first phase of democracy 
promotion in South Africa from 1982 to 1990, the Christian Democratic Foundation 
supported the Buthelezi movement in its efforts to become a central actor in the area of 
community management and local government. If Inkatha was to consolidate its 
existing support base in KwaZulu as well as to attract new political faithful to its cause, 
and if in the medium-term it wanted to gain influence among South Africa’s 
downtrodden population that went beyond the borders of its provincial stronghold, the 
organisation was to be bound to enhance both its accessibility and its resource base. 
KAF officials realised that its partner organisation needed to provide more services 
directly to South Africa’s black majority and its democracy promotion projects Inkatha 
I, II and III were designed to achieve exactly that. While Inkatha I’s local government 
project soon continued under the auspices of another NGO, Inkatha II with its 
Community Service Programme (CSTP) and Inkatha III with the Inkatha Institute at its
318
centre were clearly intended to provide the Zulu movement and with it the ‘homeland’ 
government of Inkatha leader Buthelezi with additional resources for management, 
communication and research.
In particular, the Inkatha Institute focused on those issue areas that previously 
lied fallow such as urbanisation, rural development and housing. The think tank 
provided Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government with an urgently needed research base 
for their policies, speeches and publications. Supporting the Institute, the German 
Foundation’s soft power-based diplomacy sought to improve Inkatha's standing in the 
public domain by enhancing its operational capabilities. The Institute’s Violence Study 
Unit need to be seen in the context of the IFP’s political rivalry with the ANC and was 
intended to boost the party’s public relations capabilities in its daily ‘media war’. As 
both sides resorted to violence towards the end of the 1980s, the conflict was certainly 
fuelled by Inkatha’s relative organisational weakness and it seems plausible to assume 
as former IFP researcher Errol Goetsch has, that “by giving the IFP a stronger head, the 
Foundation probably reduced the need for tactical violence.” 1010 At the time, KAF 
democracy promotion was therefore less concerned with the direct transfer of concepts 
tried and tested in a German setting than with enabling the Foundation’s partner 
organisation to become a credible political force that was both attractive and competent 
in the eyes of the South African public.
In the early 1990s, the KAF’s exclusive focus on the Zulu movement turned 
party (it had by then renamed itself Inkatha Freedom Party) was gradually relaxed with 
the Foundation opening its democracy promotion projects to a broader political gamut. 
With its Democracy Development Programme (DDP), KAF stayed abreast of changes in 
the political landscape after de Klerk’s groundbreaking speech in February 1990. 
Although initially, the DDP continued the KAF-IFP co-operation, it soon invited other 
political actors to join its programme of political education and training in order to 
“integrate all political forces.”1011 The DDP’s less ideological nature was obviously due 
to the fact that the once outlawed ANC had re-entered the domestic political arena and 
had to be seen as the strongest aspirant for the country’s future leadership in any
10,0 Personal correspondence with Errol Goetsch, 20 March 2006.
1011 Personal interview (phone) with Frank Spengler, 13 June 2005.
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electoral contest. Therefore, Germany’s CDU-led government as well as KAF project 
planners realised that they needed to intensify ties with the former liberation movement 
if Bonn’s foreign relations with a democratic South Africa were to remain as politically 
fertile as the previous KAF-Inkatha connection. In addition, the FRG’s foreign policy 
could also fall back on the traditionally close relations between the KAF’s Social 
Democratic counterpart FEF and the ANC reminding one of Rainer Tetzlaff s remarks 
that “whatever political force occupies power positions in the host society at any given 
time, there is a high probability that one of the political foundations commands 
sufficient influence to ensure Bonn’s continued presence.”1012 DDP projects provided a 
whole package of seminars, workshops and study trips to deepen the knowledge of 
South Africa’s emerging democratic parties on questions of parliamentary procedures, 
party management and local government. As in the transition cases in Spain and 
Portugal, none of the actors that had newly arrived on South Africa’s political scene had 
the experience and skills necessary to run a modem party organisation, to effectively 
manage an election campaign, to develop concepts of political communication or to 
competently run a town hall. The DDP programme included more than 300 events and 
activities and was aimed at enabling all those political forces that had been silenced for 
decades to articulate their vision of a new South Africa.
Another pillar of KAF involvement during the first half of the 1990 was the 
round-table project Political Dialogue South Africa (PDSA), which sought to promote 
cross-party consensus on economic and constitutional issues. The strategic calculation 
was that the better the new democracy’s political players were trained and endowed with 
the necessary resources the higher the level of societal acceptance of democratic values 
and principles. From a German point of view, these values and principles should be 
preferably compatible with the Federal Republic’s own socio-economic structures in 
order to ensure a smooth functioning of bilateral relations and a mutually beneficial 
commonality of interests. Since its inception in 1992, PDSA workshops and seminars 
facilitated inter-partisan dialogue on South Africa’s future economic structures and the 
controversial issue of federalism. Particularly regarding the latter, German soft power as 
part of its transnationally operated Stiftungen diplomacy realised the demand for tried
1012 Rainer Tetzlaff, ‘Grundziige und HintergrUnde Bonner Afrika-Politik’, op.cit., p.62.
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and tested foreign concepts making the FRG’s federalist structures the selling point of 
its transition projects. In co-operation with the NGO Groundswell, the Centre for 
International and Comparative Politics at the University of Stellenbosch and the Centre 
for Constitutional Analysis in Pretoria, the Foundation helped political actors previously 
hostile to the idea of decentralisation, regionalism and constitutional federalism to 
overcome their inhibition thresholds by making them familiar with the experiences of 
others and by introducing participants of its seminars to the advantages of a diversified 
power structure in modem nation-states. In spite of its traditional partnership with 
Inkatha, the KAF’s reputation as an honest broker enabled it to provide proposals, make 
suggestions and offer services to a broad range of parties without being suspected of 
bias and partisanship. As in the Iberian Peninsula, the FRG’s own historical and 
transition experience after the Second World War was an important means of 
conveyance in the area of constitution building. The Foundation’s facilitating role for 
dialogue across South Africa’s political spectrum on the question of devolution and 
federalism, which was based on seminars, conferences and the contributions of German 
guest speakers and legal advisers, was supplemented by publications on constitutional 
issues funded by the KAF. The German soft power actor was under no illusion that 
without enabling ordinary citizens to access information on those new rules and 
regulations that were to govern their lives in future, the post-apartheid democracy would 
remain an elitist experiment without any real relevance for the formerly disenfranchised.
Another project, namely financial support for the Get Ahead Foundation (GAF) 
was also aimed at delivering services to the disenfranchised. Its Stokvel programme was 
an attempt at black economic empowerment and, like KAF support for the Rural 
Foundation (RF) designed to strengthen small-scale entrepreneurship among non-white 
peasants and business owners. Finally, the Foundation displayed great sensitivity for 
local customs and cultural characteristics when it initiated several projects in the area of 
traditional leadership. Its co-operation with organisations such as the Congress of 
Traditional Leaders (CONTRALESA) accrued from the realisation that modem 
democracy with its strong European influence had to remain an artificial superstructure 
in rural African communities if it did not pay sufficient attention to the needs, 
expectations and preferences of indigenous power structures.
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Soft power as generally understood by the Stiftungen in the context of their 
international work in general and as applied in the context of the Iberian and South 
African transitions in particular did not mean to work towards the total domination of 
new democracies by one particular political force. It rather aimed for the stabilisation of 
the democratic system as a whole in order to shape the operational environment in a way 
that future (West) German governments could ‘do business’ with. An important part of 
this soft power-driven stabilisation process was undoubtedly the promotion of ‘system 
loyalty’ i.e. the acceptance of democratic structures. In order to promote this loyalty, the 
FEF’s transitional agenda did not change significantly over the years. In 1999, the 
former head of the FEF working group on economic co-operation Erfried Adam 
summarised the following core elements of the Foundation’s catalogue of soft power 
measures for the promotion of democracy: Firstly, economic development and social 
participation, secondly the rule of law and thirdly political pluralism.1013 Looking at the 
transitional processes in Spain and Portugal through such a conceptual prism, one has to 
concede that the overall approach to foreign aid for the transformation of political 
infrastructure has remained continuously in place for more than 25 years.
KAF activities in South Africa, which went through a two-phase process with 
the Foundation’s Inkatha connection during the Botha presidency and the political 
broadening of KAF democracy promotion projects after de Klerk’s dismantling of 
apartheid in the first half of the 1990s, bore great similarities with the FEF catalogue of 
political aid programmes. The most important area of activity was capacity building, as 
only parties with thoroughly developed and stable organisational structures would 
guarantee the survival of political pluralism in South Africa. Secondly, in order to strike 
roots in post-apartheid society the rule of law required a broadly accepted constitutional 
framework, which led the KAF to identify constitution building as a politically 
rewarding area for its informal diplomacy. Project work in the realm of development 
and social participation -  e.g. traditional leadership or the Rural Foundation - topped 
KAF democracy promotion off.
1013 Erfried Adam, ’Gesellschaftliche Transformationsprozesse in unterentwickelten L&ndem: Ansatze und 
Erfahrungen der DemokratiefSrderung in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit’, in Friedrich-Ebert Foundation 
(ed.), Das muhsame Geschaft der Demokratiejorderung, op.cit., pp.36.
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The aim of West Germany’s soft power diplomacy in both the Iberian Peninsula 
and South Africa was to facilitate the institutionalisation of democracy through a variety 
of programmes attributable to one of the thematic areas previously mentioned. 
Authoritarian rule is eventually followed by phases in which political opponents decide 
to pursue their leadership ambitions through political reform and by non-conflictual 
means thus initiating the transition to democracy. In such a situation, Germany’s 
political Foundations provide domestic players in the new democratic game with tried- 
and-tested concepts of socio-economic integration and help to stabilise the 
transformation process.1014 By providing material support, they enable democratic 
parties to tackle essential political tasks and to master political competition in new 
democracies. They provide other forms of material support too to enhance their 
partner’s operational effectiveness and they lead by example and contribute knowledge, 
expertise and information to the institutional maturing process of political parties and 
civil society organisations. Soft power actors like FEF and KAF act on the “willingness 
of people to voluntarily recognise that the culture, lifestyle and values of another 
country are at least as attractive as their own, a country with whom they want to trade, 
help or form alliances.” 1015 Being non-governmental organisations operating through 
channels of political communication on sub-state level, FEF and KAF as transnational 
actors are able to successfully penetrate transitional societies, which would otherwise 
remain inaccessible for conventional diplomacy. Soft power as exercised by the 
Foundations aims at influencing foreign elites while adopting a low public profile and a 
strict behind-the-scenes approach to transnational co-operation. One of the FEF’s most 
senior international relations expert explains:
In their transitional activities, the political foundations support the elites of these 
societies and political systems and provide them under the heading of capacity-building 
with the knowledge of how to formulate their own interests in a way that their interests 
will be noticed on the international stage.1016
10.5 Will Hutton, ‘Comment: Let’s extend our global reach: By funding a television World Service, the
government would be helping itself and the BBC’, The Observer, 4 July 2004.
10.6 Personal interview with Uwe OptenhOgel, Berlin, 7 March 2002 (translation by author).
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Besides promoting a positive image of Germany in the world, the political Foundations 
introduce leaders of the developing world and elites of societies in transition from 
authoritarian rule to the “context of globalisation.”1017 The FEF’s contribution to regime 
change in Portugal, Spain and South Africa can be best described by borrowing 
Guillermo O’Donnell’s words used in a different context as the “politicised resurrection 
of civil society which was initially triggered by the liberalisation process.”1018 This was 
quintessentially achieved through the modernisation of party structures, the 
organisational strengthening of trade union organisations, the influencing of public 
opinion via media seminars, journalism training courses and broadcast productions, the 
facilitation of platforms for the exchange of ideas and concepts between academics and 
political practitioners and the training of party activists and inter-party co-operation in 
the run-up to local, regional and general elections.
The realms of the governmental and of the non-governmental, the nation-state 
with its foreign policy apparatus and the seemingly borderless world of transnational 
actors are not mutually exclusive domains but part and parcel of the same jigsaw that 
represents the international system. Joseph Nye’s three-dimensional chess game 
explicitly acknowledges that in order for an international actor to play his high cards 
well he needs to remain engaged horizontally as well as vertically. Furthermore, the 
activities and institutional nature of Germany’s political foundations demonstrate that 
transnational relations taking place on the bottom board do in fact not necessarily “lie 
outside the control of governments” as Nye suggests.1019 Although his observation 
remains valid for certain transnational actors such as international terrorist movements, 
the global operations of FEF, KAF and other German democracy promotion agencies 
takes place in close co-operation with the nation-state government. Both sets of actors, 
state diplomacy with its public institutions, its bi- and multilateral channels of political 
communication and its institutionalised forms of international interaction as well as 
Germany’s political Foundations with their transnationally operated ‘private’ diplomacy
1017 Ibid.
1018 Guillermo O ’Donnell, ‘Notes for the Study of Processes of Political Democratisation in the Wake of 
the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State’, in Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and  
Democratisation, (University o f Notre Dame Press 1999), p. 123.
1019 Joseph S. Nye, ‘Redefining the National Interest’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999, vol.78, no.4, 
p.24.
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need to be seen as complementary components of the same foreign policy system. It was 
only the instrument of informal or nongovernmental diplomacy as expressed in the 
Stiftungen’s international activities that was new to Germany’s external relations 
management. The political Foundations emerged after the Second World War in 
reaction to both changes in the international system as well as changes in domestic 
attitudes vis-a-vis (West) Germany’s self-conduct in international affairs.
In all three transition theatres, Germany’s Foundations pursued state as much as 
party interests, in fact the latter were largely congruent with the former. Political 
developments in the Iberian Peninsula were as much embedded in the Cold War context 
as were issues of change and transformation in South Africa thus defining a large part of 
the FRG’s national interest. While in Portugal a credible threat existed that a 
Communist coup d’etat would quarry an erstwhile NATO member out of the alliance, 
the activities of Spain’s Communist cadres raised more concerns over the Iberian 
country’s future economic system than over Western security interests. In both cases 
though, the SPD-led West German Government sought to stabilise its operational 
environment and regional milieu by assisting Spanish and Portuguese Socialists in their 
quest for power. Bonn’s national interest called for the containment of Soviet-backed 
Communism, the promotion of market economic structures and, in the medium-term, 
the gargantuan task of integrating the economically antediluvian countries into the 
European Community. While public diplomacy frequently resorted to coercive 
strategies of threatening economic ‘sticks’ within multilateral frameworks, the 
Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung aimed at helping Iberian Socialists to become the dominant 
political forces in their respective countries by exerting its soft power. Both foreign 
policy approaches were thus anything but machtvergessen and needed to be seen as a 
clear expression of Bonn’s willingness to actively shape its regional neighbourhood, 
facilitate structural change and model institutions in foreign countries along West 
German lines. In South Africa, West Germany’s diplomacy on both state and sub-state 
level was guided by economic, cultural and ideological considerations. The foreign 
policy of government as well as Stiftung sought to prevent cataclysmic and radical 
change as the FRG’s industrial investments in South Africa and its raw material 
dependency hinged on economic liberalism and, technically speaking, political stability.
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The close relations between the main liberation movement ANC and the Soviet Union 
threatened to undermine both South Africa’s economic order as well as its govemability. 
Furthermore, any diplomacy had to take cultural links into account, and a liberation 
movement like the ANC that had occasionally given out the battle cry of ‘one settler -  
one bullet’ was simply unacceptable to the FRG’s conservative government.
The interplay between governmental foreign policy and sub-state diplomacy is 
not to deny the fact that the political foundations enjoy a high degree of operational 
freedom and agenda-setting authority. They are neither bossed around politically by 
state institutions nor kept on a short leash deprived of the right of having their own 
opinion. Their activities need to be seen as “complementary to the interests of 
governmental foreign policy.” 1020 Political foundations operate as part of a foreign 
policy ‘tandem’, which combines the traditional diplomatic resources of a nation-state 
with the more flexible and organisationally agile soft power modes of international 
engagement commanded by transnational actors. Therefore, FEF, KAF and other 
political foundations work relatively independently but still “with the national interest in 
mind.”1021 Their clear anti-Communist stance throughout the 1970s and 1980s mirrored 
the antipathy of both CDU and SPD and the majority of the West German public 
towards radically egalitarian experiments and defined the national interest 
unambiguously as preserving market economic structures based on the principle of 
private property in the Iberian Peninsula and South Africa.
“How does one globalise political power” was the question SPD foreign policy 
expert Horst Ehmke regarded to be at the heart of the international activities of West 
Germany’s political Foundations and indeed the very existence of the Stiftungen 
provides a satisfactory answer.1022 The political Foundations use soft power to help 
other countries participate in the transfer of know-how and experience, concepts and 
expertise. In their international operations, they transcend cultural, political and 
geographical boundaries and contribute towards the transformation of political 
infrastructure in newly emerging democracies. On the Iberian Peninsula, West German
1020 Guillermo O ’Donnell, ‘Notes for the Study o f Processes of Political Democratisation’, op.cit, p. 123.
1021 Ibid.
1022 Personal interview with Horst Ehmke, Bonn, 17 April 2002.
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soft power was employed for the political renewal of the body politic just as sharply, 
swiftly and effectively as hard military power has been unleashed on the Cold War’s 
battlefield on many occasions, and far from leading to the rigmarole of ‘pulpit 
diplomats’ in the seclusion of their intellectual ivory tower, the FEF’s mobilisation of its 
soft power resources facilitated the vigorous pursuit of a structural transformation and 
the successful co-option of future political elites in Spain, Portugal and South Africa. 
Thus soft power proved to be more than merely an academic razzmatazz circling around 
a fashionable but impracticable and largely unrealistic idea of persuasion-based foreign 
policy. At the same time, soft power obviously does not constitute the only game in 
town as far as a country’s foreign policy strategy is concerned and neither is it or was it 
the piece de resistance of (West) German diplomacy. Changing circumstances, policy 
frameworks and situational variables may require a shift towards a more confrontational 
stance in foreign affairs. Joseph Nye has provided a useful analytical magnifying glass 
with his three-dimensional model of the distribution of power, which suggests that only 
by playing vertically as well as horizontally, coercively, and co-optively can a state play 
out its full potential in international relations. It is the ‘variegation’ of diplomatic means, 
the diversity of operational modes in international relations and the complexity of 
situational variables, which require a thorough contextual analysis before an actor, can 
be labelled relatively powerful or powerless. But being forgetful of its power was 
arguably neither a trait nor an option for the FRG’s foreign policy during the Cold War 
and beyond.
Prospect for Further Research
The present research framework has focused on the use of soft power by two of 
Germany’s political foundations in order to highlight an often overlooked non­
multilateral yet interest-driven dimension of the FRG’s foreign policy. It has not tried to 
make a contribution towards the scholarly field of ‘transitology’ although it seems 
obvious that multiple connections exist between the two research areas. A potential 
avenue for future research would shift the analytical focus away from the examination 
of German foreign policy and its noncoercive operationalisation towards an analysis of 
the international context of political transformation in general involving an inquiry into
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the principal role, usefulness and effectiveness of soft power instruments and strategies 
as adopted by international actors at different stages of regime change such as 
liberalisation, democratisation and consolidation. Further research would act upon 
Philippe C. Schmitter’s remark that it might be “time to reconsider the impact of the 
international context upon regime change” and to question whether external factors 
could possibly be “more significant than it was originally thought.”1023
1023 Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘The Influence o f the International Context upon the Choice o f National 
Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies’, in: Laurence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimension 
o f Democratisation -  Europe and the Americas, (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 27-28.
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